The EEAS and Peacebuilding One Year on

2011 was the first year that EU foreign policy was guided and coordinated by the High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). To coincide with the first anniversary of the EEAS, a number of interesting assessments of its performance have been published¹. In this paper, EPLO also seeks to evaluate the EEAS but from a narrower peacebuilding perspective: has the EEAS made the EU more effective at preventing conflict and building lasting peace?

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Has the EEAS made the EU more effective at building peace?

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Has the EEAS made the EU more effective at building peace?

This question remains relevant because:

a) The Lisbon Treaty provides that the EU’s aims are to ‘promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (Art. 3.1) and to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’ (Art. 21.2(c)), thus progress should be measured against these commitments.
b) Other objectives of EU external action, such as the creation of European security and the promotion of democracy and human rights, depend - at least to some extent - on the promotion of peace and stability.
c) The EU has great comparative advantages as a peacebuilder because of the range of tools at its disposal, the fact that it is not a nation state and is thus seen as more neutral by some conflict parties, by the support for it to play this role among its own citizens and globally, and last but not least because of its own history as a peace project and as a model for the promotion of peace and prosperity through regional integration.

¹ See in particular: Carnegie Europe: More Action, Better Service: How to Strengthen the European External Action Service; QCEA: The EEAS One Year On; Oxfam: Fit for Purpose? The EEAS One Year On; European Policy Centre: EEAS at work – How to improve EU foreign policy;
At the same time, 2011 saw important developments in the field of peacebuilding policy. The World Bank’s *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*\(^2\) includes valuable new data and analysis as well as policy recommendations on how the international community should adapt the way it provides development assistance to countries which have experienced or are currently facing political or criminal violence. In addition, the European Commission (EC) presented the results of the thematic global evaluation of support to conflict prevention (including crisis resolution) and peacebuilding (including its demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration)\(^3\) over the last ten years which provides useful recommendations as to how the conflict prevention and peacebuilding potential of the EU can be increased.

**Positive Developments**

(1) **Increased conflict policy expertise**

There have been a number of positive developments when it comes to improving the EU’s ability to prevent conflict and to build peace.

In 2011, EPLO recommended that a Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy be created to serve as the hub of conflict expertise within the EEAS\(^4\). With the right resources and clout, EPLO suggested that it could, *inter alia*:

- carry out conflict risk assessments and use conflict analysis to assess the impact of all EU policies and programmes on actual and potential conflicts;
- develop conflict mitigation strategies and conflict prevention packages for use in countries at risk of conflict;
- lead in the development of innovative policies by bringing contemporary thinking on peace, security and conflict into EU policymaking;
- contribute expertise on conflict, peace and security issues to the full range of EU policies, programmes and activities in conflict-affected countries and fragile situations by e.g. providing input into country strategies and policy programming.

There are now policy experts within the EEAS working on conflict and peace issues and supporting the work of the geographic departments, notably the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation.

There was, however, resistance to the establishment of the Division; it has been a challenge for it to have adequate staffing and its future is uncertain. While the HR/VP has repeatedly stressed that conflict prevention should be “a silver thread” which runs through all of the work of the EEAS (i.e. it should be mainstreamed) it was never clear how this would happen without staff with expertise in the topic.

For example, when there is a commitment to conflict prevention how does that then lead to a geographic team making it a priority in a region and designing responses based on prevention of conflict? It does not ‘just happen’ but requires a number of different factors to be present, including:

- (1) understanding of the issue in the geographic team;
- (2) a good working relationship between officials with ‘geographic’ responsibilities and those with expertise on peace and conflict issues; and

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\(^3\) *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.*

\(^4\) See *Conflict prevention and peacebuilding inside the EEAS* (EPLO: 2011).
(3) policy instructions or guidance which oblige geographic staff to prioritise or at least consider the issue.

The regional policies and strategies which were developed before the Division for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation was adequately staffed could certainly have been stronger from a peacebuilding perspective. For example, the early communication on the EU’s response to the Arab Spring does not include any references to peace and security matters, with the reform of the security sector and the need for inclusive dialogue during transition periods notably absent.

