

Lessons Learnt in Monitoring the Implementation of EU Women, Peace and Security Policy

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An analysis of the current EU indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security

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Civil Society Dialogue Network

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Executive Summary

Findings

The first report on the EU indicators has been useful in illuminating both their strengths and areas for revision. It is nearly three years since the indicators were published; this and other developments¹ mean that it is a good time to refresh the indicators on the basis of the existing reports and lessons from other indicator sets and monitoring mechanisms.

The indicators aim to drive implementation and to build accountability. Their ability to do so depends on their compliance with the following criteria:

Relevance and applicability: The indicators are relevant to the women and peace and security (WPS) agenda, reflecting the four pillars of UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1325. They apply to both EU institutions and EU Member States (MS). They would be strengthened by (a) measuring the *input* (what efforts have been made) and *outputs* (what impact has been achieved) and (b) ensuring attention to the *quality* as well as the *quantity* of inputs.

Clarity: This is variable. While a limited number ask for specific, discrete information, many indicators request mixed information or are ambiguous as to the real information sought. This allows responders to report – purportedly against the indicators - on issues that are not directly relevant to the WPS agenda. Greater clarity would encourage responders to focus on the WPS agenda, removing possibilities for obfuscation or double-counting.

Measureable: Some indicators mix quantitative and qualitative information. This carries a danger that the indicators being able to track (and drive) progress over time and thus to fulfil their role as ‘*signposts of change*’². In refreshing the indicators, consideration should be given to the use of sub-indicators.

User-friendly and attributable: Unlike the global indicators, the EU indicators require responses only from those with the resources to do so – MS and EU institutions. Nevertheless, response to the indicators has been poor, compromising their utility. As well as more robust messaging from MS and EU leadership regarding the indicators (and the WPS agenda as a whole), the indicators can be made more user-friendly by ensuring that they break down the data required, focus on attribution to the EU’s efforts and focus on the WPS agenda.

Catalytic: The indicators need to contain a ‘so what’ element – prompting responders and others to take remedial action.

Comprehensive: The indicators cover important areas such as security sector reform and women’s participation in peace processes. They also need to include *relevant* aspects of humanitarian assistance and, crucially, post-conflict rule of law and transitional justice.

¹ Including the publication of global indicators by the UN Security Council and associated reports, post-2015 agenda, the recent G8 meeting, the upsurge in interest in tackling violence against women and lessons to be learned from the children and armed conflict agenda

² UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council 6 April 2010 S/2010/173

Summary of recommendations

There is much to be learned from the work of civil society³, the global indicators and other monitoring mechanisms⁴.

For the EU Task Force on Women, Peace and Security in refreshing the indicators:

- i) Ensure that the indicators are clear by seeking manageable types and levels of information and by disaggregating information on *inputs* and *outputs / outcomes*;
- ii) Ensure that the indicators focus on the WPS agenda – bringing ‘women’ or ‘gender’ into ‘peace and security’ rather than ‘peace and security’ into ‘women’ or ‘gender’;
- iii) Include options for formalised reporting by civil society (such as ‘shadow reporting’ or including civil society organisations as respondents specific questions);
- iv) Include sub-indicators where necessary to obtain clear and reliable information;
- v) Consider a ‘praise or shame’ list for Member States (MS) and institutions to be included in subsequent reporting;
- vi) Include resourcing as a means of determining level of input by institutions and MS;
- vii) Include time-bound indicators or benchmarks;
- viii) Consider narrowing the indicators to a set of thematic issues that may reflect the WPS ‘pillars’, such as rule of law, humanitarian response, peace processes and security sector reform.

For the EU Task Force on WPS in strengthening implementation:

- i) Consult with EU institutions and EU MS on how to improve reporting rates;
- ii) Institute a mechanism for training and support within EU institutions and MS on the use and value of the EU indicators. To this end, investigate the possibility of a help-desk facility;
- iii) Ensure that the views of women’s civil society (EU-based and in third countries) are integrated into the indicators themselves and the monitoring mechanisms;
- iv) Re-launch the refreshed indicators for the third cycle of reporting in 2015 to coincide with 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325;
- v) Make learning and experience from this process available to other institutions, organisations, partners countries;
- vi) Dedicate specific resources to this process and use all means at its disposal through the relevant institutions to ensure that adequate resources are allocated for implementation and monitoring of the WPS agenda.

