



Civil Society Dialogue Network
High-Level Seminar
**Conflict Prevention in the EU Global Strategy:
From Policy to Action**

Friday 28 October 2016, Brussels

Meeting Report

The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy provides a major opportunity for the EU to close the implementation gap in conflict prevention. This high-level seminar brought together 29 representatives of EU institutions and senior diplomats with top leadership of established peacebuilding organisations to discuss giving new impetus to EU conflict prevention efforts in complementarity with crisis management. A reflection paper, 'Updating the Business Model for Conflict Prevention', was circulated ahead of the meeting.

As the meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule, the views expressed may not be attributed to any participating individual or institution nor do they necessarily represent the views of all of the meeting participants, the European Peacebuilding Office (EPLO) and its member organisations, or the co-organisers.

This meeting report is organised into three sections. The first section summarises key points and issues related to conflict prevention, the second focuses specifically on the EU and looks at institutional strengths and challenges, and the third and final section covers tools and recommendations for the EU and peacebuilding civil society organisations.

The Civil Society Dialogue Network

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Instrument for Stability). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The second phase of the CSDN will last from 2014 to 2016. For more information, please visit the [EPLO website](#).

1. Conflict Prevention – in principle and in practice

At a basic level, conflict prevention can be defined as the ability to understand and respond to the underlying causes of conflict before, during, and after violence has occurred. There is increasing agreement in principle about the value of conflict prevention (one participant described it as 'not just important but an obligation') but implementation in practice remains challenging.

An important starting point is that the term 'conflict prevention' itself can be misleading because conflict is natural and present in all societies. Thus, it is not actually conflict that needs to be prevented, but violence. i.e. conflict should be channeled through appropriate institutions and in constructive ways to prevent the outbreak of violence. Given this, an important area of focus for all conflict prevention actors is: **how capable is a given society to manage conflict and prevent violence?** Who are the actors and what are the existing institutions and mechanisms that can prevent violence, and how can outsiders support their capacity to do so? A key message from this perspective is that conflict prevention is happening constantly. Countries, people, and groups are doing it by themselves all the time. The proof is in all the places where things are *not* breaking down. External actors can and should support these efforts, but cannot be the solution.

It is also valuable to recognize that conflict prevention is not only about preventing *impending* conflict. This misleading view can give the impression that one must be able to predict the future with a crystal ball. Although analysis and early warning are critical, conflict prevention is a much broader concept than just these two activities alone. Instead, **conflict prevention is about preventing all kinds of violence at all stages of the conflict cycle** (pre, during, and post). For example, one participant's organisation helped arrange a truce in El Salvador between two gangs that prevented a significant amount of violence. At first, this may not seem like a 'typical' conflict prevention story where an intervention seeks to, for example, prevent the outbreak of civil war or of communal violence. Rather, it is an example of conflict prevention focused on regular and ongoing urban violence, with a result that is just as important to the lives of El Salvadorans affected by gang violence as the more stereotypical conflict prevention efforts we often think of.

Another key feature of **conflict prevention efforts is that they can rarely be traced back to a single action or solution to the problem.** Rather, it is often many different contributions that can make the difference. There is a risk of excessive focus on trying to fund or implement the singular, most obvious solution or engaging with only one actor, and missing the point that conflict prevention is almost always the result of a variety of efforts made by a variety of actors. One participant gave the example of Somali piracy, describing how 95% of funds to address the issue were focused on stopping the problem at sea, whereas targeting efforts on land in the five villages where most pirates came from proved to also be a highly effective contribution.

Finally, a frequent criticism of conflict prevention efforts is that they are difficult to evaluate because those engaged in them are required to prove a negative. i.e. to prove that something did not happen that otherwise would have (for example, that violence would have occurred in a particular situation, but it did not due to the conflict prevention activities undertaken). Such claims often seem inherently speculative and difficult to prove. Instead, **it is more useful to think about conflict prevention as strengthening the domestic capacity to manage conflict.** In this way, rather than assessing an absence (i.e. the absence of violence), it is about assessing a presence (i.e. the presence of actors, institutions, and mechanisms that can prevent violence, and the increase in their capacities to do so).

