From Principles to Policies and Practices: How can the EU fulfil its Commitments linking Peacebuilding and Development?

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Civil Society Dialogue Network

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Introduction

Since 2000, the EU has made numerous commitments to linking peacebuilding and development.¹

In October 2012, EPLO organised a seminar on the main obstacles to and conditions for the EU’s implementation of the new and existing principles linking peacebuilding and development into policies and then practices.² Discussions were focused on the World Development Report (WDR) 2011, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal) and the OECD-DAC policy guidance on ‘Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility’.

Throughout 2013, the main item on the international development agenda has been the framework which will replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when they expire in 2015. In terms of the inclusion of peace and security in the post-2015 framework, the EU’s starting point for the negotiations has been the New Deal, including the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG), which the EU has endorsed. According to the European Commission’s (EC) communication on the new framework:

Addressing peace and security issues in the context of the post-2015 overarching framework should use as a starting point the work already done between some fragile states and the OECD countries, the EU, the UN and Development Banks at Busan in November 2011. This should build on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States that laid out an agreed set of Peace-building and State building Goals (PSG).³

In May 2013, in its conclusions on the new framework, the Council of the EU agreed to:

Recognise the impossibility of achieving sustainable development in contexts of fragility, violence and armed conflict and the importance of conflict prevention in this regard, and address peace and security and freedom from violence, and the specific needs of fragile states and countries affected by conflict or in a post-conflict situation, building on the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and the New Deal.⁴

By 1 January 2016 – the date by which the successor to the MDG framework should be in place – the EU will already be two years into its next development assistance programming cycle (2014-2020). If the EU is to present a credible argument for integrating the New Deal and PSG principles into the post-2015 framework, it must seize the opportunity presented by the ongoing revision of its own external assistance programmes to implement them in its cooperation with those partner countries which are conflict affected and/or in situations of fragility.

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² This meeting was organised in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network, a three-year project funded by the European Union (Instrument for Stability) and aimed at facilitating dialogue on peacebuilding issues between civil society and EU policy-makers.
³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A Decent Life for all; for All; Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future COM(2013) 92 final (February 2013)
⁴ The Overarching Post 2015 Agenda – Council conclusions (June 2013)
This paper is based on an analysis of the New Deal, the WDR 2011, the OECD-DAC’s policy guidance on ‘Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility’ and the 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The aims of the paper are:
1. To set out some of the implications for the EU of the new and existing principles linking peacebuilding and development
2. To make recommendations for the EU’s implementation of those principles.
3. To highlight some potential obstacles to the EU’s implementation of those principles

NB/ Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘EU’ refers to the EC’s Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Analysis

1. Civil society: Civil society has an important role to play in international co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- The first PSG (Legitimate politics) refers to the need to foster ‘inclusive’ political settlements and conflict resolution
- According to the ‘One vision, one plan’ component of FOCUS, visions and plans will be developed in consultation with civil society and monitored, reviewed and adjusted in consultation with key stakeholders
- According to the ‘Compact’ component of FOCUS, compacts will be drawn upon a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public, and be reviewed annually through a multi-stakeholder review
- Under the ‘Support political dialogue and leadership’ component of FOCUS, the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) commit to increase their support for credible and inclusive processes of political dialogue, and to support global, regional and national initiatives to build the capacity of government and civil society leaders and institutions to lead peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts
- Under the ‘Transparency’ component of TRUST, they commit to solicit citizens’ views to assess the transparency of domestic resources and aid
- Under the ‘Strengthen capacities’ component of TRUST, they commit to increase the proportion of funds for capacity development through jointly administered and funded

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5 In view of the large amount of material which has been produced on the implementation of the World Development Report 2011, and the New Deal and the PSGs in general, the scope of this paper will be limited to their implementation by the EU (EU institutions and EU Member States).
6 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2
7 FOCUS is the commitment by the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding to ‘focus on new ways of engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility’. (F: Fragility assessment, O: One vision, one plan; C: Compact, U: Use PSGs to monitor, S: Support political dialogue and leadership)
8 Ibid., p. 2
9 Ibid., p. 2
10 Ibid., p. 3
11 TRUST is the commitment by the members of the IDPS to ‘build mutual trust by providing aid and managing resources more effectively and aligning those resources for results’. (T: Transparency, R: Risk-sharing, U: Use and strengthen country systems, S: Strengthen capacities, T: Timely and predictable aid)
12 Ibid., p. 3
pooled facilities’ in order to ‘ensure efficient support to build critical capacities of institutions of the state and civil society in a balanced manner’.13

