

*Partners Apart:  
Enhancing Cooperation  
between Civil Society and  
EU Civilian Crisis Management  
in the Framework of ESDP*

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# Preface

Contemporary conflicts are often characterised by collapsed state structures, economic inequalities and political mobilisation based on ethnic and religious identities. They also involve systematic violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law. These developments have fundamentally changed the role of the international community: crisis management has widened rapidly from mere peacekeeping to large-scale civilian capacity-building operations.

At the same time, the number of different crisis management organisations has also multiplied rapidly due to the complexity of contemporary challenges in conflict areas. Providing security to people, delivering aid and supporting reconstruction today require a diverse range of actors including governments, international organisations, private companies, multilateral organisations and civil society groups. Under the shared objective of establishing self-sustaining democracies built on good governance and citizens' representation, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society play a vital role in rebuilding a country and assuring a sense of ownership among those who have often suffered the most.

De facto, however, experience on the ground shows that the necessity of multiple actors urgently requires rethinking in how to intensify inter-agency cooperation in planning and implementation, without which contemporary conflict cannot any longer be transformed into peace and stability. Nevertheless, policy planning and implementation of projects in the field are often conducted in isolation, with each organisation following a narrow mission-centric approach. As a consequence, organisations duplicate their efforts by unknowingly working on the same problems, by planning and making decisions without consulting other organisations and by not having access to updated or even adequate information. This approach causes inefficiency, waste of scarce resources and also leaves staff members vulnerable to security threats.

The European Union (EU), as a new large global security actor, has a responsibility to contribute to resolving violent conflicts and assisting war-torn societies in becoming stable democracies. The EU is well placed to develop effective crisis management capacities, drawing on its wealth of capabilities, mechanisms and instruments, and it has made considerable progress on its capacities over the last five years. Most of the EU's civilian crisis management instruments are aimed at rebuilding public institutions, such as the judiciary and ministries or the police, as well as supporting the development of a democratic political system in post-conflict countries. The weakest aspect of all EU efforts is its lack of coordination, foremost its inter-institutional coordination, but equally its capacity to link coherently at the field and Brussels levels with others, notably including NGOs.

The Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) adopted by the European Council on 17–18 June 2004 acknowledges the importance of including the views of civil society in its civilian crisis management policy orientations. The action plan states that

exchange of information with representatives from non-governmental organisations and civil society should take place on a regular basis. To this end incoming presidencies are invited to facilitate meetings with them during their respective presidencies. NGO and civil society views in relation to the general orientations of EU civilian crisis management are welcome. NGO experience, expertise and early warning capacity are valued by the EU.

A number of presidencies have made welcome progress in this field, starting with the Greek Presidency, then Luxembourg and Austria, and now culminating in efforts followed by Finland that will be continued by Germany.

What is still missing in comparison to other international organisations, such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), are mechanisms that utilise the added value of NGOs' inputs in planning and implementation. The progress in this field is sometimes challenged by the lack of information, sometimes even appreciation, in member state governments and the EU about the real potential, capacity and concrete ways in which NGOs contribute to crisis management. At the same time, NGOs are also sometimes reluctant to coordinate their activities or they lack knowledge of how to link their activities to a wider strategy. There is ample evidence that in order to have a comprehensive and coherent strategy to support state and society-building in conflict areas, it is necessary to enhance the policy dialogue between EU institutions and NGOs in Brussels, but also equally important to increase operational cooperation on the ground. What is needed is a new qualitative step forward that makes the EU-NGO cooperation more concrete, focused and systematic.

Finland has been one of the driving forces behind the development of the EU's civilian crisis management capacity. In addition, at the national level, the relevant ministries working on crisis management have established a close cooperation with NGOs. To continue its active and innovative role in the development of the civilian aspects of ESDP, the Finnish Presidency is engaged in a project with civil society to develop mechanisms through which a holistic approach to crisis situations becomes possible.

## *The “Role of Civil Society in European Civilian Crisis Management (RoCS)” Project*

In summer 2005, the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network (KATU) and Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) prepared a project on the “Role of Civil Society in European Civilian Crisis Management” (RoCS) as their input for the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland quickly gave both its financial and political support to the project. To add the European dimension, the project was joined by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)—in which both KATU and CMI are members—in autumn 2005. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) also gave its support to the project through their researcher, Catriona Gourlay, who acted as a consultant for this background report.

The overall objective of the RoCS project is to promote increased understanding and awareness among member states and ESDP decision makers on the impact that civil society can have on promoting a human security-based approach. The project has aimed to create coherence between public and NGO sector approaches in civilian crisis management and to propose some concrete methodologies and practices for a more holistic approach to conflicts. The project purpose is to develop concrete recommendations for a more effective use of the existing NGO expertise in civilian crisis management and to create synergies between strategies and operational activities.

During the drafting phase of the background report and the recommendations, the project has convened three expert workshops representing civil society, governments, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the European crisis management bodies to discuss and assess the NGO contribution and added value in the mentioned subject areas. The final report and recommendations will be discussed during a working conference of all actors, governments, CIVCOM, EU institutions and NGOs on “Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU’s Civilian Crisis Management” in Helsinki on 27–28 September 2006.

The following report is the result of the first phase of this project and it hopes to encourage further discussion in the EU about the role of NGOs in civilian crisis management and to eventually concretely enhance the cooperation between the EU institutions and the civil society in crisis management in Brussels, particularly in conflict zones.

We hope that you will find the argument and evidence of the report convincing and that the Council of the EU is willing to implement aspects of the proposed recommendations sooner rather than later.

Anne Palm  
Secretary-General  
KATU

Pauliina Arola  
Executive Director  
CMI

Nicolas Beger  
Director  
EPLO

## *The partners of the RoCS Project*

The *Civil Society Conflict prevention Network (KATU)* coordinates the conflict prevention and civilian crisis management actions of many Finnish NGOs. It promotes the discussion on conflict prevention and civilian crisis management as such by organising seminars and workshops and also by conducting various conflict prevention projects in crisis areas. KATU also emphasises the role that civil society can play in preventing violent conflicts.

The *Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)* is involved in various activities that aim to enhance the crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capacity of the international community. The CMI seeks solutions to global problems through strengthening democratic practices and a firm commitment to equitable development. In preventing conflicts, it seeks to become acquainted with their causes and to act for their mitigation through various initiatives and projects. Through focused networks of political decision makers, international organisations, civil society organisations (CSOs), business actors and research institutes, the CMI acts as a bridge builder within the international community. The aim of the activities is to come up with new tools or working practices that help the international community to respond better to the challenges of human security.

The *European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)* is the platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think-tanks active in the field of peace-building that aim to promote sustainable peace-building policies among decision makers in the EU. EPLO influences the EU so that it promotes and implements measures that lead to sustainable peace and transform and resolve conflicts non-violently. It also aims to improve the EU's awareness about the crucial role that NGOs can play in sustainable EU efforts for peace-building, conflict prevention and crisis management.

The *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)* — an inter-governmental organization within the United Nations — conducts research on disarmament and security with the aim of assisting the international community in their disarmament thinking, decisions and efforts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and United Nations Member States. UNIDIR's work is funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.



## *Acknowledgements*

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## *About the author*

Catriona Gourlay is a European Commission-funded Marie Curie Research Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, where she conducts a research project on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. Since 1995, she has been the executive director of the International Security Information Service, Europe, a Brussels-based independent research organisation working on European security and defence policy.



# Executive summary

The European Union (EU) Crisis Management Procedures foresee consultation and cooperation with other civilian actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and note that modalities for coordination in the field need to be developed. Similarly, the EU Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) welcomes regular exchanges of views with civil society organisations (CSOs) in relation to the orientations of civilian ESDP and early warning. As a result, the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) has begun to address the issue of the potential contribution of NGOs to ESDP missions. However, modalities to deliver regular information exchange both at headquarters and in the field remain undeveloped and little attention has been given to understanding how civil society experience and knowledge might usefully be drawn upon in ESDP capacity-building, including in the areas of training and recruitment. This report aims to address these cooperation gaps with a view to developing the capacities and operational efficacy of civilian ESDP missions.

## *The current situation*

The report begins by reviewing the current state of cooperation. It demonstrates that at the strategic level, cooperation between specialist European NGOs, the EU Presidencies and EU crisis management decision-making bodies is established and somewhat formalised, and has led to fruitful information exchange in preparation of EU concept and policy documents. In comparison and despite recognised potential, cooperation with regard to early warning and situation assessments remains undeveloped. Similarly, interaction with NGOs in relation to conceptual and operational planning is limited and ad hoc. Yet, where it has taken place, interaction has been extensive. The principal case in point is the cooperation of the Council of the European Union with the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in the preparation of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). In this case, the CMI played an active role in early warning and decision making within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as well as in the drafting of operational concepts and plans through the inclusion of a CMI expert on the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) team. At the operational field level, however, provisions for liaison and outreach between ESDP missions and civil society partners are ill-defined or absent. The AMM is also exceptional in this respect, since the head of mission met with civil society groups early on in the mission and appointed an official to maintain these contacts.

Over and above their interaction with ESDP mission planning and implementation, NGOs play a role in building ESDP capacity through training of personnel to be

potentially deployed in ESDP missions. While most training is organised at the member state level, in some countries independent training institutes or NGOs deliver national training services. Similarly, some EU-level training, such as the European Community (EC)-funded European Group on Training (EGT), has used a network of training institutes, including some independent organisations, to develop and deliver training modules designed for EU civilian deployments. Similarly, recruitment for EU civilian missions is decentralised and conducted at the member state level. In practice, this means that a few member states include non-governmental experts on their rosters for civilian deployments, whereas in most cases national recruitment practices fail to reach relevant experts that are employed in the private, NGO or academic sectors.

### *Key challenges*

From the perspective of ESDP partners, there are a number of issues to be addressed in designing appropriate modalities for dialogue and communication. These include how to promote information exchange without compromising ESDP security, how to provide resources for liaison functions and/or the inclusion of external experts in mission teams and how to identify legitimate and relevant civil society partners. While these challenges are real, the report argues that they should not be overstated and identifies a number of strategies for addressing them.

For NGOs, some of the principal concerns around cooperation with international crisis management interventions relate to their need to retain their operational independence and impartiality since this is typically a prerequisite for access to local populations. This may preclude deeper cooperation that would effectively place an NGO under an EU chain of command, but upstream engagement in needs assessment or planning or information exchange at the operational level is typically welcomed. In addition, resource constraints favour light modalities for information exchange and point to the importance of linking with established and sustainable fora for NGO dialogue in the field.

### *Learning from the civil-military relationship*

Military actors have long been aware of the value of cooperation with other civilian actors, including NGOs, in support of mission objectives and have developed various structures and positions to support their civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) efforts in the field. These include dialogue functions supported by civilian liaison officers and coordination centres. The prevailing trend is to enhance and expand CIMIC by increasing cooperation at the strategic level. This is true of efforts within a number of member states as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military alliance. Similarly, in recognition of the need for better coordination of the overall

peace-building effort, the United Nations (UN) is moving toward a more integrated and comprehensive civil-military approach to mission planning that, nevertheless, does not presuppose the integrative cooperation of all civilian activities in support of military goals. The development of (military) ESDP doctrine is in line with, if somewhat behind, these trends. EU CIMIC remains focused on improvements at the field level and on recent efforts to build on EU internal civil-military coordination (CMCO) and to promote comprehensive planning, and not on developing the modalities for strategic-level cooperation with other international actors and stakeholders. Rather, strategic-level cooperation remains ad hoc, although it is more formalised in relation to cooperation with the United Nations through the EU-UN Steering Committee.

There have been no parallel efforts to address how civilian ESDP missions should interact with other civilian actors with a view to improving their efficacy at the field or strategic level. However, given that civilian missions are designed to “intrude” into matters of local governance and have deep and widespread local political impacts, the rationale for proactively fostering cooperation as early and broadly as feasible is just, if not more compelling, in the case of civilian ESDP.