Partnerships and the key role of local actors

Partnerships and ensuring strong connections across the local, regional, and international levels are crucial in order for conflict prevention efforts to be effective. One participant called this 'Track 6 strategies' meaning adding together Track 1 (official diplomacy), Track 2 (informal actors), and Track 3 (the local level). Among the examples raised was the work of an organisation in Burundi: while focusing on preventing possible violence at the local level, it was also in regular communication with the United Nations to ensure their efforts were aligned. It was noted that events which can turn into a national crisis often start locally. Another participant reiterated that it is essential to talk widely and broadly to the various stakeholders engaged in the diplomatic process in order to ensure connection, complementarity, and coherence. For example, during a conflict prevention effort in Darfur in 2003 there was a failure to speak regularly with the French diplomatic service and this caused serious challenges in the process.

In terms of conflict prevention, there was a consensus that local actors play a key role, if not *the* key role, as the primary agents of change. Local actors are generally best placed to conduct regular monitoring and analysis regarding the potential for conflict and rising tensions in their areas, as opposed to outsiders. In fact, outsiders coming in can trigger concerns about sovereignty and interference and increase conflict instead of preventing it. So it is crucial to focus on strengthening local actors and building the domestic resilience of a political system so that it can deal with conflicts in a nonviolent way. Furthermore, it is important for local people to own the changes in their own community themselves because without that, any change that occurs is unlikely to be sustainable. The same is true for peace agreements – just because a peace agreement is signed does not mean that peace comes to society. For that, the people affected have to lead and own it.

At the same time, there is also added value in including outside experts in the process. Often, the situation can be politically sensitive; therefore having someone who is a visitor, who can come in and out of the country and absorb the controversy that local organisations might otherwise face can be a very useful strategic asset. Additionally, outsiders can bring experience and lessons learned from other contexts that may be of use.

Resilience

The concept of resilience is increasingly used in conflict prevention. One participant noted that the European Commission's definition of resilience is mainly a humanitarian one, focused on the ability of an individual, community or country to cope, adapt and quickly recover. This type of definition is largely focused on external shocks, whereas conflict is an internal shock that is about relationships and mistrust between the state and its people. Thus, it is important to consider how to measure the risks of conflict and violence in society, and how to analyse sources of resilience and what is preventing a situation from getting any worse. There are several organisations currently working together on a framework to help address these questions. They are using the disaster risk reduction community as a model (i.e. it is not possible to show what didn't happen, but it is possible to show how risks have been reduced or mitigated against). The tools being produced are intended to be used by locals and can help a society analyse itself and monitor changes over time. Finally, it is also important to recognize that resilience can be both positive and negative. Corruption is an example of negative resilience, and we need to work harder on programs and theories of change to undermine that and other types of negative resilience.

Conflict prevention and gender

Gender and inclusiveness also have an important role in conflict prevention. One participant noted that women's voices are frequently marginalised and their contributions to conflict prevention often minimised or ignored. However, experience shows that in order for peace and prevention to be effective, they must be inclusive of women. For example, in Liberia women played a vital role in pushing for the peace agreement reached. In Syria, although

the violence is horrific, there are spring festivals led by women's groups to celebrate different cultures that improved relationships between political actors on the ground and in their communities. In sum, when thinking about how to anchor peace in the population, it is important to remember that women's groups are key. Perhaps a greater effort to involve women and recognise their contribution in Colombia could have helped that peace agreement to be owned by more of the population.

Preventive diplomacy

One aspect of conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, was discussed in depth as a valuable tool but with several inherent challenges. First, preventive diplomacy is unpredictable and speculative because it is not always clear whether a given situation will ultimately lead to violence. It can also be controversial, because it often infringes or is seen to infringe on national sovereignty. There is a clear challenge in creating a standing capacity for preventive diplomacy, because it requires specific skills and geographic expertise and it is typically not feasible or financially appropriate to keep such expertise constantly on standby. However, despite all of these challenges, preventive diplomacy can have a significant positive impact when it works. Finally, similar to conflict prevention more broadly (of which preventive diplomacy is one available tool) it is not defined clearly enough and more work is needed to understand what is effective and what is not.

