

# Sweden

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(June 2016)

## Introduction

The 1<sup>st</sup> NAP, adopted in 2006, remained valid until 2008, while the 2<sup>nd</sup> NAP, adopted in 2009, maintained validity until 2015. The 2<sup>nd</sup> NAP remained applicable until the 3<sup>rd</sup> and current NAP adoption in 2016. Sweden was one of the first countries worldwide to adopt a NAP on UNSCR 1325. The Swedish government's aim is that they will continue to lead on the resolution's implementation. The Government will mainstream the NAP into all relevant policy areas such as gender equality, development and security.

## The 3<sup>rd</sup> National Action Plan (2016-2020)

Sweden announced their first Feminist Foreign Policy in 2014, spelling out the implementation process in an action plan<sup>1</sup>. While it rarely mentions UNSCR 1325, its essence remains omnipresent. This policy adoption represents a victory after many decades of feminist-centred peace and security work.

The NAP 2016-2020 notes four thematic priorities<sup>2</sup>:

- Inclusive peace processes and peace-building;
- Conflict prevention;
- Strengthening protection of women and girls;
- Leadership and expertise.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> NAP is the first with focus countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mali, Somalia, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine and Syria). The use of priority countries aims to focus the NAP's implementation and increase monitoring possibilities. However the Swedish Government and civil society's WPS engagement extends beyond these countries.

The current NAP<sup>3</sup> lacks an internal component, as did the previous one<sup>4</sup>. This would have included considerations about Sápmi's First nation people living in the Nordic countries' northern regions. The NAP also lacks consideration of Sweden's refugee and asylum-seeking population emigrating from conflict or post-conflict countries. The NAP focuses mainly on foreign affairs and traditional security policy.

The current NAP also includes boys and men, a positive development from the previous NAP. This mention is done under the thematic priority on inclusion: "*support women's influence and meaningful participation (...) to ensure that these take into account the needs, perspectives and conditions of women, men, girls and boys*"<sup>5</sup>. This paragraph's inclusivity refers to women's inclusion as a means to increase considerations of boys' and men's diverse conditions. It also mentions men working for gender equality under the NAP's prevention pillar which reads: "*Contribute to establishing greater participation of boys and men in conflict prevention work and measures to increase gender equality, and in counteracting gender-based violence,*

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.government.se/contentassets/b799e89a0e06493f86c63a561e869e91/action-plan-feminist-foreign-policy-2015-2018>

<sup>2</sup> This case study was compiled mainly during the final weeks of preparing for the release of the new and third NAP. After the third NAP was released there were some amendments made to the text.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.government.se/reports/2016/05/swedens-national-action-plan-for-the-implementation-of-the-united-nations-security-councils-resolutions-on-women-peace-and-security/>

<sup>4</sup> Swedish Government, *The Swedish Government's action plan to implement Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security*, (2006) Available at

[http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/nap/Swedish\\_Action\\_Plan\\_final\\_version.pdf](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/nap/Swedish_Action_Plan_final_version.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p.10

*including conflict-related sexual violence. This refers to men and boys in the population. For men in professional functions and positions, this includes clear responsibility for working from a gender perspective and for gender equality*<sup>6</sup>.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> NAP recognised that in some areas the implementation failed to improve on the 1<sup>st</sup> NAP's aims, leading to rigorous evaluations. It considered the role government agencies, missions abroad and Swedish/local CSOs should play in the NAP implementation process. Fully implementing the NAP requires following up on implementation and issuing progress reports to ensure the process' validity.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> NAP recognises several challenges associated with accelerating UNSCR 1325's implementation. It emphasises that resolution implementation requires agreement on priority areas and that deeper knowledge must follow growing awareness at all levels. NAP implementation actors must also strengthen their ability to cooperate and interact. Furthermore, the Government must display a quantitative and qualitative increase in the participation of women in peacekeeping operations. The resolution's implementation depends on sufficient resource allocation too.

