

Civil Society Dialogue Network Background Paper

Conflict analysis and assessment: where are we now?

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Civil Society Dialogue Network

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Conflict analysis has been a critical part of the fields of conflict resolution and transformation since their earliest days. Ten to fifteen years have now passed since the first significant efforts by larger organisations, NGOs, governments and multilateral organisations to systematise and formalise the experience of conflict analysis and assessment in methodologies and guidance. Since then, a large number of such analyses have been carried out.

This paper reflects on recent developments in the field of conflict analysis, drawing out lessons with particular regard to the implications for multilateral organisations. It examines the qualities and experience of different methodologies, which are taken to mean the guidance both on analytical content and on the process, as well as the actual practice of conducting conflict analysis.

Section 1: The State of the Art

1.1 Recent and notable developments

The most significant recent developments on full methodologies come from the US and UK governments. USAID produced a new version of its Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) in 2012¹. Building on its original framework, CAF 2.0 provides significantly more guidance on the process of conducting conflict assessments and producing recommendations. The UK government has developed a new whole-of-government Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework, which draws heavily on the DFID-owned Strategic Conflict Assessment methodology originally developed in 2000. The UNDP has been working on an update of its Conflict Related Development Analysis tool².

As well as these fuller revisions, many organisations have been providing ‘guidance notes’ on conflict analysis which reference, but do not provide, full methodological guidance. The EU, UK, UN PBSO and UN DPA have all recently issued such guidance³. The EU guidance note focuses on making the case for both conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis and provides brief guidance on the process of conducting analysis, referencing both an EEAS-developed ‘light-touch approach’ and a ‘fuller’ political economy approach with guidance from DEVCO⁴.

Both the CAF 2.0 and the JACS, like most other methodologies, provide similar guidance on the analytical framework, looking at structural factors, dynamics, actors, resilience and conflict management mechanisms, as well as future scenarios. However, the CAF framework remains one that is designed to be led by an expert team, with considerable fieldwork as part of the process. The JACS process puts more emphasis on bringing UK government actors to agree on a shared analysis, using a variety of source material.

This emphasis on bringing together internal stakeholders through workshops and discussions to agree a shared analysis is probably the most significant recent methodological change in approach to conflict analysis. It is now included in almost all recent guidance notes, including the EEAS guidance. It reflects an attempt to address weaknesses in earlier approaches whereby a lack of internal ownership has limited the impact of good analysis. This has often been in conjunction with attempts to develop and encourage ‘lighter-touch’ conflict analysis options: this tends to mean a process that can be completed in a shorter time-frame, with a smaller core group of participants, often based around a workshop approach.

In addition to the above developments led by governments and international institutions, the independent NGO sector has produced some important advances in conflict analysis methodologies, most notably in the area of participation. Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, with a grant from the EU, tested and developed approaches to participatory conflict analysis as part of the People’s Peacemaking Perspectives

project, producing both an analysis of their experience and key recommendations⁵. World Vision explored and documented the use of their ‘Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts’ methodology to develop macro-level conflict analysis through local perspectives⁶. These NGO approaches have tended to focus on civil society participation and their experiences are explored more in the section on multi-stakeholder analysis.

The most significantly different approach to emerge recently has been that of Fragility Assessments arising out of the New Deal agreed at the Busan High Level Forum in 2011. The assessments aim to bring together a variety of stakeholders to agree a country-led joint analysis and subsequent vision and plan to transition out of fragility. Stakeholders are identified as being representatives of line ministries, government coordination teams, civil society and development partners. Where Fragility Assessments take a fundamentally different approach to other methodologies is in their analytical framework, which is structured around the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) of: legitimate politics; security; justice; economic foundations; and revenue and services⁷.

It is also important to note the emergence of new platforms that provide both information and analysis. New media-monitoring databases such as ACLED⁸, the Social Conflict Analysis Database⁹, and GDELT¹⁰ are providing up-to-date data on violence and conflict, often at the sub-national level – an area where reliable data has often been scarce. Observatories such as the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention in Somaliland and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights collate and analyse locally-sourced information on a daily basis, providing new, regular sources of information for conflict analysis¹¹. Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media contribute to making information available globally in a way that it wasn’t when the first conflict analysis methodologies were being created.

