

Policy Paper on civilian CSDP

Policy discussions on the future of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are currently taking place among the EU institutions, EU Member States, and within the research/think tank community in Brussels and beyond. Many of these discussions focus on the following themes: (1) the strengthening of the military dimension of CSDP, either through the pooling and sharing of military resources or the possible establishment of an EU permanent civil-military planning and conduct capability; (2) the neglect of the CSDP in the broader framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in particular since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS); and (3) the further development of overall CSDP capabilities.

Without questioning the validity of these discussions, EPLO believes that it would be useful at this point to take a step back and ask additional questions which look more broadly at the impact and effectiveness of the CSDP by analysing how the civilian dimension of the CSDP (for which the shorthand civilian CSDP will be used in this paper) can contribute to the reduction of violent conflict and to long-term peacebuilding in conflict-affected countries.

The analysis in this policy paper is based on input from civil society (EPLO member organisations and others) in countries and regions in which CSDP missions have been deployed, as well as discussions with stakeholders in Brussels and at the Member State level. As with all EPLO publications, it aims to integrate a gender perspective in that it assesses the different impacts which CSDP missions have on men and women and the ways in which CSDP missions address the security needs of different parts of society, including men, women and children.

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1. An overview of civilian CSDP following ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty provides that the EU's aims are *inter alia* to 'promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples' (Article 3.1) and to 'preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security' (Article 21.2(c)).

With the Lisbon Treaty, responsibility for guidance on the CFSP as a whole and the CSDP in particular was transferred from the rotating presidencies of the Council of the EU to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) who is supported by the EEAS. The fact that the CSDP is no longer determined by the explicitly short-term (limited to six months) policy agenda of the Member State which chairs the rotating presidency is not necessarily a negative development as it allows the EU to develop civilian crisis management¹ as a more strategic tool which can contribute to long-term EU objectives in a region instead of the interests of a particular Member State. At the same time, CSDP missions themselves retain their short-term focus with mandates usually being reviewed and extended on an annual basis.

The Lisbon Treaty also formally introduced the option for the EU to deploy conflict prevention missions making conflict prevention one of the Petersberg tasks.² Conflict prevention missions would be missions aimed at preventing violent conflict rather than managing conflicts or dealing with aspects of post-conflict settlement such as the monitoring of border demarcations. One example of this could be missions aimed at supporting peace processes (see Section 4). This would entail conflict prevention being a specific objective in a civilian CSDP mission's mandate and operational plan which would in turn mean that its staffing, activities and overall evaluation would be determined by the mission's contribution to the prevention of conflict. This preventive approach to crisis management would allow the EU to consider CSDP missions as one of the tools available to support longer-term conflict prevention in a conflict-affected region.

While there was a hiatus in the launching of CSDP missions immediately after the setting up of the EEAS, three civilian CSDP missions have been launched in the last few months.

However, progress in further developing civilian CSDP has been stalled by:

- (1) Member States holding differing views about the importance of different types of CSDP operations;
- (2) debate on the relationship between the CSDP and other aspects of EU external action; and
- (3) over-emphasis on crisis response in the EU's approach to conflict in third countries as demonstrated in the 2012 annual report on the CFSP provided by the HR/VP to the European Parliament.³

¹ Civilian crisis management is an EU term to describe non-military crisis management used in EU CSDP missions. The need to establish coordinating mechanisms for EU and EU Member States' civilian crisis management was first emphasised at the European Council meeting in December 1999 in Helsinki. At the European Council meeting in June 2000 in Feira, four priority areas for EU civilian crisis management were identified: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.

² Article 42, Treaty on the European Union: 'The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.'

³ Council of the European Union (October 2012): Main aspects and basis choices of the CFSP (point G, paragraph 43 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006) – 2011 - Annual report from the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament. Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14605-re01.en12.pdf>

With the EEAS now established and the crisis management structures, including the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) integrated in the EEAS, and with some of them having gone through a phase of restructuring, EPLO believes that there are now opportunities to revive and update civilian crisis management at a conceptual and operational level. Member States have recognised this and requested a review of the procedures governing EU crisis management in December 2011, a process that is led by Yves de Kermabon, former Head of EULEX Kosovo who heads what has become known as the 'Kermabon Group'. Results of the review will be discussed by Member States in early 2013.

2. Application of a human security approach to the CSDP

EPLO's analysis of civilian CSDP is informed by the concept of human security. Human security⁴ is people-centered, focusing attention on the security of the individual and society at large rather than just state security, which focuses on the territorial integrity of the state. It should be noted that many of the political differences between Member States' positions on CSDP can be traced back to different understandings of what kind of security it should support.

Human security is broader than state security in that it encompasses a range of different factors which could pose a risk to individuals, such as economic, social and environmental factors. In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report focused on human security and highlighted its relevance for achieving objectives related to sustainable development, peace and the protection of human rights.⁵

It is also important to note that since citizens are not a homogeneous group, the human security approach, by focusing on the individual, implies an attention to the different segments of the population, including men, women, boys and girls, refugees, minorities etc. whose different security needs and perceptions are often overlooked by traditional state-centered security models. A gender-inclusive vision of human security,⁶ therefore, recognises and addresses the different degrees of vulnerability of women and men to these threats. Importantly, gender-inclusive security does not only see women as victims of insecurity, but also draws on their strengths and skills to build a more secure society.

Focusing exclusively on state security may limit a CSDP mission's effectiveness in contributing to long-term peace. In the following, we will outline the aspects of the human security approach which are of particular relevance to the CSDP:

2.1 Focus on human security

A human security approach reveals the potential gaps between formal efforts to improve the security situation by for example reforming the security sector and people's perception of security, noting that

⁴ According to the Human Security Initiative, 'human security focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and assuring sustainable continuous development. It emphasizes aiding individuals by using a people-centered approach for resolving inequalities that affect security'. Online. Available at: <http://www.humansecurityinitiative.org/definition-human-security>

⁵ UNDP (1994). New Dimensions of Human Security. Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>

⁶ For a discussion of gendered definitions of human security, please see Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi and El-Bushra, Judy, with contributions by Maguire, Sarah, "The Conceptual Framework: Security, Peace, Accountability and Rights," in International Alert and Women Waging Peace, *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: a Toolkit for Advocacy and Action*, Volume 1, (Washington DC and London: Hunt Alternatives Fund and International Alert, 2004), 5-14.