Specialised staff working on conflict prevention, peace and mediation can provide input and ideas into the work of geographic teams and EU delegations – many of which are working in countries affected by violent conflict. In addition, it allows for better and more strategic use of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) through the identification of IfS actions which support regional priorities.

(2) Development of joint strategies

EPLO recommended that the EEAS should facilitate genuinely joint EU strategies towards third countries, with conflict prevention and peacebuilding at their heart. This would involve all relevant actors within and across the EU institutions working together to decide on common objectives, instead of deciding them separately and then coordinating (i.e. sharing information) afterwards.

The EEAS has started to produce country and regional strategies, which from a purely procedural point of view is a very good and essential first step. These include the policy responses to the Arab Spring, the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel and the Comprehensive Approach to Sudan and South Sudan. In each case, however, the strategies could certainly have been stronger from a peacebuilding perspective.

(3) Political role of EU delegations

The increased political role of EU delegations and more specifically heads of EU delegations is a very welcome development as it promises to bring more insights from EU presence in third countries into EU policy-making but also provides the opportunity for the EU to be more effective and active, first by coordinating EU activities and actors in third countries and second, by playing a stronger role in coordinating EU Member States. A common approach will allow the EU – and Europe as a whole – to exert more leverage in third countries.

The success of this will depend partly on the quality of people appointed in political positions inside the EU delegations, but also on the degree to which they are enabled to play a more political role. The letter sent by the foreign ministers of 12 EU Member States to the HR/VP on 8 [Reference to the letter]

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8 The Comprehensive Approach itself is not a public document. For the main elements of the approach, please consult the Council Conclusions on Sudan and South Sudan from June 2011.
9 EPLO has elsewhere assessed some of the country and regional strategies that the EEAS has produced. Please consult Using More for More: Incentivising Peace in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (2011) or the meeting report Peacebuilding in Sudan and South Sudan: The Role of the EU (2011) which took place inside the CSDN framework.
December 2011\textsuperscript{10} suggested that many heads of delegation are mainly preoccupied with administrative tasks, which is a worrying sign.

**Remaining Challenges**

(1) **Need for mid-level strategies: limitations of the crisis response model**

The Lisbon Treaty changes and the creation of the EEAS has the potential to enable the EU to tackle the entire conflict cycle in an effective manner and to bridge the gap between short-term and long-term instruments and policies. It should also have enabled the EU to adopt a preventative approach, for which EPLO has long been advocating.

Recently, the EEAS management has focused on “crisis response”, understood as coordination at operational level in response to emergency situations. Based on the EEAS’ policy in 2011, crisis response seems to be similar in nature and scope to humanitarian response in that it is a reaction to crisis situations after they occur and is based on an ad-hoc and temporary coordination of several actors as opposed to including longer-term policy considerations. The suggestion to deploy an EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in April 2011 in Libya which was not launched since it was not requested by the UN, exemplifies this trend.

While coordination at the operational level is essential, it is not sufficient and if the EEAS prioritises crisis response in its approach to peace and conflict, there are several policy implications which need to be addressed:

**Confusion of political and humanitarian crises**

The blurring of mandates and responsibilities between ECHO and the EEAS, with the EEAS planning and delivering activities which are humanitarian in nature and thereby duplicating work of ECHO not only leads to confusion inside and outside the EU, but also poses a threat to the underlying principles of the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian assistance.

The 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding\textsuperscript{11} found that there is a lack of conceptual clarity even within the EC when it comes to key concepts related to conflict and peace. In the post-Lisbon set-up with more actors involved in EU foreign policy, it is even more important that there is clarity of the key concepts used on the strategic, policy and operational levels.

**Tackling the root causes of conflict not (just) crisis response**

The 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding highlighted that addressing the root causes of conflict and upstream conflict prevention are the two areas where the EU’s added-value as a foreign policy actor lies, due to its long-term engagement combined with wide sectoral and geographical coverage and financial muscle.

Due to the complex nature of EU decision-making and the variety of actors and institutions involved in the process, timely crisis response presents a recurring challenge to EU foreign policy

\textsuperscript{10} The letter was sent by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden and included suggestions as to how the EEAS can be improved.

\textsuperscript{11} Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.
as many decisions taken under Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) still require unanimity among EU Member States. By focusing on reactive crisis response instead of long-term conflict prevention, the EEAS seems to have prioritised the policy area where it has the least comparative advantage over EU Member States.

