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Germany

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Civil Society Dialogue Network

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a three-year project co-financed by the European Union (Instrument for Stability) and aimed at facilitating dialogue on peacebuilding issues between civil society and EU policy-makers. It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), in co-operation with the European Commission and the European External Action Service.

For more information about the CSDN, please visit the EPLO website.

CSDN Discussion Papers are intended to contribute to the overall CSDN by stimulating discussion and reflection on pertinent peacebuilding issues. It is envisaged that they will inform future CSDN events.

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As the main decision-makers in European Union (EU) external affairs, Member States remain key actors in EU peacebuilding policy and practice, in that they shape policy, monitor implementation and contribute to the capacity of the EU as a peacebuilding actor by e.g. committing resources and expertise. The degree to which Member States decide to work through the EU is a crucial factor in determining the effectiveness of the EU as a peacebuilding actor.

With this in mind, CSDN Discussion Papers on specific Member States aim to:

- Analyse the role of key Member States in areas of EU external action with relevance to conflict prevention and peacebuilding
- Identify the parts of the national administration with specific roles and responsibilities for EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding policy
- Highlight national initiatives, policies or practices that could be of interest to the EU as a peacebuilding actor
- Put forward suggestions for activities on the EU and peacebuilding at the Member State level (including activities under the CSDN project).

1. **Germany's position in EU external affairs**

   **Questions to be addressed:** What is the size and the influence of the Member State in EU external action (e.g. Council votes, interest, quality of diplomatic staff etc.)? Is the Member State generally supportive or suspicious of the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor? Are there regular alliances or tacit agreements with other Member States?

   Along with France and the United Kingdom (UK), Germany belongs to the ‘Big 3’ of EU Member States and with 27 votes in the Council of Ministers it has considerable influence in EU policy. Germany’s strong commitment to multilateral action means that it considers its national foreign policy in the context of EU foreign policy. Germany has tended to support deepening integration in this policy area, siding with similar-minded Member States. However, when it comes to final decisions, it usually aligns itself with France’s more intergovernmental approach to foreign policy as part of the strategic partnership with its neighbour.¹

   While Germany nominally stresses its commitment to EU foreign policy and the further development of the EU as a foreign policy actor, it has been absent from many of the discussions on the institutional design, direction and objectives of EU foreign policy after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. A case in point is Germany’s involvement in the discussion on the set-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Even though the EEAS is sometimes presented as and considered to be a German idea,² the level of engagement of Germany in the negotiations during the year that led up to its establishment in December 2010 was low. While opposition parties in the German Bundestag drafted their positions on the EEAS which, especially in the case of the Green Party, included detailed recommendations

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regarding the structure, staffing and policies of the EEAS,\(^3\) the then governing Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union – Free Democratic Party (CDU/CSU – FDP) coalition focused Germany’s contribution on two relatively narrow issues. The first was the attempt to have German recognised as an official language of the EEAS alongside French and English, and the second was to secure high-level posts inside the EEAS for German diplomats. This unambitious agenda stands in contrast to the important role Germany played in supporting the idea of a diplomatic service for the EU.\(^4\)

The following reasons can be put forward to explain Germany’s recent absence in discussions about EU foreign policy: first, the focus of Germany’s engagement in other areas of EU policy; second, the current division of labour between the Federal Foreign Office and the Chancellery; third, the institutional set-up of the Federal Foreign Office and fourth, a possible strategy of non-engagement as support to the EEAS and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP).

