

## EPLO Briefing Paper 1/2016

### Overview of the EU's Policy and Programming on Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (PVE/CVE)

September 2016

#### 1. Introduction

The purpose of this briefing paper is to provide an overview of the European Union's (EU) current policy and programming priorities on preventing/countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE).

#### 2. EU policy on PVE/CVE

The rise of terrorist attacks in Europe and elsewhere has prompted the EU to acknowledge the importance of addressing VE and radicalisation as key components of the preventive aspects of its CT efforts. The 'Prevent' pillar of the [EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy](#)<sup>1</sup> sets out the EU's commitment 'to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors or root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment, in Europe and internationally'.

The basis of the EU's prevention work on CT is the [EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism](#), which was most recently revised in May 2014 to address new means and patterns of radicalisation, including issues posed by individuals supporting extremist ideology linked to terrorism, lone actors, homegrown terrorists and foreign fighters, as well as the key role of the internet and social media for mobilisation and communication.

The revised Strategy addresses VE and radicalisation in a comprehensive manner, identifying a number of priority areas for coherent EU action both internally and externally:

- Promote security, justice, and equal opportunities for all
- Ensure that voices of mainstream opinion prevail over those of extremism
- Enhance government communications
- Support messages countering terrorism
- Counter online radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
- Train, build capacity and engage first line practitioners across relevant sectors
- Support individuals and civil society to build resilience
- Support disengagement initiatives
- Support further research into trends and challenges of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism
- Align internal and external counter-radicalisation work.

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<sup>1</sup> The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) is focused on four pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Across these pillars, the Strategy recognises the importance of co-operation with third countries and international institutions.

The Strategy encourages the EU and EU Member States (MS) to raise awareness of counter-radicalisation work as part of their development programming, and to take into account radicalisation when they do country analyses as the basis for programming.

The European Commission's (EC) 2014 communication on '[Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response](#)' sets out how the EC, in collaboration with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the EC (HR/VP) (currently Federica Mogherini) and with the support of the EU's CT Coordinator (currently Gilles de Kerchove), can support EU MS in preventing radicalisation. It identifies ten areas in which the EU and EU MS could take more action to prevent VE and radicalisation at home and abroad:

- Encourage EU MS to develop national strategies to prevent radicalisation<sup>2</sup>
- Consolidate expertise dedicated to preventing radicalisation within the EU and beyond
- Better align the work of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)<sup>3</sup> with EU MS' needs
- Train practitioners to prevent radicalisation
- Support EU MS to develop 'exit strategies' to help individuals leave VE
- Co-operate more closely with civil society organisations (CSOs) and the private sector to address challenges faced online
- Empower victims to help prevent radicalisation
- Encourage young people to think critically about extremist messages
- Carry out research into radicalisation trends and evaluate existing practices
- Work more closely with partner countries to foster PVE/CVE co-operation both within and outside the EU.

Regarding collaboration with partner countries, the Communication puts particular emphasis on fragile and conflict-affected countries, countries in transition and those characterised by weak governance. It highlights that the EC and the HR/VP will undertake actions to 'incorporate strategies to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism into traditional development cooperation tools and instruments, particularly in fragile states prone to violent extremism'. It also states that the EU delegations (EUDs) will take action to promote preventive strategies and to identify opportunities for the involvement of CSOs in CVE projects.

Addressing foreign terrorist fighters is one of the core issues framing the EU debate on the need for a more coherent approach to the different dimensions of action underlying the internal-external security nexus. During the second half of 2014, the issue dominated the meeting agendas of both the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA).

In its meeting in October 2014, the FAC adopted a '[counter-terrorism strategy for Syria and Iraq, with particular focus on foreign fighters](#)' which set out the following priorities:

- Prevent: Work with those third countries which are sources of foreign fighters to build their capacity regarding strategic communication
- Protect: Build regional capacity regarding aviation security, and prevent weapons from seeping out of Syria and Iraq
- Pursue: Improve co-operation with third countries to identify recruitment networks and foreign fighters, and strengthen border security in countries surrounding Syria and Iraq
- Respond: Build capacity in the region to respond to terrorist attacks
- Political dialogue: Support the Iraqi authorities and the moderate opposition in Syria

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<sup>2</sup> Several EU MS (i.e. [Finland](#), [France](#), [Netherlands](#), [Spain](#) and [Sweden](#)) have already developed national strategies to tackle VE and radicalisation.

