Libya Conflict Assessment: Literature Review

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The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reflect the positions of the CSDN as a whole, or of EPLO, the European External Action Service or the European Commission.

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Civil Society Dialogue Network
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Introduction to conflict analysis

This section explains the understanding of conflict analysis used in the paper.

1. What is a conflict analysis?

‘Conflict analysis’ entails understanding the different groups in a given context, their goals and interests, and the potential for the pursuit of these goals and interests to result in the use of violence. It is important to note that conflict does not necessarily entail violence.¹

**What is ‘conflict’?**
Conflict is an ambiguous concept that takes on different meanings in different contexts. Nevertheless, in general, conflict can be understood in the following way:

- Conflict is when two or more ‘parties’ (includes individuals, communities, countries and ethnic groups) have, or believe they have, incompatible goals and interests
- Conflict is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, but is a natural part of change in any society and may result in positive outcomes
- Conflict is negative when violence is used to manage (perceived) incompatible goals and interests.

In short, not all conflicts of interests are violent; but all conflicts involve a real or perceived misalignment of interests.

2. What are the parts of a conflict analysis?

There are many ways to undertake a conflict analysis, and the methodology employed will depend upon how the analysis will be used (its intended purpose). Nevertheless, most conflict analyses involve identification of the following elements:

- The context where the conflict takes place – including local political, economic, social and cultural factors
- The actors in a given conflict, in terms of their interests and influence
- The causes of ‘conflict’ and ‘violence’, which can be divided into:
  - Systematic (‘structural’) causes: are factors that influence the interests and actions of groups over a longer timeframe. They can include, for example, available resources, the level of democratic development, and changes in the population or the environment
  - Proximate (‘enabling’) causes: are weaknesses in, or changes to, social and political processes / institutions that influence how actors deal with structural causes – either positively (i.e. through peaceful means) or negatively (i.e. through violent means). They can include, for example, a change in the governance system, weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, or the influence of an external neighbour
  - Immediate (‘triggering’) causes: are normally single acts or events, or even the belief that an action / event will take place, that have the ability set off or escalate violence. They can include, for example, electoral fraud, arrest / detentions, food shortage or unemployment.
- The dynamics between the context, actors and causes, so as to identify potential scenarios – and hence how they can be best managed.

It is important to note that a conflict analysis can be conducted at different ‘levels’. It can be used to understand and assist planning for the context within a region (such as the Middle

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East and North Africa), with a country (such as Libya), in a specific region in a country (such as the Western part of Libya), or in a specific location (such as in Tripoli, Zawiyah or Bani Walid).

More information on the components of a conflict analysis and examples of analyses used by different organisations can be found in 'Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peace building: resource pack', Chapter 2.

It is more difficult to deliver aid effectively following conflicts or crises, or in other contexts that could be described as ‘fragile’. This is because the impact of assistance delivered into a fragile environment can be negatively affected by conflict dynamics; or because the assistance itself could worsen these dynamics. This means that aid effectiveness depends on sufficient understanding of the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity and hence on a robust ‘conflict analysis’. As such, the international framework for aid effectiveness includes specific guidance on how aid should be delivered in such environments. This guidance is most clearly spelt out in the *Accra Agenda for Action*.²

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² The full text is available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/AAA-4-SEPTEMBER-FINAL-16h00.pdf. The guidance provided in the Accra Agenda for Action draws on learning by OECD-DAC, as captured in the 2007 *Principles of good international engagement in fragile states and situations*, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf. It includes the following: (1) ‘examine the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity’; (2) ‘agree on a set of realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility’; (3) ‘capacity development for core state functions and early and sustained recovery’; and (4) ‘rapid and long-term funding modalities... to (i) bridge humanitarian, recover and longer-term development phases, and to (ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace-building, and the building of capable, accountable and responsive states’. Authors quotes.
Part 1: Actors

This review looks at three different types of actor in Libya. The first type is 'community actors'. This means the groups of people that share values and interests and could act in a unified manner. For the purpose of this study, community actors will encompass geographic communities, and tribal and ethnic communities. The second type is 'security actors'. This category of actor is especially relevant in Libya given the violent nature of the revolution and the resultant proliferation of armed groups in society. The third type is 'political actors'. This means those internal and external individuals or groups that have ability to make or influence critical decisions being made about the future of the country.

3. Community actors

   a. Geographic communities

Libya is a large country comprised of a series of geographic communities, each of which has its own particular context, interests and relationships with other communities; and which often have limited understanding of the context in other communities. As such, a good starting point for an actor analysis in Libya is to identify the different geographic communities and how they relate to one another.