For EU Member States:

- i) Reiterate a commitment to the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 (hereinafter CA) and to address all aspects of the WPS agenda;
- ii) Provide full responses to information requested on the indicators and how to overcome constraints in reporting;
- iii) Ensure that National Action Plans on WPS contain an implementable, clear monitoring mechanism including indicators which link to the EU one;
- iv) Explore the potential of a ‘help-desk’ facility for MS and EU institutions and conflict-affected countries to provide technical assistance in implementing the WPS agenda.

³ Particularly the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders.

⁴ Notably the children and armed conflict agenda and human rights treaty monitoring bodies.

Introduction

This report was commissioned by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) as a background paper for a Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) meeting on monitoring the implementation by the European Union (EU) and its member states of the EU Comprehensive Approach to UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 1325 and 1820⁵. Its aim is to analyse the design of the monitoring mechanism used by the EU and its member states and to make recommendations to the EU, to its Member States and civil society for improving both the indicators used in the monitoring exercise and the way in which progress is recorded against those indicators. The EU has agreed⁶ that it will be necessary to review some of the indicators and the way information is collected; this report is a contribution to that effort.

The CSDN meeting and this report are predicated on the principle that the spirit, as well as the letter, of the 'Women, peace and security' agenda is central to the prevention and resolution of violent conflict and peacebuilding. They also reflect an increased awareness amongst policy-makers and civil society that the effective implementation of this agenda depends on rigorous monitoring and accountability mechanisms.⁷

After a brief background to the Comprehensive Approach (CA) and the associated indicators, the paper analyses the extent to which these indicators are likely to meet their aims before drawing lessons from other indicator sets on women, peace and security or other, relevant monitoring mechanisms. Finally, the report makes recommendations for the EU, for its member states and for civil society to improve the mechanisms by which progress may be tracked and, therefore, promoted.

Background

The CA was drawn up in 2008, reflecting a renewal of momentum in the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda as evidenced by UNSCR 1820 and growing awareness that, despite many good intentions and declaratory statements, implementation of UNSCR 1325 remained slow. While women's bodies were still being used as loci for parties to armed conflicts, they were conspicuous by their absence in peace processes and formal, peacebuilding endeavours. Opinion in the international community was coalescing around the need for robust, motivational indicators to leverage then measure progress. Within civil society and some EU member states, there was also a growing recognition of the need for accountability mechanisms⁸ regarding implementation of these resolutions to which all UN member states are bound⁹. Hence, the CA contained a commitment to drawing up indicators for progress regarding the protection and empowerment of women in conflict and post-conflict settings.

⁵ [Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 \(December 2008\)](#)

⁶ Report on the EU indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council UNSCRs 1325 & 1829 on Women, Peace and Security, approved by the Political and Security Committee on 11 May 2011

⁷ Ambassador Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury at the working meeting on 1325 on 27 July 2010 at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/1325.pdf>

⁸ For example, the UK's National Action Plan recognizes the need to work more closely with civil society in drawing up and tracking progress against the plan http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/523/uk_nap_on_unscr_1325_hmg_2010%5B1%5D.pdf

⁹ Article 25, Charter of the United Nations.

The impetus to create a set of indicators was given a further push at the global level by UNSCR 1889 (2009), which called for the development of a set of global indicators to track the implementation of UNSCR 1325¹⁰. These indicators were also agreed in 2010. The global indicators are covered in more detail below.

The UNSCRs neither arose in a vacuum nor stand alone. International and regional human rights law contains, essentially, mechanisms for accountability through treaty monitoring bodies and the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. While, for a variety of reasons, the instruments do not contain sets of indicators or progress benchmarks they offer a means by which individual states can be held accountable and trends can be identified. Importantly, they also provide an opportunity for civil society to produce 'shadow reports' to states' official reports.