It seems that plans are currently being prepared which would bring both the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security and the crisis management bodies (CMPD, CPCC, EUMS) under the leadership of the current Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination. This constitutes a risk as it would further strengthen the current emphasis on crisis response which lacks political analysis and long-term thinking. Such an institutional set-up would make it difficult for the EU to capitalise on its conflict prevention potential and would hinder the much-needed revival of CSDP and crisis management, as most civilian crisis management requires long-term planning.

**Long-term Approaches**

Crisis response resulting from ad-hoc deliberations runs the risk of not being sufficiently embedded in overall EU policy approaches to specific countries and regions. For this reason, EPLO has long argued that “crisis response needs to be embedded as one aspect of an integrated approach towards peacebuilding rather than being a distinct operation”\(^\text{12}\). A focus on crisis response may mean that instead of using the EU’s political and financial weight to achieve positive long-lasting change in third countries, the emphasis lies primarily on the completion of short-term actions, which is too modest an aim.

**Policy and Guidance**

The EEAS management seems to have been particularly resistant to the development of policy and strategy which is perhaps one of the reasons why EEAS staff and EU Member States have been concerned about a lack of leadership.

This has covered all areas but on peace and conflict, the developments in 2011 were particularly problematic. A review of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Gothenburg Programme), which should have resulted in implementation guidelines, was discontinued in spring 2011. This has also meant that in the year that should have celebrated the Gothenburg Programme’s 10\(^\text{th}\) anniversary, no annual report which assessed its implementation was prepared. The June 2011 Foreign Affairs Council’s commitment to revisit the issue of conflict prevention before the end of 2011 has not been fulfilled.

The review was initiated by the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU and had the support of all EU Member States (being unanimously endorsed by the Political and Security Committee) and the active involvement of a core group of Member States. EPLO has previously commented on the issue\(^\text{13}\) but what is worth noting is that this was a missed opportunity to build strategic alliances with EU Member States who remain key decision-makers in CFSP and whose involvement remains crucial for the EEAS’ success.

The blocking of the review also led to frustration within the EEAS and contributed to the departure of key staff members which in turn had a negative effect on the level of morale inside the Service and loyalty towards it.

\(^\text{12}\) See *Five Years After Göteborg: The EU and its conflict prevention potential* (EPLO: 2006).

\(^\text{13}\) See *Strengthening EU Policy and Guidance on Conflict Prevention* (EPLO: 2011).
Some commentators have argued for an update of the European Security Strategy or the development of a grand strategy by the EU\textsuperscript{14}. Either could be useful – depending on the processes used to develop them. However, there is certainly a need for mid-level strategies and policies on particular regions, countries, and issues as highlighted by Pierre Vimont in his reflections on the first year of the EEAS in the European Parliament\textsuperscript{15}.

(2) Member States on board?

Evidence from effective support for peace and development shows that united action by external actors is important\textsuperscript{16}. In addition, given the declining power of Europe in many areas of the world, improving the impact of overall European activity is likely to be enhanced by collective action rather than a situation where the EU, plus a number of EU Member States acting bilaterally, are simultaneously present and active within a particular country or region. The financial crisis should give EU Member States additional incentives to work through the EU when it comes to engagement in third countries.

Despite these factors which create a push towards collective European action, EU Member States are highly frustrated with the situation: criticism was expressed throughout 2011, culminating in the letter sent to the High Representative on 8 December 2011\textsuperscript{17}.

When the EEAS has performed well, EU Member States have been willing to unite behind it, notably in the case of the strategies developed on Sudan and South Sudan, which were supported by the Member States and led to innovations such as joint (EU and bilateral agency) programming of development assistance for South Sudan.

While it is clear that the EEAS working effectively is a necessary condition for EU Member States to be on board, it is not a sufficient condition, meaning that the success of the EEAS is also dependent on EU Member States’ willingness to commit to EU foreign policy. Support for and commitment to the EEAS may vary from Member State to Member State and between the different constituencies within EU Member States.