1.2 The influence of changes in peacebuilding theory and practice

Approaches to conflict analysis have also been influenced by developments in peacebuilding practice. These developments are partly reflected in the new methodologies and guidance notes, but are mostly reflected in the way that analysis and assessment is done in practice.

Statebuilding and institutions

One of the strongest new narratives to emerge over the past ten years has been that of ‘statebuilding’, which is often tied – although not always comfortably – with peacebuilding. Statebuilding has certainly influenced approaches to conflict analysis in a number of ways: it has encouraged analysis to look more at formal state structures that are linked to violence, conflict and peacebuilding, such as the security forces or the judicial system; it has also encouraged closer partnerships with the state in both conducting analysis (e.g. the New Deal Fragility Assessments) and in building state capacity to manage conflict risks identified by the analysis.

Participation and legitimacy

Until recently, most conflict analysis assessments tended to be conducted by small expert-led external teams. This led to concerns about the lack of participation. Peacebuilding practitioners have become clearer about the value of public participation in facilitating change, and recent reflections on peacebuilding and statebuilding practice have also led to a stronger consideration of legitimacy¹².

Peacebuilding organisations have been developing ways – through focus groups, interviews, surveys, workshops and training – to engage a greater range of people from conflict-affected communities in the process of analysis¹³. Analytical processes have also started to pay more attention to who participates and on what basis, as well as assessing claims to, and sources of, legitimacy within the analysis. These

developments both increase the quality of the analysis and its perceived legitimacy, and create opportunities to use the process of analysis as a peacebuilding tool by facilitating discussion between different viewpoints.

From conflict analysis to peacebuilding analysis

The experience of conducting conflict analysis has also led to more recent efforts to place a greater emphasis on identifying options for programming and response. Some organisations now try to explicitly conduct a conflict *and peacebuilding* analysis¹⁴, with the latter element looking to learn from peace- and conflict-management efforts in the past, as well as looking at structures and relationships that exist in society and which contain the potential for peacebuilding.

The increased discourse around ‘resilience’ encourages analyses to examine the factors that help a society manage conflict, and the UNDP-led work on ‘infrastructures for peace’ has influenced analytical approaches, particularly within the UN, to think more about institutions that support social resilience to conflict¹⁵.

Mediation and analysis as a tool of conflict resolution

Mediation as a tool for responding to violent conflict has been growing in global prominence over the last ten years, as evidenced by the establishment of Mediation Support teams in the UN and EU, with a UN Standby Team of experts and a *European Resources for Mediation Support* structure. The UN Guidelines for Effective Mediation, which were issued in 2012, underline the importance of conflict analysis and stakeholder mapping for successful mediation¹⁶. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has produced a publically available Practice Series paper on conflict analysis for mediators¹⁷.

The non-governmental sector involved in mediation and mediation-support is also using conflict analysis with parties directly involved in violent conflict: both as a tool to help groups prepare for engagement in peace- and mediation-processes, and also as a tool to facilitate analysis and discussion between groups engaged in dialogue. More could be done to help ‘insider mediators’ initiate, use and access conflict analysis.

Conflict analysis: gender

Alongside the long-standing concern over the under-representation of women in peace processes, there has been growing interest in the peacebuilding field about the impact of gender on conflict and peacebuilding processes. UN Women has produced a short guidance note on gender and conflict analysis¹⁸, International Alert has produced important work on gender and peacebuilding¹⁹, and Conciliation Resources is working on a gender-sensitive conflict analysis resource pack²⁰. These all provide guidance on how to better understand gender within a conflict analysis and when considering appropriate responses.

Theme- and issue-specific adaptations

Conflict analysis methodologies have also been adapted to respond to issues of growing importance to the peacebuilding field. UNEP has a track record of conducting post-crisis environmental assessments, which often focus more on specific issues such as natural resources, land, population and climate issues²¹. There have also been attempts, such as the OECD’s SWAC’s work on the Sahel, to bring together climate change prognoses with conflict analysis to map areas of potential risk²².