- WDR Track 1 (Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice and jobs), identifies the need for ‘using the principle of subsidiarity: the closer to the violence, the better the understanding of the local priorities’.14

- WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency systems to support rapid action to restore confidence and long-term institution-building) recommends ‘varying the delivery mechanisms’, including ‘community structures, civil society, the private sector, and the UN and other international executing agencies’.15

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘consider whom you can work with and where to work’.16

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Designing and delivering country programmes’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors work with ‘key players in partner countries’17 and ‘draw on local stakeholders’.18 It also recommends that development actors ‘support local conflict management and resolution mechanisms’19 and ‘promote inclusive political settlements and political processes which strengthen state-society interaction and accountability’.20 Finally, it recommends that development actors ‘think about the scope for supporting positive state-society dynamics’21 and ‘design integrated interventions to foster constructive state-society relations’.22

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Choosing tools for analysis and monitoring’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘develop a “culture of analysis” within and across the various parts of development partner organisations’.23

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance’ the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘work with civil society and find appropriate instruments to channel resources to them’.24

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Improving development partner operations’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘create incentives for country managers and field staff to co-operate rather than compete with other development partners’.25

- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU ‘should strengthen its position as a key player in terms of conflict prevention and peacebuilding by consolidating and further developing its support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding’.26

Suggestions for EU responses

- Increase support for peacebuilding civil society organisations through the Peacebuilding Partnership under the next Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities thematic programme under the next Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and include support for peacebuilding and

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13 Ibid., p. 3
14 World Development Report 2011, p. 271
15 Ibid., p. 279
16 Ibid., p. 61
17 Ibid., p. 62
18 Ibid., p. 64
19 Ibid., pp. 64-7
20 Ibid., p. 60
21 Ibid., pp. 62-74
22 Ibid., p. 78
23 Ibid., p. 84
24 Ibid., p. 93
25 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 106
conflict prevention activities in the geographic programmes under the next DCI, European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).  

- Ensure that staff in EU delegations in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility engage actively with civil society organisations (CSOs) in order to hear their views on the (potential) conflict situations and to gather input to guide possible EU policy responses. The Civil Society Dialogue Network could provide a model to be replicated for this purpose.  

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to ensure that support for civil society is included in the EU’s support for ‘institution building’ in the next set of development assistance programmes.

Potential obstacles

- Despite a number of positive steps, including the establishment of the Civil Society Dialogue Network and the adoption of an EC communication on engagement with civil society, there remains some opposition to an increased involvement of civil society in EU external policy-making processes.

2. Conflict analysis: International co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility needs to be based on thorough conflict analysis.

- Under the ‘Fragility assessment’ component of FOCUS, the members of the IDPS commit to ‘conduct a periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience’.  

- WDR Track 1 (Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice and jobs), identifies the need for ‘a shift from early warning to contingency planning for repeated cycles of violence’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘understand context and local statebuilding processes and dynamics’. It also recommends ‘joint analysis’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Designing and delivering country programmes’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘keep referring back to the political analysis’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Choosing tools for analysis and monitoring’, the

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27 See ‘EU funding for peacebuilding: EPLO’s recommendations for reforming the EU’s external co-operation programmes’

28 Since July 2010, Civil Society Dialogue Network meetings have been organised on the following countries and regions: Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, the Middle East and North Africa, Myanmar, Nigeria, the South Caucasus, and Sudan and South Sudan. See http://www.eplo.org/civil-society-dialogue-network

29 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations COM(2012)492 final (September 2012)

30 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2

31 World Development Report 2011, p. 272

32 Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, pp. 46-7

33 Ibid., p. 53

34 Ibid., p. 60
OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘make use of a range of analytical tools’ and ‘develop a “culture of analysis” within and across the various parts of development partner organisations’. It also recommends that they ‘develop systematic approaches to moving from analysis to strategy and programming priorities’.

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance’ the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘understand how aid modalities and other instruments impact (directly or indirectly) on the statebuilding process’.