Between 2008 and 2010, the issue of violence against women started to gain traction across the international community, not least due to renewed realisation about the prevalence and barbarity of conflict-related sexual violence and recognition that violence against women constitutes one of the most prevalent human rights violations in all countries¹¹, impacting on development and national security.

Within the EU and some of its member states (MS), issues of gender and international development assistance, which had previously met with a lacklustre response, started to gain momentum. Examples include the EU Gender Action Plan (2010), drawn up to address "A growing awareness of the gap between EU policy and practice on gender equality on the part of several MS."¹²

By 2010, a number of EU MS¹³ had developed or even revised their own National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325, including action to be taken in partner countries facing violent conflict or its aftermath. In Africa, the 2006 Pact on Peace, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region contained at least the outline for a follow-up mechanism and grew in influence across the region in subsequent years.

In 2008, recognising that tracking progress can stimulate progress, the UNSC decided on a set of four indicators, covering gender training for relevant staff, the gender balance of EU staff deployed in conflict contexts, the level of funding for support to women affected by violent conflict and the granting of international protection to women and men¹⁴.

The UNSC's children and armed conflict agenda is a useful parallel with the WPS agenda. The first resolution in 1999¹⁵ was prompted by a shared global outrage at violations committed against children by armed forces and groups¹⁶. As with the WPS agenda, the lack of progress on implementation prompted civil society and some member states to advocate for a robust

¹⁰ [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1889\(2009\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1889(2009))

¹¹ The UN Secretary General's UNiTE campaign was launched in 2008.

¹² O'Connell, H. March 2013: Implementing the European Union Gender Action Plan 2010 – 2015; Challenges and opportunities. (<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8305.pdf>)

¹³ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,

¹⁴ http://www.svet.lu.se/documents/2010_AKR_Beijing.pdf

¹⁵ [S/RES/1261 \(1999\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1261(1999))

¹⁶ Article 4 of the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child draws a distinction between armed groups (non-state) and armed forces (state).

monitoring and reporting mechanism¹⁷, which in this case includes a 'list of shame' presented to the Security Council.

Despite these similarities, the agendas differ in that the children's agenda is purely about protecting children from violations of international law. The WPS agenda – while also located firmly in international human rights and humanitarian law – *also* addresses women as people with a contribution to make, as well as victims of violations.

The aims of the EU indicators can be paraphrased¹⁸ as follows:

- Strengthening EU accountability
- Detecting progress and achievements
- Detecting gaps and weaknesses
- Facilitating subsequent policy-making and prioritisation of actions, with possible benchmarking
- Motivating personnel
- Facilitating clear communication about EU policy
- Improving EU visibility

This compares with the relevant functions of the global indicators, namely¹⁹:

- Improve decision-making for on-going programme and project management
- Measure progress and achievements as understood by the different stakeholders
- Ensure accountability to all stakeholders by demonstrating progress
- Assess programme, project and staff performance
- Identify the need for collective or remedial action
- To help identify areas of implementation requiring urgent attention.

In short, it is clear that the primary aim of the EU indicators is to **drive implementation** at the national, regional and international level by all EU actors and MS. The EU has a number of actors working on peace and security. At headquarters, these include staff from thematic and geographical divisions in primarily in the European External Action Service (EEAS) and staff in crisis management directorates (CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) while at field level, the EU has delegations in conflict-affected countries, Special Representatives for specific countries or conflicts and, of course, the CSDP missions themselves.

Both the CA and the indicators make specific reference²⁰ to implementation by MS, with a special focus on their NAPs on UNSCR 1325. In this regard, the indicators should also help MS to refine the quality of their national action plans. Indeed, the fact of having indicators should itself encourage MS to draw up a clear and robust monitoring framework for their own plans, ideally linked to the EU level framework.

A monitoring framework aids accountability at national and regional levels. EU institutions are accountable to MS and the governments and civil society of the countries in which they

¹⁷ [UN Security Council resolution 1612 \(2005\)](#)

¹⁸ From document 11948/10 Indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security and the Report from the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union on Beijing + 15 The Platform for Action and the European Union (op cit).