The Swedish NAP emphasizes the importance behind using evaluations to measure NAP implementation process, recognizing that successful implementation and evaluations depend on sufficient resource allocation. The NAP cites a few actors necessary to fulfilling the implementation, focusing on those representing Sweden's international missions. The NAP holds only the MFA and relevant government agencies accountable for the implementation, leaving out most ministries; a fact that CSOs have routinely noted during official consultation meetings. The resolution should address all ministries, meaning that all should provide reports on the resolution's implementation.

Even though Sweden has shown ambition while implementing UNSCR 1325, managing to include a gender perspective alongside a wide range of security and peacekeeping issues, the Government still lacks systematic evaluation and reporting systems. CSOs have demanded that the MFA include a set of concrete objectives and indicators to measure actions taken toward NAP implementation. Another major gap is marked funding for the resolution's implementation. Only one of the authorities responsible for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 has marked funding for implementation<sup>7</sup>.

### **Engagement at the EU level**

The 3<sup>rd</sup> NAP contains sections on engagement both at the EU and Council of Europe levels.<sup>8</sup> *"As a member of the EU, Sweden has a special interest in, and responsibility for, ensuring the full implementation of UNSCR 1325 in EU peace-support and security-building efforts"* reads the NAP.<sup>9</sup> This statement is then followed by a number of concrete objectives, such as: (1) the number of women in civil and military CSDP missions must increase; (2) Sweden shall request EU civil and military crises management missions to include and streamline UNSCR 1325 in the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of the mission; (3) Sweden shall contribute to the reporting from EU missions concerning UNSCR 1325 related questions through development of lessons learned and half-yearly monitoring reports<sup>10</sup>. However there is no indication of how these actions should be implemented or whom should report on them.

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p.12

<sup>7</sup> See the Civil Society Monitoring Report 2013 on Sweden's implementation of UNSCR 1325, available at [http://operation1325.se/sites/default/files/women\\_count\\_2013\\_1.pdf](http://operation1325.se/sites/default/files/women_count_2013_1.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Third NAP, p.18-19

<sup>9</sup> Second Swedish NAP, p.16

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p.15

## **Design**

Until 2015, the Folke Bernadotte Academy coordinated a Swedish formal collaborative network for UNSCR 1325 gathering relevant departments, ministries and government agencies as well as civil society representatives. Meetings took place two to four times a year and included CSOs (such as Operation 1325, WILPF Sweden, Kvinna till Kvinna, 1325 Policy Group), as well as the Police, the Armed Forces, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Prison and Probation Services, the Civil Contingencies Agency, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the National Defence College, the National Courts Administration, the Swedish Prosecution Authority, the Swedish Defence research agency, the MFA, the MoD and the Ministry of Justice. Approximately 20 people attended the meetings. But since its inception, the forum has decreased in importance. Some define the forum as a meeting place for exchanging information between implementing actors, on occasion including a capacity building component as well. However, no monitoring measures existed, leading CSOs to request clarification on the network's role.

Civil society involvement in developing Sweden's NAPs varied over the years. While the Government extensively consulted CSOs on the first NAP, civil society consultations for the second NAP (2009) were less thorough. A few meetings with parliamentarians and several NGO's were held and one draft was shared, but there was no room for contributions to the text. The Government consulted neither CSO's from conflict-affected countries nor were CSOs included in the discussions leading up to the decision to prolong the second NAP. CSOs were not consulted during the drafting of the seven indicators for monitoring the implementation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> NAP either (see section below on monitoring the implementation of the NAP). For the 3<sup>rd</sup> NAP there was a much more inclusive approach and there were targeted engagements with civil society from Sweden and from conflict-affected areas. The MFA drafted the NAP and CSOs were invited and given a timetable of the process and repeated opportunities to participate.