**Germany’s engagement in EU policy**

While Germany’s role in providing direction to EU foreign policy (i.e. developing ideas, gathering support from other Member States to present joint initiatives, negotiating agreements with EU institutions, ensuring follow-up by EU institutions, supporting EU foreign policy by seconding national diplomats etc.) may be limited, other external policy areas are characterised by strong German involvement. As an export-oriented economy, Germany has vested interest in EU external action as far as it relates to trade and investment, leading commentators to conclude that ‘the German elite obsesses about business rather than diplomatic or military strategy.’\(^5\) The German government therefore prioritises its engagement in EU policy-making accordingly.\(^6\) For instance, Germany was closely involved in the development of EU investment policy which became part of Common Commercial Policy with the Lisbon Treaty.\(^7\) This led commentators to talk about the ‘grand bargain’ between France and Germany, with France acknowledging Germany’s predominance in foreign economic matters and Germany accepting France’s leadership over non-economic related foreign policy issues.\(^8\) With Germany being very commanding in the management of the EU’s response to the current economic crisis, this tendency may become even more pronounced as Germany is wary of being perceived as too dominant in setting all other EU policy agendas. This assessment counters the view that it is Germany’s lack of strategy that is at the root of its low level of engagement in setting the tone of EU foreign policy. Such an analysis overlooks the fact that Germany’s

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\(^3\) 17\(^{th}\) German Bundestag: Motion (Drucksache 17/1204) of the parliamentary group Bündnis 90 Die Grüne (24.03.2010); Motion (Drucksache 17/2118) of the parliamentary group SPD (16.06.2010); Motion (Drucksache 17/5387) of the parliamentary group DIE LINKE (06.04.2011).
\(^6\) This also explains that for regions such as Central Asia, Germany’s involvement in foreign policy is consistently of a high level. See Jos Boonstra (2013). Central Asia: Values, Security and Development in Giovanni Grevi and Daniel Keohane (eds.), Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2013: Renewing the EU’s role in the world (79-86). Available online: http://www.fride.org/descarga/Challenges_for_European_Foreign_Policy_2013.pdf.
\(^7\) Lehne (p.11).
strategy may well be to safeguard its dominant role in EU external relations as far as they concern foreign economic policy and in internal EU economic and monetary matters so that ‘while others engage in risky and often misguided war-games and other foreign adventures, Germany sells its excellent goods to the world and acquires wealth and the respect that comes with it.’

Division of labour between Federal Foreign Office and Chancellery

In addition to this long-running characteristic of Germany’s approach to external action, the current division of leadership in EU matters between the Chancellery and the Federal Foreign Office contributes to a lack of influence on EU foreign policy. As in many other Member States, the power of the Foreign Ministry is decreasing in favour of the respective line ministries dealing with external relations (development, trade and economic matters, defence) or the head of government’s office, in Germany’s case the Chancellery. This trend was supported by the fact that Guido Westerwelle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the CDU/CSU – FDP coalition, initially lacked foreign policy experience and that Germany’s focus in EU politics was concentrated on the economic and financial crisis, which was, in turn, very much driven and directed by the Chancellery. There were two concrete instances in which Germany entered the discussion on the EEAS more prominently. In 2011, it co-signed a letter of 12 Foreign Ministers to the HR/VP which highlighted Member States’ concerns regarding the functioning of the Service and included reform proposals, and in 2012, Germany convened a Future of Europe group, which brought together eleven Member States and produced a final report that included suggestions for reform across a broad range of issues (economic, financial and monetary matters, institutional reform including inside the EEAS and points related to the legitimacy and accountability of the EU), in an attempt to play a more pro-active role in shaping EU policy developments. However, this was in part seen as a surge of activism in reaction to Westerwelle’s resignation as chair of his party and did not result in a more consistent German approach to questions of EU foreign policy. Alongside the party chairmanship, Westerwelle also gave up the role of Vice-Chancellor, which made the Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology the Vice-Ministry. This further contributed to the diminished role of the Federal Foreign Office. In the grand coalition government formed in 2013 this trend continues, with the Ministry for Economy and Energy again serving as Vice-Ministry.