Assessing the impact of businesses, and in particular the extractive industries on conflict has been a significant part of conflict analysis for many years, but recently that has become an increasingly collaborative endeavour with those companies, with conflict analysis methodologies being adapted and

developed for this purpose.

As radicalisation and violent extremism have grown as issues of concern on the policy agenda, conflict analysis methodologies have been adapted to help increase understanding of these issues through ‘Drivers of Radicalisation’ and similar studies²³.

1.3 The strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to conflict analysis

Given their diversity, conflict analysis methodologies do not all share the same strengths and weaknesses, but the most salient and common are identified below. Whilst some weaknesses may stem from the methodology itself, many often stem from the manner in which it is used.

Boundaries: what’s left out?

At an early stage in the process those conducting the analysis have to decide on the system boundaries: what actors and factors get focused on, what/who gets left out? Where that boundary line gets drawn, whilst necessary, will almost always be a source of weakness.

Most frequently the system is defined at a national level, with some – but much less – attention to regional, transnational and sub-national issues. Conciliation Resources clearly articulates the advantages to a regional approach to peacebuilding²⁴, whilst the 2011 WDR clearly highlights how different forms of violence are often linked and would thus require an analytical approach that transcends these boundaries²⁵.

As states and multilaterals increasingly pursue a ‘comprehensive approach’ bringing together defence, diplomacy and development actors (and often more), there is a greater possibility that the boundaries of analysis get influenced by other policy considerations and thus become more prone to missing key issues. The UK, for example, uses a ‘Register of British Interests’ (RBI) to help prioritise countries for analysis.

A boundary does need to be drawn somewhere, but paying carefully consideration to exactly where, recognising what an analysis is not addressing, and seeking to combine a variety of approaches to analysis can all help address this weakness.

Capturing dynamics and keeping the analysis up-to-date

Many conflict analysis methodologies are based on political economy analysis (PEA). In common with many PEA approaches they are relatively good at identifying and analysing structural issues. However, they are much poorer at helping us understand the dynamics of a conflict, and at unpicking some of the messiness of politics²⁶. This is particularly the case when violence has become instrumentalised and when armed actors have a vested interest in the continuation of violence as it entrenches their power and predatory opportunities.

Despite most guidance suggesting that they should be, analyses are rarely updated on a frequent basis. This both exacerbates the difficulty of providing meaningful analysis of often rapidly-evolving dynamics, and leads to individual pieces of analysis quickly being dismissed as ‘out-of-date’.

More thoughtful guidance, and a change in approach are needed to develop a more nuanced initial understanding of actors and dynamics. However, once this is done, perhaps through a more rigorous and participatory approach, ‘light-touch’, facilitated processes offer potential for keeping analysis alive and up-to-date.

Developing meaningful responses

One of the biggest and most consistent weaknesses has been whether analysis actually results in significant changes in programmes or actions. In the past, many well-intentioned and often very insightful analyses have led to little change. This is an issue which some of the new approaches are trying to address: by getting more ‘in-house’ staff involved in the analysis, the hope is that they have greater ownership of the result and are thus more likely to act. Initial indications suggest that this is true.

However, a lack of buy-in to the process has not been the only thing that has impeded action. Good analyses carefully identify the appropriate level of analysis in advance, be that at a strategic or programmatic level, so as to ensure their relevance to decision-makers. To lead to action, good analysis also requires a correspondingly strong set of policy and programmatic options and staff who understand them. This can often be a weak link. It also requires a strong understanding of how to create or encourage political change within a society – an area in which the development community could improve²⁷.

Both the EU and UN have recently been putting effort into training staff both on analysis and how to use it and on peacebuilding and conflict transformation approaches.

Participation: too much or too little?

The question of participation can be both a source of strength and weakness for most approaches to conflict analysis. Both broad and limited participation bring their advantages and disadvantages. These are explored more in the following section on multi-stakeholder analysis.