¹⁹ S/2010/173 Women and peace and security Report of the Secretary General 6 April 2006 See paragraphs 4-6.

²⁰ See, for example Indicators 9,10 & 12 in general terms and Indicators 1 & 6 on NAPs.

operate. MS are accountable to their own population, to governments and civil society of partner countries and to each other. The indicators should be a means by which EU member states can hold the EU institutions accountable.

The differences between the EU indicators and the global indicators should mean that they are complementary. Moreover, the gathering of data (for instance on the number of women engaged in peace processes) should be mutually beneficial for each set of indicators. Moreover, the EU indicators can support (and be supported by) other processes such as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council²¹.

The extent to which the indicators fulfil these functions

The 17 EU indicators were created by the EU Women, Peace and Security Task Force (the Task Force)²².

In drawing up the indicators, the Task Force made the following decisions:

- To use available data
- To limit the number of indicators
- To make the indicators usable by both EU institutions and EU member states
- To ensure their complementarity to the global indicators
- To supplement the indicators with examples of good practice and qualitative, narrative descriptions

In some regards this contrasts with the global indicators which have been criticised for requiring further, extensive work in order to make them usable at all; for an over-reliance on information that is not available in most developing, conflict-affected countries or for having unrealistic expectations²³ of the progress that can be made in the aftermath of violent conflict²³.

The first report²⁴ reviews progress in implementation from 2008 to when the indicators were published. Hence, rather than ask whether the indicators *have* driven implementation, created accountability and so on, it is perhaps more appropriate to ask whether, in their current form, the indicators *are capable* of doing so. This means asking whether the indicators are measuring (or attempting to measure) the right change, whether they are termed accurately and robustly and whether they carry sufficient and appropriate sanction for poor performance or can prompt remedial action by those responsible. In addition, their effectiveness depends on whether they are clear - compelling accurate reporting - or whether they are ambiguous, allowing for obscure reporting. In this regard, it is important that the EU institutions, MS and those compiling the progress reports are clear about the definitions used in the indicators. This latter point is covered in more detail below.

²¹ For instance, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders: See <http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcompage.aspx>

²² The EU Task Force on Women, Peace and Security is an intra-institutional body led by the European External Action Service and involving representatives of the European Commission as well as from the Member States. Others such as NATO, UN Women and civil society organisations attend by invitation as observers.

²³ Ambassador Chowdury op. cit.

²⁴ Report on the EU indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 & 1820 on Women, Peace and Security 11 May 2011 9990/11.

The first report of the use of the indicators also serves to illustrate whether they are sufficient to create a useful baseline against which progress can be measured. In doing so, it is important to remember that, unlike the global indicators, the EU indicators measure progress *by EU institutions and EU MS*, rather than by conflict-affected countries. In this regard, the indicators can afford to be more demanding and less incremental than if they were aimed at partner countries, although they should still be user-friendly and an aid to implementation, rather than a burden on already busy professionals.

Driving implementation – necessary criteria

In general terms, the indicators are capable of driving implementation. They elaborate the key requirements such as support to partner countries on developing national plans or policies to implement the WPS agenda, funding support to women's civil society, the inclusion of women in EU mediation efforts and the recognition of women's asylum claims from conflict-affected countries. In principle, given that firstly the EU MS are bound by the UNSCRs and by their agreement with the policies of the EU; and secondly that EU institutions have a mandate to follow EU policies as well as international law, there should be no question that the requirement to report on these issues will both elicit a full response and prompt states and institutions to take the necessary action so that they can report positive progress.