<sup>3</sup> RAN is a network of practitioners from around Europe working on the prevention of radicalisation. Practitioners include police and prison authorities, as well as a number of other actors who are not traditionally involved in CT activities (e.g. teachers, youth workers, civil society, local authorities and healthcare professionals).

See: [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm)

- Engagement with key partners: Engage with regional and other key partners, and support the implementation of relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) resolutions by all countries.

In its meetings in June and October 2014, the JHA Council approved the following actions which were aimed at addressing the issue of foreign terrorist fighters from an EU internal security perspective:

- Finalise and adopt the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive<sup>4</sup>
- Reinforce checks at the external borders of the Schengen Area<sup>5</sup>
- Enhance information sharing through Europol<sup>6</sup> and Eurojust<sup>7</sup>
- Improve judicial response to the illegal trafficking of firearms<sup>8</sup> and to terrorist financing<sup>9</sup>
- Co-operate with the internet industry to remove VE-related online content<sup>10</sup>

Following a [proposal](#) by the EU's CT Coordinator, an EU Task Force known as the 'Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team' (SSCAT) was set up in 2014 to identify ways to tackle national and local communication challenges in discouraging EU MS citizens from travelling to Syria or other conflict zones where they could join terrorist groups and participate in terrorist activities. Most EU MS participate in SSCAT-related activities under a consortium led by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior (Mol). This 18-month pilot project received €1 million funding from the EU Internal Security Fund<sup>11</sup>. Given SSCAT's contribution to the understanding of terrorism beyond counter-narrative actions, the EC is currently looking into possibilities for continued support to this initiative beyond 2016.<sup>12</sup>

In 2015, the [European Agenda on Security](#) highlighted that EU actions against terrorism should address the root causes of extremism through preventive measures. In this context, it recalled the key role of RAN, the EU-wide umbrella network connecting 2000 EU practitioners and organisations working on PVE, stressing that – where possible – the experience and expertise gained through the Network should be mobilised in priority third countries, notably Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the Western Balkans.<sup>13</sup> In the MENA region, the EU's and EU MS' CT efforts to date have primarily focused on Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia through the provision of CT assistance in areas such as security sector reform (SSR), prevention of radicalization, including the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters and their

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<sup>4</sup> The provisional deal reached by European Parliament (EP) and Council of the EU negotiators on 2 December 2015 on an EU directive regulating the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime was approved by the EP plenary on 14 April 2016.

See: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150123BKG12902/EU-Passenger-Name-Record-\(PNR\)-directive-an-overview](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150123BKG12902/EU-Passenger-Name-Record-(PNR)-directive-an-overview)

<sup>5</sup> In December 2015, the EC presented [a package of proposals](#) to manage the EU's external borders and to protect the Schengen Area. One of these proposals is an amendment to the Schengen Border Code, to reinforce checks at all external EU borders. This amendment would oblige EU MS to carry out systematic checks against relevant databases on all persons, including EU citizens and others enjoying the right to free movement under EU law. In February 2016, the Council of the EU agreed on a general approach, in preparation for negotiations with the EP.

<sup>6</sup> Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency assisting EU MS in their fight against serious international crime and terrorism. See: [www.europol.europa.eu](http://www.europol.europa.eu).

<sup>7</sup> Eurojust is an EU agency dealing with judicial co-operation in criminal matters. See: [www.eurojust.europa.eu](http://www.eurojust.europa.eu)

<sup>8</sup> In October 2015, The JHA Council adopted [conclusions on strengthening the use of means of fighting trafficking of firearms](#).

<sup>9</sup> In February 2016, the EC published a communication on ['an Action Plan for strengthening the fight against terrorist financing'](#).

<sup>10</sup> In December 2015, the EC launched the [EU Internet Forum](#) bringing together EU JHA ministers, internet companies and civil society to work together for the removal of VE-related online content and its replacement with positive counter-messaging. A [referral mechanism](#) was also set up together with Europol to combat terrorist and VE propaganda.

<sup>11</sup> See Section 5.

<sup>12</sup> EP Research Service [Briefing on EU Strategic Communication with the Arab World](#), May 2016.

