Civil Society Consultation Meeting: The European Union and Somalia
5 March 2010, European Commission, Borschette Building

Please note that this report is a record of the meeting. It does not claim to be a comprehensive analysis of the issues covered. It does not include information that was not presented during the meeting. Many of the issues explored in the meeting could be explored in more depth but because the report aims to be a record of proceedings, the decision has been taken not to include additional information or clarifications that were not presented by participants during the meeting. In addition, the report does not include alternative opinions to those presented by participants during the meeting.

The views expressed during the meeting and recorded in this report are the views of participants in the meeting. In some cases the views are not shared by all participants; as such, the views should not be taken as the opinion of civil society as a whole. The meeting took place under the Chatham House rule, so the comments cannot be attributed to individual speakers.

There are many different interpretations of the events that have taken place in Somalia and different understandings of the contemporary situation in Somalia. The views expressed in the report are the views of participants in the meeting and report does not make any claims as to the veracity of the views expressed.

Session I
Opening remarks from the EU Institutions:

Speakers stressed the importance of civil society involvement in peacebuilding processes in Somalia, and of building with civil society in Somalia and elsewhere in the world, given the importance of the Somali Diaspora. Any fight against terrorism also needs to involve Non-State Actors. The EU Institutions are open to dialogue with civil society.

The Principles of Peace, which guide European Commission activities, include support to Non-State Actors. International efforts have focussed on security. While this is important, it is not sufficient. Approaches to security have to be holistic and involve governance, rule of law, and development efforts. It is important to look at the TFG and the rest of Somalia. The new government needs to be able to provide services, including health, education and support the economy, so that it is a real alternative to other forces active in the country. The Djibouti Agreement is the cornerstone for activities in Somalia. The EU welcomes efforts by the government to become more inclusive and supports improved governance, including at the regional level.

The planned troop training mission will support the TFG to provide better protection to Somalis and to resist hostile forces. Operation Atalanta is helpful but is not enough. It is important to create alternative livelihoods. The EU will continue to cooperate with the UN and the AU as they share the same objectives. Enhanced dialogue in the region would be helpful – for example, through IGAD.

The Diaspora is sometimes associated with radicalism but many in the Diaspora play a positive role.

The EU Institutions are interested in learning how to support Somali-led efforts and also in hearing ideas on how to move forward collectively. It’s also an opportunity for international civil society to learn. The consultation meeting is an opportunity to begin dialogue and consultation on development of the EU’s engagement in Somalia, including the Somalia country strategy.
Economic problems and alternative livelihoods: Piracy is a business issue: piracy makes EUR 120 million per year and development aid amounts to EUR 45 million. The EU is supporting governance efforts and rural development. The EU’s funds tend to go UN agencies and International NGOs (INGOs); the context makes it difficult to engage directly with local civil society because they are not legally recognised entities.

Civil society participants’ comments and questions

*The comments from the civil society participants during the first session are grouped by topic*

i. Regional coverage, decentralisation and statebuilding

The EU’s strategy needs to reflect the fact that Somalia has three regions. Just addressing Mogadishu is not enough. Decentralised peacebuilding efforts would be helpful. Local initiatives are developing across the country. Communities take the initiative and establish civilian administration. For example, a process of this type is developing in Juba with clans and sub-clans coming together in an attempt to form an administration. In other parts of the country, functioning civil administrations have enabled a humanitarian corridor to be established.

Statebuilding is important – but what kind of state should the international community support? The EU should invest in decentralisation. Radical elements support a centralised state. A new approach to statebuilding is necessary – the international community continues to put resources into the same things while expecting different results. The EU should look at the soft side of supporting the TFG, not just the hard side (i.e. not just cars and computers for the TFG but also governance and skills).

The EU should continue to make long-term commitments to Somalia. Civil society appreciates the fact that the EU has always been present in Somalia, including when other donors were not.

ii. The important role of civil society

A number of participants expressed the opinion that Somali civil society needs to be involved in the peace processes. There are examples of processes where Somalia civil society could and should be playing a role, including the consortium to prepare the constitution for Somalia which does not yet include any Somali civil society representatives. In addition, one participant expressed the view that civil society has not yet been consulted on Security Sector Reform. The TFG is not working with civil society on SSR – it is important to have civil society involved in security issues.

One participant put forward their own view that civil society could be considered among the most democratic element of the Somali state, given that the TFG and TFP have not been elected.