Challenges for conflict prevention actors

There were a number of challenges noted in regards to effective conflict prevention:

- Several participants noted that the **lack of a broadly agreed definition of conflict prevention**, including where it starts and ends, makes it difficult to ensure that different institutions or organisations are using the term in the same way, and also makes it harder to measure, monitor, and learn from conflict prevention activities. EU representatives noted that having clearer definitions of terms and activities would make it easier for them to work effectively in partnerships with others. Defining relevant terms is an area the EU suggested it would be useful to have civil society support on;
- Another challenge was how to get sufficient support for conflict prevention activities. It is still a **major challenge to get funding and attention prior to the outbreak of violence**. Often when things go badly, conflict prevention actors have not been in place ahead of time reinforcing the prevention of violence and don't have the right partnerships. For example, one participant noted that in Burundi it was extremely difficult to raise relatively small sums of money for prevention, but once the crisis hit then there were suddenly millions available. So the challenge is how to get people interested in prevention and to make it credible. This was at least partly understood to be a communication issue and an area for improvement;
- Similarly, it can be **difficult to work on conflict prevention when the situation in a given country seems bright on the surface**. For example, Mali was considered to be a well-functioning state for many years by comparison to its neighbours; therefore it was difficult to raise concerns, even though it was clear there were latent conflict risks due to some government policies. As these issues were not addressed, the situation ultimately did lead to the outbreak of violence and resulted in intervention by the French military;
- There remains a gap in **transforming analysis into programming**. There is a tendency to focus on the programs you can do, and fit conflict risks into these

programs, when it should be the other way around . the conflict risks should drive the programming;

- There is still more work to be done to understand **what works and what does not**, and how to track progress and learning and communicate about successes;
- Finally, several participants noted **concern that the current political context in Europe and around the world is quite negative for conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts**. There are a lot of challenging perspectives on conflict management and security in Member States, and potentially also in the EU institutions, and this may be having an impact on how resources are and could be distributed in the future. There is a real need for a sense of confidence around core conflict prevention issues, beliefs, and principles, including why the EU as peace project has legitimate role to play in peacebuilding activities. This is something that not just the EU institutions and Member States need to understand, but EU citizens as well.

2. Conflict Prevention and the European Union

Participants discussed existing EU commitments on conflict prevention . many of which were reiterated in the EU Global Strategy in one form or another. It was announced that a **Communication on resilience will be issued as a follow up to the EUGS**, with work currently ongoing to define what is meant by resilience and how the concept can be of use going forward.

EU contributions to conflict prevention

Participants discussed a number of positive examples and roles for the EU in conflict prevention activities. These included:

- **EU Special Representatives (EUSRs)** . They can play an effective role as external actors and generally have sufficient time to think about medium and long-term conflict risks, unlike EU Delegations which are often heavily loaded with a variety of tasks. For example, Alexander Rondos, EUSR for the Horn of Africa, identified concerns about the Red Sea before others did, which was useful for conflict prevention. Although some challenges with EUSRs have been raised, on the whole they are great assets;
- **Election Monitoring Missions** are also very useful and under-appreciated. They are good examples of external and internal partnerships, and given that elections can often trigger violence, they can be a useful prevention mechanism. However, one participant noted that election monitoring often comes quite late and that prevention efforts should start earlier to be more robust;
- One participant noted that based on previous evaluations of EU peacebuilding efforts, when the **EU engages using its Comprehensive Approach, there is a stronger chance of positive impact**. This is a clear and consistent finding across multiple evaluations;
- **Seemingly “small” contributions can have an important impact**. For example, in Sierra Leone, the EU funded salaries for civil servants and this made a real difference. Paying for Kofi Annan’s mediation in Kenya was another crucial and relatively low cost investment, as is funding for keeping the lines of communication

open in the Caucasus in the expectation that it will be useful in the future when the situation becomes ripe;

- **Similarly, sometimes the EU may be well placed to play the role of “Best Supporting Actor”** - it doesn't have to be front and center every time. Sometimes the EU (or UN or others) may not be the right actor to actually take the action, but rather can be the best enabler to make sure it happens. It takes a shift in mindset to think this way;
- **A significant added value of the EU is that it is there for the long run and has a global presence.** Additionally, it has huge advantages because it is less dependent on political cycle of national elections. This is really worth capitalising upon.