<sup>13</sup> The MENA region, the Western Balkans and Turkey were identified as geographic priorities for EU CT engagement by the FAC during its meeting on 9 February 2015.

return, critical infrastructure and soft target protection, including with regard to tourism, industry and transport.<sup>14</sup>

Following the February 2015 FAC [conclusions on CT](#), which called for close coordination between internal and external action on the one hand, and between relevant EU institutions and EU MS on the other hand, in June 2016, the EC published a communication on '[Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism](#)' in which it identified the following seven specific areas where work at the EU level could strengthen the effectiveness of EU MS' national policies to tackle radicalisation:

- Supporting research, evidence building, monitoring and networking
- Countering terrorist propaganda and hate speech online
- Addressing radicalisation in prisons
- Promoting inclusive education and EU common values
- Promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people
- Addressing the security dimension of tackling radicalisation
- Addressing the international dimensions of VE and radicalisation.

The June 2016 Communication outlines the EU's approach to addressing the international dimensions of VE and radicalisation. This consists of two complementary lines of action:

1. Strengthening partner countries' security capacities: This will include reinforced co-operation with law enforcement agencies in third countries. Anti-radicalisation activities, particularly in the MENA region, will emphasise the role of youth, education and socio-economic development, in line with the priorities identified in the [review of the European Neighbourhood Policy](#) (ENP).
2. Supporting third countries in tackling the underlying factors of radicalisation: This will be channeled towards identifying drivers for youth extremism, empowering women, promoting community dialogue, strengthening local actors or improving the media and education capacities to counter radicalising ideologies.

The 2016 [EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy](#) highlights the EU's commitment to broadening partnerships and deepening dialogue with a multitude of actors, including civil society, in order to share best practices and to develop joint programmes on CVE and anti-radicalisation. It further reiterates the EU's aim to strengthen internal-external security links and to address the security-development nexus.

In September 2016, the Council of the EU adopted a [legal framework](#) which, for the first time, would allow the EU to apply sanctions autonomously to ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida and persons and entities associated with or supporting them. Prior to this, sanctions could only be applied to persons and entities listed by the UN or by EU MS acting individually.

### **3. EU engagement with international partners**

The CT agenda is at the core of the EU's relations with many third countries. It can take a variety of forms, including high-level political dialogue<sup>15</sup>, the adoption of co-operation clauses and agreements, specific assistance and support for capacity building. PVE/CVE issues are addressed in the following regional and country strategies and action plans:

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<sup>14</sup> See: [Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the 2016 Global Counter Terrorism Forum Ministerial Meeting](#), New York, 21 September 2016.

<sup>15</sup> CT political dialogues are held with a range of countries and institutions, including Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the UN and the United States (US).

- [EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh Threat](#)

This strategy foresees a mix of political and diplomatic engagement, communication work and practical support measures. It highlights the active participation of women as being essential for ensuring the effectiveness and sustainability of all PVE/CVE actions. Regarding PVE specifically, the Strategy stresses the EU's commitment to supporting deradicalisation programmes and radicalisation prevention. It also commits the EU to supporting partner countries' capacity building efforts to ensure that they are able to handle CT and the foreign terrorist fighters' threat effectively, while pushing for rights-based reforms of their CT legislation.

- [EU CT/Security Strategy on Pakistan](#)

The objective of this strategy is to create an enabling environment for security-related work in Pakistan by disrupting and reducing extremist and terrorism threats in the longer term. It aims to steer Pakistan's CT efforts in the direction of a civilian-led approach to CVE through engagement with local communities and the diaspora, as well as with regional partners. The Strategy commits the EU to channeling its support to Pakistan in a manner which will enhance the security-development nexus and promote civil society participation in PVE/CVE efforts.

- [EU Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020](#)

This action plan takes a broad approach to PVE/CVE, emphasising the development-security nexus and committing the EU to support sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, good governance and internal conflict resolution as a means of addressing the root causes of VE and radicalisation in the region. It highlights the key role of young people in prevention and the importance of fostering viable economic and social opportunities to prevent them from being radicalised or recruited by networks engaged in VE.

- [EU CT Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen](#)

This action plan aims to support capacity building measures in partner countries to: (i) address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and (ii) foster societal resilience against incitement, recruitment and violent radicalisation. It also foresees community engagement and outreach to vulnerable groups, including youth, refugees, ethnic or religious minorities, prison populations and politically marginalised groups at risk of radicalisation.

- [EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020](#)

This action plan identifies VE as one of the main challenges faced in the region. It calls on the EU to strengthen partner countries capacities in justice, security and law enforcement, and to target its development assistance in the region towards mitigating the underlying factors and root causes which drive VE and radicalisation. It recommends that the EU considers providing support to CSOs, including religious bodies, working on PVE.