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- Develop a conflict assessment tool to be used as a basis for the programming of development assistance in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility. It should be continuously updated and development assistance programmes should be checked against it on a regular basis in order to ensure that they remain conflict-sensitive and relevant.

- EU Member States should commit to joint EU-EU Member State co-operation activities in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility. In this context, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament (EP) should support both the EC and the EEAS’ commitment to promote joint EU-EU Member States programming, and the EC’s specific proposals for joint EU-EU Member States development assistance programming under the new DCI and the new ENI.

**Potential obstacles**

- It is doubtful that that the EU delegations in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility countries currently have sufficient members of staff with the relevant expertise required to undertake continuous conflict analysis.

- There is some opposition from EU Member States to engaging in joint EU-EU Member State co-operation activities.

- In June 2013, the EC announced that it would be discontinuing its work on the development of a methodology for political economy analysis.

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35 Ibid., pp. 76-9
36 Ibid., p. 78
37 Ibid., pp. 78-9
38 Ibid., p. 82
39 In 2001, the European Commission published the EC Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict. However, it is unclear to what extent this has been employed by staff in EU delegations in countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.
40 According to the 2012 guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues in the strategic programming of geographic cooperation instruments, the European Commission and the European External Action Service were in the process of developing a conflict assessment tool.
42 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation COM(2011) 840 final
44 See Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, pp. 101-2
45 See European Centre for Development Policy Management, (2013), All for One or Free-for-All? Early experiences in EU joint programming – Briefing Note No. 50
3. **Flexibility:** There is a need for flexibility in development assistance programmes in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- According to the ‘One vision, one plan’ component of FOCUS, plans will be ‘flexible so as to address short-, medium- and long-term peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities’ and ‘monitored, reviewed and adjusted (…) on an annual basis’.  

- Under the ‘Transparency’ component of TRUST, the members of the IDPS commit to ‘develop and use simplified, accountable fast-track financial management and procurement procedures to improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Designing and delivering country programmes’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘allow for flexible, step-by-step approaches, and longer timescales’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Choosing tools for analysis and monitoring’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘keep adjusting activities as necessary’.  

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Improving development partner operations’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘adapt to changing circumstances’.  

- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU could aim at both acting quickly and flexibly when the situation deteriorates in a particular country or region and restoring or consolidating structural stability’. It also recommends that the EU considers ‘(i) using annual programming (vs. multi-annual programming), (ii) changing focal sectors during and outside the mid-term review process, (iii) reallocating programmed funds between focal areas or between EDF envelopes (transfer of funds from A-envelope to B-envelope), and (iv) using flexible procedures for programming.’

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- The Council of the EU and the EP should support the EC and the EEAS’s commitment to promote more flexibility in EU development assistance programming processes and the specific EC proposals for increasing flexibility in the new DCI.

**Potential obstacles**

- The EU’s development assistance programmes have been criticised for their inflexibility.

4. **Risk management:** International co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility carries inherent risks which need to be managed.

- Under the ‘Risk-sharing’ component of FOCUS, the members of the IDPS commit to identify ‘context-specific, joint donor risk-mitigation strategies which will require different approaches’ and ‘identify and use joint mechanisms to reduce and better manage risks’.

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47 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2  
48 Ibid., p. 3  
49 Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 60  
50 Ibid., p. 79  
51 Ibid., p. 92  
52 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 110  
53 Ibid., p. 116  
54 OECD-DAC, (2012), European Union – Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review  
55 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2
• WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency systems to support rapid action to restore confidence and long-term institution-building) recommends that development actors ‘balance the risk of action with the risk of inaction’, 56 ‘accept that some programmes will fail’ 57 and ‘vary the way aid is delivered to manage risks and results’. 58

• As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance’ the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘consider the use of jointly managed and pooled funds where appropriate, and adapt them to a changing environment’. 59

• As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Improving development partner operations’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘manage the risks of operating in fragile and conflict-affected situations’. 60

Suggestions for EU responses

• Implement the Council of the EU’s recommendation that: ‘appropriate risk management systems should be developed, including for cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected situations’, 61 and the EC and Council’s commitments that ‘the EU shall strengthen the risk management framework for EU budget support’ and that ‘the EU should further promote joint risk assessments’. 62

Potential obstacles

• Increasing pressure on the EU’s external relations budget (as shown by the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020) and an increased focus on results-based performance has severely the limited the scope for the EU to accept failure in its development assistance programmes.