### *Learning from and linking with the development sector*

There is no single development approach to achieving rule of law through reforming, strengthening and building oversight capacities for the security sector, although guiding principles for international development efforts, which emphasise local ownership, long-term commitments and a holistic approach, have been agreed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC). In practice, development actors aim to promote local ownership through political dialogue and consultations with other stakeholders and NGOs in the context of planning and programming. Activities to build institutional capacity and promote security sector reform (SSR) focus on central government capacities and increasingly include direct budget support as well as the provision of technical expertise to build institutional capacity. However, these activities are also complemented by actions directed at building state and civil society capacity at the local level and elements of the programmes are often outsourced to NGOs.

Given that ESDP actions will typically form only a part of the longer-term international effort and that ESDP resources are limited, it is critical that ESDP planners have the information and resources to ensure that ESDP actions add value, and that efforts to develop complementary and/or follow-up development-funded actions, including at the local level, are set in motion as early as possible.

## *The added value of increased engagement with civil society*

While NGOs play a number of roles that are important in peace-building processes, this report focuses on the roles and capabilities that might be better harnessed in support of ESDP mission objectives. It argues that better linkage with civil society groups can provide added value in assessing local ground truth and thereby enhance EU situation assessment and early warning. This can be achieved both by improving modalities for routine information exchange and through cooperation in the preparation and conduct of EU fact-finding missions. Similarly, external experts with specialist and/or local expertise, including from the NGO sector, can provide valuable contributions to pre-planning and mission planning, as was demonstrated by the preparation of the AMM. During the implementation of ESDP missions, cooperation with NGOs and civil society actors can help improve mission visibility and sustainability, and can contribute to the development of complementary flanking or follow-on activities. Moreover, to enhance ongoing efforts to promote comprehensive planning and coherence of EU external actions, ESDP mission evaluations should be comprehensive in approach and draw on feedback for key EU partners, host government and host populations. Civil society actors can provide a valuable role by surveying local opinion and providing independent evaluations of the impact of EU action.

Finally, much relevant expertise resides in the non-governmental sector and can be better harnessed to boost ESDP capacity through their inclusion in ESDP training and recruitment efforts. Non-state actors, including independent training institutes, individual trainers and experts with local knowledge, can boost ESDP generic, pre-deployment and in-mission training capacities. Similarly, greater cooperation with relevant non-governmental or private sector actors can help member states expand their national pools with suitably qualified candidates.

## *Recommendations*

To improve cooperation at the strategic level with Brussels-based decision makers and planners, the EU should:

- establish an EU-NGO peace-building advisory group tasked with promoting practical modalities of communication, qualitative mapping of NGO actors and activities, and routine dialogue in relation to thematic or geographic areas;
- establish civilian liaison officers within the Council Secretariat tasked with liaising with external civilian actors with a view to improving the suitability of

information received, improving institutional knowledge of ongoing activities and identifying potential partners that might provide complementary roles; and

- provide for the inclusion of external experts in fact-finding or pre-planning missions, including through the development of the Civilian Response Team (CRT) concept.

To improve cooperation during mission implementation and with a view to enhancing mission evaluation, the EU should develop a concept and operational guidelines for cooperation with external civilian actors, which would:

- clarify modalities for routine information exchange, building on established fora for civil society cooperation where possible;
- establish civilian liaison officer positions with liaison, reporting and outreach functions;
- provide for the development of public awareness campaigns, including elements to be delivered through civil society partners; and
- provide for increased consultation with partners and local stakeholders in the preparation of mission evaluations.

To generate ESDP capacity through cooperation in training and recruitment, the EU should:

- ensure that EU training addresses issues of cooperation with other civilian actors;
- develop a database of trainers from governmental organisations and NGOs, including a pool of pre-selected trainers that could be mobilised at short notice to deliver pre-deployment or in-mission training;
- develop recruitment outreach, whereby a wider range of contact points in member states are notified of mission vacancies;
- expand the use of directly contracted personnel to include consultants for specialist and urgent operational needs; and
- encourage member states to link participation in EU-level training with deployment and to expand the inclusion of experts from the private or non-governmental sectors in national recruitment efforts.

# 1. Objectives and scope

The European Union (EU) Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) welcomes a regular exchange of views with civil society organisations (CSOs) on the general orientations of EU civilian crisis management and affirms that “non-governmental organisation (NGO) experience and early warning capacity are valued by the EU”<sup>1</sup>. The EU Crisis Management Procedures also provide for “contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the United Nations (UN) and other international and regional organisations, as well as with NGOs, etc.” in virtually every phase of an ESDP operation, from the routine early warning phase (phase 1) to mission implementation (phase 5). Moreover, with regard to implementation, the procedures note that “modalities for co-ordination in the field between the EU and international organisations, local authorities and NGOs need to be developed”<sup>2</sup>.

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) discussed the potential contribution of NGOs and NGO experts to ESDP missions and capacity-building during the Greek, Luxembourg and Dutch EU Presidencies.<sup>3</sup> However, modalities to deliver regular information exchange both at headquarters and in the field remain undeveloped and little attention has been given to understanding how civil society experience and knowledge might usefully be drawn upon in ESDP capacity-building, including in the areas of training and recruitment.

The principal objective of this report is to address these cooperation gaps with a view to developing the capacities and operational efficacy of civilian ESDP missions. More specifically, the report considers how improved modalities for information sharing and cooperation at headquarters and in the field can benefit the planning, implementation and evaluation of ESDP actions and how ESDP actions might be strengthened by drawing on local knowledge and specialist expertise from the non-governmental sectors in the areas of training and recruitment.

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- 1 Council of the European Union, 2004, *Draft Action Plan for the Civilian Aspects of ESDP*, Document 10325/04, Article 22, 9 June, Brussels.
  - 2 Council of the European Union, 2003, *Suggestions for Procedures for Coherent, Comprehensive EU Crisis Management*, Document 11127/03, 3 July, Brussels, p. 25.
  - 3 During the Greek Presidency, these discussions resulted in a paper that was initially annexed (Annex IV) to the Rule of Law Concept, but which was ultimately not included in the final draft. The paper recommended, inter alia, direct engagement of relevant non-governmental groups and actors in mission preparation (information provision and pre-deployment training) and implementation, including six operational tasks. During the Luxembourg Presidency, an informal CIVCOM meeting discussed ways in which ESDP capabilities could contribute to the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 process. During the Dutch Presidency, an informal CIVCOM meeting addressed Article 22 of the Action Plan. No conclusions were drawn from these informal Presidency events.



The scope of this report is intentionally limited to civil society interaction with ESDP instruments rather than the full range of EU civilian crisis management instruments, including those of the European Community (EC), managed by the European Commission. Nevertheless, it is understood that to the extent that certain civil society actors provide important peace-building services for the EU, this is primarily in the context of their role as implementing partners for EC programmes in countries affected or threatened by conflict. Moreover, complementary, “flanking” or follow-on activities supported by the EC or member states and implemented by NGOs or civil society actors can directly support ESDP objectives. Indeed, this is recognised in the European Security Strategy, which calls for greater coherence in EU external action, particularly in the use of first and second pillar instruments. To this end, a number of efforts have recently been launched to address the need for more effective intra-pillar coordination in planning. These include the development of a concept for comprehensive planning within the Council of the European Union<sup>4</sup> and some practical suggestions to improve strategic inter-pillar cooperation made by the European Commission<sup>5</sup>. Given that improved inter-pillar coordination is also a prerequisite for enhanced complementarity of action between civilian ESDP missions and EC-supported civil society action, a secondary objective of this report is to support a more comprehensive approach to planning that involves increasing the opportunities and capacity for informal strategic-level dialogue with the EC and civil society regarding situation assessments and possible complementary flanking or follow-on EC actions.

Given the ESDP focus of this report, the European Commission’s partnership with civil society is not addressed. This is, however, a dynamic area where the modalities for EC-civil society cooperation are currently being developed, including through the European Commission’s proposed Peacebuilding Partnership.<sup>6</sup> As the European

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4 Council of the European Union, 2005, *Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning*, Document 13983/0, 3 November, Brussels.

5 Communication from the European Commission to the Council of the European of June 2006, *Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility*, 08.06.2006, Doc COM (2006) 278 final, Brussels.

6 The plans for the European Commission’s Peacebuilding Partnership were outlined in a letter from Commissioner Ferrero Waldner to the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in the context of the negotiations to agree the Stability Instrument in 2006. They included six elements, four of which sought to build on the EC’s cooperation with civil society through: (i) building a representative network of specialised European NGOs with strong grass-roots links in third countries and expertise in early warning, conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict recovery; this network will be an important interlocutor with the European Commission in policy development and in the identification of expertise in these fields; (ii) building capacity among non-state actors, regional and subregional organisations and networks with operational or policy peace-building experience through grant financing awarded on a competitive basis; (iii) agreeing framework partnership agreements with specialised NGOs, allowing rapid provision of support for peace-building assistance in situations of crisis; and (iv) developing an operational capacity within the European Commission to deploy civilian experts at short notice in situations of crisis.

Commission strengthens its cooperation with civil society actors in the area of peace-building, it should increasingly serve as a useful conduit for information on NGO actors and activities provided through its civil society partnerships. This in turn strengthens the case for strong upstream inter-pillar cooperation in information sharing and strategic planning, in addition to efforts to improve direct information sharing, cooperation and, in some cases, concerted action with trusted civil society partners.

## 2. Review of the current situation

### *Cooperation at the strategic level*

#### *Cooperation in the development of concepts and policy orientations*

In practice, information exchange between NGOs and the bodies of civilian ESDP has typically been ad hoc and informal, but is by no means non-existent. Indeed, the Action Plan call for “regular information exchange on the general orientations of civilian ESDP” and recognition of the value of “NGO experience and early warning capacity” reflects established practice and possibly seeks to build on it.

It is now also common practice that each Presidency hosts at least one event that addresses issues of conflict prevention and/or peace-building in cooperation with civil society partners. Indeed, this has been the case during the Irish, Luxembourg, Dutch, United Kingdom (UK) and Austrian Presidencies. In some cases, the events addressed the ESDP-NGO relationship directly (for example, the Luxembourg and Dutch Presidencies), while others focused on best practices in thematic areas such as conflict prevention (Austria) and security sector reform (United Kingdom). Cooperation in the context of these thematic events has given rise to further informal information exchange that has contributed to the elaboration of Council policy positions or concepts.

Moreover, there have been a number of occasions when ESDP decision-making bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and CIVCOM, have been briefed by representatives of international NGOs in the context of strategic, upstream or conceptual deliberations.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, in some cases—notably, the intervention of former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari in the PSC with regard to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)—the intervention of civil society actors has played a critical role in moving from early warning to early action.

#### *Cooperation in early warning and situation assessments*

However, attempts to engage in systematic ESDP-civil society dialogue with regard to *early warning and situation assessments* have generally been less successful. After it was established in 2000, the Policy Unit in the Council held annual informal meetings

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7 For example, representatives from the Crisis Management Initiative, the International Crisis Group and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute have been invited to brief the PSC. Similarly, CIVCOM has invited representatives from independent training institutes that are members of the European EGT to address issues relating to training for ESDP, and has invited representatives from peace-building NGOs and networks, including EPLO, International Alert, Saferworld, Nonviolent Peaceforce and International Security Information Service Europe, to address issues relating to conflict prevention, SSR and DDR in its formal and informal meetings.

to which selected humanitarian, development and security policy organisations represented in Brussels would be invited to present their views on a limited number of countries where they were active. These meetings were discontinued in 2003, however, possibly because of restructuring within the Policy Unit and/or because their procedural format—a tour de table of organisational activities in and analysis of developments on the ground—was not sufficiently operational.

Moreover, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the formal EU early warning and situation assessment structures draw on civil society inputs. In accordance with the EU Crisis Management Procedures, the EU Situation Centre collects information from the EC, member states and other international organisations, including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). There are no equivalent modalities for collecting information from civil society actors at headquarters.

Although it is now commonplace for ESDP *fact-finding* and *pre-planning missions* to meet with local representatives from international NGOs, such consultations are typically limited to meeting with one or two international human rights or humanitarian NGOs, and generally do not include local actors, including local government agencies, religious groups, traditional leaders, community-based organisations and representatives from the media and academia.