In addition to the abovementioned strategies and action plans, the EU engages in a number of other initiatives aimed at strengthening the external dimension of its PVE/CVE work. This involves working closely with the UN, as well as with regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

The EU is an active member of the [Global Counter-Terrorism Forum \(GCTF\)](#), an international platform which promotes a strategic, long-term approach to CT and the VE ideologies which underpin it. Together with Turkey, it also co-chairs the GCTF's [Horn of Africa Capacity Building Working Group](#).

As a board member of the [Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund](#) (GCERF) in Geneva, and of the [International Center of Excellence on CVE](#) (Hedayah Center) in Abu Dhabi, the EU supports a number of key GCTF initiatives on CVE in the MENA region, especially on

developing narratives<sup>16</sup> to counter radicalising ideologies. Other ongoing EU activities in the MENA region include a Strategic Communication Task Force which works with EUDs in Arab countries and with the [Anti-ISIL Global Coalition](#) in order to identify shared values and develop concrete actions to address VE and radicalisation.

A key goal of the GCTF is to support and catalyse the implementation of the [UN Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism](#) and the [UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy](#). The EU has expressed its support for the UN Plan of Action in several statements.<sup>17</sup> In this context, it welcomed the Plan's specific reference to the links between preventing conflicts and PVE, and its acknowledgement of the connections with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including the gender perspective. The June 2016 EC communication on 'Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism' further emphasised communalities between the UN Plan of Action and existing EU policies on PVE.

The EU also welcomed the [fifth review](#) of the UN Global CT Strategy in mid-2016, noting its substantial references to the role of women and youth, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, terrorism financing and radicalisation in prisons. The EU stressed, however, that the review did not address certain issues in a way it would have expected, including the central role of the UN, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and assistance to victims of terrorism.<sup>18</sup>

## 4. EU programming on PVE/CVE

### 4.1 Outside the EU

EU funding for the external dimension of PVE/CVE is geared towards the following objectives<sup>19</sup>:

- Better understanding and tackling the root causes and drivers of VE and radicalisation, including countering and preventing recruitment to VE and terrorism
- Building the capacities of partner countries to reinforce the rule of law, good governance and human rights, and to promote sustainable development
- Strengthening vulnerable communities through targeted interventions aimed at improving socio-economic inclusion and services, access to justice, and resilience
- Enhancing the CVE capacities of relevant non-governmental actors, including civil society and the media.

The EU's financial support for PVE/CVE-related activities in third countries is drawn from the following thematic and geographic funding instruments and trust funds:

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<sup>16</sup> EP Research Service [Briefing on EU Strategic Communication with the Arab World](#), May 2016.

<sup>17</sup> [EU statement](#) to the UN General Assembly (GA) on agenda items 16 and 117: Culture of peace; The UN Global CT Strategy, New York, 12 February 2016; [EU intervention](#) at the Panel Discussion on PVE, 31st Session of the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, 17 March 2016; [EU statement](#) at the Geneva Conference on PVE, Geneva, 8 April 2016.

<sup>18</sup> [EU statement](#) to the UN GA on the fifth review of the UN Global CT Strategy, New York, 30 June – 1 July 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Based on discussions with EU officials and consultation of the following official documents: Commission implementing decisions on the annual action programmes [2014](#) (including Annex I: [Action Document for Countering Terrorism](#)) and [2015](#) (including [Annex I: Action Document for Counterterrorism](#)) of the IcSP, Article 5; EU Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020; EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020; Joint communication on the '[Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy](#)'; [Regulation \(EU\) No 232/2014 establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument](#) as well as the [programming documents](#) for ENI bilateral programmes, regional programmes for the East and the South, the Neighbourhood-wide programme, and the Cross-Border Co-operation programme; [Constitutive Agreement](#) of the EU Trust Fund Békou for the Central African Republic; [Revised Constitutive Agreement](#) establishing the Madad Fund; [Commission Decision](#) establishing the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa as well as its [Constitutive Agreement](#) and [Strategic Orientation Document](#).