The Country Strategy Paper does set out a clear agenda of engagement between Somali civil society and the EU. It’s important for there to be a direct dialogue between the EU and Somalia.

INGOs should work on transfer of skills to Somali CSOs and develop genuine partnerships with Somali civil society.

There is sometimes misuse of funds by Somali civil society. This needs to be addressed if Somali NGOs want to engage directly with the EU.

Like anywhere, there are good and bad civil society organisations. But they are mainly good and mainly active. In the absence of a state, civil society has filled the vacuum. Generally, NSAs can play a role in monitoring aid effectiveness and delivery. Aid monitoring is essential; NSAs have access to all areas of the country. In South Central, NSAs are ready to provide information to donors and to play a role in monitoring and evaluation.

Somalia is a difficult environment for civil society. In the last two years, over 60 civil society activists have been killed. There is sadly little international reaction when civil society activists are killed.

iii. AMISOM
AMISOM and civil society have started a dialogue. AMISOM is in Somalia to keep peace – but what peace? It seems as though AMISOM is there to protect the government and the airport. It should focus more on protection of civilians. Some civil society representatives raised concerns about AMISOM’s shelling of civilian neighbourhoods and asked the EU to help hold AMISOM to account for its actions.

iv. Protection and Human rights

People in Somalia have the right to protection. The international community should pay more attention to the protection of civilians. Crimes committed in Somalia should be punished, for example through the ICC. The EU could be more active on justice issues.

v. The EU’s CSDP Missions

There have been a range of problems when troops trained elsewhere have returned to Somalia, including lack of payment of wages, and human rights abuses by troops.

There is a strong risk of defection by troops when they return to Somalia. This has happened when troops trained in Djibouti returned.

When the troops return to Somalia, they will be commanded by people in the TFG including some who have carried out human rights abuses.

There was a discussion about carrying out the troop training in Somalia itself, with different opinions expressed.

Participants recommended:

- A study should be undertaken to see where the 14,000 troops already trained by international missions have ended up;
- Guarantees that troops’ wages will be paid need to be in place;
- Weeding out the dangerous elements among the troops is important;
- Human rights training for troops.

The impact of the Atalanta mission is not being felt in Somalia itself. There is a perception in Somalia that the mission exists to protect European interests. It is important to identify the root causes of piracy and collectively address them.

vi. Young people

Young people are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by Al-Shabaab. Young people tend to leave the country or turn to extremism.

vii. The role of the business community

According to some of the participants, one of the limitations of EU involvement in Somalia is a lack of reference to the business community. There is a need for systematic engagement with the private sector. On participant expressed the view that the weak element of the Country Strategy Paper is the private sector. International efforts should use existing networks that span the country, including higher education and business. There is economic development in some areas due to the role of business.

The business community has not had and does not want aid money, although it hasn’t always delivered what is required from it and as it has been contracted to do. The EU can act in the role of guarantor to build trust between business community and local authorities in Somalia.

Although platforms already exist for this purpose, one participant expressed the view that new platforms or other fora to support links between business and civil society would be helpful.

viii. Other comments

Concern was expressed about the kidnap of internationals in Somalia and by Somali pirates.
Firefighting phase is ending; with improved governance of the TFG, support to civil society (in Somalia and the Diaspora) and support to regional government, security will follow.

Poverty reduction is key; after that anti-piracy and security will follow.

There have been positive changes in the Diaspora’s approach since the 1990s.

Concerns were raised about the large amount of resources for Somalia that are going into Nairobi, due to the presence of NGO and UN personnel there.

**EU Institutions concluding remarks and clarifications:**

The Atalanta Mission has a narrow mandate and can only provide narrow benefits to Somalia within the terms of that mandate. It has, however, been supporting supply of food relief to Somalia, which is of benefit to the population.

Salaries of troops trained by the new Mission are guaranteed until January 2011. Human rights training will be included in the troop training (and is already an element of training carried out in Djibouti).

Troop training needs to take place with proper recruitment, salaries, chains of command, equipment.

**Session II**

**Lessons from the Accord publication (please see www.c-r.org for more information):**

The pattern of intervention in Somalia has not been effective. Instruments for short-term state failure are not helpful in the case of long-term state failure. Supporting Somali-led peace initiatives is key. Security governance – security forces should only be inserted into areas where there is a political settlement. Building security should only be attempted when political settlement has been reached.