Naturally, in addition to meeting directly, a huge amount of information generated by NGOs is publicly available and can, therefore, be drawn upon by those responsible for situation and needs assessments or the planning of ESDP missions. However, much relevant information held by NGOs is not in the public domain because of the impact that this might have on operational activities, including access to populations and staff safety. Thus, while it is difficult to assess to what extent the EU makes use of unsolicited reports by NGOs, it seems fair to say that the utility of ESDP-NGO information exchange in relation to situation assessment has fallen short of its potential.

### *Cooperation in strategic planning*

In the context of the development of a strategic approach to ESDP, the importance of coordination between international actors has been recognised. Indeed, the decision to launch an ESDP mission is the result of a process of consultation aimed at quantifying the added value that ESDP may provide where “this potential added value will have to be measured together with the EU’s interest in a specific scenario, against envisaged ESDP involvement in other competing scenarios and against the

potential added value of other actors”<sup>8</sup>. Thus, the role and potential added value of other actors, presumably including international organisations, international non-governmental actors and local actors, would normally be considered in strategic decisions of the PSC and CIVCOM, which in turn are normally informed by the Council Secretariat, the European Commission and the findings of ESDP fact-finding or pre-planning missions. Moreover, when considering the comparative advantage of an ESDP intervention, one of the key factors (as identified by Pedro Serrano) is “whether the coordinated use of a plurality of EU instruments brings added value”<sup>9</sup>. The recently agreed comprehensive planning and security sector reform (SSR) concepts are important foundations for developing such a coordinated approach, but their implications with regard to ESDP cooperation with civil society have yet to be clarified.

It is clear that in order for the PSC and CIVCOM to be in a fully informed position so as to contribute to strategic-level assessments of the potential added value of a potential Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mission, they need to have a clear overview of the supply side (the resources at their disposal) as well as the demand side (the needs in the host country and the potential added value of other actors). To help achieve this challenging task, the EU Crisis Management Procedures provide for “contacts and appropriate co-operation as necessary with the UN and other international and regional organisations, as well as with NGOs, etc.” in virtually every phase of an ESDP operation, including phase 1: the routine, early warning phase; phase 2: the crisis build up/elaboration of the draft Crisis Management Concept (CMC); phase 3: approval of the CMC and development of strategic options; phase 4: the development of planning documents; and phase 5: mission implementation.

While modalities for cooperation with the United Nations have been developed at various levels in accordance with the 2003 EU-UN declaration, including through the regular meetings of the EU-UN Steering Committee, and EU cooperation with NATO has been formalised, inter alia, through the Berlin Plus agreements, there have been no significant developments with regard to the modalities of EU-NGO cooperation since the Crisis Management Procedures were agreed in 2003. There is no systematic approach to cooperation at the strategic level, particularly with the bodies engaged in strategic planning in the Council Secretariat. Nevertheless, while there has been no systematic cooperation, what little there has been on an ad hoc basis has been extraordinarily extensive. The Council’s cooperation with the Crisis Management

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8 Pedro Serrano, 2006, A Strategic Approach to European Security and Defence Policy, in: *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way*, Chaillot Paper No. 90, June, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 40.

9 Ibid., p. 44.

Initiative (CMI) in preparation of the AMM is remarkable in this context. Given the extensive information sharing and cooperation in strategic and operational planning, this case is reviewed in more detail below.

### ***From early warning to early planning: the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission<sup>10</sup>***

In the case of the AMM, cooperation between the CMI, the NGO that brokered the peace agreement, the European Commission and the Council bodies that established the ESDP mission that monitors the implementation of aspects of the agreement went beyond early warning to operational cooperation in mission pre-planning and operational planning. Direct cooperation was initially with the European Commission and began as technical working-level contacts between the CMI and those in the European Commission responsible for managing the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, which ultimately funded the peace talks led by Ahtisaari in his capacity as founder and chair of the board of the CMI.

Given the extraordinary access and influence that Ahtisaari enjoyed in the EU and personally with High Representative and Council Secretary-General Javier Solana during this European Commission-funded mediation action, the prospect of a follow-on EU monitoring mission was raised by Ahtisaari directly with Solana, which led to the launch of the first EU “assessment mission” in June 2005. Interestingly, despite the fact that the AMM was preceded by an EC-supported action, the genesis of the ESDP mission depended more on a high-level request for ESDP assistance, similar to those received from the United Nations—in the case of Artemis and EU SEC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—or the African Union (support to Amis II), than on cross-pillar cooperation in planning. Moreover, Ahtisaari later played a critical persuasive role in PSC deliberations, convincing key member states to support the proposed mission. In the absence of authoritative external pressure, it remains to be seen whether and how “comprehensive planning” can help address personal leadership gaps, with a view to promoting the transition from EC-civil society partnership, including in “track II” mediation efforts, to more official CFSP/ESDP engagement of the EU.

The early planning stages of the AMM were also exceptional in a number of respects to normal ESDP-civil society cooperation in information exchange. Unusually, it was the EU planners who experienced a deficit of information since they were only partially involved in the negotiation of the agreement. Officials from both the

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10 The descriptive information contained in this account is based on interviews with CMI staff and officials in the Council Secretariat as well as the publication by Giovanni Grevi, 2005, *The Aceh Monitoring Mission: Toward Integrated Crisis Management*, in: *The EU Mission in Aceh: Implementing Peace*, Occasional Paper No. 61, December, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Council and the European Commission went to Helsinki during the fourth round of talks in May 2005 and the last round of negotiations in mid-July, where they participated in negotiations on monitoring, but not in negotiations on other agenda items. While the terms of the agreement were kept secret until the official signature on 15 August 2005, when the follow-on monitoring mission was due to be launched, the CMI did provide the EU access to the draft agreement before the final round of talks, and the CMI regularly updated EU officials on progress in the talks by way of informal briefings by Brussels-based staff. Similarly, the inclusion of the CMI on the Council and European Commission task force that drew up the concept for the EU Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) by end of July 2005 helped ensure that EU planning was well informed of the terms and background of the peace agreement process.

Remarkably, the CMI was also directly involved in the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) that was sent to Aceh in August 2005 and which played an unusually significant role in operational planning. The TAM built on the IMP concept, an operations order, operations plan, deployment plan, safety and security plan, instructions to monitors and training programme for incoming monitors. It also drafted the concept of operations (CONOPS), which was then sent to Brussels for discussion and finalisation.

The inclusion of an expert from the CMI in the TAM, while undoubtedly useful given their knowledge of the terms of peace agreement and the local actors, was, however, problematic in practice. Notably, the expert lacked the normal security clearance, insurance and salary typically provided by member states to national secondees. This meant that exceptions to normal procedures had to be made on a pragmatic basis.

It remains to be seen whether the form and level of cooperation between the ESDP and CMI that was experienced in the case of the Aceh mission remains exceptional or is precedent setting. Both the EU and CMI are in the process of conducting internal reviews, which should help generate lessons learned from the mission, including for ESDP-civil society cooperation. There is no history of civil society-ESDP cooperation in mission evaluations, however, and despite their concerted efforts in mission planning, the case of Aceh is no exception in this regard.

### *Cooperation in the field*

In principle, ESDP cooperation with international NGOs is no different from ESDP interaction with other international actors that work alongside ESDP missions, often in pursuit of the same objectives. In practice, however, it is more limited than EU information exchange with other international organisations. Provisions for information exchange, liaison and outreach between ESDP missions and international NGOs or host nation civil society partners during the implementation of a civilian

ESDP mission are conspicuously ill-defined or absent. Indeed, this is explicitly recognised in the EU Crisis Management Procedures, which state that “modalities for co-ordination in the field between the EU and international organisations, local authorities and NGOs need to be developed”<sup>11</sup>.

Once again, the AMM is exceptional. In this instance, the AMM-IMP held an early meeting with civil society groups on 17 August 2005 to share information about the purpose of the mission and to discuss how civil society groups plan to support the peace process and how the AMM should best communicate with civil society. Thereafter, Head of Mission Pieter Feith appointed an AMM official to maintain these contacts.<sup>12</sup>

## *Cooperation in the generation of ESDP capacity: training and recruitment*

### *Training*

NGOs or individual NGO experts are involved in training of personnel to be potentially deployed in ESDP missions in a number of different contexts and at different levels. With regard to the provision of EU-level training for personnel that are potentially to be deployed in EU missions, this has, to date, been largely managed and paid for by the European Commission in the context of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. A number of European training institutes (some governmental, others independent) have been involved as implementing partners in this project and collectively comprise the European Group on Training (EGT), which has developed and delivered a number of generic and specialist training courses. It has also developed pilot training courses for personnel nominated for ESDP Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) with a view to ensuring that all members of the CRT pool are pre-trained. By 2006, the EGT had organised 47 courses attended by over 1,000 participants and by 2007 it will have trained a further 450, including 100 CRT members, thereby helping to build a pool of trained civilian experts in line with project objectives. However, such recent EU-level training initiatives have only reached a small proportion of the pool of potential EU civilian personnel. Indeed, a recent survey of ESDP mission members conducted by the Council Secretariat, revealed that under 5% of mission staff had received EU-level generic or pre-deployment training, including but not limited to that offered through the EGT.

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<sup>11</sup> Document 11127/03, p. 25.

<sup>12</sup> The effectiveness of these modalities for communication, including whether they could be made to work at the district level, will presumably be reviewed in the final AMM lessons learned evaluation.



The majority of generic or pre-mission training is conducted at the national level. This is typically provided by government agencies, although in some cases, including Austria and Germany, specialist training institutes are independently managed. Nevertheless, the combined national and EU-level training efforts still do not reach a significant proportion of deployed personnel. For instance, the Council survey also showed that approximately a third of mission personnel had received no generic or pre-mission training prior to deployment and over a fifth had received no in-mission training. Hence, the EU is currently exploring ways of expanding training capacity at the EU and national levels and strengthening the link between training and recruitment.

In addition to training personnel for deployment on ESDP missions, the EC has contracted NGOs with relevant training expertise to provide skills-based peace-building training for European Commission and Council Secretariat staff.

### *Recruitment*

Recruitment for ESDP missions is decentralised and conducted via contact points in member states. Many member states have developed pools or rosters of experts who are potentially available for deployment on ESDP missions in line with the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal, but in relatively few cases these are also populated with non-governmental experts. In Germany, for example, recruitment is managed by an independent organisation that maintains a roster including both civil servants and independent experts. In other cases, such as the United Kingdom, the roster is managed inside the government—in this case, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)—but includes many non-civil servants, including NGO experts. In most member states, however, pools from which experts for ESDP missions are nominated only include civil servants. Consequently, current recruitment practices do not generally reach relevant experts that are employed in the private, NGO or academic sectors.

### *Summary of cooperation to date*

This brief overview of past practice in civilian ESDP-civil society cooperation is by no means exhaustive, and a more detailed examination of the subject would undoubtedly reveal a richer picture of informal contacts. Despite the cursory nature of this review, a number of conclusions on the current state of civilian ESDP-civil society cooperation can be tentatively offered:

- cooperation between specialist NGOs and the Presidencies/CIVCOM is established and somewhat formalised, and has led to fruitful information exchanges in preparation of EU policy and concept documents, including on conflict prevention and security sector reform (SSR);

- cooperation at headquarters with specialist NGOs in the area of early warning and situation assessments has recognised potential, but remains undeveloped (with the exception of Aceh);
- within ESDP structures, only the PSC and CIVCOM have traditions of outreach to trusted NGOs for briefings; in this context (notably Aceh), international civil society actors can provide leadership in moving from early warning to early action;
- there are no identifiable entry points for information exchange with the Council Secretariat (the Situation Centre, Directorate General E IX, CivMil cell) or the Policy Unit;
- ESDP procedures do not provide for the inclusion of external experts in ESDP fact-finding, planning or mission teams (with the exception of Aceh);
- cooperation in the field is limited to meetings with one or two NGOs in the context of the assessment of the political situation and, in some cases (Aceh), includes a meeting with local civil society groups in the early phase of a mission for the purpose of mission outreach;
- there are no provisions for routine liaison with international or local civil society actors in the implementation of civilian ESDP missions, although, in the case of Aceh, a liaison officer was appointed for this purpose;
- there are no provisions for information exchange or cooperation with regard to mission evaluations or lesson-learning exercises;
- cooperation with NGOs in the field of training is currently limited to the inclusion of some independent training institutes in the EC EGT, which currently provide non-mission specific, generic or specialist training and training to members of the CRT; and
- recruitment is managed by member states; in some cases national rosters include both civil servants and independent experts, but typically pools from which experts for ESDP missions are nominated only include civil servants.