The reality, however, seems to be different. This is not just so for the EU indicators – the global indicators also have a variable rate of response. In order to be effective – whether in driving implementation *per se* or stimulating accountability, there are some basic criteria which need to be fulfilled.

i) Relevant and applicable

The EU indicators are all relevant to the WPS agenda – in that they address the four pillars of UNSCR 1325. They are also almost all relevant and applicable both to the EU institutions and the role of EU MS – including in terms of support to conflict-affected countries in *their* implementation of the WPS agenda. To ensure that the indicators are relevant, they should be restricted to the WPS agenda. For example, Indicator 17²⁵ – an important indicator of MS' adherence to international law and their own national standards²⁶ may include applications on the basis of persecution that is unrelated to violent conflict (e.g. on the basis of sexuality).

In order to be applicable to the work of the EU, the indicators need to measure both the *input* of the EU (such as the support given to women's participation in peace negotiations) and the *output* of these actions (such as the involvement of women's civil society in peace negotiations). The latter will include the extent to which the EU has managed to leverage support by, for instance, UN or regional bodies. Indicator 9 measures the level of support given to women's participation in (any) peace negotiations (the *input*). Indicator 8 measures women's participation in peace negotiations supported by the EU but does not tie this indicator to any activity by the EU. It misses an opportunity, therefore, to measure the extent to which the EU has managed to leverage its influence and guarantee that women are represented in peace processes.

The applicability of the indicators would also be stronger, if they addressed the *quality* of EU actions as well as the *quantity*. Interventions are more likely to be effective – and provide value

²⁵ This indicator comes from the 2008 set of four indicators.

²⁶ Many EU states have incorporated gender guidelines on assessing claims for asylum

for money – if they are of good quality. For instance, Indicator 4 on coordination refers only to the *fact* of coordination. If the indicator measured *how* the coordination mechanisms were conducted (for instance whether they met regularly, were led by senior personnel and reported transparently), the mechanisms are more likely to be conducted effectively. Addressing the quality of EU action is likely to involve the creation of sub-indicators. Indicator 6, for example, on NAPs in EU MS would be more helpful if it could contain a set of sub-indicators regarding, for instance, how often these plans were reviewed, the budgetary allocation towards their implementation or their involvement of civil society, which are recognized as significant signs of a plan that is likely to be successful²⁷.

ii) Clear

The clarity of the indicators is variable. Some are clear, such as Indicator 12 on the proportion of relevant staff members trained specifically in gender equality and Indicator 13 on the inclusion of references in CSDP mandates and planning documents.

Others appear clear but on closer examination are less so. These include Indicator 8 on the number and percentage of women mediators and negotiator and women’s civil society groups in formal or informal peace negotiations. This indicator conflates the involvement of women’s civil society organisations – CSOs - involved in informal peace negotiations (such as ‘people to people’ or ‘women to women’ dialogues) with the appointment of women mediators and negotiators in formal peace processes. Thus, an institution or MS can appear to have done well under this indicator by supporting civil society women’s attendance at a side event to the formal peace process, even where women are excluded from the formal process itself. Unless the indicator robustly measures the number of women involved in the formal process, with official status, it allows for downgrading of women’s participation. The example quoted in the first monitoring report, from Uganda, serves as a reminder of the extra burden that women in ‘affected communities’ carry in order to have an impact, particularly where the EU institutions and MS have not ensured the inclusion of any women in the ‘high level discussions’²⁸. Indicator 9 – the degree to which EU activities have supported women’s participation in peace negotiations allows for attribution along a broad scale – from intensive, financial and political support to minor interventions under the umbrella of ‘lobbying’ or ‘highlighting’.

Lack of clarity or ambiguity may prompt responders to give confused or confusing responses. For instance, Indicator 1 asks for the number of partner countries in which the EU is engaged in supporting actions ‘furthering women, peace and security’ and/or drawing up national policies and plans. It is not clear, therefore, whether this indicator really aims to encourage MS and institutions to support the creation of NAPS or simply to help partner countries to do something that furthers the WPS agenda.

To a large extent, ambiguities in the indicators (and hence in the reporting) arise from an overly flexible interpretation of the WPS agenda. It seems that some responders have interpreted the WPS agenda as an imperative to include ‘peace and security’ in their work on women or gender, rather than to ensure that women (or even ‘gender’) is prominent in their work on peace and security. General gender equality work, work to support women’s human rights or even work on violence against women is not, necessarily, in furtherance of the WPS agenda. For instance, the first monitoring report on Indicator 2 states that “Some EU Member States

²⁷ Maguire S, McClean-Hilker L: 2012 Evidence for DFID Business Case on the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme – unpublished.