## (a) Thematic funding instruments

- **[Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace \(IcSP\)](#)**

CT/CVE is one of the main priorities of the 'Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats' (Article 5) component of the IcSP. 26% of the € 478 million budget of IcSP Article 5 for the period 2014-2020 is earmarked for CT/CVE-related actions.<sup>20</sup> The EU uses this funding to support the [Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism \(STRIVE\)](#) initiative which is aimed at identifying drivers for youth extremism, empowering women, promoting community dialogue, strengthening local actors and improving media and education capacities to counter radicalising ideologies. Examples of CVE-related initiatives funded under the 'STRIVE Global' action during 2014-2017 include a € 5 million grant for the Hedayah Center in Abu Dhabi to support local partners to design and implement approaches against radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, and a € 2 million grant to GCERF for initiatives designed to stem radicalisation and provide counter-messaging, positive alternatives to communities at risk of VE, and the promotion of pluralism, diversity and tolerance. The Article 5 component of the 2016 Annual Action Programme<sup>21</sup> (AAP) for the IcSP includes a € 4 million 'prison deradicalisation' programme which aims to increase the capacity of selected countries to manage violent extremist prisoners, and to prevent radicalisation to violence in their prison systems.<sup>22</sup> This follows the [November 2015 JHA Council conclusions](#) which invite 'the EU to promote criminal justice response measures to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism, internationally and to assist third partners in this respect, duly taking into account the local circumstances and security and public safety concerns.'

## (b) Geographic funding instruments

- **[European Development Fund \(EDF\)](#)**

The EDF is the EU's main instrument for providing development assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and to overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The EU uses the EDF to support the implementation of the 'EU Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020' and the 'EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan 2015-2020', both of which include PVE/CVE as strategic objectives to be implemented through projects contributing to peace and security, good governance, the rule of law, justice reforms, economic integration, and resilience. The EDF is financed by direct contributions from EU MS and is separate from the EU budget. The overall budget for the 11th EDF (EDF 11) for the period 2014-2020 amounts to € 30.5 billion.

- **[Development Cooperation Instrument \(DCI\)](#)**

The primary aim of the DCI is to contribute to the reduction of poverty. Although it does not include CVE as a priority, the DCI contributes to the achievement of a number of EU external action priorities related to addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of VE, in particular fostering sustainable economic and social development, and promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights. The DCI's thematic programme 'Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Local Authorities (LAs)' supports CSOs' and LAs' involvement in development strategies. The budget for the DCI for the period 2014-2020 amounts to € 19.6 billion.

- **[European Neighbourhood Instrument \(ENI\)](#)**

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<sup>20</sup> See: [http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/05/05/2014 - 1422/session\\_9\\_instrument\\_contributing\\_to\\_stability\\_and\\_peace\\_icsp.pdf](http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/system/files/file/05/05/2014 - 1422/session_9_instrument_contributing_to_stability_and_peace_icsp.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/commission-implementing-decision-annual-action-plan-2016-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/commission-implementing-decision-annual-action-plan-2016-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace_en)

<sup>22</sup> The implementation of this project will be coordinated and led by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

The ENI funds the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 16 partner countries.<sup>23</sup> Programming priorities are developed in close co-operation with the national authorities of partner countries and in coordination with EU MS. All [bilateral co-operation](#) programmes prioritise strengthening efforts and collaboration on preventing and combating terrorism, including by promoting actions aimed at combating VE propaganda. Bilateral co-operation is complemented by [regional](#), [neighbourhood-wide](#) and [cross-border cooperation](#) initiatives. For example, under regional co-operation priorities, [€ 10 million](#) was allocated in 2015 to support action on countering radicalisation and foreign terrorist fighters in the Southern Neighbourhood. The revised ENP<sup>24</sup> specifies that financial support to civil society, especially to youth organisations, will factor in the anti-radicalisation dimension. The ENI budget for the period 2014-2020 amounts to € 15.4 billion.

- **[Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II \(IPA II\)](#)**

The IPA II is EU's main instrument for providing development assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Turkey. Although it does not include CVE as a priority, IPA II thematic priorities include addressing past grievances and promoting reconciliation, peacebuilding and confidence-building measures.<sup>25</sup> EU co-operation on the rule of law with Albania<sup>26</sup>, Kosovo<sup>27</sup>, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>28</sup> and Turkey<sup>29</sup> includes judicial co-operation in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, including their sources of funding. The budget for the IPA II for the period 2014-2020 amounts to € 11.7 billion.