Section 2: Multi-stakeholder conflict analysis

There has been growing interest in multi-stakeholder conflict analysis. The primary drivers are two-fold, although not always compatible. The first is the ‘quality’ argument: that by involving more people, and in particular a wider range of views, you get a stronger product – a more detailed, nuanced, and in-depth analysis. This is supported by evidence and experience. The second argument is concerned with both efficiency and impact: that by involving a smaller group of the ‘right’ people (usually internally) you get a streamlined process and generate greater consensus and ownership of the analysis by the people that you want to act on it. You therefore increase the likelihood of the analysis impacting on programming and strategy.

2.1 Internal stakeholders

Governments and multilaterals have made particular progress on bringing together internal stakeholders, and the importance of this, as well as suggestions on how to do it, have featured prominently in recent guidance. The EU has been facilitating conflict analysis workshops in its delegations, often supported by training. The UK JACS process is designed to bring together staff from across different government departments, and the UK has started to create joint political teams in-country. In the UN, Peace and Development advisors are deployed with a specific pot of money to facilitate a UN country team analysis and take forward some of its findings.

This focus on bringing together internal stakeholders has been in response to earlier experiences of analysis which tended to be led by external experts, and whilst of high quality were often not sufficiently ‘owned’ internally to generate meaningful action. These new approaches, which often take a workshop approach, appear to be overcoming these issues, but bring their own disadvantages. Whilst ‘externals’ may also be invited, these tend to be from other similar organisations or ‘independent experts’. At times,

research and other inputs are commissioned in advance. However, there remains a high risk that the analysis is skewed as a result of being created by a small group who share a similar background and experiences. It is rarely subject to external challenge or scrutiny, which also raises questions of accountability.

2.2 External stakeholders

Civil society organisations have meanwhile been leading the way in developing multi-stakeholder approaches to conflict analysis that prioritise external stakeholders. They have used a variety of methods such as focus groups, interviews, surveys, deliberative fora and joint analysis workshops. Some of these are also recommended within guidance, such as for CAF 2.0., although more often as a data-gathering technique. Rigorous multi-stakeholder approaches place greater emphasis on the participatory discussion and joint analysis.

These consistently provide greater depth and nuance to the analysis. A multi-stakeholder approach can also generate a radically different understanding of the problem and potential solutions: de Waal illustrates how public consultations by the AU High-Level Panel for Darfur over forty days in 2009 generated a very different understanding of the violence from that held by the international community and also suggested a different solution in the form of an internal Darfurian process with wide representation at a round table²⁸.

Experience with wider multi-stakeholder analysis also demonstrates how the very process of analysis can itself serve as a peacebuilding intervention by bringing together individuals and groups with different views to jointly analyse the conflict.

These processes are not without their challenges: they require considerable amounts of time, energy and money; there are still challenges with accessing hard-to-reach populations and their views; there are security risks for both researchers/facilitators and participants; and the analysis process may not be backed by sufficient resources to translate ideas into action.

2.3 National Governments

Some attempts have been made to partner more explicitly with the national governments of countries experiencing conflict. A 2002 attempt by several donors to support a Nigerian government-led conflict assessment led to some very comprehensive analysis but little action. The New Deal Fragility assessments explicitly aim to put the national government in the driving seat, leading an inclusive process. However, in practice, the assessments – conducted in 5 out of 7 pilot countries to date – have generally been of mixed quality, and have not resulted in the intended meaningful political dialogue²⁹. Reasons include: an over-emphasis on technical exercises; the fact that some assessments have effectively been led by external experts and not country-owned; and that the outcomes have been used to adapt pre-existing accountability frameworks rather than to initiate political dialogue that also includes civil society³⁰.

A common issue with multi-stakeholder assessments, but which becomes particularly acute when involving governments of conflict-affected countries, is that many external actors (and domestic civil society) can feel restrained in the issues they can raise and the analysis they can present. For many it thus becomes at best one form of analysis that needs to be supplemented by other approaches that offer greater confidentiality for discussing politically sensitive issues.

2.4 Bringing these experiences together

Given the strengths inherent in all of these approaches, the big challenge therefore lies in bringing these

different elements of multi-stakeholder analysis together. This opens up new challenges: power relationships can inhibit open conversation; security concerns limit the sharing of classified information; inter-cultural issues can hamper constructive dialogue.