• There is some opposition from EU Member States to engaging in joint EU-EU Member State co-operation activities.

5. Integration of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities into development co-operation: Activities which contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding need to be integrated into development assistance programmes in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility

• According to the PSG component of the New Deal, ‘the PSGs will guide the identification of peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities at the country level’. 63

• WDR Track 1 (Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice and jobs), identifies the need for ‘the development of a specialized suite of catalytic products’. 64

• WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency procedures) identifies the need to ‘accept the links between security and development outcomes’. 65

• As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Designing and delivering country programmes’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘design integrated interventions’. 66

56 World Development Report 2011, p. 277
57 Ibid., p. 277
58 Ibid., p. 280
59 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, pp. 82-4
60 Ibid., pp. 90-2
63 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2
64 World Development Report 2011, p 271
65 Ibid., p. 276
and ‘prioritise support for state functions that are strategically important for statebuilding’. 67

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance’ the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘align aid modalities with statebuilding objectives’ 68 and ‘align technical assistance with statebuilding objectives’ 69.

- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU should ‘further strengthen the four dimensions of the integrated approach’. 70

Suggestions for EU responses

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to ensure that activities which contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding are fully integrated into the next set of external assistance programmes.

- Implement the Council of the EU’s recommendation that ‘the work on the security, fragility and development nexus must be taken forward, including through the development of a comprehensive strategy’ 71 by updating and implementing the EU Action Plan for Situations of Conflict and Fragility.

Potential obstacles

- There is some opposition to the integration of peace and conflict issues in EU development assistance programmes. This may stem, in part, from a view that by including civilian peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities (even those which are recognised by the OECD as legitimate uses of official development assistance) 72 in its development assistance programmes, the EU runs the risk of the “militarisation” of its aid.

- There may be some confusion about the meaning of the security-development nexus in the EU context. 73 This could result in opposition to its full implementation, possibly in part due to a misunderstanding of support for human security (‘people’s security) as support for traditional state-centred security.

6. People’s security, justice and job creation: Activities which contribute to people’s security, justice and job creation need to be integrated into development assistance programmes in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- The second PSG (Security) refers to the need to ‘establish and strengthen people’s security’, the third (Justice) refers to the need to ‘Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice’, and the fourth (Economic Foundations), refers to the need to ‘generate employment and improve livelihoods’. 74

- WDR Track 1 (Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security,

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66 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, Ibid., pp. 62-74
67 Ibid., pp. 67-74
68 Ibid., pp. 82-6
69 Ibid., pp. 86-7
70 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, pp. 107-9
72 See DAC Statistical Reporting Directives (2010)
73 See Chatham House, (2013), Navigating the Nexus: The Interplay of EU Security and Development Policies in Africa
74 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2
justice and jobs), identifies the need for ‘(1) combined tools that link citizen security, justice, jobs, and associated services, and (2) structural investments in justice and employment capacity.’

Suggestions for EU responses

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to ensure that human security is included in the list of crosscutting issues to be mainstreamed in the next set of external assistance programmes.
- Include specific support for activities aimed at justice promotion and job creation in all relevant country and regional programmes 2014-2020.

Potential obstacles

- There is some opposition to the use of EU development assistance to support anything security-related. This may stem, in part, from a misunderstanding of support for human security (‘people’s security) as support for traditional state-centred security.

7. “Whole-of-government” approach: All relevant departments / ministries / agencies / institutions need to be brought together to develop common objectives and strategies for co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility, and then work jointly towards meeting them.

- WDR Track 1 (Preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, justice and jobs), identifies the need ‘to move away from simply tweaking current practices toward a fundamentally new practical set of tools to link development and security, development and mediation, and development and humanitarian assistance’.
- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘work towards greater coherence throughout your government/organisation’.
- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Improving development partner operations’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘strengthen integration and co-operation across departments within your organisation’.
- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU should ‘further strengthen the four dimensions of the integrated approach’ and ensure that ‘its financial support is sufficiently complemented and leveraged by non-financial support at global, regional and country levels’.