### (c) EU trust funds

- **[Trust Fund for the Central African Republic \(CAR\) \(Bêkou Trust Fund\)](#)**

With a budget of € 64 million, the Bêkou Trust Fund for the CAR is aimed at preparing the transition from humanitarian assistance towards longer-term development assistance. The resilience-building component of the Trust Fund is geared towards addressing the consequences of the influx of refugees in Cameroon caused by the crisis in the CAR and, more specifically, to reduce tensions between local and refugee populations in host areas, and to help to prevent potential radicalisation.

- **[EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis \(Madad Fund\)](#)**

With a budget of € 427 million, the Madad Fund primarily addresses the longer-term resilience needs of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries, and supports host communities and their administrations. It also foresees support for activities aimed at countering potential extremism amongst refugee populations and host communities. The Madad Fund is one of the delivery mechanisms supporting the implementation of the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the ISIL/Da'esh threat.

- **[EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa](#)**

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa covers the [Sahel and Lake Chad region](#), the [Horn of Africa](#), and the [North of Africa](#). It pools € 1.8 billion from both the external component of the EU budget (DCI and ENI) and EDF 11, and € 81 million which was pledged by EU MS and other donors at the Valetta Summit on Migration in November 2015.<sup>30</sup> It is aimed at tackling

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<sup>23</sup> Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.

<sup>24</sup> See the joint communication on the '[Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy](#)'.

<sup>25</sup> See: [Regulation \(EU\) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance \(IPA II\)](#).

<sup>26</sup> See: [Indicative Strategy Paper for Albania \(2014-2020\)](#).

<sup>27</sup> See: [Indicative Strategy Paper for Kosovo \(2014-2020\)](#).

<sup>28</sup> See: [Indicative Strategy Paper for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia \(2014-2020\)](#).

<sup>29</sup> See: [Indicative Strategy Paper for Turkey \(2014-2020\)](#).

<sup>30</sup> See: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pledged-contributionseutf-06062016\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/pledged-contributionseutf-06062016_en.pdf)

the root causes of irregular migration and displacement in countries of origin, transit and destination, through support in the following sectors: economic development, resilience, migration management, and stability and governance. The Trust Fund's support for stability and governance is focused on activities promoting conflict prevention, PVE/CVE, addressing human rights abuses and enforcing the rule of law.

## 4.2 Inside the EU

EU funding for the internal dimension of PVE/CVE is geared towards the following objectives:<sup>31</sup>

- improving information sharing and criminal justice co-operation among EU MS
- strengthening networks<sup>32</sup> between practitioners and policy-makers
- developing recommendations and guidelines on PVE/CVE and sharing best practices
- developing practical tools such as training programmes and e-learning materials
- creating effective counter-narratives to prevent radicalisation online<sup>33</sup> and offline.

Funding is provided under the following programmes:

- **Erasmus+**

Under the Erasmus+ programme, priority is given to tackling radicalisation through education and youth action. Up to € 400 million have been made available for this purpose for the period 2014-2020 and [a specific € 13 million call for proposals](#) was launched in March 2016 to support projects in the fields of education, training and youth, which aim at scaling up and disseminating innovative good practices on preventing violent radicalisation and promoting democratic values, fundamental rights, intercultural understanding and active citizenship. The April 2016 communication on '[Delivering on the European Agenda on Security](#)' specifies that the EC will also launch large-scale virtual exchange programmes with third countries in order to foster intercultural understanding among teachers, children and young people, notably through the e-Twinning<sup>34</sup> programme and Erasmus+.

- **Internal Security Fund (ISF)**

The ISF includes over € 1 billion for the period 2014-2020 for projects related to the prevention of radicalisation. One example is an EU-wide 'Empowering Civil Society' programme which aims to provide support to civil society partners to challenge the terrorist narrative through the development and dissemination of narratives which counter and challenge those of extremists, and provide positive alternative narratives.<sup>35</sup> The RAN Centre of Excellence is funded under the ISF-Police component.

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<sup>31</sup> See: JHA Council conclusions on '[Enhancing the criminal justice response to radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism](#)' (November 2015); EC communication on '[Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism](#)' (June 2016); EC communication on '[Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response](#)' (January 2014); EC factsheet on '[Preventing Radicalisation - The Role of the European Commission](#)'; EC factsheet on '[Tackling radicalisation through education and youth action](#)'; [Horizon 2020: Secure societies \(Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens\)](#) Work Programme 2016-2017.