Learning from the positive examples and extrapolating from EU Member States’ criticism one can put together the factors which need to be in place to encourage EU Member States to support joint EU action thus improve the effectiveness of overall European action:

- Timely and high quality strategy and policy ideas provided to EU Member States;
- Relevant analysis and strategy development which takes into account contemporary thinking in external affairs;
- Appropriate resources – human and financial – allocated to the implementation of policy commitments;
- Strategic alliances built by the EEAS (in particular its senior management) in order to generate trust.

If these factors are not addressed, then EU Member States are likely to increasingly invest in bilateral action and not in the EU.

\textsuperscript{14} See in particular the work of the Egmont Institute, \url{www.egmontinstitute.be}

\textsuperscript{15} EP Public Hearing (21 March 2012): The role of the EEAS - one year on

\textsuperscript{16} World Bank: \url{The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development}

\textsuperscript{17} The letter was sent by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden and included suggestions as to how the EEAS can be improved.
(3) Reform of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

The EUISS is a Paris-based EU agency which serves as a think tank, providing research and hosting debate on security issues. EPLO believes that it could be more effective if it is reformed. The planned change in leadership which will take place this year and ongoing discussions about its budget provide an opportunity for reform.

It is likely that the EUISS will continue to exist and that it will continue to be based in Paris. EPLO believes that with changes to its governance and management it could play a role commensurate with its status and resources, wherever it is based.18

Despite repeated requests, the EUISS has declined to provide EPLO with any information on its budget. A formal access to document request has been submitted but as yet no reply has been received. It is assumed that the annual budget of the EUISS is around EUR 4 million. At a time of scarce resources and during tough negotiations over the EU budget, this is a comparatively large amount of money (e.g. in comparison to the budgets of the divisions and units working on conflict, peace and security within the EEAS and DEVCO). The price-performance ratio of the EUISS can certainly be questioned.

EPLO therefore recommends that EU Member States and the EEAS start immediately to identify and appoint a strong leader (not necessarily a high-profile political appointee or former diplomat) with a track record in managing and reforming institutions as Director of the EUISS.

Board members of the EUISS (EEAS, EU Member States) should also:
- Assess the EUISS (activities, regional coverage, contribution to EU foreign policy discussions etc);
- Review the price-performance ratio of the EUISS19;
- Identify key areas for reform;
- Request that the EUISS makes public information on its finances.

The EUISS could provide high-quality analysis for EU foreign policy discussions, bring contemporary thinking on peace, security and conflict into EU policy-making and support the EEAS in shaping its agenda.

(4) An integrated approach: development is an integral part of EU external action...

To ensure an integrated EU approach towards third countries, which is of specific importance in the case of conflict-affected countries, the EU has to ensure that its policies and activities are prepared jointly by the relevant institutions and actors involved, as opposed to having them developed by the different actors separately and trying to coordinate them afterwards. In order to enable collective European action, wherever possible the second option for programming

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18 Due to “the Strasbourg question”, it seems unlikely that the EUISS will be moved to Brussels as some have argued – France is committed to the principle that EU institutions can be located in cities other than Brussels notably because it wants the European Parliament to continue to have a seat in Strasbourg. While it would be preferable for the EUISS to be in Brussels, under effective leadership it could function well from Paris.
19 For example, during 2011 EPLO’s income was EUR 670,000 (from membership fees and grants). With this budget it organized 3 large-scale events bringing together civil society from conflict-affected countries, 10 mid-scale policy meetings, 4 meetings on EU policy in EU member states, 10 informal discussion events, 3 policy papers, 5 short statements, over 20 other written outputs for public use, plus contributing to debates and events, bi-lateral meetings, provision of information and services to its membership etc.
contained in the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Global Europe: A New Approach to Financing EU external action should be used: ‘A joint programming document prepared by the EEAS and Commission services with Member States’\(^{20}\). More information is also provided in the proposal for the regulation establishing the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)\(^{21}\).

Part of an integrated approach is the joint programming\(^{22}\) of the EU’s funding which involves both the EEAS and the EC. Although programming may appear to be a technical issue, it determines how the EU’s assistance is spent and could therefore have a significant impact in conflict-affected countries.

The Council Decision establishing the EEAS prescribes that the first three stages of the programming cycle should be prepared jointly by the EEAS and DEVCO. In January 2012, an inter-service agreement was concluded between the EEAS and the EC which stipulated among other things, how the “RELEX family” of the EC would co-operate with the EEAS regarding the programming of external action instruments\(^{23}\).