Suggestions for EU responses

- Base co-operation with those partner countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility on a comprehensive (integrated) approach in which objectives are developed by and agreed to by all relevant EU institutions, and the necessary policies, “tools”, and activities are developed in order to meet them.

75 World Development Report 2011, p. 270
76 Ibid., p. 271
77 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, pp. 52-4
78 Ibid., pp. 92-3
79 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, pp. 107-9
80 Ibid., pp. 111-2
81 See Discussion Points on the EU and the Comprehensive Approach (2013)
**Potential obstacles**

- There is some opposition to the development of an EU Comprehensive Approach. This may stem, in part, from concerns about loss of power and/or subversion of principles.\(^{82}\)

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**8. Joint analysis and programming:** Development actors should undertake joint analysis and programming in their co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- According to the ‘Compact’ component of FOCUS, compacts will ‘ensure harmonisation and donor coordination, reduce duplication, fragmentation and programme proliferation’.\(^{83}\)
- Under the ‘Risk-sharing’ component of FOCUS, the members of the IDPS commit to ‘conduct joint assessments of the specific risks’ and to ‘use joint mechanisms to reduce and better manage risks’.\(^{84}\)
- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends ‘joint analysis’, ‘joint objectives and joint country-specific operational priorities’ and ‘joint financing instruments and joint staffing mechanisms’.\(^{85}\)
- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that EU ensures that ‘coordination mechanisms at all levels, but especially between the Commission, the EEAS, the EU Council and EU MS, go beyond a mere exchange of information and aim at enhancing complementarities at strategy and implementation levels’.\(^{86}\)

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**Suggestions for EU responses**

- EU Member States should commit to joint EU-EU Member State co-operation activities in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility. In this context, the Council of the EU and the EP should support both the EC and the EEAS’ commitment to promote joint EU-EU Member States programming, and the EC’s specific proposals for joint EU-EU Member States development assistance programming under the new DCI and the new ENI.

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**Potential obstacles**

- There is some opposition from EU Member States to engaging in joint EU-EU Member State co-operation activities.

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**9. Political guidance and coordination:** There is a need for clear political guidance and strong coordination in international co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends ‘clear political guidance and a lead co-ordinating role at HQ and in the field’.\(^{87}\)
- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU should ‘provide a focused set of workable tools and guidance for intervening...’

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\(^{82}\) *Ibid.*, p. 5
\(^{83}\) A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 2
\(^{84}\) *Ibid.*, p. 3
\(^{85}\) Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, pp. 53-4
\(^{86}\) Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 109
\(^{87}\) Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 53
in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context’.

Suggestions for EU responses

- Update and implement the EU Action Plan for Situations of Conflict and Fragility.
- Raise the status of the 2012 guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues in the strategic programming of geographic cooperation instruments in order to ensure compliance.
- EU Member States should enable the EU to take a role in coordinating co-operation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

Potential obstacles

- There is some opposition from EU Member States to the EU trying to coordinate EU Member States’ development assistance programmes
- It is unclear to what extent the 2012 guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues in the strategic programming of geographic cooperation instruments has been followed by staff in EU delegations in countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

10. Relevant indicators: Specialised indicators are needed for monitoring and evaluation in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency systems to support rapid action to restore confidence and long-term institution-building) identifies the need for ‘indicators that can show short-term progress’ and ‘indicators on security, trust in national institutions and progress in governance’.  
- Under the ‘Use PSGs to monitor’ component of FOCUS, the members of the IDPS commit to ‘use the PSGs targets and indicators to monitor country-level progress’.
- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU should ‘develop and implement monitoring frameworks with specific indicators for operating in a post-conflict or conflict (-prone) context’.

Suggestions for EU responses

- In co-operation with EU Member States, develop conflict-sensitive indicators for monitoring and evaluating in those partner countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

Potential obstacles

- There may be opposition from certain EU officials to deviating from standard criteria for monitoring and evaluating EU-funded projects (e.g. developing specialised project evaluation grids), particularly for those projects which are implemented by CSOs.

11. Longer timeframes for co-operation: Development assistance programmes in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility need to take place over longer time periods.