Available at <http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/explore-resources/toolkit-for-advocacy-and-action/>

different groups within a society (for instance men and women) may have very different perceptions in this - and many other - areas. For them, CSDP missions which are only aimed at ensuring state security may not be able to achieve security and safety. For missions working on the rule of law, security sector reform (SSR), public administration or border management, the focus should be promoting security and justice for the people. Thus, mandates of CSDP missions should be centered on their security needs. This requires a detailed understanding of the conflict dynamics, which takes into account the different roles and experiences of men and women, and which is best acquired by conducting conflict analysis which is focused on understanding the perspectives of those most affected by conflict.

Example: Taking a human security approach to security sector reform

Focusing on human security and applying a human security approach can highlight the discrepancy between international reform efforts to strengthen security provision in conflict-affected countries and actual security needs and public perceptions of security services by communities. Such an analysis can highlight issues of concern for specific groups, such as the security needs of women in rural Liberia⁷ and greatly inform policies dealing with the reform of the security sector such as in the case of Kosovo.⁸

2.2 Accountability towards local populations

Ensuring security for people as primary beneficiaries widens the scope of accountability of CSDP missions, from a focus on state security to include individuals and the society in which they are operating, in line with how security is conceived in EU Member States. Therefore, establishing functioning working relationships with a broad range of civil society actors, based on trust and long-term engagement is necessary to ensure that CSDP missions are aware of and act upon the security and justice needs of local populations. This means that in planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating CSDP missions, the EU's crisis management bodies need to maintain contact with a wide variety of civil society organisations (CSOs) including but not limited to peacebuilding and conflict prevention NGOs, human rights organisations, CSOs representing women's interests etc. and be informed by for example population surveys. This would not only lead to better relations between CSDP missions and the societies in which they operate but also allow them to work more effectively as they would receive information about the conflict situation across the country and the impact of their activities. This engagement is particularly important in contexts where the government's ability to provide security to the population is limited due to issues such as a lack of legitimacy or capacity.

Example: Community security in areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) conflict affects tens of thousands of people. Originating in northern Uganda in the late 1980s, more recently it has spread to the neighbouring countries of South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The LRA thrives by terrorising local populations – attacking and abducting civilians and looting. The conflict has led to mass displacement across the region. Until now, most approaches to the LRA conflict have been military. These attempts at solving the issue have not only proven ineffective, they have also resulted in increased suffering (e.g. displacement, protection issues) among local communities because state mechanisms to protect civilians are not in place. There needs to be a better assessment of the impact

⁷ Elizabeth Drew & Dr Alexander Ramsbotham, 'Consolidating peace: Liberia and Sierra Leone', Accord 23, March 2012 - chapter 'Human security in Liberia: Local perspectives on formal and informal security sectors' by Richard Reeve & Jackson Speare. Available at: http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/CON1222_Accord_23_8.pdf

⁸ Saferworld (2011). Public perceptions of safety and security in Kosovo: Time to Act. Available at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Kosovo_tracker_survey_2011_English_reduced.pdf

of military interventions on local communities, starting at planning and continuing throughout different phases by monitoring at the grassroots level.⁹

2.3 Conflict sensitivity

For CSDP missions to implement a human security approach, they also need to be conflict sensitive. Conflict sensitivity implies the ability of an organisation to:

- understand the context in which it operates;
- understand the interaction between its intervention and the context; and
- act upon the understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

To be conflict-sensitive, CSDP missions need to be based on thorough analysis. In addition, they need to have a good understanding of how their presence, activities and interactions with different local actors affect, negatively or positively, the conflict dynamics in the country to avoid reinforcing the status quo regarding power-relations, the exclusion or marginalisation of certain communities and the risk of being instrumentalised by one party to the conflict. This would also enable them to capitalise on opportunities to promote peace in a particular context by for instance including the perspectives of marginalised groups, encouraging engagement across the conflict-divide etc.

Example: The EU Border Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point

The EU Border Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) is set up in a way which has provided the Government of Israel with significant control over the operation of the mission. This imbalance has been exacerbated by the fact that EUBAM Rafah has not been able to fulfill its mandate for most of the time since its launch because of the closure of the Rafah Crossing Point.¹⁰ This raises questions about the conflict sensitivity of the missions: what impact has its set-up had on the conflict dynamics?

3. Reviewing civilian CSDP

3.1 Member States on board?

Member States are the main decision-makers in the CFSP and thus also the CSDP. As such, they are responsible for launching new CSDP missions and overseeing existing ones. Most of them are in favour of continuing and further developing civilian crisis management despite their often-expressed frustration about the limited and slow progress in this area. This commitment, expressed most recently in the Council conclusions of July 2012,¹¹ is crucial as the success of CSDP missions depends to a large extent on the Member States' willingness to support the mission by co-operating and sharing information, sending qualified staff, and monitoring and learning from their work. Indeed, one of the key contributions of CSDP missions to the CFSP is their ability to act as a vehicle for collective action on behalf of EU Member States, thereby strengthening their ownership of and support for EU action.

⁹ For more information about the LRA and Conciliation Resource's work on increasing collaboration between communities in the four affected countries, ensuring affected communities are able to inform conflict responses and contribute to conflict-related government policies, and encouraging the return and reintegration of abductees from the LRA, please go here: <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/lords-resistance-army>

¹⁰ QCEA (February 2012): The European Union Crisis Management Missions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, p.12.

Available at: <http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/bp-mideast-csdpv4-en-feb-2012.pdf>

¹¹ Council of the European Union (July 2012).

This advantage may be lost if CSDP missions are perceived as a tool to advance individual Member State's interests rather than collective European interests.

There may be an overall push for effective and collective EU action caused by (1) the declining power of Europe in many parts of the world which suggests that for the EU to be relevant, collective action, of which CSDP missions is a prime example, is necessary; (2) the current economic climate, as acting through the EU is more cost-effective for Member States than situations where the EU plus a number of Member States acting bilaterally, are simultaneously present and active within a particular country or region; and (3) the body of evidence which shows that collective action by external actors has a far greater impact in fragile and conflict-affected countries.¹²

Despite the factors in the external environment which encourage Member States to act jointly through the EU, there is a trend towards EU Member States acting bilaterally in countries where the EU is also present with a civilian CSDP mission. Examples of this include the proliferation of police training in Afghanistan with limited or no coordination with EU Policy Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) or the activities pursued by individual Member States in the DRC, which at best compete with and at worst undermine the effectiveness of the two CSDP missions there.