# 3. Challenges for cooperation

There is no doubt that coordination in the planning and conduct of international peace missions is challenging for both partners. This section highlights some of the main transaction costs associated with cooperation by both ESDP and NGO actors, with a view to identifying means of reducing them.

## *Challenges for cooperation from the perspective of ESDP*

### *Security*

Civilian ESDP missions are secure operations with a political purpose. ESDP early warning, strategic and operation planning processes and documents are internal and the documents they generate are typically classified. Information exchange with civil society partners needs to generate relevant information for ESDP without compromising security. Options for addressing this challenge include:

- routinely checking that assigned classification codes of agreed strategic-level documents, including EU “concepts”, are in line with commitments to openness;<sup>13</sup>
- conducting dialogue with trusted NGO/civil society partners informally and off the record as well as routinely so as to minimise the political significance of the dialogue itself;
- ensuring that all personnel who are selected for EU training courses and/or for national personnel pools are subsequently vetted so that they have the required security clearance for participating in EU operations; and
- developing just-in-time security clearance provisions at the member state level that can be activated when the head of mission requests that an individual consultants/expert with relevant local or specialist knowledge be hired to support the mission.

### *Resources*

It is widely recognised that the Directorate General E IX in the Council Secretariat is overstretched, given that it is responsible for conducting strategic and operational planning as well as providing some mission support services to multiple missions with fewer than 50 staff. Similarly, there is limited capacity in other relevant ESDP

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<sup>13</sup> ESDP doctrine is largely defined through its concept papers, but these are often routinely classified and only made public after much delay or after a specific request for access has been received. Indeed, many basic conceptual documents, for example, in relations to EU priority areas of action and training, remain classified even where it is unclear how their publication could compromise mission operational security. This hinders the ability of others to understand and work with the EU.

bodies, including the Civil Military Cell, the Policy Unit and EU Situation Centre. There is also no budgetary provision for dialogue with external civil society actors within the Council's administrative budget or in mission budgets. Moreover, at the operational level, member states often cite financial concerns as the most significant constraint on the inclusion of non-state experts in member state personnel pools since there are normally no provisions in place at the national level for the payment of salaries to experts who are not civil servants.

However, while real, resource challenges should not be overstated. The resources involved in developing more effective means of cooperation at headquarters or employing a few independent specialists for participation in ESDP missions are not great. Nevertheless, the following questions warrant further consideration:

- How can the Council Secretariat support the development of liaison functions?
- How can ESDP mission budgets be adapted to include strengthened liaison and outreach elements?
- How can member states adequately compensate individual experts with relevant specialist or local expertise?
- How could mission budgets be adapted so as to enable the head of mission to directly contract independent consultants with specialist expertise where suitable candidates cannot be found through normal channels?

### *Number and legitimacy of actors*

Civil society forms a large, diverse and fragmented body of organisations. NGOs vary from the very large to the extremely small in all aspects, including legitimacy, reliability, aims, roles, staff, financial resources, capacity and geographical reach. In the absence of a reliable qualitative NGO “who’s who” guide or universal accreditation system, the task of identifying relevant and legitimate civil society partners appears a formidable and resource-intensive one. The challenge for ESDP is how best to manage this task since trust is a prerequisite for cooperation with regard to information exchange in early warning, planning or evaluation. There are, however, different degrees to this challenge depending on the purpose of the cooperation and a number of ways in which the transaction costs of cooperation can be reduced.

- **Organisation**

Structured forms of dialogue are designed to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation. This is true of high-level multilateral negotiations as well as working-level fora for information exchange. Routine structures for dialogue in the context of early warning also have the political advantage of reducing the political significance to

third parties of the dialogue itself. Systematising dialogue can cloak the operational significance of particular discussions. In this way, structures for routine dialogue can serve as a forest in which trees of operational significance can be nurtured and hidden.

- Specialisation

The subset of international NGOs with experience and specialist knowledge on particular conflicts or thematic areas—for example, community policing, rule of law, civil administration, civilian monitoring, SSR and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)—is often relatively small. Organising cooperation around specialist themes reduces the number of relevant NGOs and the transaction costs of establishing working relationships with them.

- Working with ESDP partners: EC, UN and/or NGO networks

The job of acquiring knowledge and building relationships with the broader NGO community can be at least partially “outsourced” by working effectively with partners. In the context of the EU, the European Commission is well positioned to identify potential reliable partners with which it has established relationships, and which might also be called upon or have the capacity to conduct flanking or follow-on actions. This can entail working with EC delegations, both at the headquarters level and in the field. Member states and other international organisations can also serve a useful similar function. National donors could provide information on their national trusted NGO partners. Similarly, the EU could seek to expand its relationship with the United Nations so as to share information about CSOs and NGOs that they have worked with in particular countries or thematic areas. Moreover, establishing a network of civilian liaison contact points with civilian affairs officers in United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) missions or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) field offices would also serve to improve field-level cooperation efforts with local civil society and other international partners. Finally, NGO networks are useful sources of knowledge and entry-points for cooperation. In the EU context, there are a number of NGO networks that focus on engagement with the EU. These are well established in the areas of development (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development/CONCORD), humanitarian relief (Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies/VOICE), human rights and democracy (Human Rights and Democracy NGO Network/HRDN) and, most recently, peace-

building (EPLO). While membership of such networks is diverse, membership criteria rule out the inclusion of suspect organisations, and network secretariats can perform useful services, including identifying suitable NGO members or individual experts in response to specific requests for information, or coordinating common positions on specific issues.<sup>14</sup>

These three strategies for minimising the costs of relationship management are not mutually exclusive; elements of all three are likely to be present in each case, and determining the most appropriate mix is likely to depend on the precise purpose of the cooperation in relation to a particular political and operational context.

## *Challenges for cooperation from the perspective of NGOs*

### *Maintaining independence, impartiality and access*

A perception of NGO impartiality is essential for most peace-building activities conducted by NGOs since this is often a prerequisite for access to local populations. How NGOs ensure their impartiality and independence varies greatly and depends on organisational policies, organisational functions, forms of cooperation and political context.

Organisational policies regarding cooperation with governmental and international actors relate closely to their functions. Those NGOs that specialise in mediation, capacity-building and reconciliation or the development of promoting inclusive bottom-up approaches to security, including community safety and policing programmes, reintegration programmes, and weapons for development programmes, must be able to work with local communities and government counterparts. As a consequence of their functions, their operational guidelines rarely preclude opportunities for dialogue with representatives of the EU (ESDP or EC) since cooperation will normally be mutually reinforcing. Moreover, many peace-building organisations are funded by international donors, including the EC, and would welcome upstream involvement in needs assessments since this in turn should help ensure that such assessments draw on their understanding of the needs on the ground and should help them formulate relevant project proposals. Consequently, upstream dialogue with regard to situation and needs assessments or programming priorities would in most cases be welcomed.

However, deeper cooperation that would effectively place an NGO under an ESDP chain of command would be more problematic for most NGOs (as well as their ESDP

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<sup>14</sup> For example, EPLO is in the process of developing a database of organisational expertise, which would enable the rapid identification of substance experts in response to specific requests.

partners). Even where ESDP missions enjoyed popular support, and association with them would not necessarily compromise access, most NGOs would insist on operational independence and would not be willing to be “integrated” in ESDP missions, although some would clearly consider being subcontracted service providers. Where concerted action in monitoring or capacity-building was required, NGOs would rather that this be provided for through comprehensive planning processes to ensure the complementary application of EC funding instruments. Moreover, should future ESDP missions conduct substitution or executive functions, the pressure for NGO disassociation in order to protect access to local populations would certainly increase. This is in line with the lessons from military cooperation with humanitarian actors, which has often observed the paradox that the worse the security situation, the greater the need for disassociation.

### *Resources*

Although international NGOs vary in size and resource capacities, most experience difficulties in funding networking activities, including those aimed at improving cooperation within the NGO sector and with international governmental organisations (IGOs) in general and the EU specifically. Since such activities are often not tied to project deliverables and their impact is notoriously difficult to measure, NGOs often find it hard to attract and commit sufficient resources for information exchange and coordination in the field and with EU actors at headquarters. Moreover, the latter is particularly costly since it requires knowledge of the EU institutions and often a Brussels presence. Consequently, from the perspective of NGOs, modalities for information exchange with the EU should be as light and transparent as possible, and EU donors, including the EC, should consider the need for funding provisions to be made to enable NGO networking activities at the local level and in relation to IGO/EU partners.

As with ESDP resource concerns, however, the issue of resources should not be overstated. As long as the benefits of cooperation are seen as outweighing the costs, NGOs—no matter how small—routinely engage in cooperative behaviour and attend meetings, providing tailored information, briefings and advice without cost. Thus, operational considerations matter most. Similarly, cooperative procedures and structures will only be sustainable if they are useful and paid for (at least in part) by their members or stakeholders. This suggests the importance for the EU of linking with established networks of local CSOs or NGOs.

## 4. Lessons learned from partners

Increasingly, actors in multidimensional peace-building efforts have come to recognise that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs. Indeed, tackling the challenges of cooperation is now widely viewed as an operational imperative. The lessons learned for mission success over the 15 years of intrusive stabilisation and post-conflict capacity-building operations, whether they were conducted by the United Nations, OSCE or coalitions of the willing, all point to the centrality of effective coordination between international actors and the local society. Moreover, while security/state-building tasks are often initiated in the context of international peace operations, they require long-term commitment. Development actors, including a subset of specialist security/peace-building NGOs, have demonstrated experience in post-conflict state-building and have, in practice, been at the forefront of doctrinal developments in areas such as community policing, rule of law, SSR and dimensions of DDR. There are, therefore, a number of lessons that are relevant to civilian ESDP cooperation with CSOs that have been learned in the context of military-led peace operations and in the context of developmental approaches to state-building. These are briefly reviewed below, both as a means of demonstrating the benefits of cooperation and as a guide to how such cooperation might best be structured.

### *Learning from the civil-military relationship*

The international collaborative study entitled “Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination” led by the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden with 15 military partner organisations from six continents, concluded that:

At the international level, there is an emerging recognition that government departments and agencies, the armed forces, education and training institutions, national NGOs, representative offices from IOs and UN agencies, and the private sector all need to work together more closely with respect to national contributions to international peace operations ... (Whereby) the principal areas for cooperation and coordination in a mission include: operational concept development; detailed operational planning; conduct of operations, including specific operations related to security; governance; institution building; rule of law; disarmament demobilization and integration; security sector reform; human rights; gender; refugee return and



humanitarian assistance; information sharing; operational priority setting; resolution of inter-cultural conflicts; education and training; and the evaluation of progress.<sup>15</sup>

While in many cases cooperation is not well developed in practice, this list of areas for cooperation is still, therefore, aspirational, and it is true that military actors are increasingly aware of the value of cooperation, including with NGOs and CSOs, and that considerations about how best to achieve it are driving structural and planning reform as well as practice on the ground. To illustrate the increasing importance that is being placed on strategic- and tactical-level cooperation, this section reviews some of the relevant practices and developments within the United Nations, NATO and some member states.