From presentations of the main elements of the inter-service agreement, which is not a public document, it seems that the EEAS is leading on the first three stages of the programming cycle for geographic programmes, under the responsibility of the respective Commissioner and in close co-operation with the EC services. Regarding thematic processes, the roles are turned around, with the EC leading on programming in co-operation with the EEAS. It is not clear, however, whether this inter-service agreement, which will guide programming from now on, specifies (1) how the geographical desk and the thematic desks within the EEAS will work together and (2) how thematic directorates in the EEAS and DEVCO, including the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, and the Fragility and Crisis Management Unit, will be involved in the discussions and decisions on country allocation, country and regional strategy papers, and national and regional indicative programmes.

It is essential that the thematic divisions are involved in programming from the beginning to avoid a situation in which conflict prevention, peacebuilding, gender and human rights are last-minute add-ons. This critical aspect should therefore be included in the inter-service agreement and other practical guidance on programming. For example, (1) guidelines for EU delegations and geographic teams on programming should highlight the importance of conflict sensitivity and (2) guidance and support on conflict sensitivity should be provided to EU delegations by the thematic divisions.

The drafting of the annual action programmes for all financial programmes is the responsibility of DEVCO with a very limited role for the EEAS. However, to ensure that the policy is jointly owned and that conflict sensitivity is integrated adequately, close co-operation between DEVCO and the EEAS in drafting them would be helpful. The revival of the EU Action Plan for Situations of

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\(^{20}\) COM(2011) 865 final, Section 5.2.  
\(^{21}\) COM(2011) 839 final, Article 11  
\(^{22}\) In EU terminology, instruments are the programmes that define EU policy for a specific region or topic. They also set out the amount of money that is available to implement the policy. For instance, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is the programme that specifies the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. The programming of an instrument refers to the process of deciding how to spend the budget that has been allocated to it.  
\(^{23}\) It is worthwhile to note that the HR/VP Report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission from December 2011 (HR/VP Report) which was supposed to set out how the EEAS and DEVCO will work together is very evasive about this issue.
Fragility and Conflict, which is mentioned in the EU Agenda for Change, provides an opportunity to develop guidelines for co-operation which could apply to this process.

By ensuring effective co-operation throughout the programming cycle and extending co-operation to the drafting of annual action plans, the EU could implement several findings from the 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding which showed that the EC’s approach to conflict analysis is not sufficiently systematised, that it often failed to tackle the root-causes of conflict and that the EC therefore encountered challenges in supporting the transition to long-term peace.

(5)… so are investment and trade: using the EU’s real power

One of the main findings of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development is that international assistance to conflict-affected countries has to focus on providing security, justice and economic opportunities for citizens, including marginalised communities. In that respect, it requires international actors to pay more attention to job creation and social and economic equality when delivering assistance to those countries.

The economic deprivation which affected large parts of society was one of the factors that sparked the uprisings in some of the countries in the Middle East/North Africa region. This was recognised by the EU, which focused large parts of its response to the crisis on economic assistance in the form of increased lending through the European Investment Bank (EIB). In addition, the Foreign Affairs Council approved the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Both of these measures have the potential to increase social equality, improve living conditions and support inclusive economic growth in the countries concerned. However, investment and free trade per se do not necessarily lead to these outcomes and may in turn even have a negative impact. Therefore, it needs to be ensured that the impact on social, environmental and conflict dynamics is assessed properly before decisions about EIB loans are made and free trade areas or agreements are negotiated.

The bulk of the expertise needed to do such an assessment lies with the geographic and thematic units in the EEAS and DEVCO. For the EU to capitalise on the positive impact which its trade and investment can have in third countries, those units should be systematically involved in ensuring compliance with the EU’s commitment to peace, human rights and sustainable development, and in monitoring the compatibility of economic activities with the EU’s overall strategy in the country concerned. In this respect, it is striking that according to the HR/VP’s report in December 2011, none of the 937 briefing requests which the EEAS handled in 2011 was prepared for DG Trade, DG Energy or DG Environment. For the EEAS to drive the political agenda, more proactive engagement with these parts of the EC is vital. In addition, the increased importance of EU delegations regarding the coordination of EU policies and activities in a third country should be exploited, for instance, by co-locating EIB offices inside delegation buildings and involving the delegations in public consultations on proposed EIB projects.