The following table is not intended to be comprehensive of all geographic communities; and each community could in most cases be subdivided into further communities. Instead, it is meant to represent some of the geographic communities that need to be understood for a proper conflict analysis of Libya. The relationship between geographic communities and ethnic / tribal communities is touched on in the table and further explored in section 3b.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic community</th>
<th>1. Context: who lives in the community and what are the key current or historical factors that distinguish it from others?</th>
<th>2. Interests: what are the known interests of the community?</th>
<th>3. Relationships: are there important positive or negative relationships with other communities?</th>
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<tr>
<td>North Western Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Zuwarah</td>
<td>Zuwarah is a majority Amazigh/Berber community.</td>
<td>The community is considered to be pro-revolution as well as to be interested in promoting Amazigh/Berber culture and rights. At the same time, some in the community may also have economic interests in control over the movement of goods (legal and illegal) across the border at Ra’s Ajdir.</td>
<td>There is ongoing conflict between the communities in Zuwarah, and in Zaltan, Al Jamel and Raqdal. The conflict is partly because of: (1) grievances from the revolution / conflict; (2) partly due to longer-term inter-ethnic tensions; and (3) partly due to economic interests, including control of the border with Tunisia at Ra’s Ajdir. At the time of writing, national peacekeepers (‘Libya Shield’) were deployed to the area to prevent violence.</td>
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<td>2. Zaltan, Al Jamel and Raqdal</td>
<td>Zaltan, Al Jamel, and Raqdal are Arab towns situated in an arc around Zuwarah. The main tribe in Al Jamel and Raqdal is the Nuwal, which is also spread along both sides of the border with Tunisia. Qaddafi’s security forces are believed to have recruited substantially from this community.</td>
<td>The community is considered to be anti-revolution. Some also believe that the community hosts substantial ‘volunteer’ security groups. Both claims are denied by local representatives. Local representatives object to ad hoc justice measures against those from the target communities.</td>
<td>Ongoing conflict with Zuwarah. See 1 for more explanation. Zaltan, Al Jamel and Raqdal are viewed with suspicion by pro-revolutionary communities for not having a locally-driven uprising during the revolution / conflict.</td>
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3 This table is based on a broad mapping of communities conducted by the Peaceful Change Initiative in March 2012, which has been further developed through a review of publically-available media articles from January 2011 to July 2012.
<p>| 3. Az Zawiyah | Key strategic area in the revolution / conflict, as an entry point for the liberation of Tripoli. Similar to Zuwarah, it rose early in the revolution, but was subsequently re-occupied by Qaddafi’s security force, suffering substantial damage and casualties. | Az Zawiyah is considered one of the principal pro-revolution areas in Western Libya and is thought to have significant influence at the national level. Locally there is an interest in ‘justice’ for suffering during the revolution / conflict period, in terms of both: (1) greater recognition of the community’s role vis-à-vis Misrata and Benghazi; and (2) punishment for the human rights abuses and crimes committed by Qaddafi’s forces during the revolution / conflict. | Tense relationships with the Al Aziziyah community since the end of the revolution / conflict, culminating in armed violence in November and December 2011. Strong ties with Misrata, Benghazi and Zintan, due to the shared experience of the revolution / conflict (e.g. the naming of one Benghazi armed groups as ‘The Martyrs of Zawiyah’). |
| 4. Al Aziziyah | Majority Worshefena tribal area. Similar to Zaltan, Al Jamel and Raqalain, it is believed that Qaddafi’s administration previously recruited substantial numbers of security personnel from this community. This community is considered to be ‘anti-revolution’ in other parts of the country, and especially in Az Zawiyah because of the local experience of fighting during the revolution / conflict. | | Tense relationships with Az Zawiyah. See 3 for more explanation. Al Aziziyah is viewed with suspicion by pro-revolutionary communities for not having a locally-driven uprising during the revolution / conflict. |
| 5. Nafusah / Western Mountains 1: Nalut, Zintan, Jadu, Kiklah and Jafran | The community in the Western and Central parts of the Nafusah mountains is comprised of a mix of Arab and Amazigh / Berber towns. The Nafusah mountains tend to be under-developed and more traditional than other parts of northern Libya. This community played a pivotal role during the revolution / conflict, as the main front in the West and as a training / staging point for revolutionaries from other parts of Western Libya. While the Nafusah mountains were overall ‘pro-revolution’, there is a significant inter-tribal conflict between Zintan and the El-Mashasha tribe (which is displaced from Awiniya in the Nafusah / Western mountains to its other tribal towns to the south of the mountains). This conflict erupted into fighting in December 2011 and again in June 2012. The community is for the most part interested in ensuring the ‘direction of the revolution’ and in reversing the under-development experienced during the Qaddafi period. | Because of its role at the forefront of the revolution and the continued use of its armed groups, especially those from Zintan, in other parts of the country, it has substantial political leverage nationally. At the same time, there is some animosity towards armed groups from this community, and from Zintan in particular, in other parts of the country. The exception to this is Jadu, which has positive relations with areas considered ‘pro-Qaddafi’ due to its actions during the revolution / conflict. At the time of writing, national peacekeepers (‘Libya Shield’) were deployed to prevent violence. |
| 6. Nafusah / Western Mountains 2: Gharyan, including Al Asabi’ah | Gharyan was another pivotal area in the revolution / conflict, as a second entry point (after Az Zawiyah) to Tripoli. Similar to Az Zawiyah / Zuwarah, it rose up early in the revolution, but was retaken by Qaddafi-regime forces in March 2011. As well as the main town of Gharyan, this community also comprises a number of other smaller towns, including (importantly) Asabi’ah. While Gharyan is considered ‘pro-revolution’, Asabi’ah has been referred to as ‘anti-revolution’. There was significant conflict between Gharyan and Al Asabi’ah in January 2012. Gharyan representatives state that the purpose of the fighting was to remove ‘anti-revolution’ armed groups from Asabi’ah; while Asabi’ah representatives claim the fighting was for local | Gharyan has difficult relationships with Bani Walid, due to the alleged action of its armed groups during fighting for Bani Walid. Residents from Bani Walid believe that Gharyan’s armed groups committed widespread vandalism and theft during the fighting. |
| <strong>7. Tripoli</strong> | Tripoli is a complex geographic community as it comprises a mix of tribes / groups from other parts of Libya, who in some cases live in distinct regions of the city. For example, Suq al Juma and Fashlum are considered to be mostly home to old Tripoli families; Hadba and Abu Selim mostly to people from the Tarhouna and Warfalla tribes; and Gurji and Drebi mostly to families form the Nafusah / Western mountains. Some districts of the city are associated with being pro- or anti-revolution. For example Tajura, Suq al Juma (which saw substantial anti-Qaddafi protests on the 20th and 25th February 2011) and Fashlum are closely associated with the revolution, while Abu Selim (which was the last area of Tripoli to be liberated) and Hadba are associated with Qaddafi. As a result, there is no coherent voice within Tripoli. In fact, due to the various associations of different districts, there can be difficult relations between them. The different districts also have different relationships with other communities. For example, Suq al Juma is in conflict with Bani Walid, due to the death of Suq al Juma fighters in Bani Walid in January 2011. Abu Selim and Hadba, on the other hand, have stronger relations with Bani Walid and Tarhouna due to family / tribal links (e.g. the presence of substantial Warfalla / Tarhouna communities in these districts). |
| <strong>8. Khoms, Zlit and Al Karabali</strong> | These geographic communities are situated on the coastal road between Tripoli and Misrata and are home to a mix of tribes (e.g. the Fourtir and Mejur in Zlit). The towns in this area saw substantial fighting as the front between Misrata and Tripoli moved Westward. Not much has been reported on the interests of the community in these towns. In general Khoms is reported to be pro-revolution: Al Karabali to be pro-Qaddafi; and Zlit to have mixed allegiances. Not much has been reported on the relationships between this and other communities; apart from the on-going confrontation between armed groups from Zlit and Bani Walid (including tit for tat detentions). |
| <strong>9. Tarhouna</strong> | Tarhouna is mostly populated by the Tarhouna tribe, which also has a significant presence in Tripoli and Eastern Libya. The Tarhouna tribe is reported to have received preferential treatment during the Qaddafi period, partly through its integration into the regime’s security forces. The Tarhouna tribe is reported to have had mixed feelings towards the revolution and not to have fully supported the ‘liberation’ of the community. Since the end of the revolution / conflict, Tarhouna’s armed groups have been involved in sporadic clashes with those from other communities, most notably with Misrata’s armed groups in June 2012; and in occupation of Tripoli’s airport in June 2012, following the disappearance of one of its armed groups’ commanders. Tarhouna is viewed with some suspicion in the surrounding ‘pro-revolution’ communities. This community has stronger links with Bani Walid and with the Abu Selim / Hadba districts of Tripoli, the latter through family and tribal connections, as there is a substantial Tarhouna population in these areas. |
| <strong>10. Bani Walid</strong> | Bani Walid is the main town of the Warfalla tribe; one of the largest in Libya, and which was closely associated with Qaddafi’s regime. While the tribe as a whole is associated with Qaddafi, Warfalla tribal members were at the forefront of an attempted coup in 1993, which led to the arrest / imprisonment of coup leaders and an uprising in Bani Walid. Bani Walid was the penultimate town to be ‘liberated’ in the revolution / There is presently a dispute for authority over the community, between the social council and Shuhada dina armed group on one side, and the local council and 28 May armed group on the other. The latter claims its legitimacy from the 2011 revolution / conflict, the former from a popular mandate and the 1993 revolution. This dispute resulted in a small conflict in January 2011, since when the 28 May armed group / local council have been excluded from the town. Bani Walid has extremely difficult relationships with a number of communities, including: (1) Misrata; (2) Az Zawiyah and Gharyan, due to theft and lootings by armed groups from these areas during the town’s ‘liberation’; (3) Suq al Juma due to the deaths of revolutionaries from this community in Bani Walid in January 2012; and (4) Zlit with reprisal detentions between the two communities. At the same time, Bani Walid has strong links to Abu Selim / |</p>
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<th>11. Misrata, and the town of Tawurgha</th>
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<td>Misrata is an important trade city, with a substantial freight harbour and a large business community. The city was on the frontline of the conflict and suffered a good deal of physical and psychological damage. Residents in the city claim that Qaddafi’s security forces committed human rights abuses and war crimes, including systematic rape. Fighters from Tawurgha, which actively supported Qaddafi’s forces during Misrata’s siege, have been accused of the most serious crimes. As a result, the town’s population has been displaced since the end of the siege. Tawurgha’s population is formed in part by former slaves / labourers, whose rights were reportedly expanded during the Qaddafi period.</td>
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<td>Due to its suffering during the revolution / conflict, Misrata has become invested in promoting the ‘revolution’s objectives’ – including transition to a democracy and purging of Qaddafi-era officials. This has involved a substantial role for the community’s armed groups in other parts of the country. At the same time, revolutionary fighters from the community have attempted to develop a greater national political influence through a Union of Revolutionaries. Misrata’s community is also interested in ‘justice’ for the human rights abuses and war crimes suffered during the revolution / conflict. This has led to punitive actions by the city’s armed groups, including the arrest and detention of those accused of crimes from other communities.</td>
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<td>Similar to the Western/Nafusah mountains (Zintan), Misrata has become an important national security and political actor because of the community’s role in the revolution / conflict. It has especially strong relations with Az Zawiya and Benghazi. At the same time, apart from Tawurgha, Misrata has difficult relationships with: (1) Bani Walid, both historically and because it is perceived as pro-Qaddafi; (2) Sirte, because it is perceived as pro-Qaddafi; (3) some communities in Tripoli, due to the actions of armed groups from Misrata in Tripoli; and (4) Sabha due to the negative perceptions of Misrata’s armed groups that were deployed in Sabha in early 2012.</td>
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<td>Sirte, along with Sabha, is the principal home of the Qadhadhfa / al-Qaddafi tribe. As a result, Sirte benefitted from substantial economic development and political influence during the Qaddafi period. Apart from the Qadhadhfa / al-Qaddafi tribe, the population in Sirte is comprised of a number of other tribes (including Firjan and Warfalla), with tribal loyalties being more evident than in most urban areas in Libya. Sirte was the last city to be ‘liberated’ during the revolution / conflict and has sustained severe physical and psychological damage.</td>
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<td>Sirte is presently one of the most divided community’s in the country, with internal divisions: (1) along pro- and anti-revolution lines, even within families; (2) along tribal lines, with most tribes maintaining its own armed group (some of which were formed after the revolution, rather than being associated with it); and (3) between those with a more secular orientation, and those looking to promote a more austere version of Islam locally. These divisions inside the community have led to internal clashes. In June 2012 international organisations were requested to leave Sirte by the local council and Supreme Security Committee, partly for their own protection.</td>
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<td>The community is treated with suspicion by pro-revolution communities because it is perceived: (1) not to be under the full control of the national authorities, and (2) to be pro-Qaddafi. Sirte’s most difficult relationship is with Misrata, as demonstrated by recent confrontations between Sirte and Misrata’s armed groups in April and (potentially) June 2012. In addition, residents in Sirte accuse armed groups from Misrata of extra-judicial arrests and detentions. People in Sirte seem to have strong relationships with those in Bani Walid and Sabha, due to family / tribal connections.</td>
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| North Eastern Libya | 14. Sabha, Murzuq, Aubari and Birak | Along with Sirte, Sabha is the principal home of the Qadhadhfa / al-Qaddafi tribe. As a result, Sabha benefitted from substantial economic development during the Qaddafi period. The Qadhadhfa / al-Qaddafi is a minority in Sabha, the major tribes being Awlad Sulayman / Abu Seid, Magarha, Warfalla and Hasawna, as well as a small Tabu population. There is a significant Tuareg population in Sabha, and a majority population in Aubari. There also seems to be a demographic change in the community with an influx of Africa migrants. Only one district of Sabha experienced an uprising during the revolution / conflict, involving three to four weeks of fighting. Sabha has traditionally been a hub for illegal / migration from Niger and Chad and for control of trafficking routes. Sabha is believed to be a pro-Qaddafi community, as demonstrated by the lack of a city-wide uprising during the revolution / conflict. While the Qadhadhfa / al-Qaddafi was preeminent during the Qaddafi period, the Awlad Sulayman / Abu Seid and Tabu tribes have had a greater role since. Fighting erupted in March 2012, probably over local political control and access to economic resources, although also fuelled by ethnic tensions between Arab tribes and the Tabu / Tuareg. Most armed groups in the community seem to have been formed after the revolution (rather than being affiliated with it), and are associated with particular tribes. Some also seem to have an interest in control over trade / trafficking across the borders. Non-armed groups residents are worried about the lack of control over the borders, and the potential for trafficking in arms, drugs and people to impact on security. Some Arab residents are concerned by what they believe to be a systematic attempt to change local demographics, by black Africans, and the Tabu in particular. Tabu and Tuareg are interested in combating what they perceived to be discrimination (e.g. in social housing or employment opportunities); and, in the case of the Tuareg, promoting Amazigh / Berber culture. Sabha has a difficult relationship with Misrata, due to the actions of Misrata's armed groups deployed in Sabha in early 2012. At the time of writing, 'Libya shield' peacekeepers were in Sabha to prevent violence. |