Many of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of UN peacekeeping operations have led the United Nations to seek to develop more robust peace operations, including a wider range of civilian components, including humanitarian relief, police, rule of law and DDR. To improve coherence and efficiency of effort, the United Nations has experimented with new forms of integrated planning for integrated peace operations, whereby greater attention is paid to the sequencing of military and civilian tasks in combined strategic and operational plans. Integrationists argue that this offers greater unity of purpose, reduces duplication and waste, improves coordination and enhances accountability through streamlined reporting mechanisms. The focal point of civil-military cooperation debates in this context has been the extent to which integration means actual or perceived subordination of humanitarian principles to the political or military priorities of a mission. In this context, the United Nations has developed a number of policy guidelines to govern the relations between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and emphasis has been placed on physically separating the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) field offices and humanitarian coordination centres from the UN mission so as to protect the role of humanitarian action within integrated UN missions. Similarly, at the tactical level, the United Nations does not operate a civil military cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine as such in order not to presuppose integrative cooperation in support of military mission goals in all crises. Rather, the United Nations uses the term civil-military coordination (CMCoord), which emphasizes the civilian lead in assistance and reconstruction, and military roles in support of that. It highlights the need for peacekeepers to understand

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15 The Challenges Project, 2005, *Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and Coordination*, Stockholm, Elanders Gotab, p. 14, at <[www.challengesproject.net](http://www.challengesproject.net)>.

humanitarian principles, but acknowledges tensions between political directives (e.g. to place one faction under sanction) and humanitarian assistance. CMCoord is supposed to help resolve these tensions.<sup>16</sup>

There are, however, no agreed guidelines on how many state-building areas of civilian operations, including rule of law or community policing, should cooperate with civil society actors. Rather, this is constantly evolving, in part through the lessons drawn from independent evaluations of integrated peace operations in member state sponsored studies<sup>17</sup> and DPKO-commissioned lessons learned reports and surveys of public opinion in mission areas<sup>18</sup>. However, in practice, DPKO missions (and the civilian aspects thereof) employ similar coordination arrangements, including civilian affairs officers who serve as contact points for liaison with local civil society actors.

The military alliance NATO is currently experimenting with a more integrated approach to civil-military cooperation in the context of its Provincial Response Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, and is considering how best to build on its structures and procedures for CIMIC on the ground. Examples of these structures include the NGO-military working group in Afghanistan and the Iraq Assistance Centre. A recent review of CIMIC in the context of PRTs, for example, recommended, inter alia, that NATO develop common assessments and concerted planning and pre-training with civilian actors working in PRTs, and that it explore ways of deepening cooperation with NGOs in this context so as to limit competition over roles between PRTs and NGOs.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, a discussion paper produced in the context of NATO

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16 This description of the UN CMCoord is provided in Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer (eds), 2006, *Resetting the Rules of Engagement, Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 21, March, London, Overseas Development Institute, p. 12. Also see United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Concept, 2005, Geneva, OCHA.

17 See, for example, Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karin von Hippel, 2005, *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*, Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May, New York, United Nations.

18 See, for example: Scott N. Carlson, 2006, *Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: Lessons Learned Study*, DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, March, New York, United Nations; Edward Rees, 2006, *Security Sector Reform and Peace Operations: Improvisation and Confusion from the Field*, external study, DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, March, New York, United Nations.

19 NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 2006, *ISAF PRT Operations in Afghanistan and the Implications and Consequences for Civil-Military Relations*, seminar report, January, Budel, the Netherlands, Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, p. 30.

Allied Command Transformation Enhanced-CIMIC discussions<sup>20</sup> explores how NATO might improve its operational partnerships with international actors, including international NGOs, through:

- better qualitative mapping of international organisation and NGO actors;
- creating civilian agency adviser posts from the strategic level down to key operational command levels<sup>21</sup>; and
- adapting NATO standard operating procedures to facilitate just-in-time interaction in the field, including information sharing and building on normal CIMIC mission components.

Moreover, at the strategic planning level, NATO already provides for “independent senior concept developers” to engage in consultation on doctrinal developments, and for representatives from international NGOs to take part in NATO training and exercises and follow-up consultations, while, at the field level, CIMIC units provide NGO/CSO activity reporting services and liaison arrangements.

It is beyond the scope of this study to thoroughly explore *national models* of CIMIC, but it is worth noting that a number of EU member states are seeking to expand strategic- and field-level interaction with NGOs. At the strategic level, for example, the UK Ministry of Defence has established an NGO-Military Contact Group, which is responsible for developing guidance and policy for its members. In the Netherlands, NGOs and aid officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participate in joint exercises and scenario planning for civil-military operations. At the field level, the United Kingdom is also considering standardising the use of civil military humanitarian advisers and development advisers to support senior military commanders in the field.

Many of the military doctrinal developments in relation to CIMIC have also been integrated into the development of ESDP. For example, the EU agreed a CIMIC concept in 2002 that was modelled on and compatible with the NATO CIMIC concept. The EU concept defines CIMIC as “the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations

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20 This discussion paper was drafted by Paul La Rose Edwards, one of the team of independent senior concept developers engaged by NATO Allied Command Transformation to produce insights and recommendations on aspects of NATO Crisis Management at the strategic level as partly exercised during Crisis Management Exercises CMX05 2005, and then CMX06.

21 These are intended to be “former NGO and/or IGO staffers with experience in working in NGO and/or IGO field operations. Having come up through the ranks of NGOs/IGOs, they will have insider knowledge of NGOs/IGOs and have greater perceived legitimacy by their former NGO/IGO colleagues.” Ibid., p. 7.

and civil actors (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to providing for direct support to the civil environment and military force, which is not applicable to the civilian ESDP context, CIMIC provides for extensive liaison and information exchange functions that are relevant to civilian ESDP, but have not yet been developed in this context. Moreover, as indicated above, the EU Crisis Management Procedures agreed in 2003 noted a continued need for the development of the modalities of cooperation between ESDP missions and local and international actors in the field.

As with other international actors engaged in peace operations, the EU has also recognised that in order to deliver the desired “effects” in an efficient manner, it needs to adopt a more comprehensive approach to planning. Hence, the agreement of a draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning in November 2005 that seeks to promote an effects-based approach to planning ESDP missions so that ESDP operations are fully cognizant of and aligned with EC actions and larger international communities’ efforts. This is designed to complement and build on the EU’s internal civil-military coordination (CMCO) in planning. However, although the need for incorporating expertise with local knowledge and considering the views of local stakeholders is acknowledged, the EU has yet to elaborate how engagement with civil society or NGOs might contribute to EU comprehensive planning.

In summary, there are parallel trends in the conduct of peace operations, whereby the value of cooperation is recognised as being of central importance to mission efficacy. At the operational level in the field, the military has developed mechanisms for liaising with civilians where these mechanisms are based on recognition of NGO independence, recognition of the need for different coordination arrangements for different kinds of civil society actors and recognition of the civil-military cooperation paradox regarding humanitarian actors (the worse the security situation, the greater the need for disassociation). In addition, it is also now recognised that CIMIC is not sufficient for ensuring effective multiplayer actions. Hence, CIMIC is being enhanced to include further upstream or strategic-level cooperation in parallel with efforts to promote comprehensive or integrated planning.

The development of (military) ESDP doctrine is in line with, if somewhat behind, these trends. While EU ESDP has developed EU CIMIC to promote civil-military cooperation in the field with a view to improving the efficacy of military missions, these efforts remained focused on the tactical level. Recent efforts to build on EU

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<sup>22</sup> The European Union, 2002, *Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations*, Document CI 7106/02, 18 March, Brussels.

internal CMCO so as to promote comprehensive planning do not elaborate on the modalities for strategic-level cooperation with other civilian actors, including relevant stakeholders and NGOs. Rather, strategic-level cooperation remains ad hoc, although it is more formalised in relation to cooperation with the United Nations through the EU-UN Steering Committee.

There have been no parallel efforts to address how civilian ESDP missions should interact with other civilian actors with a view to improving their efficacy at the field or strategic level. However, given that civilian missions are designed to “intrude” into matters of local governance and have deep and widespread local political impacts, the rationale for proactively fostering cooperation as early and broadly as feasible is just as, if not more, compelling, in the case of civilian ESDP.

## *Learning from and linking with the development sector*

### *Trends*

Development actors are involved in various activities designed to promote reform, build capacity and improve oversight of all the principal institutions of government, increasingly including the security sector. This follows the wider policy consensus on the nexus between development and security and on the need for more integrated and comprehensive interventions in the economic and governance and social development sectors, particularly in failing state and post-conflict situations. Among many member states and intergovernmental organisations there is also recognition that post-conflict work has been inadequate.<sup>23</sup> To partly address this, the World Bank is now targeting its post-conflict efforts at the strategic level—policy, coordination and resource mobilisation and management—while UNDP and other UN agencies are working to improve their operational post-conflict capacities, and also addressing funding gaps.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, since the extension of Official Development Assistance eligibility to the area of security, as agreed at the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC) High-Level Meeting in March 2005, a wider spectrum of SSR activities can now be financed by development cooperation funds. These include a number of advisory and capacity-building functions, similar to those exercised or possible in the context of civilian ESDP missions in the areas of police, rule of law and civil administration.

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23 The positions and capabilities of major development players are explored in more detail in a discussion paper by the United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit entitled “DPKO and Civilian Post Conflict Capacities” available at <[www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/)>.

24 Including through the suggestion made by the United Nations Secretary-General that DDR should be financed from assessed contributions made available to UN agencies such as UNDP, and through the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peace Fund.

Moreover, the notion has largely been rejected that crisis interventions are sequential, with security and relief actors handing over to reconstruction and development actors. Rather, the post-conflict process is now seen as requiring simultaneous complementary interventions, with development interventions occurring earlier and often alongside short-term security and relief work. This has focused attention on how various actors can work together better to forge a common approach, fusing or coordinating short- and long-term actions. In the context of the UN development actors and international financial institutions (IFIs), this work has focused on more joint assessments and strategic planning frameworks<sup>25</sup> and developing new planning processes for integrated missions, although neither is yet comprehensive<sup>26</sup>. Similarly, the EU has produced a concept on comprehensive planning, but it has yet to be implemented.

Given that security and development actors increasingly occupy the same space—often with similar mandates, objectives and operating at the same time—this has given rise to some jostling for position and fear of duplication. However, the risk of duplication is often overstated since the needs in the field are rarely overserved and joint or complementary efforts are often preferable to the delegation of responsibility to a single actor. Indeed, in most cases the development of civilian capacities requires many partners working with different approaches and at different levels. This, however, requires intensive institutional cooperation and better integration of overall effort. In this context, the starting point for planners and decision makers alike must be an understanding of the comparative advantages of organisations in relation to sectors and functions.

### *Characteristics / advantages of the development approach*

There is no single development approach to achieving rule of law through reforming, strengthening and building oversight capacities for the security sector, although guiding principles for international development efforts, which recommend local ownership and a holistic approach, have been agreed by OECD/DAC.<sup>27</sup> Although most development actors subscribe to these principles, in practice they are often compromised and few have the capacity or means to engage in every aspect of reform. Moreover, there are still broad variations among donors about the relative utility of targeted SSR actions. While some EU member states have long pioneered

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25 For example, through the work of the UN Development Group and the UN Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs Transitions Working Group and through joint UN IFI assessment missions in Haiti, Iraq and Liberia.

26 For example, DPKO remains largely absent from the joint planning processes mentioned above, while integrated mission planning processes still struggle to deliver effective coordination. See Espen Barth Eide et al., op. cit.

27 See *Security System Reform and Governance, Policy and Practice*, 2004, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris, OECD.

development approaches to SSR—for example, the United Kingdom—others support very few activities in this area. Even UNDP does not claim to work on all civilian dimensions of SSR, but rather focuses on judicial reform and capacity-building, providing local access to justice, supporting the police, developing community policing and promoting parliamentary oversight.<sup>28</sup> It is beyond the scope of this report to comprehensively review development activities in this area. Rather, this section seeks to identify a few defining characteristics of the development approach, namely its long-term, holistic and consultative nature, with a view to highlighting some common challenges and key differences with the crisis management ESDP approach.