Peacebuilding provides the key to stability, as demonstrated by Somaliland and Puntland. Security forces have to be linked to political leadership. Somaliland and Puntland have the confidence of their people. The State is not necessarily benign – misuse of state power and its monopoly on the use of violence can occur. External actors focus too much on the state because they need a state to engage with. It’s not clear to whom the TFG is accountable, whereas accountability is clear in Somaliland and Puntland. Stability would enable Somalia to handle terrorist and security issues.

Breakdown in Somalia is part of a regional constellation of events. Regional actors put their security first at the expense of the Somali people. Ethiopian intervention had a devastating effect in Somalia. Somalia’s neighbours are negatively affected and they are stakeholders but they should not dictate terms.

Specific recommendations:

- Security strengthening should not take place until there is a political settlement
- Regions/areas where there is a political settlement should be supported
- The international community should do no more to rein in Somalia’s neighbours
- It is important to go beyond the imposition of force, including supporting civil society along with supporting government.

**Peace Mapping Study (for more information, please see www.interpeace.org)**

There have been 130 local and regional Somali-led peace initiatives. Most were successful and ended violence. EU policy framework document should recognise that Somali-led peace processes have led to governance and law and order, whereas internationally-supported processes have not.
Key elements of Somali-led peace processes:

1. preparation, process-oriented, flexibility responding to dynamics
2. Overseen by mediation and leadership committees
3. Accountability mechanisms, including constant contact with constituents to discuss developments
4. Inclusivity of processes, including women, youth, media and business.
5. Potential spoilers are part of the processes.
6. Different tactics are used to move ahead.
7. Authority of accords reached is drawn from inclusiveness, representativeness of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.
8. Public outreach afterwards, including caravans to publicise the agreements.

Features of Somali-led peace processes include an initial focus on ending violence and restoring security, through the creation of buffer zones, green zones, the use of third parties and sanctions for violations.

The international community should support the outcomes of Somali-led peace processes. Their support should be incremental and calibrated.

Comments from civil society participants

Currently 3.2 million Somalis are in need. The international community has largely withdrawn. The only way to reach these people is through civil society. Resources should be used to support civil society development.

Al Shabaab recruits in Somaliland and Puntland as well. If AMISOM troops were moved out of Mogadishu, then Al-Shabaab would take over in days. Somaliland and Puntland still have far to go when it comes to accountability.

Local initiatives have limitations, including when it comes to the involvement of armed groups.

Somali-led processes have greater legitimacy but the international community is involved in Somalia. People need to be informed about peace agreements, they need to be publicised through the work of NSAs. Carrying out consultations on peace agreements facilitated by the international community would be helpful.

Local agreements are useful for managing local business but there are other powerful actors in Somalia. Institutions are needed to safeguard peace agreements that have been reached.

The international community does not have a common agenda. There is now an agreement on implementation of the Djibouti Agreement but there is a lack of a common vision with different actors having different priorities.

The EU should try to harmonise international strategy towards Somalia (at very least harmonising the strategies of its member states). Developing a comprehensive strategy for Somalia, with an emphasis on the regional dimension would be helpful.

EU Institutions’ comments

The Horn of Africa region is strategically important for the EU. It supports IGAD, tries to ensure that IGAD represents the interests of all its members, and reinforces the capacity of IGAD to resolve regional issues. Somalia’s impact on its neighbours does have to be considered.
The international analyst suggested that while Somalia has seen a protracted failure of state that does not mean there has been a failure in authority. The International Community (IC) should look towards authority centres in business, civil society and regional governance structures. In terms of state building the wrong message has been sent to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). They have been given the impression that they are permanent. A mapping exercise should analyse what the TFG can do, and be clear it is transitional not permanent. He noted that the best functioning government was the Islamic Courts – and that they had the support of the business community. The Somali civil society community should do more explaining to decision makers. He proposed four areas for further discussion:

Civil Society as a Resource: Develop an advocacy resource centre. An umbrella organisation that filters up ideas. It would be representative of and focused on CS.

Fellowships: Youth fellowships to Somalis to bring them into policy debates.

Operationalise “do no harm”: Produce “do no harm” impact statements from CSOs that has gauged the potential impact of donor funding before the money is dispersed; consult civil society widely before programmes and missions are implemented.