| North Eastern Libya | 15. Ajdabjiya | Ajdabjiya has substantial Firjan and Zuwaya tribal populations. The Zuwaya tribe is also prominent in the Kufra area. Ajdabjiya is the closest urban centre to the main oil fields in North Eastern Libya; and as a result has also seen migration of Libyan workers from other parts of the country. Ajdabjiya was a front-line city for part of the revolution / conflict period, and the Western part of the town is damaged. The community itself is believed to be mostly cohesive and pro-revolution. Similar to Az Zawiya, people in Ajdabjiya feel that their actions in the revolution / conflict have not been given the same recognition as other communities, such as Benghazi, Misrata and Zintan. Armed groups from Ajdabjiya have played a significant role in protecting displaced persons in Libya, with the Al Jazeera brigade mentioned in a number of sources. |
| 16. Benghazi | The population of Benghazi considers itself more cosmopolitan and less affected by tribal identities than other communities in Libya. Nevertheless, it has significant Firjan, Zuwaya and Warfalla populations, as well as groups from other areas / tribes (e.g. from Misrata and Tajura). Benghazi is an important political and cultural centre in Libya. It was the first city to 'rise up' and was the home of the National Transitional Council and the National Army during the revolution / conflict. Importantly, Benghazi is the centre of the revolution and federalist movements. This community is on the whole united in support for the revolution (although this attitude may not be shared by some IDPs in the community). At the same time, there is frustration at what is perceived to be political marginalisation in favour of Tripoli. There are, however, different opinions on how to address this perceived marginalisation; including those that support increased devolution / decentralisation of decision-making and those that support federalism. Benghazi has strong ties to Az Zawiyah, Zintan and Misrata due to the shared experience of the revolution / conflict. Importantly, Benghazi is considered a 'safe' city for communities persecuted because of their (perceived) support for Qaddafi. As a result, there is a significant IDP population in Benghazi (especially from Tawurgha). Benghazi also has an improving relationship with Sirte, due to the recent role of the 'Martyrs of Zawiyah' armed group in preventing punitive detentions in the city (at the time of writing this armed group had a check point on the Western side of the city). |
| 17. Green Mountains 1: Al Bayda, and surrounds | Al Bayda is a university town and intellectual centre for Libya. It is also home to the Sanussi order, a Sufi religious order that practices a conservative and austere form of Islam. Along with Derna, Al Bayda has traditionally been considered the source of Libyan jihadism. Al Bayda was prominent in supporting the revolution in 2011. Little further information on the interests of this community is available. Little information is available on relationships between Al Bayda and other communities. |
| 18. Green Mountains 2: Derna and surrounds | Derna was the centre of significant revolts during the Qaddafi period (and the use of substantial force to supress them). Derna has a reputation as a 'hotbed' of austere Islam. Because of these associations, the community is considered by some to be on the periphery of Libyan political life. The city seems to be united in being pro-revolution – indeed armed groups from the city played an important role during the revolution. However, there may be internal disagreements over the role of Islam in society. Derna is viewed with suspicion in some quarters as being a 'hotbed' of austere Islam. It may also be the case that armed groups from Derna continue to play an important role in promoting an austere version of Islam in other communities. However, there are no evident fractures between Derna and other areas / communities (as also seems to be the case across Eastern Libya). |
| 19. Tobruq | Tobruq is a border community that is essential for control over the crossing points into Egypt. It is the major home of the Obeita tribe, which was associated with the revolutionary military leader Abdul Fatah, who was killed during the revolution / conflict. Not much has been reported on the interests of this community. Not much has been reported on the relationships between this and other communities. |
| 20. Al Kufrah (Al Jawf) | The Zuwaya tribe and the Tabu form most of the population in Kufrah with smaller Ikhwan and Majabrah groups. The Libyan Tabu residents have been augmented by Tabu migrants primarily from Chad; and as such the size of the Tabu population has grown. There are competing interests over control of transit / trafficking routes across Libya's borders. There is also substantial ethnic-tensions between the Tabu and Zuwaya tribe, partly driven by Zuwaya's concern over the increase in the local population. Some Arab residents are concerned by what they believe to be a systematic attempt to change local demographics, by black Africans, and the Tabu in particular. As noted, for their part, the Tabu believe they are subject |

**South Eastern Libya**
b. Tribal and ethnic communities

**Arab-Berber tribal affiliation**

Most sources refer to 140 main Arab-Berber tribes in Libya, although approximately 30-50 are thought to play an important political and social role. There is consensus that there continues to be a strong identity of Libyans with their tribal networks, with such networks being important for access to social, political and economic opportunities during the Qaddafi regime. Indeed, some tribes in Libya have been closely associated with the Qaddafi regime, due to the ‘privileged status’ that they were perceived to have been given – including the Qadhadhfa, Maghraha, Warfalla, Worshefena and Tarhouna tribes. It has also been reported that these tribes played a greater role in the regime’s security forces. The importance of tribal allegiance is believed to be lessening with the majority of the country’s population now living in urban areas along coastal Libya and becoming more mixed. Indeed, it has been reported that some towns, including Ajdabjiya and Benghazi, have witnessed strong post-revolution political action to reduce the power of tribal network in local politics. At the same time, there was a push to ensure that Libyans did not vote along tribal lines during the elections for a National Congress, through a law banning parties formed along tribal lines. That said, tribes and tribal relations are believed to continue to represent: (1) a driver behind conflict, due to the collective grievances between tribal groups stemming from the revolution / conflict, the way in which opportunities were allocated during the Qaddafi period, and longer historical relationships; and (2) as a resource for managing conflict. This is especially the case in the less developed and less mixed parts of the country.

The importance of tribal relations as drivers of conflict is argued to be evidenced by the way in which grievances from the revolution / conflict have in a number of cases developed into ongoing inter-community / tribal retribution. This includes between Az Zawiyah and the Worshefena, Zintan and the El Mashasha, Gharyan and Al Asabi’ah, and most evidently between Misrata and Tawurgha. It has also been argued that tension between Eastern (Cyrenaica) and Western (Tripolitania) Libya can be mapped onto the two main Arab tribal identities in Libya, the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulayman.