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88 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, pp. 114-5
89 World Development Report 2011, p. 280
90 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 3
91 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 115
92 According to the EC and the EEAS’ response to the 2011 thematic evaluation of EU support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the EC was planning to develop these indicators
- WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency procedures) identifies the need for “dedicating a target percentage of assistance to larger and longer-term programs in fragile and conflict-affected states”.

- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU’s ‘expectations with respect to timeliness and disbursement of funds should be realistic’.

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to extend the duration of crisis response measures under the IfS and to ensure that, where necessary, there are means to continue them under geographic programmes.

**Potential obstacles**

- There is some opposition to the EC’s proposal to extend the duration of crisis response measures under the IfS.

**12. Women’s participation in policy-making:** Activities which contribute to the effective participation of women in all aspects of policy-making processes need to be integrated into development assistance programmes in countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

- Under the ‘Support political dialogue and leadership’ component of FOCUS, the members of the IDPS commit to ensure that ‘specific support is targeted to promote youth and women’s participation in political dialogue and leadership initiatives’.

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- Continue efforts to improve the gender balance at senior and decision-making levels, and to increase levels of gender expertise.
- Staff in EU delegations in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility should engage actively with those CSOs working on gender equality and women’s rights, and peace and security issues. The Civil Society Dialogue Network could provide a model to be replicated for this purpose.

**Potential obstacles**

- Despite some progress over the past two-and-a-half years, there remains a major gender imbalance at senior and decision-making levels in the EEAS. There is also insufficient gender expertise within the EC and the EEAS.
- The EU has experienced difficulties regarding the implementation of existing commitments on women, peace and security, including those set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325.

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93 World Development Report 2011, p. 281
94 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 116
95 See ‘EU funding for peacebuilding: EPLO’s recommendations for reforming the EU’s external co-operation programmes’
96 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, p. 3
13. **Local ownership versus own values:** Development actors need to consider the extent to which they are able to support national priorities in countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility or whether they should prioritise other areas in order to support peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors are ‘more honest about tensions and conflicts between local “ownership” and the normative values and interests of development partners’.
- The evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding recommends that the EU ‘should examine on a case-by-case basis how far it should align its activities with priorities defined by national authorities, and to what extent it should reserve the right to distance itself from such priorities and even support priorities deemed more relevant in terms of CPPB’.

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- Take into account the evaluators’ recommendation on aligning with national priorities when it is programming its development assistance in partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.

**Potential obstacles**

- There is some opposition to the use of conditionality in any form even if it is used to ensure compliance with the EU’s normative values.

14. **Coherence:** Development actors need to ensure that all of their policies which may have an impact on countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility do not undermine their efforts to build peace.

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘identify and manage discord between different objectives’.

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to ensure that activities which contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding are fully integrated into the next set of external assistance programmes.

**Potential obstacles**

- There is some opposition to the use of EU development assistance to support anything security-related. This may stem, in part, from a misunderstanding of support for human security (‘people’s security) as support for traditional state-centred security.

15. **EU delegations:** Development actors can help to increase the effectiveness of their cooperation with countries and regions which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of

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97 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 51
98 Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, p. 112
99 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 48
fragility by ensuring that they have sufficient human resources in their embassies to manage their development assistance programmes.

- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Improving development partner operations’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘devolve greater responsibility to the field’.  

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- The EU should increase the number of staff in EU delegations in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility.  

**Potential obstacles**

- EU delegations in those partner countries which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility do not all have sufficient staff members to undertake the activities which further ‘deconcentration’ would entail.

16. **Internal reorganisation**: Changes in the nature of conflicts necessitate the reorganisation of development actors’ own institutional arrangements in order to ensure the effectiveness of their responses.

- WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency procedures) identifies that ‘internal reform is needed for international agencies to improve responsiveness’.  

**Suggestions for EU responses**

- The EC’s Unit for Fragility and Crisis Management should be empowered to provide clear direction on ensuring conflict sensitivity and integrating peacebuilding into EU development assistance programmes to all geographic directorates.

**Potential obstacles**

- There appears to be significant resistance to raising the profile of peacebuilding within the EC. This may, in part, explain the long delay in approving the joint EC-EEAS guidance note on addressing conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security issues in the strategic programming of geographic cooperation instruments.

17. **Predictability**: The effectiveness of development assistance programmes can be undermined if the allocation of funding is unpredictable.