## **Implementation**

The MFA is responsible for coordinating both implementing authorities and CSOs working on WPS issues. The relevant ministries and government agencies will be asked to attend bi-annual follow-up meetings to monitor NAP implementation.<sup>11</sup>

After recommendations by civil society, Sweden appointed, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2015, an Ambassador for UNSCR 1325. This position is meant to increase Sweden's visibility on UNSCR 1325 and to streamline the government's engagement. In addition, the fact that the current government adopted a Feminist Foreign Policy and has a female foreign minister represents a window of opportunity. Margot Wallström plans for rights, representation and resources for women and girls and Sweden is proud to have led the work which resulted in the appointment of the first EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender and UNSCR 1325.

The Feminist Foreign Policy lifted the UNSCR 1325 agenda to the core of foreign policy. Arms trade, collaboration with NATO or the Swedish military defence are some of the on-going public debates that include women's and feminist voices. Work within the EU foreign and security policy is mentioned in the NAP and Sweden participated in the launch of a women mediators network.

## **Review**

A review of the second NAP took place during its last year of implementation. The foundation Kvinna till Kvinna was commissioned to write a report detailing NAP reception and

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<sup>11</sup> Third NAP p.27

implementation in five partner countries, their recommendations and reflections on how Sweden may support the WPS agenda's effective implementation. In addition to women's groups, representatives from UN missions and UN bodies, international donor organisations, security sector actors, academics, private sector representatives and governmental representatives contributed to the consultations. This participation is unique in its kind. It is the result of repeated calls made by CSOs to include into the NAP debates the women and the CSOs from the countries and regions where Sweden supports the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This wide consultation increased inclusion and ownership while emphasizing women's roles as actors. The consultation process also led the NAP to include priority countries. In addition, the Swedish chapter of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom wrote a report including comments and recommendations from several women and peace organisations. These reports, CSOs commissioned research, sustained lobbying and advocacy efforts have been considered in the new NAP.

The implementing authority's annual report monitors the NAP<sup>12</sup>. It measures for example numbers of women recruited to international missions, their rank or positions, the number of women and men trained on gender equality and UNSCR 1325 or the amounts spent on gender equality. The civil society organisation, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) annually monitors the NAP through its project Women Count.

An earlier study, launched in November 2012 by the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, Operation 1325 and the Swedish Committee on Afghanistan reviewed Sweden's impact on implementing UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan. The study, *Missing the Target*<sup>13</sup>, showed that despite the NAP, Sweden's intervention in Afghanistan has had little or no effect on the Afghan women and includes the following recommendations to the Swedish government:

- To create a more relevant and strategic NAP, it should include a more specific plan for each country Sweden engages with.
- More energy needs to be put into qualitative efforts on the ground. The indicators for the Swedish NAP need to mirror the whole NAP, not just the quantitative part of it
- The Swedish government should annually report to the Parliament on its implementation efforts, in an effort to increase accountability and transparency
- The MFA should appoint a special rapporteur on UNSCR 1325, who supervises NAP coordination and implementation.

## Conclusion

CSO involvement in NAP planning is important, as it will contribute to its successful implementation. With multiple stakeholders engaged, a greater sense of NAP ownership exists. There is also an increased likelihood that the plan is relevant in the Swedish context and that monitoring will take place. CSO's NAP involvement should guarantee some transparency, as they may support, endorse, and hold the Government accountable.

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<sup>12</sup> Folke Bernadotte Academy (2014) available (in Swedish) at [https://fba.se/contentassets/d271365b270d462db90ecffcbe31f2cd/indikatorrapport\\_2014\\_final.pdf](https://fba.se/contentassets/d271365b270d462db90ecffcbe31f2cd/indikatorrapport_2014_final.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Operation 1325, *Missing the Target*, 2014, available at [http://operation1325.se/sites/default/files/1325\\_full\\_report\\_final\\_0.pdf](http://operation1325.se/sites/default/files/1325_full_report_final_0.pdf)