The Diaspora: Engage the Diaspora in more frequent meetings of Somali CS

The discussion was then opened to the floor. The following comments/interventions were made by the group. The youth fellowship concept was given support but was also called for CSOs as well. On the suggestion of an “umbrella network”, a participant expressed their own opinion that such an initiative existed 5 years ago but failed to work because it become “fractured and regionalised” (in the form of three linked, region-specific platforms) and the idea of a single unitary platform should be revived as it would bring people together. (The original idea was of a bigger umbrella covering all Somalia issues). The EU was apparently overseeing the initiative and could be asked to look again at what why a regional rather than national approach was adopted 5 years ago and whether this was correct.

One speaker presented recommendations on using civil society as a resource, in particular because South Central, Somaliland and Puntland CSOs are divided. Two recommendations followed: The EU should involve CSOs in the monitoring and evaluation of aid delivery. CSOs can see what’s happening on the ground and at subdistrict level. And the EU should empower women, youth, pastoralists/farmers, religious groups and business. In particular women, youth and farmers need support. They can be empowered to build the Somali “family” from the grass roots. Voices from the communities can be used to talk to al-Shabaab, and assist in the peace process. Civil society representatives believe that there are elements within Al-Shabaab that are approachable.

The organisers reiterated the need for concrete recommendations that could be used to take these ideas forward. The Commission called for concrete ideas in four areas: youth and employment; Justice, Human Rights and impunity; the business community; and local governance, and reminded the participants that the Commission currently works in three areas: governance (including peace/state building); education; and employment, economic recovery and food security. It was noted that if the current dialogue process comes up with specific recommendations the Commission would make efforts to follow them.

In response one speaker highlighted two areas that need to be taken into account when problems or issues are identified for EU involvement. Firstly, the active transfer of knowledge to the actors on the ground, and secondly, a phasing-out strategy that will leave a sustainable project running autonomously. In the past 18 years the EU has invested in Somalia but there doesn’t appear to have been a strategy of phasing out the EU and letting CSOs take over the leadership for projects. Now there exists a “viscous cycle of capacity-building discourse with no graduates”. One problem raised is that what is done now is very distant from the people. In addition, a point made by
several participants was that something needs to exist in Mogadishu – a safe area for the EU and the IC to operate.

A participant described the Principles of Peace as produced by the Mombasa conference in December 2009. In Mombasa there were three groups: Somali civil society, business people, the Diaspora. In addition there were 3 generations: the old generation; the middle generation (‘that is somehow lost’) and the Diaspora (born outside or recently departed).

The speaker presented the format and outcome of the Mombasa conference and its two results – the commitments to peace and the communiqué. The meeting resulted in a sense of majority, of principles and inclusive representation to be taken forward. This has given the impression that Somali CS has gone over a ‘peace tipping point’. There are close synergies between the principles and the mapping exercise [by Interpeace]. In particular the speaker highlighted ‘security as a right and not a privilege’, strong messages for accountability and the need to support existing institutions and end the culture of appropriating public funds.

A recommendation was made that the international community should commit to the system not to the individuals. Personalised politics is no longer an option. Access to humanitarian aid is a right - anyone diverting or obstructing aid needs to be held accountable. The speaker suggested that the European Parliament endorse the ‘principles’ document, in parallel to further endorsement at local level. Another participant suggested that the European Commission should promote the principles.

The following speaker presented concrete recommendations on Youth and Women. On training: Organisations should set up vocational training programs for 6 months (which will become a time period where the option to join the fighting is removed). The participant raised women’s role in peacebuilding: youth and women are suffering most. The business community, NGOs and the IC can support training in the communities. A good example is the Elman Peace Centre. Local business and the IC support it, while it is managed by local NGOs. Another participant suggested mainstreaming youth issues all across the programs but especially in peace processes. Currently youth are kept out of all peace and mediation activities.

One INGO suggested that the EU guidelines for HR defenders could be operationalised.

It was suggested that “security” needs to be more clearly defined. It is more than [an EU] training [mission]. There are many dimensions – political, economic, social. Communities need to be involved in security. In some cases warlords committed crimes for which they need to be made accountable.

One participant called for the training mission [EUTM-Somalia] to reflect the ethos and culture of Somalia’s police and army. Adding that the good will for support is not enough - donors need to be even more committed. This prompted the comment that there is a direct role for CS to play in monitoring EU-trained troops once they are deployed. Another suggestion was that each person who goes through the EU training must be recommended by an MP. This would help stop desertion post-training.