Tribes are argued to be a resource for managing conflict in two main ways. Firstly, because of the penetration of tribal groups across different geographic areas (e.g. the Firjan in Benghazi, Ajdabija and Sirte). Secondly, because the tribes have functioning traditional processes for managing conflicts through ‘Committees of Elders / Wisemen’ (sometimes also called ‘National Reconciliation Committees’). These Committees have played essential roles *inter alia* in the conflict between Zuwarah and Zalltan, Al Jamel and Raqdalin, in the conflict between Arabs and Tuareg in Ghadames and in negotiations on detained persons (e.g. between Bani Walid and Misrata). At the same time, there are question marks over their accountability and ability to prevent violence in a sustainable manner.

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4 There has been substantial mixing between indigenous Amazigh / Berbers and the Arab tribes that arrived in Libya in the 11th century.
Ethnic identity
Apart from the Arab-Berber tribal network described above, sources referred to three significant ethnic groups in Libya: (1) the Amazigh / Berbers of Zuwarah and the Nafusah / Western mountains (sometimes referred to as the ‘Western Berbers’); (2) the Tuareg that are predominately in the South West of Libya (sometimes referred to as the ‘Southern Berbers’); and (3) the Tabu that are predominantly in the South and South East. In addition, there is a small Tawurgha population in North Libya (now displaced).

Western Amazigh / Berbers
The Western Amazigh / Berbers live in Zuwarah (including a range of coastal villages between Sabratah and the border with Tunisia) and in the Nafusah / Western mountains, and are indigenous to Libya, with a separate language and alphabet. It is consistently argued that the Amazigh / Berbers were culturally and politically marginalised during the Qaddafi regime. This included the absence of legal recognition as a distinct and indigenous ethnic group, legislation (‘Law 24’) banning Amazigh / Berbers from giving their children non-Arab names, and a reluctance to provide official documentation attesting to their citizenship. This background has been argued to be one of the main reasons why the Western Amazigh / Berbers played a significant role on the pro-revolution side during the 2011 revolution / conflict.

Following the end of the revolution / conflict, reports point to some nervousness among Arab Libyans that the Amazigh / Berbers would push for some form of autonomy from central Government. Reports also point to nervousness among some Amazigh / Berbers that revolutionary Libya is proving equally unready to recognise and promote Amazigh / Berber culture. Indeed, there have also been examples of local level reflecting discrimination between Arab and Amazigh / Berber communities, where the punitive actions of one side are reciprocated in actions by the other. This is most evident in the ongoing conflict between Amazigh / Berber Zuwarah and the Arab towns of Al Jamel, Raqdalin and Zaltan.

Tuareg
The Tuareg are an Amazigh / Berber nomadic pastoralist group that have a substantial presence in Libya, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. It is argued that due to this regional presence, the Tuareg are an important regional security actor that is able to influence political processes and trafficking / trade routes in a number of countries. The role of Tuareg fighters in the civil war in Mali is a frequently cited example of this regional importance.

Some sources argue that the Tuareg were closely affiliated with Qaddafi’s regime and that Tuareg fighters fought in defence of the regime – both Libyan Tuareg and ‘mercenaries’ from other parts of North Africa. This is argued to be partly because of the Qaddafi regime’s support for the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger in the 1970s, and partly because of settlement allowances given to the Tuareg in southern Libya. It is important to note that there may be a difference in actions between different Tuareg tribes, including those that are ‘Libyan’ and those from other parts of North Africa that may cross Libya’s borders intermittently.

At the same time, similar to other Amazigh / Berbers, it is argued that the Tuareg experienced cultural and political marginalisation during Qaddafi’s regime (see above). As a result, there is believed to be a desire on the part of the Tuareg to increase their political and cultural standing in Libya. Due to the perception that the Tuareg ‘fought for Qaddafi’ and the movement for greater political / cultural rights for Tuareg, sources point to some conflict between Tuareg and Arab-Berber communities since the end of the revolution / conflict, most notably in Ghadames and in Sabha.

Tabu
The Tabu is a black African tribe indigenous to Southern Libya, Chad and Niger. In Libya, their main population centres are Sabha in the South West and Kufrah in the South East. Similar to the Amazigh / Berbers, it is consistently argued that during the Qaddafi regime the Tabu were
politically and culturally marginalised. The question of who is a ‘Libyan Tabu’ and who is a ‘foreign Tabu’ is hotly contested, and has been complicated by ongoing migration of Tabu from Niger and Chad into Libya, with a particular incentive of work within the oil industry between Kufrah and Ajdabjiya. This question culminated in the withdrawal of identity cards and passports from the Tabu in 2007 / 2008 – a policy seemingly aimed at deterring further migration of Tabu into the region. It has been consistently argued that this experience of marginalisation resulted in the Tabu actively supporting the revolution.

Tensions between Tabu and Arab-Berber communities have, however, remained high after the end of the revolution / conflict, with sources indicating serious armed clashes in both Sabha and Kufrah. In both cases, the clashes are analysed to have been inspired by: (1) a feeling among Tabu of ongoing discrimination by Arab-Berber tribes; (2) concerns among Arab-Berber tribes that the Tabu are looking to purposefully change local demographics and acquire local political / cultural dominance; and (3) control over transit / trafficking routes across Libya's borders.

**Tawurgha**

The Tawurgha is a black African ‘tribe’ that lived in a town to the East of Misrata and is partly descended from slave workers. It is consistently argued that during the Qaddafi period Tawurgha’s citizens benefitted from increased rights and opportunities. Fighters from Tawurgha, which reportedly actively supported Qaddafi’s forces during Misrata’s siege, have been accused of significant human rights abuses and war crimes, including systematic rape.

Following the end of the siege of Misrata, the entire population of Tawurgha was displaced to two main camps in Benghazi and Tripoli. There are conflicting accounts of the displacement. On the one hand some reports state that the population of Tawurgha was forcibly displaced by armed groups from Misrata. On the other hand some reports state that the local population fled out of fear of revenge attacks from Misrata’s armed groups. The same two arguments are also used to explain the failure of Tawurgha’s population to return following the end of the revolution / conflict.

There are also two separate narratives about the justification for actions against Tawurgha’s population within Libya society. On the one hand, it is argued that the population of Tawurgha is responsible for the actions of its fighters during the siege of Misrata (and especially for rapes committed). On the other hand, some argue that Libyan society has allowed the entire Tawurgha community to be punished for crimes committed by some Tawurgha fighters, because they are black Africans (e.g. because of discrimination). It has been suggested by some sources that fighters from other communities had committed similar crimes in Misrata, but that their communities were not targeted because they are Arabs.

**4. Security actors**

a. **National and local actors**

Libya is presently host to a range of local and community-specific armed groups (mostly referred to as ‘catibas’ or, in the pejorative, ‘militia’), and a number of nascent national bodies that are still in the process of establishing their legitimacy. The creation of national and nationally-trusted security and justice actors, to replace the range of armed groups that developed during and after the revolution / conflict, is consistently presented as a key challenge during the transition period. There is consensus that national security and justice systems were under-developed during the Qaddafi period, with (for example) investment in a series of catibas / militias that reported directly to Qaddafi, family members or trusted aides, rather than a national army. This has meant that there is limited or no culture of accountable national security institutions, making post-revolution security sector reform in the country more difficult.

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5. ‘Catiba’ translates as ‘brigade’; although they can differ in size substantially.
There is also consensus that this process is further complicated by the different ways in which armed groups developed during the revolution / conflict. In the East there was greater coherence and coordination both between armed groups and with the part of the Libyan National Army that had defected (referred to as the ‘National Liberation Army’). The actions of these groups and defectors are considered to have been accountable to the National Transitional Council. In the West, however, armed groups developed independently of the National Transitional Council, were to a large extent autonomous and self-reliant for their success, and were more closely tied to their communities.