Institutional set-up of Federal Foreign Office

The lack of adjustment inside the Federal Foreign Office to foreign policy developments at the EU level has been highlighted as contributing to the lack of engagement and influence in EU foreign policy. Miskimmon observes that ‘bureaucratic re-organisation within Germany as a result of impulses emerging from CFSP/ESDP has been minimal’ and Cornelius Adebahr

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9 Guérot (p.6).
10 Lehne (p.7).
11 Joint letter from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission, Catherine Ashton (8 December 2011).
suggests that inside the Federal Foreign Office ‘no major changes to adapt to the existence of the European foreign service are envisaged’ in 2013. However, it should be pointed out that this not unique to Germany as there has been no restructuring inside the foreign ministries of the majority of Member States in response to the EEAS which does of course not preclude that some of the internal processes and working methods have been adapted to accommodate the changed foreign policy architecture at the EU level.

Non-engagement as support to the EEAS and the HR/VP?

Finally, the limited involvement in discussions about the structure of the EEAS and its objectives and mandate could also be interpreted as a conscious decision of the German government to allow the HR/VP to design the Service without excessive Member State involvement and, to certain degree, interference. With the establishment of the EEAS, the main issues of concern to Germany, namely the coming into existence of an EU diplomatic service under the leadership of the HR/VP, ideas Germany presented in its proposals during the European Convention in 2002, were addressed. Such an interpretation would be in line with Germany’s commitment to deeper integration in the field of external action and a strengthened role for the HR/VP and the EEAS which is included in the recent grand coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Contesting this analysis is that with the joint letter in 2011 and the Future of Europe Report in 2012 mentioned above, Germany aimed to support as well as influence the further development of the EEAS at two specific instances.

2. Germany’s position on peacebuilding

Question to be addressed: What is the general position of the Member State regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding? (e.g. Supportive, sceptical, not interested etc.).

German foreign policy after 1945 has been based on two main tenets: first, the commitment to act as part of the multilateral system; second, the primacy of civilian response to conflict and a resulting reluctance to use military means. Shortly after reunification, the understanding of Germany’s role in foreign relations as a civilian power led to a debate on whether the German army should be taking part in interventions outside its borders even when they are conducted under a United Nations (UN) mandate. While the controversial decision to support the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999 is seen as the first deviation from this principle, subsequent German governments have been reluctant to support military interventions outside Germany’s borders.

A case in point in this regard is the government’s decision to abstain from the vote on the UN Security Council Resolution supporting military action against Libya in March 2011. This has

14 Adebahr (p. 14).
17 Coalition agreement CDU/CSU and SPD (2013): ‘We support the strengthening of the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The EEAS’ capacity to act on matters of preventive crisis management and rapid crisis reaction has to improve. A lean EEAS should be a functional and not predominantly representative Service’. (p. 166 Translation by author). Available online: http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/koalitionsvertrag136.pdf
led some commentators – those with a traditional ‘hard’ security approach - to predict lasting isolation of Germany in international and EU foreign policy. They have identified Germany’s commitment to non-military response to crises as a crucial stumbling block for enhancing Germany’s role on the international scene commensurate with its economic power, as well as further integration and advances in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) at the EU level. This argument has recently been repeated regarding Germany’s refusal to support France’s military intervention in Mali, with some analysts arguing that ‘Germany’s foreign policy options are severely constrained by its enduring unease over the use of military power as a security policy instrument.’ This line of thinking derives from a realist assumption that policy influence is based on military power and a different analysis would be put forward from a peacebuilding perspective.

Germany’s commitment to non-military responses to conflict does not directly translate into a strong profile regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding when it comes to policy practice, meaning that conflict prevention and peacebuilding do not consistently inform foreign policy decisions. With the adoption of the Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building in 2004 (more information in Section 4), the German government articulated its understanding of civilian crisis prevention and developed 161 concrete action points to be implemented. The establishment of the Bundestag Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Networked Security in 2009 is further testament to Germany’s interest and dedication to civilian response to conflict. However, despite the Action Plan as policy guidance and the additional oversight structure of the Subcommittee, the challenge of making conflict prevention a priority throughout German foreign policy, and overcoming the problem of lack of coherence across a wide range of policy areas prevails. That said, Germany has used its membership of the UN Security Council (2011-2012) to advance its support for conflict prevention at the international level, for instance through the chairmanship of the working group on children in armed conflict.