Areas for improvement

Participants then discussed specific areas for the EU to focus on in order to improve its capacity as a conflict prevention actor:

- **Leadership and Communication** . It is important for the top EU leadership to clearly communicate the importance of conflict prevention so that staff who commit their time and resources know they are doing what is expected of them. There should be loud and clear signals, regularly repeated, about the ambitious conflict prevention platform that has been laid out, including speeches by the High Representatives and key Commissioners. This could galvanise the EU institutions and, in the current environment with the number of crises ongoing, it is crucial. It was noted that there is also a desire to bring in the Member States more robustly and to add conflict prevention to the agenda in the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

Furthermore, it was noted that EU staff are actually doing conflict prevention regularly in a variety of places, but they are not capturing the stories because the people involved do not think of their work as conflict prevention or are not documenting it as such. More consistent documentation and communication about these efforts could help strengthen institutional incentives to increase such activities;

- **Ways of working** . It is important to start from the local context and then think about the instruments available to address the situation, not the other way around. Joint conflict analysis is a very effective way to get the EU institutions and Member States working together, which then makes it much easier to sequence the instruments based on the local context. There are good tools on joint analysis but the focus on it can be scaled up.

Additionally, there is also the question of how to bring people together. People in the Delegations can be confused by the set-up in Brussels because it is not always clear who to talk to. Setting up one single, virtual unit dedicated to helping staff in Delegations connect with the information or experts they need to carry out their work could maximise the EU's impact in conflict-affected settings. It would also be useful to think about how to plug in Delegations more to the EU system and partnerships.

Finally, some participants noted that EU analytical tools are **static** and not dynamic enough. There is a need for more cyclical or regular revisiting of assumptions based on fully integrated conflict analysis and learning methodologies leading to changes in EU action on the ground. Monitoring and evaluation can be helpful in that respect: the Dutch Government has reportedly recently decided that rather than asking partners to demonstrate the direct impact of their projects, which can be difficult and

lead to exaggeration or simplification, they will instead ask them to demonstrate that they have learned as much as possible. This creates a positive incentive structure to ensure programming gets continuously better;

- **Frontline delivery** . EU Delegations are a huge asset and have impressive expertise. However, the staff are often overwhelmed by the variety of tasks they are called upon for, and so cannot get out and talk to people enough. It is important to think about how to free up Delegation staff to help get them out and about;
- **Information** . Information sharing is critical to the effective functioning of the system. There is room to think further about how Delegations access information, especially when it is classified. Additionally, it is also worth thinking about good communication around the Conflict Early Warning System. Knowledge management also remains a real challenge for the EU. For example, what happens to all of the EU Special Representatives' knowledge and analysis when the person leaves or the office closes?
- **Partnerships** . We know from all the lessons learned exercises that the international community needs to be united in fragile and conflict-affected environments. There is therefore a need to think about how to link up more with the UN, the World Bank, civil society experts and others on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. At a minimum, there should be recognition that we all have different instruments working on different timelines, and so need to think about how to maximise resources. A related question is whether the EU currently has the right division of labor between partners and itself;
- **Human resources** . The EU has very high quality staff in the Delegations and in Brussels, but there are not career paths for people who want to specialise in conflict issues, who want systematic training, and who want assurances that such specialisation will be positive for their career. A related issue is the lack of surge capacity of the EU. The EU needs to better understand what works in terms of rosters and other mechanisms. One possible example is the UN's mediation standby team set up by Norway. It was noted that the EU would like to establish regional expert teams that can serve as surge capacity to go out and respond as needed;
- **Funding** . It is important to signal that risk is welcome in EU programming. There should be the flexibility to have interventions that are designed and implemented fairly quickly. There are various resources available, but there is work to be done in ensuring comfort with risk taking and making sure that Delegations know where to go to get funds when they need them;
- **Innovation** . Because the field of conflict prevention is changing and new technologies are bringing new opportunities and challenges, there's a whole raft of creative initiatives, for example related to early warning or using social media to convey peacebuilding messages. There is also a lot that has been learned regarding behavioral psychology and what drives people's choices and decisions that could be incorporated;
- **Strategy** . The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was welcomed by participants, particularly the positive language and aspirations for the EU's role in conflict prevention. However, some participants expressed concern that the EUGS could be difficult to implement given how much is covered in the policy;
- **Domestic security focus versus global security focus** - There was a debate amongst participants about whether the foreign policy focus on EU internal security is

in conflict with the goals of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Some thought it was not an either/or but rather that both could work together and complement each other, while others thought that it is a big tension that needs to be addressed better. Either way, it was clear that this is the reality we are facing today.