While the EEAS will not be able to prevent Member States from pursuing their national foreign policy interests in a given country or region, the way in which it involves Member States in the development of CFSP and CSDP missions can help to bring them on board.

Recommendations:

To the EEAS management:

- Ensure that Member States are involved in the drafting of country or regional strategies (as opposed to presenting them with the almost finalised draft strategy as a *fait accompli*);
- Initiate detailed discussions about the EU's overall objectives of the EU in any given context, and how CSDP missions can contribute to achieving these objectives.

To EU Member States:

- Ensure that national policies and activities in a conflict-affected country do not contradict or undermine the activities of the CSDP missions;
- Actively monitor CSDP missions and contribute to their effectiveness by seconding well-qualified staff and engaging with them in conflict-affected countries.

3.2 The CSDP and the Comprehensive Approach

The EEAS and the European Commission are currently developing a communication on an EU Comprehensive Approach which should clarify how the EU can best implement its commitment to comprehensive action in third countries. Given the various policies and tools which it has at its disposal, the EU is well positioned to address situations of instability in a comprehensive way. Discussions on how the EU can overcome obstacles which prevent it from taking a comprehensive approach and on the elements of the communication on an EU Comprehensive Approach are taking place in various fora.¹³

¹² See World Bank (2011): World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development.

Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf

¹³ Such as the Wilton Park Conference organised in co-operation with the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands on 17/18 December 2012.

Throughout these discussions, Member States disagree about the place for the CSDP within an EU Comprehensive Approach, with some Member States arguing that it should be the main component and others wanting it to be one element among other tools, such as development assistance. While it is not clearly expressed, it seems as if Member States belonging to the first group fear that aligning the CSDP with other policy areas under an EU Comprehensive Approach may reduce its overall importance in EU external action as well as their control over it.

The debate about the place of the CSDP within an EU Comprehensive Approach raises a number of issues regarding its future, its relation to other parts of EU external action and possible areas of reform, some of which will be developed further below.

(a) The CSDP as part of an overall strategy

Recently-launched CSDP missions have been part of an overall EU approach to a specific country or region. In these cases, the EU first developed country and regional strategies which defined its objectives and then decided on the most appropriate policy tools to meet them. This limits the risk that CSDP missions are disconnected from longer-term EU engagement in a particular country or region and that no exit strategy is developed. In addition, it may render it less likely that CSDP missions are perceived as the only EU activity in a conflict-affected country or region and reduce the expectations that they will address all conflict issues there.

This approach appears to be supported by the senior management of the Crisis Management and Planning Division (CMPD) and has been adopted by the Member States. According to the Council conclusions on CSDP of July July 2012:

“The Council emphasises that the focus and impact of such operational engagement is enhanced when it is embedded in an overarching strategy, such as the strategic frameworks for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. This allows for a comprehensive approach that makes full use of the role of the High Representative who is also one of the Vice Presidents of the European Commission, and that mobilises the different tools at the EU's disposal in close interaction with the Member States to achieve the EU's objectives, in close cooperation with other international actors and making optimal use of scarce resources.”¹⁴

The process of first developing country or regional strategies and then deciding on the role a CSDP mission could play in meeting the EU's objectives also enables EU decision-makers to establish whether the setting-up of a mission is the most appropriate tool, (i.e. whether it will be the best way for the EU to meet its objectives) and to assess the opportunity costs of setting up a CSDP mission. This would prevent CSDP missions being misused as the “default option” to show the EU's engagement in a region.

Despite these positive developments, the CSDP often remains separate from other EU policy and activity, perhaps also due to the fact that its political culture is more opaque than other parts of EU external action. While there have been cases of good co-operation with the EC in previous missions throughout the planning stage, this often seems to have been discontinued once the mission was launched. This may jeopardise the impact of the EU as an external actor, waste resources as it leads to duplication of activities, create confusion in the country concerned, and may be exploited by local actors. In addition, it makes it more difficult for other EU policies and programmes to build on the achievements of the CSDP mission or to provide continuity for successful initiatives and fill the void

¹⁴ Council of the European Union (July 2012). Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy. Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131971.pdf

that the CSDP mission - in some countries the most prominent EU interlocutor - has left. This is especially unfortunate in places where activities carried out by CSDP missions such as SSR are often simultaneously supported by other forms of EU assistance through the EU delegations. The European Court of Auditors' (ECA) report on EU assistance to the rule of law in Kosovo highlights coordination challenges between the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), EC programmes and Member States' political priorities as well as the need for the EEAS and the EC to ensure adequate planning on how EC projects can support EULEX objectives after the closing of the mission.¹⁵

Recommendations:

To the EEAS management:

- Provide guidance on the EU's response to crisis by leading on the development of country or regional strategies which set out the EU's objectives in a given context;
- Ensure that the upcoming joint EEAS and EC communication on an EU Comprehensive Approach clarifies how the EU envisages using the policy tools at its disposal at the various stages of the conflict cycle in a coherent manner.

To the EEAS crisis management bodies and Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention (Directorate K):

- Prepare a comparative analysis including cost-effectiveness to evaluate whether a CSDP mission or operation will contribute to building lasting peace in a particular context better than other tools at the EU's disposal; as part of the analysis, the possibility of certain activities (e.g. rule of law work) being carried out by EU delegations should be considered;
- Define and further develop those areas of peace and security in which the EU can offer advice and expertise.

To the EEAS crisis management bodies:

- Ensure that crisis management staff co-operate with the relevant geographic and thematic EC departments, primarily the Unit for Fragility and Crisis Management in DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) who have valuable expertise and tools at their disposal regarding the planning of interventions and evaluation of impact in conflict-affected countries throughout the planning and operation of a CSDP mission.

To regional units/divisions in DG DEVCO and the EEAS:

- Involve crisis management structures systematically in the programming of instruments and the drafting of country strategy papers to ensure that CSDP missions, existing or under preparation are part of the EU's overall approach to a given conflict context.

(b) Crisis management inside the EEAS

The new thinking on the role that CSDP missions can play as part of a broader EU approach towards a certain region or country is supported by greater openness on the part of the crisis management structures. EPLO has noted an increasing recognition among officials working on EU crisis management of the added value of consultations with external experts and intended beneficiaries of CSDP action, as well as the need to forge closer working relationships with the rest of the EEAS. A more participatory approach to lesson learning processes has been developed which includes consultation with populations in countries where CSDP missions are deployed in addition to

¹⁵ European Court of Auditors (2012). Special Report No. 18. European Union assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law. (pp. 34). Available at: <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/17764743.PDF>

counterparts from the national government, the EU's international partners, Member States representatives in the country concerned etc.