²⁸ 2011 Monitoring Report p. 23.

provide technical support...specifically on implementing CEDAW... Several Member States... reported that they consider development cooperation or humanitarian aid as main channels of support for the implementation of UNSCR 1325.” An example of good practice – the EU / ECOWAS Ministerial Troika explains that both sides agreed on the need for instruments such as micro-credit to guarantee “women’s equitable access to... resources.” While these initiatives are important and may indeed increase the likelihood of women being able to participate in peace processes and peacebuilding, it is important not to count all women’s empowerment as *per se* furtherance of the WPS agenda. Nor should the WPS agenda be considered a panacea for everything that needs fixing in post-conflict contexts.

Indicator 16 (the percentage of EUSR activity reports with specific information on WPS) provides another example. The EUSR for the Great Lakes Region reports that WPS references were made in 23% of reports (the highest reported number) but we are also told²⁹ that the Council Joint Actions on EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo, while including specific references to the need to combat sexual violence, do not mention gender.

iii) Measurable

Indicators are ‘signposts of change’³⁰. At a minimum, therefore, they need to track progress over time and to measure one action or change at a time.

Few of the indicators are explicitly time-bound. It is possible to track progress over time where the same institutions and MS respond each reporting period and there is generally a high response rate. Absent this, it is necessary to have benchmarks and targets. In Indicator 5, for instance, it should be possible to state a minimum level of funding (by proportion) of projects or programmes in specific sectors.

In order to measure progress over time, it may be necessary to separate out different aspects of the actions required. While the quantitative indicators are able to measure, for instance, increases in the proportion of trained personnel or of allegations of sexual abuse that have been investigated, the indicators which mix quantitative and qualitative measurements are largely un-measurable. Indicator 7, for instance, aims to measure the important dimension of collaborative action between EU and other bodies and recognises that this may take different forms. The wording ‘Number and type of joint initiatives...’, however, does not allow for the measurement of progress over time. As currently drafted, it also allows MS, who channel much of their money through multi-lateral organisations, to claim that they have engaged in ‘joint initiatives’ with these organisations. There is also scope for the EU institutions or MS either to (a) amplify their involvement in other bodies’ initiatives by having ‘attended’ or ‘actively participated’; (b) overstate the involvement of other institutions by manipulating the statistics (for example, a statement that ‘over 400 people attended, including NGOs, military officials and policy-makers’ may mean that the audience was comprised mainly of the latter two groups or it may mean that there were a handful of officials in an event consisting mainly of international women’s CSOs) or (c) ‘double count’ successful activities.

In order to keep the indicator set useful, clear and straightforward, the refreshing of the indicator set should apply a robust test to each to ensure it really does drive implementation.

²⁹ 2011 Monitoring Report p28.

³⁰ UN Secretary General’s report to the Security Council 6 April 2010 S/2010/173.

iv) User-friendly and attainable

The indicators have met with variable response from EU MS and institutions alike. Poor response may say more about the willingness or ability of the MS and EU institutions to respond than about the indicators. For example, the response rate for Indicator 17 was so low as to be unusable, while responses to Indicator 16 appear to have contained only a blunt statistic. Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that the indicators themselves do not overtax or overwhelm already hard-pressed personnel. Clear, comprehensive responses are more likely if the indicators themselves are clear and straightforward. Indicator 5, for instance, asks about the number and funding of all sectoral projects and programmes including health, education, humanitarian response and development. There is valuable information to be gained, here, about programmes and funding that relate directly to WPS. There is a danger, however, that this requirement for complex data for a multitude of programmes – some of which may not relate to the WPS agenda - can result in non-response or a loss of the information.