The adoption of the concept of ‘networked security’ by the German government has been perceived by many civilian actors as an encroachment of military approaches on civilian conflict response. ‘Networked security’ was first introduced by the German White Paper on Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr which did not offer a concrete

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19 Stefan Erlanger and Judy Dempsey (24.03.2011) Germany Steps Away From European Unity Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/europe/24germany.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
definition. Through its application in Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan, ‘networked security’ became understood – rightly or wrongly - as a subordination of civilian response to crises to military rationale and approaches and was therefore rejected by a number of civilian actors. In later government publications, ‘networked security’ has been compared to what is commonly referred to a ‘whole-of-government’ or comprehensive approach to crises.

Finally, from a peacebuilding perspective, decisions regarding the export of military equipment undermine Germany’s commitment to civilian power. In their intention to enable others to conduct military operations, they have been branded as ‘substitution’ for Germany’s involvement in military missions. The recent export of military equipment to countries such as Qatar, Algeria and Saudi Arabia has called into question the mechanisms that govern arms export and has contributed to a broader debate about the role that norms play in the conduct of German foreign policy.

3. Germany’s position on the EU, conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Questions to be addressed: Is the Member State supportive of increasing the EU’s capacity to prevent conflict and build peace or not? What are the approaches or policy areas in which the Member State is influencing the EU in this regard?

Consecutive German governments have reiterated their support for civilian crisis management and the EU as the framework for international action. The coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP of 2009 highlights diplomatic and political engagement in international conflict prevention and the deployment of civilian experts as Germany’s contribution to international peace and security and the recent coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and SPD mentions that the next government will develop initiatives for the strengthening of CFSP. In the run-up to the German federal elections in September 2013, a cross-party alliance of Bundestag members demanded the next German government to be more proactive in furthering the EU’s

23 The relevant section reads ‘future security policy development are not military, but social, economic, ecological and cultural conditions, which can be influenced only through multinational cooperation. It is therefore not possible to guarantee security by going it alone, or with armed forces only. What is called for, rather, is an all-embracing approach that can only be developed in networked security structures based on a comprehensive national and global security rationale.’ Federal Ministry of Defence (2006): German White Paper on Germany Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr Available online: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=156941


26 See exchange of articles in Die Zeit (2 March – 23 March 2013) between Eberhard Sandschneider, Director of the German Council for Foreign Relations’ Research Institute, Jörg Lau editor for foreign affairs in Die Zeit and Gebhart Baum, FDP politician and former Minister of the Interior. Available online: http://www.zeit.de/schlagworte/themen/aussenpolitik/index


role as a power for peace, focusing on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction.  

This political support is mirrored by public opinion, which has since 1945 been characterised by a strong reluctance towards the deployment of the German army in military campaigns abroad. A recent study found that the vast majority (81%) of German respondents answered that Europe stands for peace. In addition, it demonstrated a strong correlation between respondents who think that the EU derives its legitimacy from its history as a peace project and those who wish Germany to co-operate in foreign and security policy. Thus, while the German public is predominantly sceptical about German military interventions abroad, the majority of Germans are supportive of their government’s engagement on foreign policy and security issues at the EU level. This supports the argument that the EU is the only way in which Germany can further develop its military power. Irrespective of the underlying motivations behind Germany’s support for CFSP and CSDP, it is often pointed out that of the ‘Big 3’, Germany is the Member State that is most comfortable with the development of a strong EU foreign policy, which, unlike France and the UK, it does not have to bring into alignment with its own foreign policy ambitions.