**Local armed groups**

There is consensus that local armed groups are on the whole associated with a particular community, especially in the Western Libya. This is important as Libyans, for the most part, tend not to distinguish between the members of armed group from their community and ‘ordinary residents’, in the sense that armed group member are ‘from and part of the community’. That said, sources point to the fact that armed groups have formed for different reasons, both during and after the revolution / conflict, and have diverse levels of local legitimacy depending on the purpose behind their formation. There are too many armed groups in Libya to list in this briefing. Instead, different types of armed groups and individual fighters are categorised below – on the basis of one source.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armed groups</th>
<th>Individual fighters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong> – formed during the revolution / conflict to defend (e.g. Misrata or Ajdabiya) or ‘liberate' (e.g. Tripoli groups trained in Zintan) their own communities.</td>
<td><strong>Genuine thuwwar</strong> – those that played an active role in the civil conflict. Many of these fighting thuwwar have returned to ‘civilian life’&lt;br&gt;It is important to note that in some communities those that supported the revolution, e.g. through logistical support, cooking for fighters or humanitarian assistance, are also considered ‘thuwwar’ of an equal status with those that fought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong> – formed during the revolution / conflict to ensure political control in home towns, but who did not need to engage in large scale fighting for this (e.g. some groups from Derna or Benghazi).</td>
<td><strong>Incentivised thuwwar</strong> – those that have adopted the mantle of ‘thuwwar’, and in some cases joined or formed armed groups, because of the benefits that the title brings (including payments from the government and access to personal development programmes).&lt;br&gt;Includes some fighting thuwwar who had returned to civilian life, but were incentivised to re/join brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection</strong> – formed mostly after the civil conflict to protect local communities (e.g. in Sirte or Al Jamel). Such protection catibas can be formed of: (1) ‘thuwwar’ (see right-hand column); (2) those that were neutral during the revolution / conflict; and (3) even those that supported the previous regime.</td>
<td><strong>Exploitative thuwwar</strong> – those that have adopted the mantle of ‘thuwwar’ and joined armed groups to further their own goals. These can include enrichment, protection of themselves / their communities, and promotion of an ideology.&lt;br&gt;Such thuwwar can include: (1) those that did not take an active role in the revolution / conflict; (2) those that fought with or supported the previous regime; and importantly (3) fighting thuwwar whose motivations have changed over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological</strong> – formed during or after the civil conflict to promote a particular ideology, and most usually an austere version of Islam (e.g. potential some groups operating in Derna, Benghazi, Ajdabiya and Sirte)</td>
<td><strong>Individuals with guns</strong> – people who acquired weapons during the civil conflict. Such individuals can include all of the above categories as well as other ordinary civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Militias’ – groups of armed individuals that gather together for purposes not associated with the revolution / conflict. These are mostly criminal or interest-based.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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6 This is not a consensus area of analysis, as this table categorisation is taken from a Peaceful Change Initiative’s Policy Briefing (July 2012); although it has been further validated through an analysis of publically-available media sources as part of this literature review.
Many Libyans would also label ideological and protection catibas ‘militia’. At the same time, some would argue that those military or political groups that had ‘stepped outside their mandate’ (e.g. through the detention of people suspected of war crimes) are also ‘militia’.

It is important to note that groups and individuals may move between the categories over time. For example, a group that was formed to gain political control over a community may develop into an ‘ideological’ group. Similarly, individuals that fought in the revolution / conflict may be incentivised into re-joining armed groups that they had left.

Available sources describe military, political and protection armed groups (i.e. those that generally have greater local legitimacy) as generally fulfilling one of two functions: (1) ‘protection of the revolution’; and (2) ‘protection of the local community’. The different tasks that these functions entail are outlined in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection of the revolution</th>
<th>Protection of the community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Intervening in local disputes / conflict</td>
<td>• Manning checkpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protecting the borders</td>
<td>• Protecting local infrastructure (such as banks and courthouses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protecting key infrastructure such as oil refineries and airports</td>
<td>• Controlling traffic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Justice / retribution for the actions of Qaddafi supporters during and before the revolution. Can include arrest / detentions and other measures</td>
<td>• Collecting weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Providing pressure for revolutionary objectives, including the pace of the democratic process and for purging of Qaddafi-era official from governance positions</td>
<td>• Filling in policing gaps: e.g. arresting those under warrant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection of the revolution</th>
<th>Protection of the community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Manning checkpoints</td>
<td>• Providing a resource for local needs in association with other agencies (broad role that can include personal security as well as other needs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available sources point to the fact that the legitimacy of action by armed groups from one community is often challenged by those from another community, because of how they behave towards members of that community. For example, in the ongoing conflict between Zuwarah and Al Jamel, Raqdalin and Zaltan, each side considers its own armed groups to be legitimate in that they provide protection for the community, but both challenge the revolutionary legitimacy of the other side’s armed groups, in some cases referring to them as ‘militia’. Similarly, while residents in Misrata reportedly support the actions of their armed groups in detaining those from other communities suspected of crimes / human rights abuses, these actions are reportedly often viewed as punitive measures in the recipient communities (e.g. Sirte).

National armed groups

Given the diverse experience of the revolution / conflict in different parts of the country, and evident differences in interest between some community actors (see above), the transitional authorities have found it difficult to develop security forces capable of acting on a national scale. The main national actors mentioned in reviewed literature are as follows.

Local armed groups

In some cases those local armed groups that act to ‘protect the revolution’ are deployed to areas outside their community, often for long periods of time. This is most notably the case with armed groups from Misrata, Zintan and Ajdabiyah / Benghazi, which have been deployed independently as brigades to protect borders or important infrastructure, to stop fighting between sides, or to arrest and detain wanted persons. While these actions are often coordinated with the transitional authorities, this is not always the case.

Libya Shield / ‘Daraa’

Libya Shield is comprised of armed groups that gained substantial fighting experience during the revolution / conflict (and can be considered ‘elite units’). The purpose of Libya Shield is to
be deployed to those areas suffering from inter-communal tensions or violence. At the time of writing, Libya Shield forces were deployed in Kufrah, Sabha, near Bani Walid and between Zuwarah and Al Jamel, Raqdanin and Zaltan. Libya Shield / ‘Daraa’ operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.

**National Army**
The Libyan National Army, which replaced the Qaddafi-era Libyan Army, is still under construction. Its core is comprised of the deserters that joined the National Liberation Army under National Transitional Council auspices in the East during the revolution / conflict. While it presently has limited capacity, the reintegration process proposed by the Warriors Affairs Committee includes plans to integrate 50,000 fighters into the Army.

**National Guard**
The National Guard was established by the transitional authorities to provide an alternative to local armed groups in sensitive locations. Some reports argue, however, that the National Guard is a front for the Tripoli Military Council and may even promote an austere Islamist agenda. There is little information about the actual tasks of the National Guard to date. It operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence.

**Supreme Security Committees**
The Supreme Security Committees were developed by the Ministry of Interior across Libya as a temporary measure for a number of purposes. Firstly, they were established to hold the fighters that had registered under the Ministry of Interior’s reintegration programme, which ran parallel to that of the Warriors Affairs Committee. Secondly, they provided a strong local alternative to local armed groups, in protecting local communities. Thirdly, in some cases, they have been used to challenge the authority of military councils as the point of coordination of local armed groups, and hence as important political actors. While initially temporary in nature, with a six month mandate, the Supreme Security Committees have been reinforced rather than disbanded.

**Cyrenaica Army**
A number of armed groups in Eastern Libya had, in advance of elections for a National Congress, coordinated actions as a ‘Cyrenaica Army’, which has been described as a ‘military wing’ of the ‘Cyrenaica Transitional Council’. The most high profile action by this Cyrenaica Army has been closure of the road between Benghazi and Tripoli at Wadi Al-Ahmar. The purpose of the army, it has been argued, has been to pressurise the transitional authorities to allocate an equal number of seats between Western and Eastern Libya. There is little information available on its potential role post-elections for a National Congress.

**b. Accountability and control**

There are a number of political and community actors, at the local and national level, that have an interest in leveraging control over the actions of the security actors described above, and over the security development processes related to them. These actors and the processes for leveraging their interests are captured below.⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional / social actors</th>
<th>Process for leveraging control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Community themselves     | - on the basis that community members recognise armed group members, know their families and can access assistance / make complaints directly or through family links or tribal links  
- because armed groups members come from the same tribe as the community. Hence they are controlled through tribal relations and elders in particular  
- however, this means that people from other communities / tribes might not have the |

⁷ This is not a consensus area of analysis, as this table categorisation is taken from a Peaceful Change Initiative Policy Briefing (July 2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>2. Local councils</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directly or via military councils</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• local councils can be centrally appointed, self-appointed or elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• oversight can be levered either directly or through military councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• however, a strong working relationship between the local council and armed groups (directly or via the military council), does not necessarily mean wider community accountability over armed groups’ actions – as local councils may not themselves have legitimacy (e.g. being ‘pro-revolutionary’ in an ‘anti-revolutionary’ area)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>3. Military Councils</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• mostly self-appointed bodies that attempt to be representative of armed groups in (or from) the area. In most cases, military councils do not have budgets or the ability to pay associated armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• have various links with national authorities: (1) can be closely associated with the MoD; (2) can be the main body of interaction with a range of ministries; (3) can be accountable to the local council; or (4) can operate completely independently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• association with a military council does not necessarily mean that armed groups undertake military tasks, or that armed group members will follow the directions of the military council (e.g. weak control in Zuwarah and Derna, but strong control in Zintan and Misrata)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>4. Ministry of Interior</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• through the Supreme Security Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the actual tasks undertaken by Supreme Security Committees can be very different in nature, including: (1) coordinating MoI-registered individual fighters, who are in turn clearly marked and identifiable; (2) focusing on capturing those with ‘blood on their hands’ and (3) as a vehicle for coordination between the main ‘compliant’ armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• registration with a Supreme Security Committee does not necessarily pull individual fighters out of their armed group or help with weapon control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>5. Ministry of Defence</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• either through direct oversight (e.g. Libya Shield or the National Army), or through positive relations directly or through military councils. A number of military councils and armed groups have stated that they are operating under the direction of the Ministry of Defence and are hence part of the ‘national army’ when undertaking national security tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• it is claimed that such fighters are still not paid, instead working because they are motivated by a desire to provide stability / security across the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, there appears to be some competition over who should set the agenda for security and justice sector development in the country, including both Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, and hence over who ultimately controls security institutions.