The way the crisis management structures, in particular the CMPD, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and EU Military Staff (EUMS), are set up constitutes a challenge to integrated planning. This is due both to the Council decision¹⁶ setting up the EEAS which stipulated that the crisis management bodies have to be under the direct responsibility of the HR/VP and to the different political cultures which exist inside these institutions. Although the recent restructuring within the EEAS is positive in that it tries to bring those bodies closer together, it is still difficult to see how coordination between the different structures will work in practice. This is especially true for the CMPD and the CPCC where there is a risk of duplication of work and confusion of responsibilities.

For the moment, the challenge lies with the senior management of the CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS to ensure that their staff work together closely with their respective counterparts either by adapting working methods or by developing so called "functional solutions"; in the absence of institutional integration (i.e. the merging of divisions/directorates) it may be necessary to ensure working together in other ways, (e.g. through working groups). The same holds true for the co-operation between crisis management officials, the rest of the EEAS and other EU institutions.

Last year's restructuring of the EEAS brought the Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention closer to the crisis management bodies. The Directorate can provide the various crisis management bodies with conflict risk assessments, use conflict analysis to assess the impact of a planned CSDP mission on actual and potential conflicts, support the development of conflict mitigation strategies and conflict prevention missions, and contribute to the overall expertise on conflict, peace and security inside the crisis management bodies. The Crisis Management Board, which is chaired by the HR/VP, and the Conflict Prevention Group, which is convened by the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments are fora in which the EEAS can explore these issues and ensure that the crisis management bodies, especially the crisis planners, are keeping abreast of the latest developments in the field of conflict policy and conflict analysis including in terms of respecting norms espoused by the EU in critical areas such as justice, human rights and gender.

Recommendations:

To the EEAS management:

- Consider whether future reforms of the EU's crisis management structures should envisage merging the CMPD and the CPCC;
- Reduce the unnecessary level of secrecy around crisis management activities which may hinder crisis management structures from soliciting external views and analysis; the review of the crisis management procedures which is a closed process could benefit greatly from external input and should at some point be opened for discussion with a wider group of stakeholders;
- Provide clear political guidance to heads of missions (HoMs) and senior crisis management staff for instance regarding relationship with neighbouring countries, strategic partners etc.

To the management of the EEAS crisis management structures:

- Ensure the co-operation of crisis management staff across the different departments (i.e. CMPD, CPCC and EUMS) and establish "functional solutions" to compensate for the lack of integrated planning;

¹⁶ Council of the European Union (July 2010). Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service.

Available at: <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11665-re01.en10.pdf>

- Increase co-operation between the crisis management bodies and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, especially the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments.

(c) Civil-military integration

Civil-military integration should be one component of an EU Comprehensive Approach. The current phase of civil-military integration started in 2008 and led to the creation of the CMPD. It was seen by some as a way to increase European weight within NATO and to develop independent capabilities for military actions, including the possible development of a European command structure. Increased “pooling and sharing” of military capabilities, which is currently high on the political CSDP agenda, is seen as a possible response to the cutting of defence budgets at national level.

In this context, it is important that civilian crisis management receives the necessary attention. This includes adequate policy space to discuss the development of civilian crisis management (e.g. policy debates at Member State and Brussels level, Member State initiatives regarding CSDP and related lobbying). These fora are often dominated by the issue of defence assets while similar discussions around the EU's civilian capacities – such as taking forward the EU's civilian headline goals – attracts less attention.¹⁷ The multi-annual work programme for civilian capability development which was announced last year could signal a welcome change, even though limited information is available on its implementation.

Depending on the type of CSDP mission, different expertise is needed. Therefore, the application of military concepts, approaches, tools and personnel to civilian crisis management should be avoided. At the moment, military planners are leading on planning civilian missions, and personnel with military background and experience are appointed as HoMs for civilian missions, etc. While they may have extensive and valuable experience, this is not necessarily applicable to the complex rule of law activities carried out by civilian CSDP missions. At the UN level, similar missions would be headed by a civilian and, in many cases, a diplomat.

To date, the majority of the EU's interventions have been civilian and this is likely to continue to be the case due to public support for civilian missions within Europe and the high demand for specialised civilian assistance from citizens and governments in conflict-affected countries. It is, therefore, important to ensure that staff with expertise and experience in areas covered by the missions' mandates including gender, conflict prevention, support to mediation and dialogue as well as staff that can provide strategic input on how political reform can be promoted in the specific country are present at both planning and operational levels.

Recommendations:

To the management of the EEAS crisis management structures:

- Ensure an adequate balance between planners with civilian and military background which reflects the actual nature of the activities of CSDP missions as well as gender balance;

To EU Member States:

- Second qualified civilian experts to both crisis management bodies in Brussels and CSDP missions, including experts with an understanding of civilian matters at the strategic level;
- Dedicate resources to the development of civilian capacities, such as the civilian headline

¹⁷ The recent Council Conclusions on Military Capability Development (19 November 2012) are a case in point in this respect.

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133560.pdf

goals and the establishment of recruitment systems for civilian experts for crisis management.

3.3 Concepts for civilian crisis management

The EU's adoption of civilian crisis management more than ten years ago was far-sighted and many of its ideas have since been adopted by NATO and third countries such as the US. While civilian CSDP missions were conceived as a tool for short-term, crisis management response, many of them are involved in longer-term complex statebuilding work and end up operating in a country for years. Even missions which are primarily focused on short-term, post-conflict activities such as the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) and the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) include longer-term and more complex components. In the case of Georgia, the EUMM should 'contribute to the reduction of tensions through liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures'¹⁸ and EULEX Kosovo has a significant part of its work in monitoring, mentoring and advising.¹⁹ For CSDP missions to be effective, they have to consider the increasing evidence of when external engagement is successful in conflict-affected countries and, therefore, review the concepts on which civilian crisis management is based.

Reviewing the concepts is important not only to ensure that the EU's engagement in conflict-affected countries is conceptually in line with relevant EU developments, but also so that the way civilian CSDP missions are planned and managed is adapted to the changes in the nature of conflict and to evidence about how to respond to it. An example of the complex areas of work in which many civilian CSDP missions are involved is reform of the justice and security sectors. The World Bank's *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*²⁰ contains evidence and analysis which should inform this line of work. For instance, the report suggests that one practical way external actors can support longer-term institutional reform and more functional state-society relations is through community-based programmes for policing. Taking a purely technical approach to police training by limiting it to skills transfer may have the adverse effect of strengthening illegitimate institutions rather than reforming them.