However, as outlined above, Germany has arguably lacked ambition and strategic vision on EU foreign policy since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Apart from the letter to Catherine Ashton in December 2011 and the Future of Europe Report in 2012 (see Section 1), it can be argued that so far a clear strategy or vision for EU foreign policy has not been developed.

**Germany’s re-engagement through civilian CSDP**

Germany’s active engagement in the discussions on CSDP in the run-up to the European Council Summit in December 2013 goes against this general trend. Germany is often described as a strong supporter of CFSP as well as the launch of CSDP, which it regards as part of its commitment to further EU integration. Germany provides an important contribution to the staffing of all missions, civilian and military alike. In September 2013, it has seconded a total of 646 personnel to CSDP missions, including military staff, police officers and civilian experts, thereby contributing more than any other Member State in absolute numbers. There are, of course, aspects of the German federal system that render the supply of appropriate personnel for civilian crisis management difficult, such as the fact that recruitment, training and secondment of police personnel falls under the competences of the federal state

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29 Joint letter by Reinhard Brandl (CSU), Agnieszka Brugger, Viola von Cramon (both Die Grünen), Bijan Djir-Sarai (FDP), Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU), Lars Klingbeil (SPD), Stefan Liebich (Die Linke) appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (07.03.2013). Available online: http://www.bijan-sarai.de/content/mehr-europ%C3%A4ische-au%C3%9Fenpolitik.
31 Lehne (p.10).
32 Almut Moeller and Julian Rappold (2012).
33 Gross (p. 502); Wolfgang Wagner (2005) From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European Security and Defence Policy, German Politics, 14,4 (455-469) (p. 456); Miskimmon (p.156).
governments who may be even less inclined to make their staff available for missions outside Germany than the Federal Ministry of Interior may be. Nevertheless, of the approximately 1200 policy officers seconded to EU missions in 2012, over ten per cent came from Germany.\(^{35}\)

In the preparations for the December 2013 meeting of the European Council, there was initially a strong focus on defence understood as military capability development and support to the defence industry.\(^{36}\) In the planning of the European Council meeting, Germany and other Member States helped shift the focus so that more attention would be paid to the civilian dimensions. Other Member States, who were equally wary about this imbalance later on suggested that it was because of Germany’s insistence on acknowledging the importance of the civilian dimension of CSDP that this agenda item has been maintained and further developed.\(^{37}\) This illustrates that smaller Member States\(^{38}\) which support a balanced approach to CSDP depend on the political backing of a big Member State, in this case Germany, to strengthen their efforts and highlight the importance of the civilian dimension as well as the military dimension.\(^{39}\)

In addition, Germany issued specific recommendations regarding the development of civilian CSDP which it presented in a non-paper in April 2013.\(^{40}\) The non-paper, which was signed by all other Member States, served as a basis for discussion with the crisis management structures inside the EEAS on the issue of civilian CSDP and led to the development of a roadmap that detailed the timeline for the implementation of the different recommendations. Germany has thus used the European Council meeting to demonstrate its commitment to civilian CSDP and provided direction to EU foreign policy in this field. Even though the non-paper focuses on technical details related to the launching, management and closing down of CSDP missions, it has supported renewed attention and discussion of civilian CSDP. This does not compromise Germany’s support to the development of military CSDP through, for instance, the Weimar Initiative which promotes a permanent civil-military planning and the further development of EU battle groups.\(^{41}\)

From a peacebuilding perspective however, civilian CSDP constitutes an area where Germany can apply its commitment to civilian action in EU foreign policy and where its involvement as part of the ‘Big 3’ is desirable. While some commentators inside and outside Germany - who favour the development of CSDP as a primarily military tool - have tried to construct the discussion about Germany’s role in CSDP in a way that sees Germany either committing to military operations outside its territory or jeopardising the success of CSDP as a whole, the


\(^{36}\) After several years of domination by the economic and financial crises, the agenda of the December 2013 European Council Summit is dedicated to foreign policy. CSDP is one of the areas to be discussed and it therefore provides an opportunity to address the challenges that CSDP is facing and make the political decisions that would enable progress. The agenda for the Summit has been heavily influenced by France and other Member States who have an interest in military co-operation and increasing support for national defence industries.\(^{36}\)

\(^{37}\) Discussion with Member State official in Brussels, April 2013.