The Warriors Affairs Commission (of Rehabilitation and Development), which is based in Benghazi, in theory provides the main focus for DDR, through a programme of registering revolutionary fighters (‘thuwwar’), identifying their aspirations and skills, allocation of some registered thuwwar to government posts – primarily the Ministry of Interior and Defence – and vocational training / development programmes for the remainder. The Warriors Affairs Commission has been criticised for a ‘loose’ registration programme, with far more thuwwar than actually exist registered; with some sources also indicating that the Commission is considered to be illegitimate in a number of geographic communities. At the same time, DDR has been complicated by: (a) parallel registration processes developed in geographic communities – for example, Misrata’s military council had already elaborated a sophisticated process by the time the Commission was up and running; (b) the Ministry of Interior’s registration process linked to the Supreme Security Committees; and (c) the payments for thuwwar delivered through the Ministry of Social Affairs.

In terms of SSR, available sources point to parallel processes in the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, and at the local level in geographic communities. There is consensus that the Ministry of Defence has not been able to establish control over the various armed groups in the country, partly due to the fact that they are not always closely aligned with military councils (see above). However, even in those cases where armed groups are aligned with military councils, the military council may be more responsive to local elected or traditional officials than to the central government. It has been argued that this is in part because of the power that control of armed groups provides to geographic communities during the transition
At the same time, the Ministry of Interior has also looked to control armed groups through the Supreme Security Committees, which operate in parallel to normal police services. Sources indicate that the Supreme Security Committees have been more successful in those places with weak military councils – such as areas that are considered ‘anti-revolution’ (e.g. Sirte), or where there has been competition between various armed groups (e.g. Tripoli or Derna). Sources point to some competition between the military councils and Supreme Security Committees in some geographic communities.

Importantly, some sources also argue that some geographic communities have attempted to acquire greater control over national security actors through their influence in government ministries – most regularly evidenced by the fact that the Minister of Interior is from Misrata, while the Minister of Defence is from Zintan. Finally, some sources indicate that some austere Islamic groups have managed to gain control over the security sector in some geographic communities, either through armed groups, military councils or Supreme Security Committees; but there is no consensus on this issue.

5. Political actors

a. National actors

Transitional authorities
The National Transitional Council (NTC) is comprised of representatives from all communities in Libya, and has expanded over time both during and after the revolution / conflict. Despite enjoying an initial degree of ‘revolutionary legitimacy’, the NTC has been variously criticised for having ex-Qaddafi regime members, for alternatively favouring the Eastern and Western parts of Libya, and for a lack of transparency in decision making.

The process for selecting NTC representatives has not been clear, and there is little public analysis on the interests and relationships of individual NTC members, apart from those with a high profile. In general, sources point to a number of key groups that have been influential throughout the NTC’s lifespan. The first group comprises former regime officials: (1) the original leading individuals from Eastern Libya, including Mustafa Abdel Jalil; and (2) those associated with the reformist movement, including Mahmoud Jabril, who acted as a de facto war time Prime Minister and subsequently established the successful National Forces Alliance. The second group comprises Libyan expatriates, mostly from the exiled opposition movement, who returned during the revolution and are sometimes considered to promote a more liberal agenda. The most prominent of these is Ali Tarhouni, who established the National Centralist Party. The final group is comprised of activists that played central roles in organising revolutionary activities, and who may be perceived as having a greater degree of credibility.

There is consensus that the transitional government appointed by the National Transitional Council in November 2011 has suffered from a credibility deficit as: (1) it does not have a popular mandate, and was to be replaced by a new government as appointed by the National Congress (the elections for which were held on 07 July); (2) there has been a struggle with the National Transitional Council over decision-making authority in key areas, leading to a vote of confidence (passed); and (3) as it has not been deemed to have the political weight to manage the mosaic of armed groups across Libya in an authoritative manner. In addition, there is evidently some suspicion / frustration that the government includes returning expatriate Libyans (as epitomised by the Prime Minister Abdurrahman El-Keib and his Deputy Mustafa Abushagur), who are not thought to understand Libyans. Importantly, it is consistently argued that some pro-revolution geographic communities have looked to influence key ministries through acquiring positions at the top and mid-levels; with the ‘control’ of the Ministry of Defence by Zintan and the Ministry of Interior by Misrata the most frequently used examples.
Sources indicate that the transitional government will change shape substantially after the formation of a National Congress (which is tasked with appointing a new government and the creation of a constitutional committee); although it is believed there will be continuity at the level of deputy minister and in mid-ranking officials.

**Political parties**

At the time of writing, during the elections for a National Congress on 07 July, the main political forces at this time were judged to be: (1) the National Forces Alliance, a broad coalition of many smaller groups founded on a moderate or 'liberal' Islamic platform and positioned behind the profile of Mahmoud Jabril; and the (2) the Justice and Development Party, which is part of the wider Muslim Brotherhood. Other parties emphasising a more austere Islamic platform included the Al-Watan (Homeland) Party and the Party of Reform and Development. Parties considered more liberal include the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, founded in 1981, and the National Centralist Party.

**b. Foreign actors**

Libyans are acutely conscious of, and desire to avoid, influence from external countries and interests. This is partly a reaction against what is often described as 42 years of anti-international propaganda, as well as because a perceived vulnerability during the transition period and the belief that some external actors would look to exploit it for their political and economic benefit. As a result, there is deep suspicion of organisations and actions that originate in other countries.

**Regional**

Libya is undergoing a significant transition in its regional relationships as well as internally. While there was little analysis available on the influence of regional states on Libya at the time of writing, there was a consensus on the impact of the conflict on: (1) state-level political relationships; and on (2) regional community-level relationships. State-level political relationships between the transitional authorities and Algeria, Chad, Niger and Mali have deteriorated; with Algeria and Chad, due to accusations of active support for the Qaddafi regime during the revolution / conflict; with Niger and Mali, due to the flow of mercenaries from these countries during the revolution / conflict. At the same time, there are suspicions at the intentions of Tunisia and Algeria due to the protection given to some ex-Qaddafi regime officials by these countries’ governments. This suspicion is in turn linked to the fear of a counter-revolution led by expatriate Qaddafi supporters in the future. By contrast, relationships with Sudan improved due to the provision by Sudan of weaponry to the NTC, especially in defence of Kufra.

At the community-level, there is nervousness over relations with Chad and Niger in the south, due to the vast desert borders that are perceived to have become a significant security risk, in terms of smuggling and the crossing of armed groups, due to the low capacity of state security forces. The flow of anti-revolution fighters and weapons from Libya following the defeat of Qaddafi is considered to be of concern regionally. In addition, Libyans seem to be mindful of lessons, both positive and negative, from the other North African countries that experienced revolutions in 2011. This is most evidently the case with Egypt, which has provided a precedent in how to manage international organisations (e.g. the crackdown on foreign NGOs), but also created concern at the apparent interference of the military in the transition process and the success of austere Islamic political parties.

**International**

Motives of other international actors will likely include humanitarian and commercial, ideological and geo-strategic self-interest. Apart from the original urgency to avoid major civilian casualties at the beginning of the revolution, a prosperous and democratic Libya is seen as important for regional stability, and for the future progress of the Arab Spring. Securing oil and gas supplies will likely be of more importance for key importing countries,
whilst the European Union countries have a particular interest in assisting Libya to properly control illegal migrants from other parts of Africa that use Libya as a staging post for entry to Europe.

Part 2: Potential conflict drivers

For the purpose of this review, potential conflict drivers have been divided into three categories. The first category relates to those drivers that have their root in experience of the revolution / conflict, including grievances over treatment, and the manner in which those grievances are presently being addressed post-revolution / conflict. The second category relates to those drivers rooted in different interpretations of what a ‘fair’ distribution of opportunities looks like in the new Libya, including how political opportunities are distributed and the governance process established to manage them. The third category relates to long-standing changes in Libya society that were also at play during the Qaddafi period, including demographic changes and potential changes in values.

6. Experience of the revolution / conflict

a. Grievances and fears

Each community in Libya has had a different experience of the revolution / conflict period, which has informed separate and often clashing grievances and fears.