First, the development approach's principle aim is *poverty reduction*. It has been increasingly recognised that development is impossible without security and, therefore, that development actors must support countries to improve security and justice for their populations. The development approach, thus, tends to prioritise reforms and programmes that address issues with the strongest correlation with improving development outcomes.

Second, the development approach is *long term*. This is based on the premise that structural changes and capacity-building are essentially long-term processes. Programmes reflect this, usually with three-year and sometimes up to seven-year plans. In the context of countries emerging from conflict, this is a particular strength since a critical time is often two to five years after the conflict, when economic absorptive capacity may be growing, but donor support—including crisis management/peacekeeping engagements—may be falling. In comparison, while a crisis management (such as ESDP) approach is not necessarily short term (many operations may run for a number of years), intrinsic to their planning is the assumption that they have objectives that are achievable in the short to medium term and a clear exit strategy. Indeed, institutional reform and capacity-building in the context of crisis management tends to be dominated by short timelines, and the ability of development actors and programmes to continue the work often forms a major part of the exit strategy.

Third, the development approach aims to be *holistic*. While it may also deliver focused and targeted smaller actions, the planning of these actions is invariably done in the context of a far broader framework and strategic plan, attempting to capture all the relevant aspects of a particular sector or issue. For example, in the context of supporting security and justice sector reform, the planning of a programme will involve analysing the whole of the security and justice sector—police, prisons,

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<sup>28</sup> This list of UNDP activities was given in a presentation by Kelvin Ong, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, at a seminar on EU-UN Cooperation in Security Sector Reform in Brussels on 28 June 2006.

judiciary, court administration, border security, armed forces, and sometimes secret or intelligence services with the aim of identifying the relationships between the elements and the most effective entry points for reforming the whole system. Increasingly, donor governments are trying to improve implementation of this holistic approach through “whole of government” approaches involving defence and diplomatic as well as development personnel. The multifaceted nature of tasks is also reflected in the planning tools. Rather than planning a mission with a core tangible objective and a mission plan or CONOPS detailing how it should be achieved, development practitioners tend to work with planning matrices, which graphically demonstrate the (intended) link between various actions or projects to programming and strategic objectives. This approach cannot be restricted to state actors since in many countries the provision of security is rarely monopolised by the state, particularly in failed state or post-conflict situations where typically up to 80% of security “services” are provided by non-state actors, including militias and private security companies<sup>29</sup> and traditional security services, including the police and army, are—at best—viewed by the local populations with deep distrust.

Finally, the development approach emphasises *consultation* and *ownership*. Local “ownership” is built into both development and crisis management approaches to rule of law and security institutional capacity-building, but this is subject to different interpretations in practice. While crisis management operations require local buy-in in the sense that the host government formally invites or agrees to the mission, their role in planning tends to be limited, with the concomitant danger that the action does not have sufficient local buy-in to be sustainable. In contrast, considerations of sustainability are central to the development approach and issues of ownership and partnership are still subject to lively debate informed by various lessons learned processes. Typically, however, the development of strategic plans involves elaborate consultative processes with partner governments. In the EU context, for example, this is foreseen in the Cotonou agreement between the EU and African Caribbean and Pacific regions and, consequently, all EC Country Strategy Papers that establish programming priorities are agreed jointly with partner governments. However, the focus on partnership with governmental actors has a constraining effect with regard to development work in support of good governance, democratisation and human rights. Most host governments prefer traditional development assistance that focuses on economic development, with only a relatively small percentage of EC development assistance (less than 10%) dedicated to governance-related activities. In recognition of these limitations, the EC has stressed that partners should consult local stakeholders (Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement) and has developed budget

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29 Ibid.



lines—for example, the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights—with procedures that do not require host government consent. However, independent evaluations have shown that both have fallen short of expectations.<sup>30</sup>

More generally, the development community has a long and painful history of exploring how best to achieve local ownership through development activities. Indeed, having experienced poor results when timelines and objectives were externally imposed on reform programmes, development agencies have increasingly chosen to support recipient countries' own policies and strategies rather than impose their own. This challenge is particularly acute in failing or post-conflict states where a dysfunctional government and the security sector, in particular, is invariably at the heart of the conflict and a primary inhibitor of the success of crisis management interventions, reform objectives and development activities. In this context, the immediate security imperative of establishing security institutions as soon as possible often clashes with the development imperative of establishing constitutional and institutional arrangements in accordance with multistakeholder consultative processes as soon as feasible. Indeed, finding the right balance between long-term strategic planning, involving extensive consultation, and the capacity for rapid action in response to urgent needs is arguably the central challenge for the overall peace-building effort.

### *Operational relationships with NGOs and civil society*

Although some attempts are made by development actors to involve local stakeholders, including local civil society, in strategic planning processes as noted above, donor planning processes are also informed to a degree by input from international NGOs with relevant experience. These organisations are also often tasked with undertaking studies or contributing to situation assessments with a view to informing sector specific programming. In the area of rule of law, for example, the International Centre for Transitional Justice and the International Legal Assistance Consortium routinely provide legal assessment services. Others may be recruited to provide country-specific advice on the mainstreaming of human rights, gender and conflict sensitivity into development programming.

Furthermore, unlike the civilian crisis management sector, the development donor community has far more experience in working directly with international and

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30 Saferworld's activities in support of civil society dialogue with government in the context of the implementation of Article 11 of Cotonou found that local civil society actors were not aware of these treaty provisions and were not consulted by their governments in accordance with them. Similarly, an independent study commissioned by the European Parliament on the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights projects found that, in practice, host government consent was required if these projects were to be successful. See R. Youngs et al., 2005, *No Lasting Peace and Prosperity without Democracy and Human Rights: Harnessing debates on the EU's Future Financial Instruments*, independent study, July Brussels, European Parliament.

local NGOs as partners in the delivery of programmes and projects. Unlike other sectors such as education or health, however, NGOs are rarely supported to deliver core services as the provision of security services is the responsibility of the state. However, NGOs can perform important functions in supporting reform programmes and building capacity at the national and local levels, and providing technical assistance in addition to that provided directly by donors.

For example, in Kenya, a range of international and local NGOs are involved in helping the Kenyan police to develop strategic plans and pilot and expand community-based policing initiatives<sup>31</sup>—all aimed at encouraging police to be more responsive to the needs of local communities. With EU funding, UK-based peace-building NGO Saferworld and local partners have supported community safety projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.<sup>32</sup> Similarly, specialist NGOs have relevant expertise in developing the justice sector at the community level. For example, in 2003, a UN assessment mission found that the judicial system in Bunia, in Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, had entirely collapsed. With French government and EC support, a project was launched to rapidly rebuild minimal judicial capacity. This was undertaken by the Belgian NGO Réseau de Citoyens Network, and within a few months the Bunia judicial system started functioning. A year later, 440 cases were under investigation and 42 judgements had been rendered.<sup>33</sup>

Few doubt that the NGO sector enjoys comparative strength and expertise in relation to building capacity at the community level. International NGOs working with local partners are often involved in projects to raise awareness and capacity of local civil society and parliamentarians to perform oversight or “watchdog” functions, to improve access to justice and to develop community policing and safety, including through international accompaniment activities that serve as a civilian protection tool. This expertise resides in a relatively small sector of the international NGO community, however, and has been developed to address the fact that local civil society capacity, particularly in failing or post-conflict states, is often weak and/or not engaged in the politics of security.

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31 See <[www.saferworld.org.uk/en/community\\_policing\\_kenya.html](http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/community_policing_kenya.html)>.

32 See <[www.saferworld.org.uk/en/see\\_community\\_safety.html](http://www.saferworld.org.uk/en/see_community_safety.html)>.

33 See F. Borello, 2004, *A first Few Steps: the Long Road to a Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Occasional Paper series, October, New York, International Center for Transitional Justice, p. 46.

In Kosovo, for example, despite the proliferation of NGOs since the end of hostilities<sup>34</sup> and the large sums of money that have been poured into the civil society sector<sup>35</sup>, defence, police and intelligence activities remain almost unobserved and there is no tradition of public scrutiny or engagement in security policy<sup>36</sup>. There are, however, a couple of positive exceptions. In the justice sector, the Judicial Services Monitoring Programme<sup>37</sup> provides important public scrutiny functions. Similarly, recent initiatives to create local community safety councils<sup>38</sup> have helped build trust between local communities and the police and generate public interest in local governance and safety issues. An example is the project implemented by Saferworld with the local partner organisation Forum for Civic Initiative in the Kosovar village of Germova.<sup>39</sup> Some judge that “had these Councils been in existence from an early stage many public security lapses, such as the March 2004 riots, could have been prevented”<sup>40</sup>. In other countries, a number of peace-building NGOs conduct similar work to improve local capacity to engage in local governance and security issues. These include Search for Common Ground, International Alert, Saferworld, Nonviolent Peaceforce, Civil Peace Service, and Peace Brigades International, to name but a few.

In addition to this, think-tanks and NGOs are also involved in developing best practices on various aspects of peace-building, security and justice sector reform in the development context, either for their own advocacy and project purposes or on behalf of donors as part of OECD/DAC and other lesson-learning processes.

### *Conclusions for ESDP*

In summary, the development approach to promoting reform and building capacity of the civilian security sector is multifaceted. At the strategic level, it often includes political dialogue and consultations with other stakeholders and NGOs in the context

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34 According to the United States Agency for International Development NGO Sustainability Index 2004, there are currently between 2,000 and 2,500 registered NGOs, of which 10% are routinely active.

35 The NGO sector operating in Kosovo between 2002 and 2002 received 809 million euros. See B. Pula, 2005, *A Changing Society, a Changing Civil society: Kosovo's NGO Sector after the War*, second edition, Pristina, KIPRED, p. 12.

36 This is noted in: Ilir Dugolli and Lulzim Peci, 2005, *Enhancing Civilian Management and Oversight of the Security Sector in Kosovo*, November, London, Saferworld and Pristina, KIPRED; and Edward Rees, op. cit.

37 See <[www.jsmp.minihub.org](http://www.jsmp.minihub.org)>.

38 These were initially funded by the UK Department for International Development and later the UN Mission in Kosovo took on some responsibility for the guidance of these groups. See Edward Rees, op. cit., p. 22.

39 See D. Helly and S. Rynn, 2006, *Community Safety in Kosovo: Lessons Learned*, *European Security Review*, Issue 29, June, at <[www.isis-europe.org](http://www.isis-europe.org)>.

40 See Edward Rees, op. cit., p. 22.

of planning and programming. Activities increasingly include direct support to governments as well as the provision of technical expertise to build institutional capacity. Unlike ESDP civilian actions, efforts to strengthen central government institutions are also complemented by actions directed at building state and civil society capacity at the local level and elements of the programmes are often outsourced to NGOs.

The planning and conduct of civilian ESDP missions follows a different, more military-style approach. Nevertheless, given that ESDP actions will typically form only a part of the international effort and that ESDP resources are limited, it is critical that ESDP planners have the information and resources to ensure that ESDP actions add value and that efforts to design complementary and or follow-up development actions are set in motion as early as possible. Thus, ESDP missions should have sufficient expertise and capacity to identify key international and local partners, to engage with them at the appropriate level and format and to link this exchange with the process of designing flanking and follow-on action—particularly by the EC and EU member states—and, ideally, in accordance with country or regional strategic plans for SSR informed by comprehensive needs assessments, including input from NGOs. In addition, at the operational level, ESDP missions might benefit from closer engagement with other international actors as well as NGO or civil society actors, in view of the relative expertise that NGO actors have in generating local civil society engagement in and support for judicial and security reform processes.

## 5. The added value of civil society engagement

It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive overview of the diverse roles that civil society actors play in broader conflict transformation and peace-building processes. Such a mapping exercise was recently undertaken by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, and is presented in the report entitled “Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War and Building Peace”<sup>41</sup>, which divides civil society roles and functions into 34 categories that cover the broad spectrum of engagement in early warning, prevention, mediation, monitoring, civilian peacekeeping and reconciliation<sup>42</sup>. Similarly, in relation to the specific objectives of promoting SSR in Kosovo, a recent Saferworld/Kosovo Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) report<sup>43</sup> identifies a range of roles that local civil society can play. These include:

- acting as a counterweight to the power of the state and authoritarianism;
- monitoring and encouraging respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- disseminating independent analysis and information on security issues;
- putting security issues on the political agenda;
- contributing to parliamentary competence and capacity-building;
- giving alternative expert perspectives on security policy, budgets and procurement; and
- fostering public debate.