The PPP tried to address some of these challenges by facilitating dialogue between ‘representatives’ of the broader range of stakeholders and both government and EU officials in delegations and in Brussels³¹. The CSDN has proved to be an important means of facilitating dialogue between civil society specialists and EU staff³². The Arria formula allows civil society to speak directly to the UNSC. And NGOs engage in a wide variety of advocacy and dialogue activity to bring their analysis to the attention of officials, although information rarely flows so freely in the opposite direction.

It seems clear that what is not needed is some kind of meta-analytical methodology that seeks to proscribe a way of integrating these many elements. What *is* needed is greater awareness by all who commission, participate in, and use analysis, of the limitations of each approach and how it might be supplemented. Key questions should be: how are our own assumptions guiding this? What questions are we not addressing? Whose views are we not hearing? Continuing to build trust between organisations engaged in analysis will promote sharing and collaboration. It is also important to find more ways to allow analysis (including ‘official’ analysis) to be open to critique and challenge.

Section 3: The use of conflict analysis by multilaterals: challenges (and opportunities)

The preceding sections have identified a number of weaknesses in methodology and challenges in carrying out conflict analysis. Multilateral organisations will face many, if not all of these issues. However, they may also face some other particular challenges:

Getting agreement and focus

Reaching agreement on the need for a conflict analysis and its focus and purpose can be more challenging. Member States become additional internal stakeholders with their own views and perspectives, alongside internal institutional perspectives. Accommodating a diversity of Member States views and interests can dilute the focus of analysis, as well as impacting on its depth.

Some of these issues can be managed by delegating leadership for an analysis process to the in-country team, thereby potentially both reducing the number of Member States with a strong interest and reducing some of the political visibility of the process. Inviting Member States to contribute particular expertise can help address particular concerns without pulling all the resources behind the analysis in one particular direction.

What is the right level of stakeholder engagement?

Managing the increased number of internal stakeholders associated with being a multilateral organisation can make opening the process to external stakeholders appear even more daunting, and harder to get agreement on.

Using a variety of ways to promote participation by external actors can help. For example: in the preparatory phases; by funding, supporting and using more participatory analysis produced by others; by making stronger efforts to test and solicit critiques of the analysis.

The politics of the process and of the analysis

The politics of the process can become trickier in multilateral settings. This is particularly so when the

analysis is proposed to take place in or ‘on’ a member state. Clarity on purpose and transparency on process can assist, but where this is particularly sensitive it may be necessary to explore alternative ways of conducting analysis – for example supporting others to do so.

Influence: whose decisions and what strategy?

The challenges around influencing programming and strategy that is determined within the institution will remain similar to other contexts. However, in multilaterals some decisions will require a political decision between member states – within the PSC in the EU, for example, or in the UN Security Council. This poses additional challenges of how analysis generated by staff in the institution is used alongside analysis generated by Member States themselves, and the degree to which each influences decision-making. This can be problematic when analyses diverge (e.g. differences between UN staff in Rwanda and the Security Council in 1994), or when states have strong views on particular courses of action e.g. dialogue with armed groups.

Key individuals (e.g. SRSGs, EUSRs) can play an important role in bridging divides and facilitating discussions. Involving representatives of key Member States in the analysis process can be helpful. Internal and external advocacy may need to be done subtly but can also be useful.

Section 4: Conclusions and recommendations

4.1 Adapting conflict analysis to the changing nature of conflict

Changes in both the nature of conflict and our understanding of it point to new ways in which the practice of conflict analysis can be improved:

- **Improve analysis of actors and their motivations**

Although not a new phenomenon, more attention is being paid to the rational use of violence by powerful actors to acquire and maintain power, influence and wealth. Current conflict analysis methodologies are poor at capturing these dynamics. The use of emerging datasets and information about violence as opposed to conflict deaths can help shed light on where this occurring³³. New work on sources and manifestations of legitimacy could be used to analyse and understand these actors better³⁴. In general, the ‘actors’ section of analyses needs to be given more attention and more frequently updated.