<sup>32</sup> Examples include the [RAN](#) and the [European Network of Deradicalisation \(ENoD\)](#).

<sup>33</sup> Recognising the significant potential of the internet to fuel radicalisation by facilitating the rapid and large-scale global distribution of hate messages and praise for terrorism, especially among young people, the EU has identified the prevention of online radicalisation through education, counter-narratives and awareness-raising campaigns as one of its PVE/CVE priorities. See: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-16-2179\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2179_en.htm)

<sup>34</sup> E-Twinning is an EC initiative that aims to encourage European schools to collaborate using information and communication technologies (ICT) by providing the necessary infrastructure. The EU will extend the e-Twinning platform to selected European Neighbourhood countries, especially those facing problems related to violent radicalisation and where intercultural dialogue is most needed. See the EC [communication on 'Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism](#)', p.15.

<sup>35</sup> See the EC communication on '[Delivering on the European Agenda on Security to fight against terrorism and pave the way towards an effective and genuine Security Union](#)'.

- [Horizon 2020](#)

The ‘Secure Societies’ theme of the EU’s Horizon 2020 research programme includes funding for various initiatives aimed at understanding and tackling the drivers and root causes of terrorism and VE, and at developing a comprehensive approach to violent radicalisation in the EU from early understanding to improving protection.<sup>36</sup>

## 5. Key institutional interlocutors

### 5.1 For actions taking place outside the EU

- **European External Action Service (EEAS)<sup>37</sup>**
  - The EEAS focuses on the external dimension of CT in close coordination with the EU MS in the Council Working Group on International Aspects of Terrorism (COTER) which is chaired by the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU.
  - Through the EUDs, the EEAS coordinates CT external outreach and capacity building assistance to third countries by the EU and EU MS. A network of 11 CT and security experts developed by the EEAS is currently active in the EUDs in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. Efforts are underway to expand this to Chad and Bosnia-Herzegovina and to add civilian CT expertise to Lebanon. Key areas of capacity building support are in the fields of law enforcement, criminal justice, countering the financing of terrorism and counter-radicalisation and VE.<sup>38</sup>
  - Within the EEAS, CT-related EU external relations are handled by the Division for Counter-Terrorism (SECPOL.5) in the Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention (SECPOL) under the Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response (DSG-CSDP).
  - The Division for Conflict Prevention, Peace building and Mediation (SECPOL.2)<sup>39</sup> deals with certain aspects of the ‘Prevent’ pillar of the EU CT Strategy as part of its broader approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
  - The Division for Security Policy and Space Policy (SECPOL.3) prepares the strategy papers and the multiannual programmes for IcSP Article 5 in consultation with the EC Directorate-General (DG) for International Cooperation and Development’s (DEVCO) Unit for Stability, Security, Development and Nuclear Safety (B.5) (see below).
  - At intra-institutional level, SECPOL.5 works in close coordination with SECPOL.2, SECPOL.3 and the Division for Global Issues (GLOBAL.4) on CT matters.
  - The EEAS works closely with all relevant structures in the EU institutions and agencies (e.g. Europol and Eurojust) in addressing the internal-external dimension of CT.
- **DG DEVCO<sup>40</sup>**
  - DG DEVCO addresses the manifestations of VE and the conditions conducive to it as developmental challenges, and aims to strengthen vulnerable communities through capacity building.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>36</sup> See: [Horizon 2020: Secure societies \(Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens\) Work Programme 2016-2017](#), p.22.

<sup>37</sup> See: [http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> See: [Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the 2016 Global Counter Terrorism Forum Ministerial Meeting](#), New York, 21 September 2016.

<sup>39</sup> The role and composition of SECPOL.2 may change in the second half of 2016 due to the ongoing re-structuring of the EEAS’ security and crisis management structures.

<sup>40</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/devco-organisation-chart-01062016\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/devco-organisation-chart-01062016_en.pdf)

<sup>41</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/strive-development-strengthening-resilience-violence-and-extremism_en)

- Based on the strategy papers and multiannual programmes which are prepared by EEAS SECPOL.3, DEVCO B.5 prepares the draft proposals for the Article 5 AAPs and keeps SECPOL.3 informed.
- The Unit for Fragility and Resilience (DEVCO B.7) is involved in the programming and implementation of both the DCI and the EDF. The EEAS is consulted throughout these processes. For example, while implementation remains the sole responsibility of DG DEVCO, the EEAS can contribute to it through heads of EUDs acting as sub-delegated authorising officers on the spot.<sup>42</sup>
- DG DEVCO chairs the strategic boards of the Bêkou Trust Fund and of the EU Trust Fund for Africa's Sahel and Lake Chad, and Horn of Africa windows.
- **DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR)<sup>43</sup>**
  - DG NEAR manages the programming and implementation of the ENI and the IPA II.
  - It also chairs the strategic boards of the Madad Fund and the EU Trust Fund for Africa's North of Africa window.