The report also stresses the importance of combining support to the justice and security sectors with activities aimed at creating jobs and providing economic support. This confirms the need for CSDP missions to be closely aligned with other EU actors and programmes such as the EU's development assistance in the country or region concerned.

These issues were recognised in the recent joint EEAS and EC communication on EU support for sustainable change in transition societies which stresses the importance of inclusive transition processes to address socio-economic inequality. The communication also refers to the abovementioned lack of reform by highlighting the need to involve civil society to make the provision of security more effective and accountable.²¹ EPLO has previously stressed the need to include civil

¹⁸ Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia.

Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:248:0026:0031:EN:PDF>

¹⁹ Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO.

Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:042:0092:0098:EN:PDF>

²⁰ World Bank (2011): World Development Report on Conflict, Security and Development.

Available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf.

²¹ European External Action Service and European Commission (October 2012): Joint Communication on EU Support for sustainable change in transition societies. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/communication_transition_en.pdf

society oversight mechanisms in institutional reform processes and provided examples of cases where civil society played such a function in conflict-affected contexts.²²

Recommendations:

To the EEAS management and the ‘Kermabon Group’:

- Consider the issue of crisis management concepts in the review of the crisis management procedures;
- Setout a process for the review of the crisis management concepts, open to external input.

To the management of the EEAS crisis management structures:

- Ensure that where concepts have been revised, (e.g. the Operational Document ‘Implementation of Women, Peace and Security resolutions in the context of CSDP missions’), the necessary implementation mechanisms are spelled out as part of the review.

3.4 The EU Institute for Security Studies

In the past, EPLO has commented on the need to reform the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to make it more effective in providing high-quality analysis for EU foreign policy discussions, bringing contemporary thinking on peace, security and conflict into EU policy-making, and supporting the EEAS in shaping its agenda.

Having obtained figures for the EUISS budget for recent years thanks to the intervention of the European Ombudsman, EPLO believes that given the EUISS’ annual budget of EUR 4 million, it should play a role commensurate with its status and resources.²³ Member States, who pay significant contributions to the EUISS budget, should insist on it presenting them with concrete plans on it will contribute to the development of the EU’s foreign policy by providing analysis and evidence-based recommendations for the future development of the CFSP and the CSDP and leading on discussions on specific issues to inform EU policy-making.

Recommendations:

To EU Member States and the EEAS (who are board members of the EUISS)

- Monitor the EUISS to ensure a better price-performance ratio.

3.5 The impact of CSDP missions

HoMs write regular reports for the Political and Security Committee (PSC) about the progress of a mission in achieving its objectives. As they are not public, it is difficult to assess the quality and usefulness of the reports. However, EPLO understands that these reports do not assess the wider impact which a mission has on the context in which it operates. Similarly, the strategic reviews of the CSDP missions which are carried out by staff in the crisis management structures are often limited to assessing whether they have achieved their objectives and do not address broader questions about their effectiveness or impact on the overall conflict situation. In addition, as has been noted by the ECA’s report on EU assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law, there is a lack of benchmarks and indicators for assessing progress in meeting the mission’s objectives.²⁴

²² EPLO (July 2011): [Using More for More: Incentivising Pease in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy](#); CSDN Background Document (December 2011): [The Role of Civil Society and Institutional Reform](#).

²³ EPLO (2012) [The EEAS and Peacebuilding One Year On](#).

²⁴ European Court of Auditors (2012) pp. 30.

A good understanding of the context and the impact of the CSDP mission on it would enable a CSDP mission to co-operate with actors supportive of peacebuilding and ensure that a mission's presence does not inadvertently fuel conflict, exacerbate power imbalances, or aggravate tensions by, for instance, being instrumentalised by one of the conflict parties.

Learning from EULEX Kosovo: Lessons from the ECA's report

The ECA's report on EU assistance to Kosovo related to the rule of law including through EULEX Kosovo finds that 'despite significant assistance, progress in improving the rule of law is limited and levels of organised crime and corruption remain high'. While the report is specific to the situation of EULEX Kosovo, many of the findings and recommendations can be applied to CSDP operations elsewhere. The crisis management structures should, therefore, use the report to revise and inform the process by which CSDP missions are planned, executed, monitored and evaluated.

The following findings have particular pertinence for civilian CSDP missions:

- 1) There is a need for better coordination between the EU Special Representative/Head of EU Office in Kosovo (who has the mandate to provide political advice to EULEX) and EULEX;
- 2) The objectives and roles of the EC and EULEX on rule of law need to be better defined, respective benchmarks should be included in the planning phase;
- 3) Staffing constraints are a serious concern, including quality and quantity of staff seconded to EULEX and periods of staff secondment;
- 4) The limited role for civil society impairs the prospects of sustainability of EU actions in the future;
- 5) Since there is no system in place to analyse how much time staff spend on monitoring, mentoring and advising (MMA) or executive functions, a cost-effectiveness analysis of EULEX compared to other forms of EU assistance is impossible;
- 6) The EC and the EEAS have not made sufficient use of policy dialogue and conditionality to strengthen the rule of law;
- 7) There is a need to develop an exit strategy which includes how the EC will take over EULEX' capacity building functions.

Recommendations:

To EU Member States:

- Correct the lack of evidence regarding CSDP missions' impact in conflict-affected countries by supporting research projects aimed at filling this gap and integrate lessons learned into the planning and management of missions; consider the role of the EUISS in this respect;
- Insist that HoM reports and strategic reviews of CSDP missions take into consideration the effect that the presence of an international mission may have in the country concerned, including, for instance, the fact that international staff are paid significantly higher wages than the local population as well as incidences of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), prostitution and trafficking of women.
- Address the persistent lack of women in senior-level positions which perpetuates gender stereotypes by seconding more women to crisis management bodies in Brussels and at country level.

3.6 “Local ownership”

While everyone agrees with the importance of “local ownership”, its meaning is often contested²⁵ and its application in practice proves to be difficult. Regarding CSDP missions, three aspects are of particular importance:

On one level, ‘local ownership’ applies to the relationship which the CSDP mission has with the host government. CSDP missions are often confronted with governments which refuse to implement agreed reform commitments. In these cases, CSDP missions, and the EU in general, may find it difficult to use leverage to put pressure on the government to fulfill its commitments.