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41 Catherine Barnes, 2006, *Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing war and Building Peace*, August, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Hague.

42 The report gives descriptions and illustrative examples of the following civil society roles and functions: waging conflict constructively; mobilising for change: enacting the power of resistance; systematic prevention: movements addressing the root causes of conflict; power to reframe and change perceptions; bearing witness: the power to expose; generating empathy and shifting conflict attitudes; envisioning a better future: power to identify, analyse and propose; developing a vision; defining the peace agenda; shaping peace policy; mobilising constituencies for peace; international solidarity: mobilising a global response; power to reduce violence and promote stability; power to alert and to act: early warning and early response; crisis response, de-escalating tensions, creating oasis of stability; civilian monitoring; inter-positioning, accompaniment and civilian peacekeeping; making peace: helping to reach an agreement; back-channel communications between opponents; unofficial dialogue processes; pressure for peace; mediation/facilitation of peace negotiations; direct participation in peace negotiations; pragmatic peace: power to build peace in communities; community-based responses to conflict; localised peace agreements; transformation: creating peaceable and just relationships and structures; demilitarising minds and healing psyches; reconciliation; addressing the consequences of conflict; addressing root causes locally; power to change cultures and priorities; promoting tolerance and transforming stereotypes; and learning to work with conflict constructively.

43 Ilir Dugolli and Lulzim Peci, op. cit.

While civil society roles and the actors performing them are numerous and diverse, they typically share a common approach that is community-based or “bottom-up”. It follows that CSOs often have unique access to the “ground truth” and are well placed to monitor and potentially mobilise public support. Thus, CSOs are both important local actors and potentially local partners for the EU in regions affected by conflict. This section outlines some of the principal areas in which engagement with civil society could add value to civilian ESDP by harnessing local knowledge and developing mission visibility and outreach. Moreover, cooperation with specialist NGOs that have relevant expertise in the areas of police, rule of law and monitoring as well as SSR and DDR could also include cooperation in the identification of “best practices” and the development of operational guidelines as well as cooperation in planning, where civil society actions precede, complement or follow on from ESDP missions. Finally, training and recruitment are identified as areas in which CSOs have relevant capacities and expertise, which could be usefully harnessed to strengthen civilian ESDP capabilities.

## *Situation assessment and early warning*

### *Better linkage with civil society groups can provide added value in assessing local ground truth*

Civil society actors are important sources of local knowledge. Impartial and accurate early warning analysis and needs assessments require comprehensive and inclusive approaches to gathering information on the ground. This should ideally include the perspectives of all stakeholders as well as international CSOs that are present and well placed to monitor developments on the ground.

Some international NGOs with a local presence specialise in reporting developments on the ground; well-known examples include the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Others, such as FAST International, have pioneered comprehensive early warning methodologies based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches to data analysis.<sup>44</sup> While these international NGO services provide valuable public monitoring, reporting and analysis functions,

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44 FAST International is a project of Swiss Peace based in Bern, Switzerland. It provides early warning analysis on 20 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. The centrepiece of FAST’s methodology is based on a collection of single cooperative and conflictive events. These events are collected by local staff and entered into a web-based software tool through a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. For each country/region monitored, unique sets of data are collected by FAST’s own local information networks. This is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing a constant influx of information. The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators, developed within the IDEA framework. As even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST’s qualitative data analysis is carried out in collaboration with internationally renowned country experts. See <[www.swisspeace.org/fast/products.htm](http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/products.htm)> for more information.

they are not generally tailored to the needs of ESDP missions. Moreover, they do not capture much of the information that is held in international NGOs and local civil society groups that choose not to produce public reports of relevant developments for fear that this would compromise their access to affected populations or jeopardise their safety. This is the case for humanitarian as well as many specialist peace-building NGOs, including, for example, Search for Common Ground<sup>45</sup> and International Alert<sup>46</sup>. It is, therefore, not possible for the EU to tap the full knowledge potential of civil society only by refining its open source monitoring capacities and/or partnering with organisations that specialise in early warning.

## *Fact-finding missions*

### *Cooperation with civil society groups can benefit the preparation and conduct of EU fact-finding missions*

The PSC authorises fact-finding missions to contribute to the assessment process, including by identifying the underlying causes and dynamics of the crisis as well as key actors. However, the exposure that fact-finding teams have to local civil society actors and perspectives typically is limited. This is perhaps because ESDP fact-finding and pre-planning missions encounter practical constraints, including short timelines and the challenge of identifying and arranging meetings with relevant and legitimate civil society actors. Structured cooperation with international partners and NGOs could help address these challenges by recommending relevant actors/groups for fact-finding teams to meet with.

Moreover, the EU Comprehensive Planning Concept notes that fact finding “usually requires access to subject matter experts. For example: national authorities and experts in governance, justice, development, security, DDR and SSR.”<sup>47</sup> Many experts in these fields with relevant local knowledge are employed outside the EU and member state government structures, but ESDP has limited access to them and in any

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45 Search for Common Ground works with local partners to find culturally appropriate means to strengthen societies’ capacity to deal with conflicts constructively. Of its 15 country or regional programmes, 10 use media, whether by producing radio and television programmes (for example, radio soap operas and children’s TV series) or working with journalists (for example, Common Ground news services and Common Ground media training). See <[www.sfcg.org](http://www.sfcg.org)> for more information.

46 International Alert works in seven regions to build sustainable peace in areas threatened or affected by violent conflict. Some of its various activities include: strengthening capacities for conflict analysis and resolution by working with CSOs, women, analysts and parliamentarians; building trust and re-establishing relationships between communities affected by conflict through dialogue, joint projects and reconciliation or rehabilitation efforts; promoting good governance through creating awareness of peace accords, accountability and fair elections; and supporting research, analysis and advocacy on conflict-related issues by local actors (for example, analysts and women). See <[www.international-alert.org](http://www.international-alert.org)> for more information.

47 EU Comprehensive Planning Concept, Brussels, Council of the European Union, p. 7.

case typically relies on in-house personnel for its fact-finding missions. Enhanced cooperation with the European Commission and NGOs directly could help identify potential candidates with suitable expertise for inclusion in fact-finding teams.

## *Strategic planning*

### *External experts with specialist and/or local expertise can provide valuable contributions to pre-planning and mission planning*

While modalities for cooperation with other international organisations, notably the United Nations and NATO, have or are being developed, there have been no formal developments with regard to the modalities of EU-civil society cooperation since the Crisis Management Procedures were agreed in 2003. Systematising strategic-level dialogue plays an important enabling function, however, since structures for routine dialogue can serve as a forest in which trees of particular operational significance can be nurtured and hidden.

To date, strategic-level dialogue has been ad hoc and limited to very few NGOs, notably those with direct access to the highest levels of ESDP decision making—that is, the CMI under the leadership of Ahtisaari. Cooperation in the preparation of the AMM set a new precedent of close operational cooperation at a strategic level between the CMI and the ESDP planning and decision-making structures, which led to a CMI representative being directly involved in the TAM and the development of a draft CONOPS. The inclusion of an NGO expert in the pre-planning team was problematic in practice, however, and required that normal security, insurance and financial procedures be modified on a pragmatic basis. Thus, the case of Aceh demonstrates that cooperation with specialist NGOs can provide valuable contributions to ESDP mission planning, but it also reveals some practical obstacles to the inclusion of external experts in EU planning teams. More importantly, perhaps, are the conclusions to be drawn from the top-down nature of strategic-level cooperation. Arguably, without the personal authority and leadership of Ahtisaari, the European Commission-supported mediation action may never have been brought to the attention of ESDP decision makers and planners since modalities for “bottom-up” information exchange between civil society and relevant ESDP bodies’ decision makers are undeveloped.

While there can be no substitute for personal authority and leadership as demonstrated by Ahtisaari, the Aceh case can be taken to support the argument for a more systematic approach to information exchange between ESDP and civil society in order to provide entry points and reveal opportunities for useful operational cooperation even in the absence of high profile advocacy. Moreover, the development



of efficient mechanisms for feeding in information from civil society would be in line with the EU's ambitions to move toward more comprehensive planning and could, to this end, be developed in cooperation with the European Commission.

## *Mission implementation*

### *Cooperation with local actors can help improve mission visibility and sustainability*

Local CSOs often form some of the few remnants of social networks in post-conflict situations and are uniquely equipped to monitor and to mobilise popular support. As such, local CSOs can provide a valuable link between the ESDP mission and the local populations. Operational-level outreach can help ensure that the mission is well informed of popular concerns or misperceptions. Dialogue can help provide reassurance to local communities about the mission, play a key role in public outreach and information strategies and help generate popular support. While military operations are well aware of the role that structured CIMIC plays in addressing the “hearts and minds” of the host population with a view to improving public support and operational efficacy, civilian missions have yet to exploit the potential of structured outreach and/or informal dialogue with civil society actors for enhancing the visibility and popular support of the mission.

Moreover, when ESDP missions end, top down pressure from the EU must be replaced by local pressure for reform and effective implementation. Given that civilian missions are often associated with state-building—notably of the police and justice sector—public information and support is also essential for generating local political support for the long-term capacity-building and reform processes. Cooperation with civil society has the potential to help build local awareness, generate confidence in nascent state structures, foster a culture of popular scrutiny and ultimately lay the foundations for a sustainable reform and state-building process.

The modalities as well as the substance of this dialogue are important. The substance should help spread awareness of mission objectives, international standards and milestones, whereas the form of cooperation can serve as a model for public-private partnerships and participatory approaches to (good) governance. EU missions must lead by example. Just as the gender balance of missions has an impact on host populations' perceptions of gender roles, the seriousness with which an EU mission engages in civil society dialogue shapes the perceptions—within the government and in the population at large—of the utility and legitimacy of public accountability.

While enhanced ESDP-civil society cooperation is, therefore, an important element of the mission “exit” strategy, it should not be activated late in the mission nor in a marginal way. Rather, to be effective, it should also form part of the mission entry strategy, standard operating procedures and, potentially, operational plan.

## *Evaluation and lessons learning*

### *Civil society actors and NGOs can provide a valuable role in surveying local opinion, and providing independent evaluations of the impact of EU action*

Civilian ESDP is still a toddler—conceived of six years ago, born in operational terms in 2003 and currently in a rapid phase of growth and development. It is, therefore, necessary and entirely normal that its learning curve is a steep one. It is also understandable that, to date, it has learned primarily by doing and reflecting internally upon what was done judged against mission objectives. As ESDP matures, there is arguably room for expanding this process in line with EU ambitions to adopt a more comprehensive approach to planning. This would require further inter-pillar cooperation in assessing the overall coherence and effectiveness of the combined first and second pillar efforts. In line with international best practices, comprehensive reviews should be effects-based and examine the short and longer-term impact of EU interventions.

While the lessons-learned process may well remain an internal one, to be comprehensive it will need to include and assess feedback from key EU partners, the host government and host populations. Civil society actors have relevant expertise and access and could provide a valuable role in surveying local opinion and providing independent evaluations. These could be focused, dealing specifically, for example, with the efficacy of mission interaction with local civil society, or seeking to evaluate the overall coherence and impact of EU action.

## *Training*

### *Non-state actors, whether they are independent training institutes, individual trainers or experts with local knowledge can all play a role in ESDP training*

Training of civilians engaged in peace operations is typically weak compared with that received by the military. Indeed, a recent study of UN peace operations noted that “many civilians continue to arrive in dangerous mission areas with a minimal understanding of the political, environmental, and personal safety issues and are potential liabilities to mission effectiveness and the safety of themselves and their

colleagues”<sup>48</sup>. Likewise, as detailed in Section 2 above, a significant proportion of civilians deployed in EU missions have received no prior training. Duty of care and commitment to improving the professionalism of civilian interventions requires that the EU strive to improve its record in training of civilians. While training will likely remain dispersed, efforts are being made to identify minimum standards, align these with those of the United Nations and OSCE, improve the match between generic training and recruitment and work to ensure that all personnel receive pre-deployment and in-mission training. Non-state actors, whether they be independent training institutes, individual trainers or experts with local knowledge of the international and local actors in the field can all play a role, and there are a number of practical reasons for why and at which level they should do so.