On youth and business one speaker suggested 3-6 month working groups facilitated by the business community. This could include training young people on conflict resolution.

The next speaker called for the [Mombasa] conference to be continued by maintaining an online forum. “Make the discussions mobile”. IC and TFG could also send in their documents to that online forum, just as they did for Mombasa. This is how to expand and recruit more people to the process of building peace.

The issue of security cannot just be dealt with in terms of physical security. People must also have the freedom of thought, freedom of expression. This theme was expanded on from the perspective of economic development - security will come through economic empowerment though local
production. If the EU and IC invest in fundamental skills and employment, and in local resources – livestock, fisheries, agriculture - business people would then be able to develop light industries, and security would be empowered.

One participant called for the EU to pressure the Somaliland government to move ahead with elections. Postponing the elections further will create tensions. They need to set a date. The lack of representational equality in ruling institutions was also noted: only one minister and one MP are women. Increased representation in power positions is needed.

Somali Diaspora, especially the youth, are disaffected. The current trend is for young disaffected Diaspora wanting to return to Somalia and join al-Shabaab. The EU should commission a study on this phenomenon and come up with ideas that would target young Somali Europeans.

One speaker presented several recommendations: Humanitarian delivery has to be intensively scaled up. Displacement and devastation have caused enormous poverty. Basic social services should be restored. Civilian protection has to be increased. Access to livelihood and survival skills/training increased. There is immediate need for the country to be stabilised and the institutions developed. Security forces require restructuring and the chain of command stabilised. The political conflict is affecting the youth (and vice versa).

A participant called for an end to the culture of impunity by setting up a Human Rights Commission to investigate HR abuses. This should be followed by smart sanctions from the EU targeting those abusers. Human Rights workers in Somalia need to be encouraged. IC actions need to be harmonised – it is time for the EU to take the lead. Somali CS are concerned that other regional actors will interfere. The EU’s Somalia unit is too small. It needs to be upgraded in order for them to be a dialogue partner. There needs to be more empowerment of the EU inside the country. On a similar note a separate speaker called for the EU to upgrade its mission to Somalia to reflect its importance.

The piracy issue needs to be linked with local concerns. The EP has called for the UN and Commission to look into fishing and dumping. More needs to be done.

On this issue of ‘diasporisation of Somalia’, one participant noted that 1 in 7 Somalis live outside their country. There will be benefits from and risks with the Diaspora. The 3 December explosion by a Diaspora (Denmark) jihadist killed 3 returnees. Some return to contribute, others to take life. There has been no strategic engagement with Somali Diaspora. They are disconnected, disaffected, not coordinated for peace and disenfranchised. Diaspora is a critical issue but there needs to be a link between the Diaspora and the EU. The EU could take this forward and change the Diaspora to being a resource for Somalia not a security risk. The EU should develop a strategic engagement with the Somali Diaspora to exploit its strengths. The implications are external and internal.

Some participants suggested that CSOs could develop a platform for engaging with Sheik Sharif. Currently he listens to his friends only, added to which more regular CSO meetings could be hosted in Nairobi.

**SUMMARY**

An INGO representative made a summary of the points made. She indicated the possible support for programs around business, youth, Human Rights, Justice and Law, and that the Principles of Peace can be deepened and operationalised. She commented on the strong emphasis on push/pull factors: jobs and economic wellbeing should be addressed to stop the pull away towards violence or abroad. The business community will be part of the solution and there seems to be an existing and potential triangle of opportunity linking business, youth and training. She noted the call for security accountability, in particular the monitoring of security sector support and recruitment. Human Rights and impunity need to be addressed – but how and when was not answered. The
Diaspora was a constant theme in the discussion and needs to be explored as a central issue. Currently this does not fit our way of looking at assistance – the message from the discussion is that the Diaspora and civil society are one and the same.