3. Tools and Recommendations

Suggested Tools:

- **Peace mapping and measuring resilience** . Conflict mapping is well known, but peace mapping may actually be a more useful tool. There is not enough attention focused on where things are going well and why, and there is a lot to learn from these places. There are several groups working together on a framework that will help measure resilience from a conflict perspective, using the disaster reduction community model of showing how risks can be reduced. These tools are meant to be used by local actors and to help monitor developments over time. Focusing on resilience and what is going well also has strong convening power. People are more willing to get together to talk about the strengths they see in their country than about what is going wrong;
- **The Women's Situation Room** . In the 2011 elections in Liberia, there was real concern that violence might erupt again. Women's groups created the Women's Situation Room hotline. Whenever violence was reported, representatives would go there to try to calm things down. It was so successful that the African Union went on to use it as a best practice for elections in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone;
- **Regular national level assessments** . The conflict prevention and peacebuilding sector does not currently do regular national level assessments to analyse how the situation is improving or deteriorating in a given country. Other sectors, such as public health, have had a lot of success with this type of diagnostic tool. This could be an important area for investment;
- **Joint conflict analysis** . This is a useful way to avoid groupthink and get people from different divisions, institutions, and organisations on the same page. Additionally, one participant noted that not only is the product of the analysis important, the impact on the people involved is also significant because it can lead to a change in mindset. While participatory or joint processes generally take longer, the payoff can be substantial;
- **Joint scenario planning** . It was suggested that external partners of the EU who cannot presently participate in the Conflict Early Warning System could instead participate in a shadow process that selects certain priority countries and runs through scenarios together as well as possible actions from the different stakeholders to help facilitate more effective partnerships;
- **Peer review** . One participant noted that her organisation was having success with the use of internal peer reviews. Colleagues within the organisation were charged with reviewing each other's work and providing a fresh perspective and analysis based on their own experience. This could also take place with individuals outside the organisation. It is a low cost and useful way of ensuring high-quality work, a culture of learning, motivation and that staff pass on best practices;

- **Preventive strategies** . It was noted that there had previously been an idea to generate prevention strategies for priority countries. The idea became politicised and so was unsuccessful, but may be worth reconsideration.

Recommendations for the EU:

- Senior EU leadership should communicate clearly and regularly that conflict prevention is a top priority;
- Ensure that planning starts from the needs of the local context as opposed to the programming instruments available;
- Create an internal ~~one~~ one stop shop+ for information regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding within the EU. This could be a virtual unit with a single email address. It would make it clearer for Delegation staff and others who are struggling to identify who to turn to in Brussels to get the information they need;
- Make an effort to reduce the workload on Delegation staff so that they have more time to engage directly with host country nationals and partners;
- Reassess information sharing to maximise access as appropriate, particularly regarding the Conflict Early Warning System, and increase knowledge management and organisational learning efforts;
- Think further about how to enhance partnerships and coordination with other multilateral organizations and civil society, and assess whether the EU has achieved the right division of labor in its current partnerships. Ensure that partners feed back information gathered during their work into the EU system;
- Seek to create human resource mechanisms that work in support of conflict prevention. Human resources were raised repeatedly as an issue . it is critical to be able to recruit people motivated to focus on conflict prevention issues and provide them with training and a viable career path. More effort is also needed to examine potential surge capacity options for when the EU needs to deploy people swiftly;
- Ensure that funding mechanisms are flexible and respectful of the need for an appropriate level of risk, given the nature of the conflict prevention activities and the potential rewards for doing so;
- Consider funding support to help conflict prevention actors generate an evidence base that can help all stakeholders better understand what works regarding conflict prevention;
- Make use of innovations in social media, big data, behavioral psychology, and elsewhere to enhance the ongoing conflict prevention efforts of the EU;
- Assess whether the strategic documents currently guiding the EU's conflict prevention activities are sufficiently clear as a basis for decision-making or whether a more concise and clear strategy statement may be needed;
- Communicate more clearly about the ways in which EU domestic security and global security are linked, and how conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts can enhance EU security;