This is exacerbated by a technical approach which is focused on training rather than deeper political reform. Combined with a lack of resources in the host country or political difficulties in encouraging reform, this can lead to the neglect of more reformist dimensions of a CSDP mission’s work aimed at transforming host government institutions and a focus on politically less difficult work which strengthens the respective institutions rather than reforming them.²⁶ Regarding the justice and security sectors in particular, there is a real risk of the EU being complicit in further strengthening unaccountable and corrupt institutions. For this reason, clear benchmarks for a discontinuation of CSDP activities should be developed and support should be conditional on progress towards the reform objectives. This risk should also be addressed in the abovementioned cost-effectiveness analysis in order to address at which stage working with the government through a CSDP mission is the most appropriate tool for the EU to promote reform.

Example: Strengthening reform elements in CSDP missions

In several CSDP missions tasked with the reform of the security sector, the extent to which they manage to contribute to actual reform is not clear. This is the case for the EU Policy Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) where the mission is said to “keep it a technical mission and shy away from political issues”.²⁷ Similarly, the EU mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DRC) has been criticised for not including specific benchmarks for reform on which EU support is conditional and that the benchmarks which are included are purely technical.²⁸

On another level, “local ownership” relates to the relationship between the population and the government and the fact that institutions and reform processes should be “owned” by the local population. There is a risk that “local ownership” is equated solely with the government. This is especially true for CSDP missions where the partner government is often their only direct counterpart.

For this kind of ownership to be established, it is important to engage with people who are directly affected by the conflict as a means of understanding their needs and the drivers of conflict and peace. The importance of including civil society in EU activities has been recognised in other policy areas. For

²⁵ Martin, Mary, Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al (2012). Existing Conflict, Owning the Peace: Local Ownership in International Peace Operations. Available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09182.pdf>

²⁶ CSDN Meeting Report (May 2011): [EU Support for Security Sector Reform: Learning from the EU CSDP Missions and other EU support in Guinea-Bissau and DRC](#)

²⁷ QCEA (February 2012): The European Union Crisis Management Missions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, p.17.

Available at: <http://www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/bp-mideast-csdpv4-en-feb-2012.pdf>

²⁸ Joint report from civil society (April 2012): The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform. Available at: <http://www.pole-institute.org/documents/drc-ssr-report-20120416.pdf>

instance, the recent EC communication on engagement with civil society in external relations²⁹ stresses the role of civil society in inclusive policy-making as well as the willingness of the EU to support and monitor effective mechanisms for result-oriented dialogue. It also includes a commitment to develop roadmaps for engagement with civil society at the country level which should then guide EU activities in the specific country and support collective action on behalf of the EU. Surveys of the security perceptions of the local population are also crucial in this regard.

A third dimension of “local ownership” applies to the relationship between a CSDP mission and the local population. For missions working on the rule of law, SSR, public administration or border management, the focus should be on promoting security and justice for the people which requires a detailed understanding of the conflict dynamics. Local civil society has valuable insights into the conflict dynamics, which means that involving them can lead to the development of more effective and sustainable policies.

The accountability of CSDP missions to the society in which they operate has sometimes been a point of tension. Often, the missions want civil society to focus exclusively on monitoring governments in the country whereas local civil society is also interested in holding the missions themselves to account. This is particularly the case where missions exercise considerable power in a given context, hold executive mandates, or are involved in crucial institution-building work which impacts on state-society relations.

As a reaction to civil society oversight and a lack of connection or poor relations with local populations, some personnel in international missions have developed condescending and prejudicial attitudes towards the societies in which they are based.³⁰ This may also be caused by their own frustrations about the lack of effectiveness of the mission’s work. It is unfortunate to discover this attitude inside CSDP missions³¹ as it not only has repercussions for the standing of the EU as a foreign policy actor and its acceptance in the host country, but also seriously undermines the mission’s credibility in promoting democracy and good governance. As a minimum, the generic standards of behaviour adopted by the Council of the EU in 2005 should be applied. Failure to do so should lead to reprimands and disciplinary action and HoMs should be held to account for their staff’s behaviour.³²

Recommendations:

To the management of the EEAS crisis management structures:

- Link the work of CSDP missions to broader democratisation activities and political dialogue.

To EU Member States:

- Discuss how to react when a host government blocks previously-agreed reform efforts or carries out human rights violations and use the EU’s political influence where possible;
- Acknowledge and address tensions and problems in the relationship between international mission staff and civil society (e.g. by closer links to EU delegation staff) and hold HoMs to

²⁹ European Commission (September 2012): The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations.

Available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0492:FIN:EN:PDF>

³⁰ Martin, Mary, Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al (2012). pp. 3

³¹ When visiting countries where CSDP missions are deployed, EPLO staff members have frequently observed hostile and prejudiced attitudes to the local population on the part of CSDP mission staff.

³² In this respect, the accountability mechanism in case of possible breaches of the Standards by operation or mission staff stipulated by the EU Action Plan on Democracy and Human Rights to be put in place by mid 2013 is a welcome development: Council of the European Union (2012). EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf

account for their staff's behaviour.

To heads of missions:

- Engage with local civil society to ensure CSDP missions have an understanding of conflict dynamics and that they are aware and can act upon the security and justice needs of the local populations;
- Establish functioning working relationships with civil society, based on trust and long-term engagement, and reach out to local CSOs, not only those with close ties to the government but with the whole spectrum, including women's groups, civil society representing minorities etc. and engage on a regular and structured basis;
- Ensure that the generic standards of behaviour adopted by the Council of the EU in 2005 are applied. Failure to do so should lead to reprimands and disciplinary action;
- Use the resources in EU delegations such as relations with civil society, analysis and surveys of populations' perceptions to inform the activities of the mission.

To heads of EU delegations:

- Ensure that roadmaps for engagement with civil society drafted at country level also take into consideration the activities of CSDP missions and how they will relate to and engage with civil society.