## 5.2 For actions taking place inside the EU

- **DG for Migration and Home Affairs (HOME)<sup>44</sup>**
  - Since November 2014, DG HOME has led the EC's actions on CT issues inside the EU.
  - It manages the programming and implementation of the ISF.
  - The RAN is established under DG HOME.
  - Together with the EU Research Executive Agency (REA), DG HOME manages the 'Fight against crime and terrorism' sub-call which is foreseen in the 'Horizon 2020 - Secure Societies' research programme's Work Programme 2016 – 2017.<sup>45</sup>
  - A European Commissioner for the Security Union was appointed<sup>46</sup> in August 2016 to support the work of DG HOME in implementing the 2015 European Agenda on Security focusing on *inter alia* tackling terrorism and preventing radicalisation.
- **DG for Education and Culture (EAC)<sup>47</sup>**
  - DG EAC leads the EC's education-related PVE/CVE initiatives inside the EU.
  - It manages the programming and implementation of the Erasmus+ programme.

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<sup>42</sup> See: [Instructions for the Programming of the 11th European Development Fund \(EDF\) and the Development Cooperation Instrument \(DCI\) 2014–2020](#)

<sup>43</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/who\\_does\\_what/20160623-near-org-chart.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/who_does_what/20160623-near-org-chart.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/who-we-are/dg-home-affairs-chart/docs/organigramme\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/who-we-are/dg-home-affairs-chart/docs/organigramme_en.pdf)

<sup>45</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2016\\_2017/main/h2020-wp1617-security\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2016_2017/main/h2020-wp1617-security_en.pdf)

<sup>46</sup> See: [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-16-2707\\_ro.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2707_ro.htm)

<sup>47</sup> See: [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education\\_culture/docs/organisation\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/docs/organisation_en.pdf)

## EPLO MEMBERS

Berghof Foundation

Budapest Centre for the International Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities

Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (Cordaid)

Causeway Institute for Peace-building and Conflict Resolution

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre)

Community of Sant'Egidio

Conciliation Resources

Concordis International

Crisis Management Initiative

Democratic Progress Institute

Dialogue Advisory Group

European Institute of Peace

ESSEC IRÉNÉ

European Network for Civil Peace Services

Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict

Guerrand-Hermès Foundation for Peace

Institute for Integrated Transitions

International Alert

International Center for Transitional Justice

International Crisis Group

Interpeace

Kosovar Center for Security Studies

Kvinna till Kvinna

Life & Peace Institute

Nansen Dialogue Network

NGO Support Centre

Nonviolent Peaceforce

Oxfam International

Partners Network

Pax Christi International

Quaker Council for European Affairs

Saferworld

Search for Common Ground

swisspeace

TIDES Training and Consultancy

Wider Security Network (WISE)

World Vision International

## EUROPEAN PEACEBUILDING LIAISON OFFICE (EPLO)

EPLO is the platform of European NGOs, NGO networks and think tanks which are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict.

EPLO aims to influence the EU so that it promotes and implements measures which lead to sustainable peace between states and within states and peoples, and which transform and resolve conflicts non-violently. EPLO wants the EU to recognise the crucial connection between peacebuilding, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development worldwide and the crucial role NGOs have to play in sustainable EU efforts for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

EPLO advances the interests of its member organisations through common policy positions and consequently advocating for those common positions. EPLO disseminates information and promotes understanding of EU policies of concern to its member organisations. The Office also builds solidarity and co-operation amongst its member organisations and with other relevant NGO networks.

Finally, EPLO raises awareness about the contribution the EU should make to peacebuilding and the need to hold the EU accountable to its own political commitments of helping secure peace within and outside its borders.

## ABOUT EPLO'S BRIEFING PAPERS

EPLO's briefing papers are succinct and accessible guides to EU policies on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, security and development. Their purpose is to inform those working in the broader peacebuilding field about developments at the EU level.

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