- **Better understand the inter-linkages between different sorts of violence**

The 2011 Global Burden of Armed Violence report indicated that more than three-quarters of global violent deaths occur in non-conflict settings³⁵. The 2011 World Development Report highlighted the linkages between different sorts of violence³⁶. Conflict analysis methodologies could provide greater guidance, advice, and tools on assessing and understanding these interlinkages. The boundaries of conflict analysis processes needed to be shifted to encourage examination of these linkages.

- **Focus more on regional dynamics**

In a similar vein, the WDR and others have highlighted the regional dynamics to many conflicts. Greater attention should be given to taking a regional perspective to analysis.

- **Pay greater attention to dealing with the past and human rights**

The WDR also points out that 90% of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years³⁷. Conflict analysis is currently primarily used to analyse the present

and anticipate future risk. More attention could be paid to analysing the process of transition from previous conflicts. This could include greater attention on how a society has dealt with the past, going beyond a superficial look at formal justice mechanisms, and also drawing more on tools for human rights analysis.

- **Examine the conflict sensitivity of security and justice interventions**

Increased attention has been paid to security and justice issues over the past 5-10 years. Recent increases may be attributable to the WDR's focus on the importance of transforming security and justice institutions. However, it is not always clear that these interventions are as carefully planned as they could be. More attention could be given to using conflict analysis to ensure the conflict sensitivity of security and justice interventions, which carry particular potential to exacerbate conflict dynamics if poorly designed or implemented.

- **Focus more upstream**

The fact that the transitions in the Middle East and North Africa, often referred to as the 'Arab Spring', caught many policymakers by surprise is indicative of some of the shortcomings in when and how conflict analysis is used. Methodologies should encourage greater 'up-stream' use when societies exhibit structural risk factors even if the dynamics of (potential) violence are less immediately obvious.

4.2 Using conflict analysis to inform peacebuilding responses

As well as addressing the issues identified throughout this paper, the following can be particularly useful in creating better peacebuilding responses:

- **Reframe it as a conflict *and* peacebuilding analysis**

The most important step to take is to become more explicit about the peacebuilding purpose of the analysis. Analysis should be used to consider the (potential) structural causes of peace, the drivers of peacebuilding and the actors who have a role to play. Greater attention could be paid to what has worked in the past – both peace initiatives, and structures and institutions within society. Analysing peace processes themselves would also make a major contribution by helping learn from previous efforts and identifying weaknesses and opportunities in current processes.

- **Improve the use of analysis to understand individual incentives and motivations**

This element of actor analysis is often weak in conflict analysis, and needs to focus on motivations for collaboration as well as violence. This can be particularly helpful in informing efforts to establish or support peace- or mediation-processes.

- **Use conflict analysis as an intervention**

This can occur in many ways: parties can use analysis to prepare themselves and their constituencies for dialogue or negotiation; joint analysis can be part of a dialogue process at many different levels; it can be used to monitor and assess progress of agreements or to warn of difficulties.

- **Involve those people who you want to respond/act differently**

This lesson has been partially learnt and is being addressed by institutions that are focusing on including internal stakeholders whose behaviour they want to influence. But often the most important actors are those who hold positions of power in conflict contexts – find ways to involve these people, whether in person or by proxy.

4.3 The use of conflict analysis by multilaterals

In addition to all of the above...

- **Play to multilaterals' strengths: convening power**

There are significant gains to be made by getting a variety of significant powerful actors onto the same page by agreeing a shared analytical understanding of a conflict. Multilaterals have significant convening power in this regard and should ensure their ambition goes beyond seeking agreement amongst internal officials. They can use their convening power to bring political actors together around a shared analysis.

- **Make multiple analyses greater than the sum of their parts**

Multilaterals typically have far greater global reach and representation. They are likely to be producing or involved in a greater number of analyses than any other single organisation. This represents a strength that needs to be exploited: by helping identify some of the regional issues and connections; by identifying and analysing global trends; by using this information to anticipate, prioritise and allocate staff and resources at a global level and encourage others to do so³⁸.

- **Pay greater attention to the participation issue**

There are reasons this is hard, but as discussed above, there are a variety of options available including drawing together different processes. Multilaterals could pay more attention to their communications around conflict analysis and make public what information they can. They could also be clearer about what data resources they are drawing on, and engage more in dialogue with those working towards similar goals.