4. Scenarios for reviving civilian CSDP

In reviving civilian CSDP, the EU should decide on the role it wants civilian crisis management to play in the future. In this section, EPLO sets out a number of ideas regarding different scenarios for reviving civilian CSDP based on a human security approach:

Option 1: Focus on support to peace processes

The EU could decide to use CSDP as a tool to fulfill very specific activities related to the monitoring of peace agreements and preventing the recurrence of violent conflict, building on lessons from EUMM Georgia and the AMM. Missions could either be limited in mandate and focus on the implementation of peace agreements by, for instance, monitoring border demarcations, recording incidences of violence etc. More ambitiously, they could expand to cover support to negotiations of peace agreements which could involve support to the team leading mediation efforts, shuttle diplomacy between conflicting parties etc., and finding creative ways to implement the relevant commitments in the Comprehensive Approach to the Implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 in this regard.

The human security perspective:

In both cases, the EU would need to ensure that CSDP missions have been identified as the most appropriate tool to support the peace process and that they are focused on supporting inclusive peace processes. This requires a good working relationship with civil society to ensure that there is clarity on the role of the CSDP mission and that it is able to support the participation of the local population in the peace process. For those missions to be successful, CSDP operations need to be embedded in an overall EU strategy towards the specific country or region. This would help to ensure that the activities carried out by the mission are coordinated with and complemented by, for example, EU development assistance or loans granted from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and that they are followed-up after the mission has left.

Option 2: Develop niche expertise

The EU has developed valuable expertise in specific activities such as police training and border management and monitoring. This has been acknowledged by a variety of commentators and Member State bodies.³³ On the basis of this experience, the EU could decide to further develop its concepts and practices, integrate lessons learned from relevant CSDP missions and other comparable experience and develop specific, small-scale CSDP missions which are focused on several areas of expertise. This implies a narrower focus of future CSDP missions and would require the crisis management bodies to specialise in specific activities.

The human security perspective:

In this case, crisis management bodies should prioritise updating the concepts which underlie CSDP activities to incorporate evidence and lessons stemming from the fields of institution- and statebuilding. However, much of the success of these missions will depend not only on the underlying policy framework but also on the quality of the personnel who are seconded by Member States to work in them, an issue which was highlighted in the recent ECA report.³⁴ For a CSDP mission to be respected and acknowledged as a relevant actor, its staff, including the HoM, needs to have experience and expertise in the areas of civilian crisis management encompassed by the mandate of the mission e.g. the rule of law, police training, gender etc. For Member States to set up missions without then providing adequate personnel with relevant expertise is both irresponsible and harmful to the EU's reputation as a foreign policy actor.

Option 3: Develop and manage stabilisation missions

The EU could decide to use CSDP missions to carry out activities which are much more in line with the term 'crisis management', by deploying them explicitly as short-term stabilisation tools in conflict-affected countries or regions. They would support the establishment of a secure and stable environment to prepare the ground for political and institutional reform processes, reconciliation efforts etc.

The human security perspective:

In order to ensure that the civilian component of such stabilisation missions is sufficiently represented, there would need to be a civilian approach to planning and managing them, focused on civil protection which is not undermined by military planning modalities. Also there number of experts on civilian crisis management inside the CMPD would need to be increased. Focusing on short-term stabilisation also means that CSDP missions would be very explicit about their exit strategy and how their efforts relate to wider EU policy and programmes towards the specific country or region. This in turn requires CSDP stabilisation missions to be developed as an integral part of an overall strategy towards a certain country or region.

Option 4: Explore the option of joint EU missions

The EU could envisage developing missions which encompass a variety of different instruments ranging from short-term crisis response mechanisms to longer-term development activity, as has been

³³ UK House of Lords Report (2011): The EU's Afghan Police Mission. Available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/l201011/lselect/ldeucom/87/87.pdf>

European Parliament, Directorate General for External Policies (2012): CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes. Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/sede/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=74231>

³⁴ European Court of Auditors (2012). pp. 38.

proposed in a recent non-paper by a group of Member States on developing an EU Comprehensive Approach.³⁵ This would enable missions to make use of a wider breadth of expertise inside the institutions and recruit staff from a larger pool and could possibly ensure coherence between short-term crisis response and longer-term peacebuilding and development objectives.

The human security perspective:

Even though these missions are aimed at rapid deployment, it is necessary to ensure that they are planned jointly by the different geographic and thematic divisions inside the EEAS as well as DG DEVCO and the crisis management structures. If this is not done, there is a risk that short-term policy objectives dominate the planning and launching of the mission, leaving longer-term objectives to be integrated as add-ons at a later stage. In addition, it would be important to clarify the added value of developing joint missions as opposed to fostering more co-operation with EU delegations in countries where missions operate or channelling EU assistance through EU delegations, especially as the different reporting procedures and chain of commands will pose a challenge.

Option 5: Maintain the wide range of civilian crisis management activities

If the EU is to continue its broad range of civilian crisis management activities, which include security sector and police reform, rule of law work, border management, capacity building including monitoring, mentoring and advising, civil protection etc, it has to receive adequate policy attention from the EEAS management and the Member States. Otherwise, the EU risks spreading its capacity too thinly and, as a result, may act ineffectively.

The human security perspective:

First, it is important to ensure that both crisis management structures in Brussels and CSDP missions are adequately staffed and resourced. Second, the existing expertise which lies within the various parts of the EU institutions, primarily the Unit for Fragility and Crisis Management in DG DEVCO and the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments and the Division for Security Policy inside the EEAS as well as the respective geographic divisions/units should be used in planning missions and informing their management. Third, consideration should be given to the possibility that some crisis management activities could be delivered more effectively not as part of a CSDP mission but, for instance, as programmes coordinated by EU delegations.

³⁵ Non-paper on further developing the Comprehensive Approach developed by Finland, Luxembourg, Italy, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

5. Detailed recommendations

To the management of crisis management bodies:

- Ensure that crisis management staff co-operate with the relevant geographic and thematic units/divisions in the EC and the EEAS, primarily the DG DEVCO Unit for Fragility and Crisis Management, FPI and the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation Instruments who have valuable expertise and tools at their disposal regarding the planning of interventions and evaluation of impact in conflict-affected countries, throughout the planning and operational stages of CSDP missions; the lessons learned from CSDP missions should also be integrated into this process as well;
- Ensure the co-operation of crisis management staff across the different departments (i.e. the CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS) and establish “functional solutions” (e.g. thematic focal points) to compensate for the lack of integrated planning;
- Support a revision of civilian crisis management concepts which is informed by evidence of what kind of third party intervention was successful in conflict-affected countries, lessons learned from CSDP missions and based on the concept of human security;
- Ensure that where concepts have been revised, (e.g. operational document ‘Implementation of Women, Peace and Security resolutions in the context of CSDP missions’, the necessary implementation mechanisms are spelled out as part of the review and then used;
- For every (proposed) mission prepare a comparative cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate whether it will contribute to building lasting peace in a particular context better than other tools at the EU's disposal;
- Require staff members to consult with external experts and civil society, including gender experts and representatives of women's organisations, in countries where CSDP missions are based; regarding conflict analysis, evaluation of missions, renewal of mandates etc;
- Link the work of CSDP missions to broader EU engagement, including democratisation activities and political dialogue;
- Ensure an adequate balance between planners with civilian and military background which reflects the actual nature of the activities of CSDP missions as well as gender balance in Brussels and at mission level;
- Require CSDP mission staff to undergo specific training courses (e.g. on conflict sensitivity and gender) and ensure follow-up to training by means of monitoring changes in behaviour and approach;
- Ensure that CSDP missions are considered in the drawing up of roadmaps for the engagement with civil society in third countries which follows from the recent EC communication on Europe's engagement with civil society in external relations.