There is a tension between (a) having indicators whereby personnel are encouraged to report because they can report progress; and (b) encouraging real accountability, whereby personnel may have to report little or even negative movement. The CA and related documents are useful here, in that they create a mandatory framework against which EU personnel should expect to be measured. The challenge is to ensure that personnel in MS and EU institutions are aware of these documents, can engage with them and that this leads to regular reporting against the indicators. It is important to avoid respondents acting out of fear of criticism, or as if simply ticking boxes. If respondents felt that they would receive support on the challenges revealed by their monitoring (through for example sharing experiences and solutions), they might be more likely to act on the findings of the report, and to speak up on challenges such as insufficient or poor data.

Unlike the global indicators, the EU indicators *are* all attainable and, with some adjustment, can be reported against; in addition the EU indicators are free of unrealistic expectations visited on conflict-affected, poor countries, as they are aimed at the EU MS and institutions themselves. This should assist both with attainment and reporting.

v) Catalytic

In order to drive implementation, the indicators must – at least implicitly – contain a ‘so what?’ element. For instance, Indicator 11 on the number of women holding various positions within UN peacekeeping and CSDP missions reveals that there are few women. Sweden and Romania have the highest numbers while eight member states reported having no women participating in UN missions. The consequent question, therefore, is to enquire what the eight are going to do to remedy this situation. Setting a benchmark (say, 30%) would give these missions (as well as those that are doing better) a target to work towards.

In a similar vein, Indicator 15 asks about the *number* of cases investigated *and acted upon*, rather than asking about the action taken by CSDP missions to encourage reporting or, even to encourage positive behaviour by CSDP personnel. Moreover, the indicator does not require CSDP missions to account for *how* they have acted upon allegations. The fact that only four missions indicated that they have “dealt with” (sic) cases indicates either that sexual abuse and exploitation within CSDP missions occurs rarely or that allegations are rarely made. The report is silent about whether CSDP missions that did not deal with allegations did in fact receive more allegations.

Improved reporting against the indicators is essential for assessing progress against even the best of indicators. The challenge here lies with the internal accountability mechanisms of the EU (both its institutions and the MS) whereby decentralised delegations are trusted to report on important issues and there is little by way of peer review (or consequential action) across the EU as a community.

In order to ensure that the indicators are catalytic across the WPS agenda, it is worth considering whether to focus them on a **set of thematic areas** that broadly reflect the four WPS 'pillars' of participation, prevention, protection and relief and recovery. Suggestions here, taking into account the overlaps between the pillars, may include the rule of law / justice, humanitarian response, peace processes and security sector reform.

vi) Comprehensive

Apart from people exercising the right to seek asylum and a reference in Indicator 5, the area of relief and recovery (a pillar of UNSCR 1325) is not yet addressed specifically by the indicators³¹. If the indicators are to reflect the whole picture, it will be necessary to include humanitarian response (including but not exclusively) through ECHO. This may help to give the necessary impetus to ECHO to integrate gender considerations across its work³².

The areas of post-conflict rule of law and transitional justice are conspicuous by their absence, although many member states have brought the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) into their own legal framework and the EU has a clear focus on the rule of law as well as a formal commitment to the ICC³³. (Re)building justice systems is central to the existence of a society that is ruled by law, rather than by force. Moreover, it is an area in which women's experience has been, repeatedly, one of both exclusion and deep need.

On a positive note, the indicators do include the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) as key areas of peacebuilding.

Lessons to be learned from other indicator sets

The global and EU indicators have parallels in that they both measure the activities of their own organisations (UN and EU) across the range of peace and security and those of the respective MS. The global indicators are complex and sometimes difficult to report against³⁴ and they are almost exclusively quantitative for a largely qualitative issue.

International civil society has also designed indicator sets. Most notable amongst these is the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders' programme 'Women Count' which uses extensive women's networks in conflict-affected countries to provide information against a set of 15 indicators (some with sub-indicators). These indicators are not directly transposable, as a set, to the EU as they are not designed to focus on the institutions of either the EU or member states. They provide valuable lessons, nevertheless:

³¹ Although a limited number of member states attempted to claim that their compliance with the WPS agenda is performed through their humanitarian work.