A final comment was made by an EU official. He said that plans are being made for a “villa europa” in Mogadishu. The new mayor of Mogadishu has indicated he wants to have an MOU between CS and AMISOM. He reiterated the importance of relations between the youth and business community and noted that the EU is already involved in vocational training in Somaliland and wants to expand to Mogadishu. He asked EPLO to follow up to this meeting to see what could be done concretely. Colleagues in DG Development, DG External Relations, and the Nairobi Delegation should look at concrete opportunities to support and enhance the role and activities of civil society in Somalia.
Session III. Recommendations for improving International involvement in Somalia

The session was introduced by an international analyst who provided four points for discussion before the floor was opened to all participants. The organisers made several calls for specific recommendations for EU action. Below is a collation of the recommendations grouped around 7 interrelated themes, followed by the report on the discussion from which these recommendations have been gleaned. These recommendations are reported here as suggested by the group of participants (with only minor stylistic or clarification changes). Recommendations on which there was strong disagreement have not been included. The recommendations provide initial impetus for moving forward but further analytical work will be required to put flesh onto these policy recommendations and ideas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EU representation and leadership
   (a) The EU should reassess its representation – upgrading it to reflect the importance of Somalia and the region to CFSP. The EU needs to get closer to and commit more resources to Somalia. A presence in Mogadishu is needed, and simultaneously the Somalia ‘unit’ in Nairobi needs to be enhanced.
   (b) The International Community’s actions for Somalia need to be harmonised – it is time for the EU to take the lead.

2. A decentralised approach
   (a) The EU should adopt a decentralised approach in Somalia, including supporting regional peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives.
   (b) The EU should also support community-level peace initiatives.

3. Support for training and socio-economic development
   (a) There is a triangle of opportunity linking business, youth and training. The EU should exploit this in partnership with CSOs.
   (b) The EU should create educational fellowships for youth, women and CSO workers that would help bring these groups into policy debates or improve their understanding of the peacebuilding options available.
   (c) Youth, women and CSO workers should also be provided with more vocational training opportunities. The business community should be included as a partner in supporting such training activities.
   (d) When implementing projects the EU should include specific details on how to transfer knowledge and expertise to the local actors in order that those projects eventually become self-reliant and sustainable.
   (e) The EU should focus on economic empowerment though supporting local production, investing in fundamental skills and employment, and in local resources – livestock, fisheries and agriculture.

4. Moving beyond Mombasa and the ‘Borschette’

* The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule. In this section of the report we differentiate only between International NGO/analysts, EU officials, and Somali dialogue participants.
(a) The EU – the parliament, the EC and the Foreign Affairs Council – should endorse and support the Principles of Peace document from the December 2009 Mombasa conference.

(b) The EU should support follow up activities to the Mombasa format as far as possible, in particular by moving a forum online in order to maintain the momentum gained through that event.

(c) The EU should host more regular CSO meetings in Brussels and Nairobi.

5. **EUTM Somalia, Human Rights and Accountability**

(a) The EU training mission should include developing a Somali ethos and culture within the security forces (not a mixed/imported culture). The participants of the training should be vetted for human rights abuses and their participation could be made subject to a recommendation by an MP. Once trained and then deployed the EU should incorporate CSOs into the monitoring elements for the deployed troops. It was also suggested that Somali community leaders play a role in the training of troops to help ensure that training conforms to Somali ethos and culture.

(b) The EU guidelines for Human Rights (HR) defenders should be operationalised.

(c) Accountability is needed for HR abuses. An independent Human Rights Commission should be set up to investigate HR abuses. This should be followed by smart sanctions from the EU targeting those abusers.

(d) Accountability should be enforced on those stopping, removing or diverting humanitarian aid.

(e) The EU should involve CSOs in the monitoring and evaluation of aid delivery.

6. **Elections**

(a) The EU should call for the Somaliland government to move ahead with elections.

(b) The EU should support improved gender equality in ruling institutions.

7. **The Diaspora**

(a) The EU should develop a strategic engagement with the Somali Diaspora to exploit its strengths.

(b) The EU should commission a study on Somali Diaspora and especially the youth in Europe, to analyse not only the security risks but also and in particular the peace resource/potential of these groups.

8. **Support to civil society**

(a) The EU should consider supporting civil society activities in the following areas:

- Work with young people
- Support to women’s involvement in peacebuilding
- Job creation and economic growth
- Constructive involvement of the business community in peace initiatives
- Dealing with impunity and improving respect for human rights
- Improving governance across the Somali region and, in particular, governance and accountability of the security sector and of security providers. Governance refers not
only to governance by the state but also to governance by civil society and community/traditional/religious leaders.

(b) A mapping exercise could be carried out to identify what more could be done in each of these areas.