To heads of missions:

- Establish functioning working relationships with a broad range of civil society actors, based on trust and long-term engagement and reach out to local civil society, not only those with close ties to the government but with the whole spectrum, including women's groups, organisations representing minorities etc. on a regular and structured basis to ensure that CSDP missions are aware of and act upon the security and justice needs of local populations;
- Ensure that the generic standards of behaviour adopted by the Council of the EU in 2005 are applied. Failure to do so should lead to reprimands and disciplinary action;
- Maintain close working relationships with EU delegations.

To EU Member States:

- Ensure that national policies and activities in a conflict-affected country do not contradict or undermine the activities of the CSDP missions;
- Participate actively in in-country coordination activities led by EU delegations;

- Monitor actively ongoing CSDP missions and insist that crisis management bodies demonstrate how lessons learned are integrated into the planning of new missions;
- Insist that HoM reports and strategic reviews of CSDP missions take into consideration the effect that the presence of an international mission may have in the country concerned, including, for instance, the fact that international staff are paid significantly higher wages than the local population as well as incidences of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), prostitution and trafficking of women;
- Discuss how to react when a host government blocks previously-agreed reform efforts or commits human rights violations;
- Engage actively in the mid-term review of the EEAS with a view to encouraging the assessment of crisis management, especially regarding its impact in conflict-affected countries;
- Correct the lack of evidence regarding CSDP mission's impact in conflict-affected countries by supporting research projects aimed at filling this gap and integrate lessons learned into the planning and management of missions; consider the role of the EUISS in this respect;
- Explore a revision of the EUISS' mandate and objectives to better cover the prevention of violent conflict, situations of fragility and support to sustainable peace;
- Monitor the EUISS to ensure a better price-performance ratio, i.e. production of suitable quantity of high quality analysis commensurate with its budget;
- Dedicate resources to the development of civilian capacities, such as the civilian headline goals and the establishment of recruitment systems for civilian experts for crisis management.
- Ensure staff seconded to CSDP missions and crisis management bodies in Brussels has adequate expertise and experience in areas relevant to the mission's mandate including gender and that at least 50% of seconded staff – especially at senior-level - are women;
- Acknowledge and address tensions and problems in the relationship between international mission staff and civil society (e.g. by closer links to EU delegation staff) and hold HoMs to account for their staff's behaviour.

To the EEAS management:

- Ensure that Member States are involved in the drafting of country or regional strategies (as opposed to presenting them with the almost finalised draft strategy as a *fait accompli*) and in detailed discussions about the overall objectives of the EU's engagement in any given context, and how CSDP missions can contribute to achieving these objectives;
- Ensure that the upcoming joint EEAS and European Commission Communication on the Comprehensive Approach clarifies how the EU envisages using the various policy tools at its disposal at the different stages of the conflict cycle in a coherent manner;
- Consider the issue of crisis management concepts in the review of the crisis management procedures by the 'Kermabon group' and set-up a process for the review of the crisis management concepts, open to external input;
- Provide suggestions aimed at improving the functioning of the crisis management structures in the EEAS mid-term review in 2013;
- Consider whether future reforms of the EU's crisis management structures should envisage merging CMPD and CPCC or other forms of integration and streamlining as well as the relation to the Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention;
- Decrease the in many cases unnecessary level of secrecy around crisis management activities which may impede crisis management structures to solicit external views and analysis; the review of the crisis management procedures which is a closed process could benefit greatly from external input and should at some point be opened for discussion with a wider group of stakeholders.
- Ensure that the crisis management bodies sufficiently cooperate with each other and establish functional working relationships within and outside the EEAS, especially the Fragility Unit and Crisis Management Unit inside DEVCO and the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding

and Mediation Instruments in the process of developing crisis management concepts for missions but also in the programming of country strategy papers;

- Monitor the EUISS to ensure a better price-performance ratio.

To Heads of EU delegations:

- Ensure that roadmaps for engagement with civil society drafted at country level also take into consideration the activities of CSDP missions and how they will relate to and engage with civil society;
- Lead on co-ordination of EU activities in –country including with CSDP missions and EU Member States, as provided by the Lisbon Treaty.

To regional units/divisions in DG DEVCO and the EEAS:

- Involve crisis management structures systematically in the programming of instruments and the drafting of country strategy papers to ensure that CSDP missions, existing or under preparation are part they are part of the EU's overall approach to a given conflict context;
- Contribute to the preparation of cost-effectiveness analysis by evaluating which EU activity will be most appropriate to build lasting peace in a particular context.

To the EUISS:

- Develop concrete plans on how the EUISS will contribute to the development of the EU's foreign policy by providing analysis for the future development of the CFSP and the CSDP, informed by a human security approach;
- Ensure that the EUISS is contributing to the evaluation of CSDP by gathering evidence of CSDP missions' impact in conflict-affected countries.

To Parliaments in EU Member States:

- Monitor governments' engagement in the CSDP to ensure that it supports the EU in taking a human security approach to missions;
- Insist that the government provides information regarding the impact of CSDP missions on conflict dynamics and call for them to be monitored and evaluated;
- Encourage governments to second qualified staff to CSDP missions and highlight the need for gender equality in secondments, especially regarding senior-level positions.

To civil society and academia:

- Support the development of civilian crisis management by analysing the impact of CSDP missions on overall conflict dynamics;
- Monitor CSDP missions by producing regular reports on their effectiveness (possibly in relation to the six-monthly report produced by the HoM);
- Engage actively and constructively in consultations with CSDP missions.