With regard to the provision of foundation or *generic training* with a view to establishing pools of pre-trained experts, an important reason to draw on non-governmental resources is simply a quantitative one. Currently, combined national and EU-level training is not sufficient to cover the inevitably large pool of potential experts to be deployed. If EU member states are to expand their training capacity, it seems sensible to draw on established non-governmental capacity in this area, either in the form of individual trainers or NGOs offering relevant training services. Moreover, there are qualitative reasons for why national-level training centres, whether they are state sponsored or independent, should continue to play a central role in training for ESDP. Many of these centres provide training services for other international organisations and NGOs and have a history of working together (through the EGT). They have often worked on establishing common training curricula that are compatible with those of other international organisations, and often also engage in research aimed at ensuring that the content and form of training is appropriate to current conditions. For example, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the principal Swedish government training centre, played a key role in the international Challenges Project that resulted in a number of concrete recommendations on how the efficacy of peace operations (with special attention given to their role in rule of law capacity-building) could be enhanced through better training aimed at, inter alia, enhancing the capacity of missions work with or alongside other key international and local actors.<sup>49</sup> In short, national training institutes—both government run and independent—are also potential sources of knowledge that can usefully feed into ongoing ESDP reflections on how to develop training curricula and methodologies in line with contemporary mission needs.

Moreover, established networks of training institutes provide a geographically diverse reserve of experienced trainers and could be tasked with identifying

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48 The Challenges Project, op. cit.

49 Ibid.

individuals or teams of trainers that might be mobilised at short notice to provide *pre-deployment training*. In addition, a number of NGOs provide training services relevant to their area of expertise. Indeed, many provide context-specific training to local actors and NGOs in the field. These NGOs could also be called upon to identify reliable candidates to provide *in-mission* briefings on local context and actors, as is common practice in many military operations, and/or training in other mission-specific skills including personal safety.

## **Recruitment**

### *Cooperation with relevant private or civil society actors can help member states expand their national pools with suitably qualified candidates*

Recruitment for ESDP missions is decentralised, conducted via contact points in member states. Many member states have developed pools or rosters of experts who are potentially available for deployment on ESDP missions in line with the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal, but only in relatively few cases these are populated with independent or non-governmental experts. Consequently, mission personnel tend to be civil servants, and current recruitment practices do not generally reach relevant experts that are employed in the private, NGO or academic sectors. Cooperation with relevant private or civil society actors can help member states expand their national pools with suitably qualified candidates. The German roster, managed by ZIF, is a model of how this can be done directly through targeted outreach and advertising strategies and open Internet-based application procedures; whereas the United Kingdom provides an example of a strategy of roster growth whereby the government roster also includes details of individual non-governmental experts provided by non-governmental sources. In this case, the PCRU database includes information on independent experts obtained from RedR-IHE (an NGO that specialises in the recruitment of aid workers) and PCRU is cooperating with local bar associations to identify legal experts in line with its “explore and exploit” approach to roster growth.<sup>50</sup> Thus, cooperation with relevant private sector associations and NGOs at the national level can help member states increase the size of their national expert pools to include suitable candidates from the private and NGO sectors.

Similarly, relevant professional or NGO networks or specialist recruitment organisations can also provide useful outreach functions for national recruitment efforts by informing their members of national contact points for ESDP recruitment. They can also potentially serve as a fallback recruitment service for member states or the Council Secretariat. For example, the Red-R IHE recruitment service is often

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<sup>50</sup> Catriona Gourlay, 2006, *Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations*, DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, February, New York, United Nations, at <[www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/)>.

used by international organisations, including agencies of the United Nations, when they encounter difficulties in filling very specialist skill combination vacancies, including in the areas of governance, rule of law and civil administration. These NGO services can help identify suitable and available candidates who then usually apply for the position via the normal channels.<sup>51</sup> Happily, civilian ESDP missions have not yet encountered such difficulties in filling civilian positions, but as the demand for personnel increases, consideration should be given to fallback options, including the use of specialist recruitment services or increased outreach through specialist NGOs.<sup>52</sup>

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51 For an overview of some relevant NGO services as well as national rosters, see the study mentioned in note 50.

52 A few relevant organisations here include the International Legal Assistance Consortium, a global NGO based in Sweden with 34 member organisations with experience in providing technical assistance in post-conflict situations and representing over three million judges, prosecutors, lawyers and legal academics worldwide (see <[www.ilac.se](http://www.ilac.se)>); the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, an NGO based in The Hague that specialises in, inter alia, collating information on peace-building NGOs and their activities and hosting events designed to foster NGO networking and advocacy (see <[www.conflict-prevention.net](http://www.conflict-prevention.net)>); and EPLO, a network of European NGOs based in Brussels active in peace-building, which plans to develop its database of NGO expertise (see <[www.eplo.org](http://www.eplo.org)>).

# 6. Recommendations

## *Strategic level: improving cooperation with Brussels-based decision makers and planners*

- Establish an EU-NGO peace-building advisory group tasked with:
  - promoting practical modalities of communication with regard to situation assessment, including the identification of contact points in relevant NGOs and the Council Secretariat;
  - conducting joint qualitative mapping of relevant NGO actors and their activities in common thematic and geographical areas of operation; and
  - establishing working groups to promote dialogue in relation to particular ESDP thematic or geographic areas.
- Establish civilian liaison officers within the Council Secretariat tasked with:
  - receiving and forwarding relevant information;
  - responding to questions and briefing external actors on ESDP information needs;
  - mapping NGO actors and activities in ESDP priority areas and relevant geographic regions;
  - identifying civil society individuals/groups that fact-finding and planning teams could meet with; and
  - liaising (in cooperation with field headquarters and the EC) with civil society actors and international organisations to identify which organisations might provide complementary roles in relation to mission outreach and follow-up.
- Provide for the inclusion of external experts in fact-finding or pre-planning missions by:
  - adopting interim procedures, whereby external experts with local knowledge or specialist expertise can be included as consultants in fact-finding or pre-planning missions at short notice, as was done in the preparation of the AMM;
  - developing the CRT concept to allow for individuals from the pool to be included in fact-finding and pre-planning teams; and
  - expanding the CRT pool to include external experts with regional/local and relevant thematic expertise.

## *Field level: improving capacities and modalities for cooperation on the ground*

- Develop a concept for cooperation with civil society and operational guidelines that would include, but not be limited to, the following points.
- Establish modalities for routine information exchange with relevant civilian agencies and civil society groups whereby:
  - these would link with established fora for civil society/NGO cooperation where possible; and
  - provision would be made for the establishment of Civilian Liaison Centres—attached to ESDP mission headquarters, offices of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) or EC delegations—where no established fora for NGO/civil agency dialogue exist.
- Establish civilian liaison officer positions. Applicants would need to have relevant field experience, project management experience, language skills and local knowledge of international community partners, NGOs and local civil society actors. Where normal recruitment procedures fail to attract suitable candidates, provisions should be made for the head of mission/EUSR to directly recruit these officers as external consultants. The tasks of civilian liaison officers would include:
  - external liaison functions (with relevant international organisations, international NGOs, and all local stakeholders);
  - internal liaison functions (with EC delegations and services, including for the purposes of identifying possible complementary or follow-on EC actions);
  - reporting functions including: routine reporting to the head of mission of information that is relevant for mission safety, outreach and the conduct of operational partnerships; routine reporting on the activities of relevant international organisations, NGOs and civil society actors also for use in EU civil society mapping exercises (if any); and final reporting and input into lessons learning—including feedback from international agencies and NGO actors on the implementation of the mission and an initial evaluation of the mission’s Civilian Liaison and Outreach functions; and
  - outreach functions including: representing the mission in fora for inter-agency and NGO/civil society information exchange; and developing and managing, in cooperation with mission leadership and the Council Secretariat, the mission public awareness campaign (see below).

- Provide for the development of public awareness campaigns. These would include, but not be limited to, the following elements:
  - regular bilateral meetings between mission leadership or the EUSR and senior civil society representatives to build trust and help communicate mission objectives;
  - cooperation with the local press and broadcast media in line with mission communication strategies; and
  - developing outreach projects with civil society partners, which might include seed funding for seminars, road shows, radio soap operas, poster campaigns, comic strips, etc., where implementing partners might include academic institutions, private companies (TV and radio), NGOs and civil society groups with complementary interests and relevant expertise.

### *Mission evaluation / lessons learning*

- Expand the mission evaluation process so as to draw on feedback from partners, local stakeholders and local populations by:
  - systematically consulting international organisations, international NGOs and local stakeholders in the preparation of mission evaluations (see civilian liaison officer reporting functions);
  - providing for missions to commission (through communications or outreach budget lines) surveys of public opinion;
  - devoting specific attention in ESDP mission evaluations to the modalities and effectiveness of cooperation, at headquarters and in the field, with external actors, including international NGOs and local civil society; and
  - supporting and cooperating with independent evaluations of the coherence and impact EU actions.

### *Training*

- Ensure that EU-level training addresses issues of cooperation with civilian actors in their foundation and pre-deployment training modules and as part of in-mission training, whereby relevant external actors, including NGOs, are invited to brief mission staff on their activities and the local context.
- Establish a database of trainers, drawing on all relevant national and independent organisations with relevant training expertise, for potential use by member states and/or EU bodies for generic, pre-deployment and in-mission training.



- Identify a pool of pre-selected trainers with the assistance of European training institutes. These trainers would comprise a subset of the above-mentioned database and could be mobilised at short notice in fly-away teams to provide pre-deployment or in-mission training.
- Encourage member states to develop mechanisms that link participation in EU-level training with deployment in ESDP missions.

## *Recruitment*

- Develop recruitment outreach, whereby a wider range of contact points in relevant national training institutes, specialist NGOs and recruitment agencies are sent calls for contributions with relevant national contact point information.
- Develop back-up arrangements for identifying suitable experts should normal procedures fail to do so, including through linkage with independent roster managers and specialist NGOs.
- Expand the use of directly contracted personnel to include specialist consultants who could be recruited directly by the head of mission on an ad hoc basis in response to specialist and urgent operational needs.
- Encourage member states to establish or develop rosters for deployment in ESDP missions that include experts from the private and/or NGO sector as well as civil servants.

# Acronyms

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMCO	civil-military coordination
CMCoord	civil-military coordination (UN term)
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CONOPS	concept of operations
Council	Council of the European Union
CRT	Civilian Response Team
CSO	civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EC	European Community
EGT	European Group on Training
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
IFI	international financial institution
IGO	international governmental organisation
IMP	Initial Monitoring Presence
KATU	Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network
KIPRED	Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCRU	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PRT	Provincial Response Teams
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SSR	security sector reform
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research



As contemporary conflicts become more complex and the number of organisations undertaking crisis management tasks multiplies, more coordination and coherence is needed in external actors' response. During the past years, the European Union (EU) has launched a number of missions that assist countries affected or threatened by conflict in developing democratic and effective security institutions. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) undertake a number of peacebuilding activities with similar objectives. These include technical assistance to governments as well as community-based actions that promote civil society engagement in and support for governmental reform processes. While the benefits of complementary EU and NGO action are increasingly recognised, modalities for promoting coherence have yet to be developed. To address this gap, this report considers how information sharing and cooperation between the EU civilian crisis management structures and NGOs could be improved at headquarters and in the field.

The report has been produced in the framework of the “Role of Civil Society in European Civilian Crisis Management” project launched by the Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network (KATU), the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in association with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

## *Partners Apart: Enhancing Cooperation between Civil Society and EU Civilian Crisis Management in the Framework of ESDP*