- Under the ‘Transparency’ component of TRUST, the members of the IDPS commit to ‘increase the predictability of aid’.  
- WDR Track 2 (Reforming internal agency systems to support rapid action to restore confidence and long-term institution-building) identifies the need to end the ‘stop-go pattern of assistance to programs’.

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100 Ibid., p. 90  
101 According to the EC and the EEAS’ response to the 2011 thematic evaluation of EU support for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the EC ‘will look into the establishment of a pool of experts which can be mobilised to provide support to EU delegations undergoing a crisis’ and the EEAS is aware of the need for ‘establishing a roster of deployable staff to provide temporary support to delegations in fragile settings’.  
102 World Development Report 2011, p. 276  
103 A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, pp. 3-4  
104 World Development Report 2011, pp. 280-1
As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance’ the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors are ‘alert to the timing and predictability of financial flows’.  

Suggestions for EU responses
- The EU should involve EU delegations more closely in designing regional and thematic programmes.

Potential obstacles
- The EU’s development assistance programmes have been criticised for their low predictability between multiannual financial frameworks.

18. ‘Do No Harm’: Development actors should ensure that none of the policies which they implement in their partner countries, particularly those which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility, create or exacerbate conflict.

Suggestions for EU responses
- The EU should incorporate a commitment to ‘Do No Harm’ in all of its development assistance programmes.

Potential obstacles
- The principle of ‘Do No Harm’ does not seem to be accepted by all EU officials as the basis of engagement in the EU’s partner countries, particularly those which are conflict-affected and/or in situations of fragility. In some quarters, it may even be viewed as “an NGO concept.”

19. Managing expectations: Development actors should set realistic objectives and timeframes for their development assistance programmes.

- Track 4 (Marshaling experience and support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and global and regional institutions to reflect the changing landscape of international policy assistance) identifies the need for ‘more focused and realistic expectations built into the timetables for governance improvements’.
- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Designing and delivering country programmes’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘allow for flexible, step-by-step approaches, and longer timescales’.
- As part of its overall recommendation on ‘Choosing tools for analysis and monitoring’, the OECD-DAC recommends that development actors ‘measure and assess progress in terms of statebuilding outcomes over the medium to longer term’.

105 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, pp. 84-6
107 Ibid.
108 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 51
109 Exchange with an official from DG Trade (?), 2013
110 World Development Report 2011, p. 288
111 Supporting Statebuilding in situations of Conflict and Fragility, p. 60
Suggestions for EU responses

- The Council of the EU and the EP should use the opportunity provided by the ongoing revision of the regulations establishing the EU’s external funding instruments to extend the duration of crisis response measures under the IfS and to ensure that, where necessary, there are means to continue them under geographic programmes.

Potential obstacles

- There is some opposition to the EC’s proposal to extend the duration of crisis response measures under the IfS.
- Increasing pressure on the EU’s external relations budget (as shown by the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020) and an increased focus on results-based performance has increased the pressure on the EU to deliver results in a short timeframe.

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112 Ibid., p. 79
Annex

New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

1. Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals
2. FOCUS – Engagement to support country-owned and led pathways out of fragility
3. TRUST – Commitment for results

World Development Report 2011

1. Track 1: Providing specialised assistance for prevention through citizen security, justice and jobs
2. Track 2: Transforming procedures and risk and results management
3. Track 3: Acting regionally and globally to reduce external stresses on fragile states
4. Track 4: Marshalling support from; lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and global and regional institutions, to reflect the changing landscape of international policy and assistance

Policy Guidance: ‘Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility’

1. Making strategic choices and defining overall objectives
2. Designing and delivering country programmes
3. Choosing tools for analysis and monitoring
4. Adapting aid delivery modalities and technical assistance
5. Improving development partner operations

Evaluation of EC Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

1. Strengthen the Commission’s position as a key player in conflict prevention and peacebuilding
2. Strengthen the integrated approach
3. Clarify the role to be played in conflict countries by focusing on crisis management efforts and tackling the root causes directly
4. Leverage the Commission’s financial weight with non-financial support
5. Relevance of alignment
6. Make appropriate means available
7. Maintain “protective” character of procedures but make them swifter
8. Better anticipate conflict-related challenges