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24 In 2011, the EIB’s lending volume to the Southern Neighbourhood increased by € 1 billion and additional resources of up to € 6 billion were allocated by 2013. See also Using More for More: Incentivising Peace in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (EPLO: 2011).
(6) The EEAS as a high-calibre diplomatic service

The success of the EEAS in developing and delivering coherent foreign policy which is in line with the EU’s normative commitments under the Lisbon Treaty will depend to a large extent on the expertise and experience of its staff. This applies to high-level staff who need the experience and clout to be able to negotiate EU foreign policy matters with EU Member States and other EU institutions, but also to mid-level staff who need to have the necessary expertise and training in specific policy areas and ensure efficient and consistent implementation. In this respect, the limited and uncertain budgets for the specific divisions may constitute an additional constraint for the EEAS to act effectively.

By mid-2013, the EEAS aims to have one-third of its staff from EU Member States. In order to ensure that the most qualified candidates from EU Member States’ diplomatic services apply, assignment in the EEAS should be rewarded in national diplomatic careers. At the moment, the EU’s staffing regulation only allows for members of EU Member States’ diplomatic services to be recruited. To ensure that the EEAS can recruit the relevant experts from the largest possible pool, EU Member States should consider allowing nationals from outside their diplomatic services to apply, including from their wider civil services. This possibility is already mentioned in the staffing regulation which governs EEAS recruitment, but so far it has been limited to the areas of crisis management, security and IT. In the framework of the overall assessment of the EEAS which will take place in 2013, the staffing regulation should be amended to allow for recruitment outside the Member States’ diplomatic services.
Detailed Recommendations

To the EEAS management:
- Consider the risks and limitations of applying a crisis response model in EU CFSP and for the EEAS in particular;
- Develop working practices to ensure co-operation with DEVCO and to support thematic divisions, such as the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy and the Fragility and Crisis Management Unit in DEVCO, to be involved in the programming of external instruments in case this is not addressed in the inter-service agreement between the EEAS and DEVCO which was concluded in January 2012;
- Develop an action plan to assign responsibilities, resources and deadlines for responding to the recommendations of the 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding; those recommendations which require structural changes should be taken up during the 2013 review of the EEAS;
- Consider the establishment of a joint evaluation unit with DEVCO, as the EEAS does not currently fall under the scope of any evaluation authority;
- Design a participatory process for the 2013 review of the EEAS;
- Ensure that the relevant regional and thematic experts at the EEAS headquarters and in EU delegations are involved in deciding on EIB loans and the negotiation of free trade areas and agreements.

To EU Member States:
- Encourage the EEAS management to widen the focus of crisis response and place adequate attention on conflict prevention, crisis management, and peacebuilding;
- Insist on revisiting the issue of conflict prevention in 2012, as stipulated in the June 2011 Council conclusions;
- Propose highly-qualified candidates for the post of EUISS Director, so that the EUISS can be a useful and effective tool to support the EEAS regarding the development of EU foreign policy and strategy;
- Consider enabling policy experts who are not in national diplomatic services to apply to work in the EEAS and facilitate their applications.

To DEVCO:
- Develop an action plan to assign responsibility, deadlines and resources to respond to the recommendations of the 2011 evaluation of the EC’s support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and ensure that they are implemented within DEVCO;
- Identify opportunities for integrate the findings of the 2011 World Development Report into DEVCO's work;
- Ensure that the relevant regional and thematic experts at DEVCO headquarters and in EU delegations are involved in deciding on EIB loans and the negotiation of free trade areas and agreements;
- Prepare guidelines on co-operation with the EEAS and on how thematic divisions such as the Fragility and Crisis Management Unit and the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy in the EEAS should be involved in the programming of external instruments in case this is not addressed in the inter-service agreement between the EEAS and DEVCO which was concluded in January 2012.

To the European Parliament:
- Monitor and evaluate the EEAS’ efforts regarding the prevention of conflict;
- Call upon the HR/VP to move beyond ‘joint ops’ to joint policies and joint strategies.