\(^{38}\) Apart from Sweden and Finland, who have developed civilian crisis management at the national level and then introduced it in CSDP, the following Member States could be included in this category: Ireland, Austria, The Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Lithuania.

\(^{39}\) This analysis does not imply that Germany or other Member States oppose developments and reform on the military side; instead, it is a question of balancing attention, policy space and resources that are dedicated between the civilian and military side.

\(^{40}\) Draft non-paper on improving civilian CSDP management (April 2013).

\(^{41}\) Germany has seperately published a non-paper for the further development of the EU Battle Groups and is currently preparing another non-paper on what is called the Enhanced and Enable Initiative.
value of having Germany providing initiatives on civilian CSDP has been overlooked. Increased support for civilian CSDP could be a way for Germany to be involved in EU foreign policy on a strategic level as it conforms with Germany’s commitment to civilian power, balances France’s support for military CSDP, and is based on national initiatives and structures as outlined below.

4. National level initiatives and activities

   Question to be addressed: Are there national peacebuilding policy or initiatives that could be of relevance to the EU?

To guide its activities on civilian crisis prevention and peacebuilding, in 2004 the German government adopted the cross-ministerial Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building\(^{42}\) which includes a general assessment of the state-of-play on a variety of issues related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well as recommendations for the German government regarding initiatives to be pursued. Alongside the Action Plan, the Inter-ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention and the Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention which also includes representatives from civil society have been established to foster implementation of the Action Plan. While the Action Plan makes reference to the EU and the role Germany can play as an EU Member State, the actual implementation and discussions about the Action Plan have so far been focused on internal German politics, leaving out the broader EU dimension. The federal government regularly reports on the implementation of the Action Plan. The last available report from 2010 lists activities that are carried out by the EU regarding CSDP, the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, the Instrument for Stability, the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and co-operation with civil society.\(^{43}\) What is lacking from a peacebuilding perspective is how the different parts of the German government are supporting the EU to become more active and effective regarding conflict prevention.

With the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), Germany, along with Sweden and Finland, is one of the few Member States that has established an agency to strengthen civilian capacities for crisis prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding by providing training, maintaining expert rosters, and preparing deployment of German experts in international missions.\(^{44}\) Germany’s experience and expertise in some of the key areas of civilian crisis management is especially relevant as the few independent assessments of CSDP missions that have been carried out have identified the lack of staff expertise and numbers as crucial factors in the missions failing to fulfil their objectives.\(^{45}\)


\(^{44}\) The Centre for International Peace Operations was established in 2002 in close co-operation with the Federal Foreign Office and the German Bundestag as a reaction to the violence in the Western Balkans. It is also part of Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) which delivers pre-deployment courses and other training modules for staff working in CSDP missions.

The Civil Peace Service (CPS) was founded in 1999 and is financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The CPS seconded experts to assist local partner organisations with the implementation of projects aimed at non-violent conflict resolutions. Several German development and peacebuilding organisations constitute the Consortium CPS which sends experts to their partner organisations in conflict-affected countries.\(^{46}\)

5. **Actors involved at the national level**

Questions to be addressed: Who is involved in decision-making related to EU peacebuilding policy and its implementation at the national level? Which other actors such as influential think tanks, research institute or opinion-formers are important?