Human rights abuses and war crimes

There is consensus that one of the principal sources of grievances for many communities is the belief that they have suffered human rights abuses or war crimes during the period of fighting, and that these abuses / crimes have not yet been properly remedied. This feeling is most widespread in: (1) those pro-revolution communities that were at the forefront of the initial protests and subsequent fighting – such as Suq al Juma, Az Zawiyah, Misrata and Zintan; or in (2) perceived anti-revolution communities that experienced substantial violence towards the end of the revolution / conflict, and which feel that this violence has not been properly recognised – such as in Sirte and Bani Walid. This grievance is deepened by the perceived slowness of national justice mechanisms (including development of a ‘transitional justice law’), which is in turn are attributed by some communities to unwillingness on the parts of the transitional authorities for proper redress.

Continued existence of ‘pro-Qaddafi’ areas and ‘volunteer forces’

Sources also point to widespread grievances amongst pro-revolutionaries that some communities perceived to be ‘pro-Qaddafi’ are believed to have escaped the revolution, in that they are thought to be presently outside of the control of the transitional authorities and are thought to continue to harbour volunteer fighters. These accusations are often levelled against (for example), the communities of Bani Walid and Al Jamel, Raqadhin and Zaltan, and used as the rationale for the argument that force should be used against these communities to bring them under revolutionary control. As well as being ‘unjust’, the perceived existence of pro-Qaddafi areas outside of government control is often thought to represent a threat to the stability and viability of the new Libya, especially when allied with the fear of ‘pro-Qaddafi’ elements that have left the country.

Extra-judicial punitive actions

Sources also point to grievances among communities that were, or are perceived to have been, on the pro-Qaddafi side, at what are perceived of as extra-judicial punitive actions. These punitive actions are understood to be outside the rule of law, in that they do not follow standard legal measures and do not necessarily target those directly accused of specific crimes, but can also include the families, communities and tribes of the accused. As well as resulting in fear that communities could be intimidated, threatened or attacked at any moment,
these 'punitive actions’ are perceived to be proof that their communities are to be marginalised from the new Libya. As such, there is consensus across the range of available resources that perceived ‘punitive actions’ will increase divisions and the likelihood of violent conflict in the future. An important linked grievance for some on the pro-Qaddafi side (or believed to be on the pro-Qaddafi side) is that they have been unable to properly honour men within their family and tribes that died during the revolution / conflict – in that they are unable to publically refer to them as ‘martyrs’.

**Leverage of political and economic benefit by ‘pro-revolution’ areas**

At the same time, sources indicate that some of those accused of being pro-Qaddafi believe that these accusations are a way for prominent pro-revolution communities to leverage greater political influence in the new Libya at the expense of those that did not play as substantial a role – because those that believe they sacrificed more during the revolution / conflict, also believe they have a right to greater benefit and control post-revolution. This causes grievance, firstly because such utilisation of pro-Qaddafi accusations may directly impact on the political or economic opportunities of the accused community; but secondly they are in a number of cases thought to be unjust in themselves.

**b. Approaches for managing grievances and fears**

The manner in which grievances and fears from the revolution / conflict are being managed also has the potential to drive tensions, and even a return to violence in Libya.

**Focus on punitive justice and communal responsibility**

There is a consensus that those pro-revolution parts of Libya society that suffered abuses and crimes during the revolution / conflict are focused on achieving ‘justice’ through punishment; and believe that reconciliation processes should follow justice. In some cases, redress goes beyond punishment for those that committed the abuses / crimes at hand, to encompass those that ordered the actions, and the communities of those that committed the actions – collectively, those ‘with blood on their hands’. Importantly, for some on the pro-revolution side, punishment should also extend to all those that ‘volunteered for Qaddafi’ (meaning those that chose to fight in defence of the Qaddafi regime), irrespective of whether they are directly responsible for abuses / crimes or not. Some sources argue that this focus on punitive justice, often through armed groups (see below), indicate a lack of understanding of and support for rule of law processes.

**Use of armed groups, which in turn deepens grievances and fear**

There is a consensus that given the absence of functioning and trusted national justice institutions, armed groups have become the main vehicle for communities to exercise ‘justice’ and to manage conflicts with other communities. This can mean, dependent on the context: (1) fighting between the armed groups of communities that have mirroring grievances – as has occurred between Zuwarah and Al Jamel, Raqadalin and Zaltan, between Zintan and El Mashasha, between Az Zawiyah and the Worshefena, between Gharyan and Al Asabi’ah, and in Ghadames, Sabha and Kufrah; (2) the perceived threat of force against an entire community, the most prominent example of which is between Misrata’s armed groups and residents of Tawurgha; and (3) the arrest and detention of suspected persons from particular communities, including from Bani Walid, Sirte and Abu Selim in Tripoli.

Importantly, there is also a consensus that armed groups tend to behave well in their own community (because they are ‘part of the community’ – see above), and only commit punitive actions in other communities. Sources indicate that the use of armed groups to exercise justice has a knock on effects in terms of increased insecurity for some communities and self-enforced restrictions on movement, especially in those cases where communities believe they are at risk of violence or detention. This insecurity in turn reinforces the militarisation of communities, as they maintain or expand armed groups because they are believed to be essential for self-defence.
Role of the media in driving fear and grievance

There is a common consensus across available analysis that the media played a significant role in driving fear and grievances during the revolution / conflict, and continues to do so. During the revolution / conflict, Qaddafi-administration controlled media outlets were used to threaten a range of inter-community conflict and retributive actions against those participating in the revolution. These threats continue to be referenced by pro-revolution communities as the basis for their fear of future instability and the potential role of communities perceived to be pro-Qaddafi in driving such instability.

At the same time, Qaddafi-administration controlled media outlets created a good deal of fear in those communities associated with the Qaddafi administration, that if the revolution was successful, then they would suffer from punitive actions, marginalisation in the new Libya and even be forced to comply with austere versions of Islam. Following the revolution, the focus of the media on the revolutionary period, and on the crimes of Qaddafi and his supporters, is analysed to be divisive and to make it harder to overcome fears / grievances that one side has towards the other.

7. ‘Fair’ distribution of opportunities in the new Libya

a. Political influence

Decisions on how to allocate political opportunities have already proved to be a key potential driver of conflict in the transition period.

Lustration policy

The literature review demonstrated that society is divided on what policies should be adopted for dealing with Qaddafi-era officials, including when and to what degree they should be allowed to have a role in politics, and what criteria should be used for assessing an individual’s appropriateness for public service. In the meantime, Qaddafi-era officials continue to hold important roles in the transitional government, often with the direct backing of their communities. However, the presence of such officials causes substantial anger in some pro-revolution communities, especially when allied with a feeling that the transitional authorities have become non-inclusive and detached from the revolution. This is especially the case regarding officials in: (1) state security bodies, because of question marks over their actions before and during the revolution; and (2) Libya’s foreign delegations, due to concern over ‘outside influence’ and the destination of Libya’s oil wealth.

Allocation of seats for National Congress

There is clear consensus that allocation of seats for representatives in the National Congress, which is tasked with overseeing the creation of a Constitutional Committee, has been a substantial driver of conflict, with practically every community complaining that the allocation is not just. One of the most significant complaints has been from the federalist camp in the East (see below), which has argued that the Eastern and Western parts of Libya should be given equal number of seats, while others have argued that seats should be allocated according to population size, and others that seats should be allocated according to territorial areas. Perceptions that allocations are unfair could undermine the legitimacy of the National Congress, and hence the process of developing a constitution itself. Perhaps most importantly, it is not clear how the federalist movement will respond to the new National Congress.

Allocation of economic benefits and control of assets

There is also consensus that how legal economic benefits are distributed in Libya is a further potential driver of conflict, especially given the substantial oil wealth in the country. Indeed, the lack of transparency over how money is presently being spent by the transitional authorities has created a good deal of protest in the country, especially among those who cite the lack of fair distribution during the Qaddafi regime as one of the driving factors in the revolution /
conflict. Apart from the question of transparency, how economic benefits and money is distributed will make a strong statement over who deserves reward and who deserves punishment, and could potentially fuel resentment among those that have ‘missed out’. For example, the decisions to make one-off payments to revolutionary fighters and political prisoners has been criticised for not valuing the experiences of other people in society, and for creating competition over ‘revolutionary status’.

In addition, there has been a good deal of analysis of attempts by various political actors or geographic communities to gain control of Libya’s assets – including its natural resources. For example, there is consensus that there was a ‘scramble’ by armed groups to control various assets during the revolution, including the oilfields in the south and key infrastructure such as roads and airports. In addition, a desire to control the hydrocarbon wealth in the East of the country, which some believe to have been unequally distributed during the Qaddafi period, has been argued to be one of the main driving forces of the federalist movement.

**Control over illicit flows**
Sources also agree that the post-revolutionary period has already demonstrated the potential for violent completion over trafficking routes, which are an important source of wealth given Libya’s long borders and cross-border communities (especially the Tuareg and Tabu). Sources point to trafficking: (1) in weapons (e.g. to Mali) and oil (e.g. to Sudan) from Libya; and (2) in migrants and drugs to Libya and onwards to Europe.