³² See DFID's Multi-lateral Aid Review (2011)

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67606/ECHO.pdf and Grunewald et al (2011) Real time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by ECHO in Haiti 2009 – 2011 URD Group.

³³ [EU Strategic framework and Action Plan on human Rights and Democracy](#) (June 2012).

³⁴ The indicators are categorised according to whether it is feasible to expect reliable information about progress

The use of civil society networks in-country reduces the incentive for institutions to manipulate the information or to obfuscate. It also means that reporting is more likely to actually happen³⁵.

- Women's organisations have direct, reliable networks with people affected both by the violent conflict and by EU and MS's actions. They often also tend to have some experience in shadow reporting³⁶.
- The EU would be well advised to enlist the help of women's civil society and peace organisations to collect and provide information on EU implementation.
- The indicators are simple, straightforward and specific.
- Where the indicators are complicated, they break down into sub-indicators.
- A country focus promotes accountability; general claims can be tested against the reality.

Detailed recommendations

It is a good time to refresh³⁷ and re-launch the indicators and the reporting format.

To the EU Task Force on Women, Peace and Security:

- i) Refresh the indicators in the light of lessons learned from the first reporting cycle and the current one against the indicators, the UN Secretary General's reports on the global indicators and feedback from the CSDN meetings;
- ii) Determine what can be done to improve response rates by EU institutions and EU MS regarding implementation;
- iii) Engage in a consultation with EU-based civil society, particularly women's organisations from conflict-affected countries about the indicators themselves and how they can be effectively monitored;
- iv) Include CSOs in country as respondents to a specific questionnaire aiming at assessing the impact of EU support to implementation of UNSCR 1325 in their country to substantiate findings of the monitoring reports;
- v) Ensure there are distinct indicators measuring quantity and quality. Where necessary break-down indicators in sub-indicators;
- vi) Include options for formalised mechanisms for shadow reporting by national (MS) and partner-country based civil society;
- vii) Re-launch the refreshed indicators for the third cycle of reporting in 2015 to coincide with 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325;
- viii) Make learning and experience from this process available to other institutions, organisations, partners countries;
- ix) Dedicate specific resources to this process and use all means at its disposal through the relevant institutions to ensure that adequate resources are allocated for implementation and monitoring of the WPS agenda;
- x) Institute a mechanism for training and support within EU institutions and MS on the use and value of the EU indicators.

³⁵ This is also seen with the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies where civil society produces shadow reports

³⁶ See also, DFID's 'How to note on violence against women and girls' 2012 which explains the benefit of supporting women's rights organisations.

³⁷ Document 11948/10 states that "The indicators should be revised if deemed necessary and to reflect future developments in the area".

To EU Member States:

- i) Reiterate a commitment to the CA and to address all aspects of the WPS agenda;
- ii) Provide full responses to information requested on the indicators;
- iii) Report back to the EU on constraints faced in reporting or responding to requests for information on WPS and how this may be addressed in the next reporting cycle;
- iv) In collaboration with national civil society, draft or revise National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security to ensure that they contain an implementable, clear monitoring mechanism including indicators which link to the EU one;
- v) Explore the potential of a 'help-desk' facility for MS and EU institutions on implementing the WPS agenda;
- vi) Provide suitable assistance (technical, financial and political) to EU institutions and civil society in EU states and conflict-affected countries to enable their full contribution to a refresh of the indicators;
- vii) In particular, ensure that the EU Task Force on WPS is adequately resourced and staffed to drive implementation of the WPS agenda;
- viii) Ensure, through multi-lateral and bilateral fora that the WPS agenda is reflected in the post-2015 development agenda, particularly as it relates to violence against women and girls and to national and international security.

To civil society organisations:

Continue to work with EU institutions and EU member states to:

- i) Revise (or institute) monitoring mechanisms and indicators of EU member states national action plans on UNSCR 1325;
- ii) Share their experience in monitoring and evaluating peace and security work and devising user-friendly monitoring mechanisms;
- iii) Provide information for alternative or shadow reports against the existing indicators.