Within the Federal Foreign Office, responsibility for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and EU foreign policy is divided between three directorates.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding expertise is located in the Division for Crisis Prevention, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, State-Building, Promoting Democracy and Equipment Aid (VN 02) which is part of the United Nations and Global Issues Directorate. VN 02 is responsible to the Deputy Director-General for Civilian Crisis Prevention and Combating International Terrorism. This high-level appointment gave civilian crisis prevention visibility within the Ministry and in other government departments when it was first established. The Director chairs the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention which oversees the implementation of the Action Plan introduced above. Within the Federal Foreign Office, civilian crisis prevention is undertaken as an operational approach in the form of projects or tools available for Germany’s policy towards specific countries and regions. It seems as if VN 02 is only involved in EU policy in an ad-hoc manner and mostly on geographic issues through the task forces that are convened and which bring together different thematic divisions and the respective country and regional desks.

As part of the European Directorate-General, Division E01 provides guidance on issues related to general EU foreign policy affairs. It is unclear how it co-operates with VN 02.

Inside the Political Directorate-General, the European Correspondent coordinates Germany’s overall position on CFSP and CSDP. A specialised division within the Political Directorate-General leads Germany’s policy on CSDP and security policy (A 202). This division is part of the different task forces which are put together to prepare Germany’s response to specific crises, together with officials with country/regional expertise and those with thematic expertise, including VN 02.

Within the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, there is a division for Peace and Security which is part of the Directorate-General on policy issues and political governance of bilateral development co-operation and is the hub of expertise on peace and security within the Ministry. It is also part of the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Conflict Prevention. A separate division in the Directorate General for multilateral development policy manages Germany’s input into EU development policy specifically.

As mentioned above, the Chancellery plays an increasingly important role in formulating Germany’s policy towards the EU, including its foreign policy. Compared to the Federal

\(^{46}\) For more information on the Consortium CPS, please see: [http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en](http://www.ziviler-friedensdienst.org/en)
Foreign Office, the Chancellery has a limited number of staff so it can follow topics only superficially and relies on briefings from the relevant line ministries. Apart from political appointees, all staff working in the Chancellery are seconded by other ministries. The department of Foreign, Security and Development Policy provides general advice and support for the Chancellor on questions related to EU foreign policy (including bilateral relations) and the specific security and development dimensions. Attention to EU foreign policy depends on the relevance for the Chancellor’s agenda and his/her commitment to the specific topic.

During the 17th Bundestag (2009 – 2013), the Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Networked Security47 was established to provide support to the integration of civil conflict prevention into the work of the Bundestag and to monitor the implementation of the Action Plan. It is a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The establishment of a subcommittee on civilian crisis prevention demonstrates strong commitment to the issue (e.g. similar structures do not exist in many Member States and the recommendation for the next Bundestag is to reinstate the Subcommittee). In the first legislative period of its existence, the Subcommittee focused on collecting the perspectives on civilian crisis prevention from a variety of different actors, monitoring the implementation of the Action Plan and reviewing the government’s approach to specific countries or regions, most notably Sudan.

The Foreign Affairs Committee discusses all issues related to Germany’s foreign policy including parliamentary monitoring of German foreign policy, ratification of international treaties, decisions about the deployment of the German army abroad, etc. On many occasions it deals with issues that are of relevance to EU foreign policy or the role of Germany in EU foreign policy, but the EU angle may not be specifically prevalent in these discussions.

The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union deals with basic issues of European integration and institutional reform of the EU, EU enlargement and co-operation between the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments and is a cross-cutting committee. It is noteworthy as it brings together Bundestag members with members of the EP, and therefore bridges the gap between national- and EU level discussions.

Among the different think tanks and research institutes, the following are considered the most influential in German foreign policy: the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). SWP is a research institute with close links to the government (Bundestag members and officials from different ministries serve on its board). SWP publishes on a variety of different issues related to foreign policy and has a research group focusing specifically on EU external relations. DGAP is a membership-based organisation and think tank which publishes the Internationale Politik journal. Europe and the EU are one of the key research areas and the Alfred von Oppenheim Centre for European Policy Studies aims to bridge the gap between national and EU policy debates.

47 For more information, please see the Subcommittee’s website: http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/ausschuesse17/a03/a03_ga/index.jsp