It has been argued, that for some groups the revolution has presented an unprecedented opportunity to ‘renegotiate’ access to the economic benefits of trafficking. For example, the recent fighting in Sabha and Kufrah, while partially due to experience of the revolution and ethnic divisions, was also related to control of important trafficking routes along the Southern borders. At the same time, the conflict between Zuwarah and Al Jamel, Zaltan and Raqadalin, has been commonly attributed to control of trafficking routes across Libya’s Eastern borders. By contrast there does not seem to have been an attempt to challenge control of trafficking routes across the north-eastern border with Egypt, which is reported controlled by armed groups from Tubruq.

**Community narratives and marginalisation**
Some sources (but not all) argue that agreement on how to distribute political influence in Libya is made more complicated by the fact that most communities have competing narratives on: (1) the history of the revolution, which in most cases gives primacy to their own experience; and (2) the unique suffering and neglect experienced by the community during the Qaddafi period. It is argued that while the residents in a community are aware of and support their own narrative, they are often unaware of or dismiss the narratives of other communities. These separate narratives are important as they are used to provide legitimacy for why a particular community has greater right to influence the decisions made in the new Libya, and to benefit from the allocation of political and economic opportunities (see above). In addition, the failure of the revolution to live up to these narratives have for many communities driven a perception of marginalisation, which in turn increases the risk of future violence, as communities maintain or expand their armed groups in an effort to protect their rights and overcome their ‘marginalisation’.

**b. Governance system**

The development of a new governance system also brings with it important potential drivers of conflict.

**Local accountability – decentralisation, devolution and federalism**
There is consensus that the diverse opinions that exist on the appropriate distribution of political influence across the country represent a further potential driver of conflict. There is in general a societal desire for greater decentralisation and devolution to the local level, and hence greater control over decisions that affect each community. This is in part a response to
the lack of genuine political accountability at the local level during the Qaddafi period. There is, however, disagreement on whether this should extend to a more federal arrangement of governance. Federalist arguments are most predominant in the East of Libya (especially in Benghazi) and to a lesser extent in the South, and are driven by a belief that the Eastern / Southern parts of the country were politically and economically side-lined during the Qaddafi period, and that a similar pattern is unfolding post-revolution. The speedy reallocation of governance institutions from Benghazi to Tripoli following the end of the revolution / conflict, and the subsequent drop in consultation on decision-making are believed to be proof of this pattern.

De facto local autonomy as a risk for state-building
Irrespective of the policy arguments on the type of local autonomy most appropriate for Libya, there is consensus in the literature that many areas have de facto local autonomy. This autonomy is provided through the local councils that were created during the revolution, and in some cases have had their legitimacy increased following local elections. These councils in some cases appear quite autonomous from the national transitional government or the National Transitional Council – including both those representing geographic communities that had a driving role in the revolution (e.g. Misrata) and those that did not (e.g. Bani Walid). Importantly, some of these local councils have effective control over substantial armed groups or economic resources, meaning that they have a greater ability to influence national politics. Some sources argue that these de facto autonomous geographic communities represent a threat to the state-building process, including the development of national security and justice institutions, as they look to defend their interests through separate political and military capacities.

Unrealistic expectations of the pace of change
There is a consensus among reviewed literature that high levels of expectations on the pace of change in developing a new governance system represent a key potential driver of conflict. These expectations are in many cases unrealistic and demonstrate a lack of wider societal understand of what is required to build a new state, and the proper process of democracy. As a result, there is concern that the positive energy created by the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime could translate into action and protest against the transitional authorities if they are believed to ‘drag their heels’ on the reform process. This in turn could lead to the transitional authorities being pressurised into rushed actions, for which the groundwork has not been properly laid. Further, there is concern that the expectations could be manipulated – e.g. by those with an interest in promoting specific political or ideological agendas.

Distrust in transitional authorities
Available literature also points to low levels of trust from many communities towards the transitional authorities, for a number of reasons, including: (1) concern at the continued role allowed to Qaddafi-era officials; (2) the presence of officials who have been overseas for substantial parts of the Qaddafi period and / or during the revolution / conflict – it is felt that these officials have limited legitimacy as they are cut off from ordinary Libyans and have not shared in the suffering experienced during the revolution / conflict; (3) reduced consultations on key decisions since the end of the revolution / conflict; and (4) a lack of transparency on how funds are spent in the country.

Role of women in governance
The potential for women to participate in governance processes in Libya has also been flagged as a divisive issue in available analysis. In many communities (especially in the East), women played key social role roles during the revolution / conflict, in support of the men fighting in armed groups. This had led to experience and expectation of a more substantial role in society. However, some literature is concerned by what appears to have been a cultural and social push-back against the potential for an increased role for women. This was most evident in the cap placed on the number of female representatives in the draft electoral law for the National Congress and in the negative reaction in some quarters to female candidates in the elections themselves.
8. Wider societal changes

a. Changing demographics

Immigration and the nationality question
There is consensus in available literature that Libya has undergone a significant demographic change in line with the development of the country’s oilfields, as migrant workers from other parts of Africa (as well as from Asia) have moved to Libya in search of employment opportunities. The major part of these migrant workers has come from the Tabu and Tuareg communities in neighbouring Chad and Niger. This demographic change, mixed with the country’s long and porous borders, has resulted in dispute over who has the right to call themselves ‘Libyan’ and who should be considered as ‘foreigners’. As noted above, conflict over whether Tuareg and Tabu have the right to Libyan nationality has led to increased inter-ethnic tensions and violent clashes in both Sabha and Kufrah in the South West and South East respectively.

Prejudice against black Africans
Some sources argue that the dispute over nationality rights is also closely related to a deeper question of prejudice against black Africans. It is argued that this prejudice has been partly reinforced by the perceived reliance of the Qaddafi regime on black African mercenaries during the revolution / conflict. According to some narratives there would have been no inter-Arab fighting in the revolution without the use of foreign mercenaries, as tribes would have surrendered or changed sides through negotiation. As a result, the post-revolution period saw a significant crack down on black Africans in Libya, many of whom were migrant workers without legal documents, rather than mercenaries fighting for Qaddafi. It has also been claimed by some sources that the displacement of the Tawurgha population to Benghazi and Tripoli has been accepted by Arab society because of prejudice against black Africans.

b. Changing values

Concerns over religious divisions and social degradation
Available sources indicate that the post-revolution period has created concern in some parts of society over the potential for religious divisions and degradation of social values. These concerns in part stem from observations of internal conflict, between religious and ethnic groups, in other transition countries, such as Iraq or Egypt; and the desire to avoid similar occurrences in Libya. As a result, there is some apprehension over the potential for an influx of foreigners into Libya following the end of the Qaddafi regime and an insistence that any Western / international migrants live according to local rules.

These concerns also stem from nervousness over the impact of greater exposure to foreigners on social values. This is in part a question of to what degree Western and international standards on (e.g.) human rights and democracy will challenge (and even contradict) accepted social and Islamic standards, and whether Libyan society itself has the skills to challenge accepted values in a constructive manner. A clear example of this potential conflict between international norms and traditional culture is in the role of women in society (see above).

Islamic Renaissance
Post-revolutionary Libya has also seen a renaissance in Islamic culture and devotion, in part because of the restrictions placed on Islamic practise by the Qaddafi regime. During the Qaddafi period, Eastern Libya in particular was home to widespread support for the Muslim Brotherhood as well as significant militant uprisings by the associated Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; which were in turn suppressed by regime security services. This recent history of political and militant Islam builds on significant Islamic history in both Derna and Al Bayda.
Figures from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (now the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change) played important roles in the revolution / conflict, and have since continued to play important roles in the transition period.

There is no common analysis on the impact of this Islamic renaissance on the potential for conflict. Some analysis points to concern in some parts of society at the influence of austere Islamist groups in the transition process. This is in part because of the manner in which Qaddafi described the revolution as ‘a front for Al Qaeda’ and threatened that a successful revolution would result in the necessity to adhere to an austere form of Islam. There is also concern at the apparent increase in actions by militant Islamist groups, including attacks on gravestones and on international representations in the country, as well as their control over some military councils, Supreme Security Committees or armed groups. At the same time, other literature points to the moderate version of Islam preferred in Libya, the relative homogeneity of religion (with the country almost exclusively Sunni Muslim), and the relative lack of success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya in elections for a National Congress, as compared to Tunisia and Egypt.

Part 3: References

The analysis provided in this document is based on a wide ranging review of English-language literature on the conflict context in Libya from February 2011. This includes:

- 4 Academic sources
- 14 Portal / blogs
- 61 News / media articles
- 17 NGO publications
- 8 Official publications
- 13 Think tank publications

A full list of sources, referenced by main theme, is provided in a separate document.