

Input for the debate on the Instrument for Development Cooperation (and Economic Cooperation)¹

Based on the Presidency Paper Rev 1 dated 26 May 2006

Overview

The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is an alliance of European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks active in the field of peacebuilding, who share an interest in promoting sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the European Union (EU).

EPLO aims to influence the EU so it promotes and implements measures that lead to sustainable peace between states and within states and peoples, and that transform and resolve conflicts non-violently. EPLO wants the EU to recognise the crucial connection between peacebuilding, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development world wide and the crucial role NGOs have to play in sustainable EU efforts for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

EPLO's comments on this paper arise from these aims.

Peacebuilding is a short, medium and long term concept and has to be addressed with short, medium and long term financial instruments. For this reason, the Stability Instrument should not be the only instrument focusing on peace issues as DCI is a key instrument to ensure medium and long term actions. The DCI is, by its very nature, targeting many of the 40 to 50 countries worldwide that are considered to be fragile. Whether formally low income or middle income, these countries are either unable or unwilling to implement policies to reduce poverty and the majority are prone to or affected by violent conflict.

For this reason, we have profound concerns with this Presidency Paper as it does not include peace as an objective and conflict prevention activities as necessary activities.

• Peace as an objective for the Development Instrument

Best practice as well as official EU documents such as the European Consensus on Development or the Gothenburg Programme² show that peacebuilding and sustainable

¹ This is a position paper agreed by the Funding for Peace Working Group of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office – EPLO. See www.eplo.org for more information

² This idea was clearly expressed by the European Union in the Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: '[The European Consensus](#)', published in the Official Journal C/46 from 24.02.2006. Notably in the two following paragraphs:

"35. The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development in a number of areas (2). It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims. This constitutes a substantial additional EU contribution to the achievement of the MDGs."

development are inter-related. Yet in this paper there is no reference to peace from DCI. We believe this ignores a number of important premises:

- 1) The DCI by its very nature will be implemented in the poorest countries, where violent conflict is prevalent, and may be implemented in middle-income countries also at risk from violent conflict;³
- 2) Peacebuilding measures can only be conducted in the long-term and form an integral part of good development practice;
- 3) Any and all activities implemented under the DCI must be accompanied by conflict impact analyses;

The Stability Instrument is designed exclusively for short-term crisis management and is unlikely to have global reach. The reliance throughout the Mitchell report on the Stability Instrument for addressing root causes of conflict, or long-term peacebuilding measures is, therefore, misplaced.

- **Conflict prevention as necessary activities for the development instrument**

For the DCI to achieve its poverty reduction aims, it must integrate certain specific activities to allow the effective prevention of the outbreak and recurrence of conflict. In line with OECD/DAC rules on ODA eligibility, these should explicitly include:

1. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Small arms proliferation control and misuse is not a merely security issue⁴ but has unavoidable and interlinked development and societal dimensions and therefore is a cross-pillar issue. We urge that measures to research, assist, support and accompany the implementation of activities to combat the proliferation and misuse of SALW be included in the DCI, as measures to manage crises and prevent conflict, as measured aimed at sustainable development will be undermined without a strong commitment – and cross-pillar approach – to reducing the availability of arms in unstable areas.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

The absence of any reference to civilian and civil society contribution to DDR measures is of concern. We regret that no mention is made of civilian measures to research, assist, support and accompany the implementation of disarmament activities.

"37. Insecurity and violent conflict are amongst the biggest obstacles to achieving the MDGs. Security and development are important and complementary aspects of EU relations with third countries. Within their respective actions, they contribute to creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, war, environmental degradation and failing economic, social and political structures."

The [EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts](#) states that "the Commission is invited to implement its recommendations on ensuring that its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root-causes of conflicts in an integrated way within the framework of the poverty reduction objective".

The close link between development and security has also been stressed by several UN Reports. See the Jeffrey Sach's report: [Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals](#) and the Kofi Annan's Report [In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for all](#).

³ In 38 countries covered by the DCI there was "an ongoing severe crisis or war" in 2005 or there were "more than one violent crisis or war" between 1995 and 2004. This correspond to "high" (score 3) or "medium" (score 2) category in the field "conflict" of the 2006 [ECHO Global Needs Assessment](#).

⁴ "Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime." *We the People, the role of the UN in the 21st century*, Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan to the General Assembly, Chapter 4, p.52, October 2000.

3. Strengthening civilian control over the security system⁵

Strengthening overall civilian control over the security system (as defined by definition by the OECD DAC⁶) is a fundamental part of the process of laying the foundations of sustainable peace and development. The governance of the system has to be consistent with democratic norms, human rights and the rule of law. This may include vetting to remove human rights abusers from high office. It should be included in the DCI.