- Seek to build the capacity of local actors when and where possible given that they are best placed to monitor and analyse trends occurring at the local level and detect rising tensions early on. Quite often capacity building is done based on what outsiders think locals need, rather than what they want or ask for, and this dynamic should be reversed;
- Require civil society partners to focus on learning rather than impact, in order to create a positive incentive structure to enhance programming and lower incentives to exaggerate or simplify results;
- Allow for longer time horizons. Conflict prevention projects need longer lead-in, implementation, and lead-out times. Five years is a more suitable range than 18 months;
- Seek to identify the root causes of conflict and pay attention to the individuals involved. As in the Somali piracy example, it is crucial to trace challenges back to their source rather than only addressing the more visible manifestations of the issue. Also, it is important to think carefully about the individual personalities involved in the conflict. It is possible to create a very good peace deal, but the deal can crumble (as happened in Cote D'Ivoire) if the psychology of the people involved is not taken into account;
- Make effective use of civil society expertise and added value. Specifically, civil society has the ability to: function as additional surge capacity because it can get experts to places in need swiftly; complement and supplement the EU in politically sensitive situations where the EU may not want to get directly involved itself; go to the local level and understand conflict dynamics more in depth.

Recommendations for peacebuilding civil society organisations:

- Support training and help update the guidelines for EU staff on conflict prevention. EU staff are ultimately the ones who will put the Global Strategy into action, and they need a better understanding of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The guidelines they receive currently are long and could probably be more effective;
- Raise awareness about your reports and findings with EU staff. EU staff may unfortunately be too busy to read or even be aware of all the reports that are produced. If you want EU staff to read your reports, you should proactively help raise their profile;
- Help the EU better understand what it is doing well on conflict prevention. This can support people inside the system who can use these examples to build a case to their leadership and Member States and then replicate the activities going forward;
- Advocate for the EU to include conflict prevention in the guidance note for its development instruments. A midterm review of development instruments and the multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020 is coming up which will shape programming through 2020. There is a need for some pressure to get conflict prevention into the guidance note and to make sure it is taken seriously;
- Reach out to development organisations and stakeholders. Right now, it seems that the peacebuilding community and the development community are not

communicating together and instead represent two different worlds. This should be remedied. Regular dialogue sessions could help create shared understanding;

- Make a stronger effort to build political support. Conflict prevention was one of two main objectives of the World Humanitarian Summit and it was essentially a failure. There was no outcry or follow up by civil society afterwards to indicate to political leaders that this was unacceptable. It is crucial to build political support for your cause. EU bureaucrats can do that, but civil society activists can;
- Collaborate on a strategy to combat the current negative environment for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. This meeting was a useful opening discussion about the current state of conflict prevention, but it is necessary to create a concrete strategy about how to take the energy and ideas from the meeting forward. There is a need for a positive conspiracy to galvanise EU citizens and leadership;
- Increase cooperation and understanding of each other's strengths. There is a continued need to work more effectively together as a conflict prevention community, including by understanding the strengths that different civil society organisations bring to the table.

Issues for future discussion

Several issues were noted as worthy of future in-depth discussion, including: the current negative political context for peacebuilding and the need for urgent civil society action to address it; mediation efforts, reconciliation and early action to address reconciliation issues, and a review of how conflict resources are distributed from a holistic perspective.

EPLO offered to convene this group again to follow up on this discussion as appropriate. Furthermore, EPLO will organise additional policy meetings in Helsinki, Finland and Paris, France to discuss the implementation of the EUGS with civil society and EU, Finnish and French policy-makers. EPLO will continue its core advocacy to influence the EU so that it promotes and implements measures which lead to sustainable peace between states and within states and peoples, and which transform and resolve conflicts non-violently.