- **Use analysis to conflict-sensitise development assistance**

With approximately 30% of ODA flowing through multilaterals, there is great potential to increase the contribution of development assistance to preventing conflict and building more peaceful societies. One of the biggest challenges here will be internal change, staff development and empowerment.

- **Use multilaterals' comparative advantage as a peacemaker**

In certain circumstances the multilateral nature of an organisation will mean it is preferred or more trusted to carry out a peacemaking role such as a mediator. Ensure that high quality analysis is used to guide the development and fulfilment of this role.

- **Pay attention to assessing the impact of, and learning from, conflict analysis**

Conflict analysis is rarely measured or evaluated in the same way that programmatic work is. But more attention to this will help improve its practice and the continual improvement of this field.

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- ¹ USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework, Version 2.0 (2012)
- ² not yet publicly available (December 2014)
- ³ EEAS, Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external Action; UK, JACS Guidance & Methodology; UNPBSO, Conflict Analysis for UN Peacebuilding Fund support; UNDP, Framework for Political Analysis
- reference guidance from: The EU, UK, UN PBSO and UN DPA have all recently issued such guidance
- ⁴ EEAS, Guidance note, *ibid.*
- ⁵ Saferworld & Conciliation Resources, From conflict analysis to peacebuilding impact (2012)
- ⁶ World Vision, Bridging the participation gap (2013)
- ⁷ Piloting the Fragility Spectrum and identifying country-specific peacebuilding and statebuilding indicators, Interim Guidance Note (2012)
- ⁸ Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, www.acleddata.com
- ⁹ Social Conflict Analysis Database, www.strausscenter.org/scad
- ¹⁰ GDELT, www.gdeltproject.org
- ¹¹ Observatory for Conflict and Violence Prevention: www.ocvp.org; and Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, www.syriahr.com
- ¹² see, for example, Conciliation Resources, Owing the process: public participation in peacemaking (2002) and Conciliation Resources, Legitimacy and peace processes (2014)
- ¹³ Saferworld & Conciliation Resources (2012), *op.cit.*; World Vision (2013), *op.cit.*
- ¹⁴ for example: Saferworld, Conciliation Resources, swisspeace
- ¹⁵ UNDP, Issue Brief: Infrastructure for Peace (2013)
- ¹⁶ UN, Guidance for Effective Mediation (2012)
- ¹⁷ Huber, K, Conflict Analysis: the foundation for effective action. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2014)
- ¹⁸ UN Women, Gender & Conflict Analysis (2012)
- ¹⁹ www.international-alert.org
- ²⁰ available in 2015
- ²¹ www.unep.org
- ²² <http://www.oecd.org/swac/ourwork/siccs.htm>
- ²³ For example, DFID-funded studies in Yemen and Indonesia
- ²⁴ Conciliation Resources, Paix sans frontieres (2011)
- ²⁵ World Bank, World Development Report (2011)
- ²⁶ Wilton, P. <http://insights.careinternational.org.uk/development-blog/conflict/do-we-need-to-put-the-politics-back-into-conflict-analysis>
- ²⁷ Hudson, D & Leftwich, A., From Political Economy to Political Analysis, DLP (2014)
- ²⁸ de Waal, A 'Violence an peacemaking in the political marketplace' in Conciliation Resources, Legitimacy and peace processes (2014)
- ²⁹ Hughes, J et al, Implementing the New Deal for Fragile States, The Brookings Institution (2014)
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*; and interviews
- ³¹ Saferworld & Conciliation Resources (2012), *op.cit.*
- ³² The Civil Society Dialogue Network is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict
- see <http://www.eplo.org/civil-society-dialogue-network.html>
- ³³ see ACLED, SCAD and GDELT, *op.cit.*
- ³⁴ see, for example, Conciliation Resources (2014), *op.cit.*
- ³⁵ <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2011.html>
- ³⁶ World Bank (2011), *op.cit.*
- ³⁷ World Bank (2011), *op.cit.*
- ³⁸ For example, how can the EU HRVP collate and use the knowledge arising from multiple UE conflict analyses to inform her assessment of the international strategic environment that she has been tasked with producing by June 2015?