4. Justice

Failure to acknowledge the underlying causes and effects of conflict and past abuses can perpetuate conflict and exacerbate the exclusion of the most vulnerable, thus hindering effective sustainable development. Justice as a value should therefore be an objective of the instrument, and provision should be made for victims to seek truth and justice.

5. Capacity building of local actors

The DCI should also include explicitly other conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities such as civilian measures of **accompaniment and support to local peace and development actors** in conflict-affected areas, such as human rights defenders, traditional and religious leaders, women's groups, labour unions and similar; and promotion of conflict sensitive and free media.

Commentary on paper

Based on the following document:
Presidency Paper Rev 1 dated 26 May 2006

Recital 10 and Article 3 (1)

The list of common and universal values set out here misses 'justice' and 'peace' – these are particularly important values in the context of development cooperation.

Article 2 (2), third indent

The phrase 'encourage their smooth and gradual integration into the world economy' does not leave open the possibility of the world economy adapting to the needs of developing countries. We believe that until the needs of people, and in particular people living in poverty, without access to the means to meet their basic needs, are put before the world economy as a driver for change, development policy will not address the root causes of conflict in the world.

⁵ This idea was clearly expressed in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, '[A concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform](#)' Brussels 24.05.2006. COM(2006) 253 final.

⁶ The OECD DAC Guidelines define the security system as including the following actors: "**Core security actors:** armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias); **Security management and oversight bodies:** the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions); **Justice and law enforcement institutions:** judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems; **Non-statutory security forces**, with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias."

Article 2 (5)

In our view, it is essential that expenditure intended for development assistance should, in all cases, not be used for military purposes, therefore meeting the criteria for ODA established by the DAC-OECD. This is particularly relevant with reference to expenditure on conflict prevention and peace building.

Article 2 (6)

With reference to our comment above and with reference to the wording of this paragraph we would like to express our full and unequivocal support for this Article.

Article 2 (7)

We welcome the recognition of the need for continuity between actions funded under the Stability Instrument and those funded under this Instrument. However, in the second paragraph of this Article, we miss a similar recognition for continuity between Humanitarian Aid and Development funding⁷.

Article 3 (3)

We welcome the inclusion of the aim for coherence between development policy and other areas of external action. We would like, however, to underline the need for seeing such other areas in very broad terms. For example, the Green Paper on energy currently under consultation, does not address the issues for people in developing countries, which are implicit in the aim of energy security for European citizens and businesses, nor does it recognises the link between access to energy and root causes of conflict.

Article 3 (7)

The effective cooperation with partner countries referred to here does not address the possibility of such cooperation, necessary though it is, for creating or exacerbating conflicts. Particularly in sub-paragraph (b) it might be useful to include reference to conflicts and parties with conflicting interests.

Title II, Article B (2)(c)

We welcome the inclusion of conflict prevention into the geographic programmes as this reflects the recognition of the need for long term conflict prevention measures.

Title II, Article B (2)(f)

We are concerned that here only demobilisation and reintegration actions are included, but disarmament is not. It is our view that DDR programmes need to be integrated programmes with all elements of the programme being given appropriate weight. By separating one element from such programmes there is a real risk that the necessary coherence and coordination of programmes on the ground could be put in jeopardy.

Title II, Article B (2)(i)

This paragraph, by referring to policy reform in the fields of security and justice, would appear to reflect only the policy reform aspect of SSR and not the whole of the SSR concept. We consider it essential that SSR as a holistic concept is included here.

⁷ This link was clearly expressed in the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, [‘Linking Relief, rehabilitation and Development - An Assessment’](#). Brussels 23.04.2001. COM (2001) 153 Final.

Title II, Article C, E, F, and G

Although we recognise and welcome (see above) the inclusion of conflict prevention in the geographic programmes, we are concerned and surprised that this is then not reflected in any of the region specific sections except to a certain extent in the section on Asia with a reference to fragile states. In our view, the issue of fragile states and other conflict issues are by no means restricted to that geographical region and reference to this should be made for all geographical regions.

Title II, Article I

We are aware that there are ongoing discussions about the creation of a further instrument dedicated to democratisation and human rights. The comments that follow are made on the basis that they would equally apply to such a further instrument if that instrument reflects the content of this Article.

The fact that there is no specific reference to conflict prevention or peacebuilding in this Article is of significant concern to us. We believe that very often where there is a lack of democracy and a failure to respect human rights there will also be conflict or potential conflict and a lack of successful strategies to deal with it. It is therefore important to reflect the need for conflict prevention measures in programmes which address democratization and human rights.

Title III, Article 6

In our view, it is essential that the thematic strategy papers should focus on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. We believe that the regular revision and reviews of these strategy papers provide important opportunities to evaluate the impact of past strategies on conflict and to revise them to account for changing conflict dynamics on the ground.

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