I. Introduction

In December 2003, Member States agreed on the European Security Strategy (ESS), A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD. Wanting to take on more responsibility and to define its role in world politics, the EU has given itself a strategic framework for the further development and implementation of its foreign and security policy. In 2008, the European Union is poised to review the strategy. This EPLO policy paper is a contribution to the debate informing the review. Whereas the December 2007 Presidency Conclusions put a focus on the strategy's implementation, this paper primarily focuses on where we believe it is necessary to clarify, complement or review original positions in the context of the updating of the ESS. Our contribution is intended to open up discussion and is not intended to be a comprehensive or exhaustive commentary on the ESS.

II. EPLO Strategic Priorities and Recommendations

Europe needs a security strategy that recognizes that security is indivisible; that Europe and European people contribute to insecurity (as much as they might also contribute to security in other ways) and that the best contribution the EU could make is to lead by example: to take strong action on our contribution to global insecurity. The ESS should lay the foundation for a clear and coherent strategy for peacebuilding, crisis management and prevention, and post-war recovery drawing on the full spectrum of EU instruments and policies for an integrated security approach. Examples of this are (though this is not an exhaustive list):

On the applied security concept

1. Further clarification of the security concept applied in the strategy is needed. European Security should put the people and their needs at the centre. A revised version of the ESS should explicitly recognise that European citizens will not be secure until all members of world society are.
2. Rethinking of the exclusive focus on external threats is needed. The EU and its Member States should take a self-reflective approach to challenges and threats identified in the ESS, i.e. consider how their own policies and actions affect the security environment in Europe and beyond.

On non-state-actors and the role of civil society

3. A review of the ESS should acknowledge the important role of civil society as the basis of legitimate and democratic governance structures.
4. Civil society organisations’ expertise should be recognised and the need for dialogue, coordination and cooperation with them expressed, also to support the further development of operational capacities.

On the role of development and long-term preventive measures

5. A revised ESS should make a strong statement about giving priority to preventive measures, and explicitly recognise the potential of development policies and external aid programmes for contributing to an improved security environment.
6. Systematic use of conflict analysis methodology should become a common practice for all external action programming, including an explicit commitment to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in development to be included in the ESS.
7. The EU and Member States could increase its efforts to meet the OECD target of 0.7% of GDP for official development assistance. Exceeding this target would set a clear marker as to where the EU priority is.
On the ESS evaluation process

8. A procedure and methodology for a regular review and evaluation of the ESS needs to be introduced. European Parliament and national parliaments are to be involved in the evaluation procedure, and a programme should be set up to foster public debate about the ESS among European citizens.
9. The High Representative should respond to Parliament’s invitation to produce a White Paper on the ESS, including a stock-taking of all existing second and first pillar policies and instruments with the aim to identify their relation to strategic objectives and security environment.
10. A dialogue with relevant actors about the introduction of an action plan for the further implementation of the Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict should be introduced.

On new threats and their link to root causes of conflict

11. A clear logical and practical link between underlying root causes of conflict and identified threats needs to be established.
12. In line with a long-term, preventive approach to strategising security, the issues of poverty, violent conflict, human rights violations, climate change and gender based violence should be upgraded in a reviewed ESS, e.g. by introducing a second category of “global challenges impacting on European security”.

On the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

13. The EU should use its international role and weight to lead and promote a new WMD disarmament initiative while strengthening existing international treaty regimes and export control arrangements.

Regional Conflicts and State Failure

14. The EU’s approach to fragility and regional conflict needs to include thorough conflict analysis and should focus on the re-establishment of governance structures.
15. The participation of local civil society, and especially peace stakeholders and potential spoilers, in different phases of re-establishing good governance is essential for long-term success.
16. Regional peace-building strategies should be programmed in better coordination with regional organisations (AU, ASEAN, etc.) and UN agencies, including exchange of best practices.

On SALW and other conventional weapons

17. SALW should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “key threat” in the updated ESS.
18. The ESS should contain an explicit commitment to making the Code of Conduct on Arms Export binding and to drawing up further guidelines to limit the transfer of all categories of arms and their storage within the EU (including of arms stored on EU territory by non-EU states) in order to be a credible actor in peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict.
19. The EU should continue to engage in multilateral fora, such as the recent Dublin conference on Cluster Munitions, to agree and enforce international standards on limiting the spread of weapons with the potential to have disproportionate effects on civilian populations, and should push for the adoption of a global treaty on SALW.
**On climate change**

20. Climate change should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “global challenge impacting on European security” in the updated ESS.

21. The ESS should make reference to the proposals in the Commission-Council Joint Paper and make a political commitment to implement these proposals.

22. The ESS should recognise the effect the EU and Member States have on climate change and commit the EU to working towards a global agreement on climate change by 2009.

**On gender based violence**

23. Gender based violence, whether it is directed towards men, women or children, should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “global challenge impacting on European security” in the updated ESS.

24. The ESS should make reference to the proposals in the UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 and make a political commitment to implement these proposals.

**On addressing the threats OR Preventing Threats and Crisis?**

25. The title of the first strategic objective should be changed from “Addressing the Threats” to “Preventing Threats and Crisis”

26. The understanding of “strategic objectives” should to be clarified, and we suggest to do so by focusing on guiding principles, rather than a description of EU activities, initiatives and instruments. The definition or enumeration of the threats and challenges to be addressed by this strategy should be clearer and wider, including global challenges which impact on European security and the more immediate key threats.

27. The list of global challenges should include the root causes referred to in the ESS and gender based violence, gender based human rights abuses, climate change and global resource competition.

28. The list of key threats should be widened to include the proliferation of SALW.

**On Building Security in our Neighbourhood**

29. The contribution pillar one financial instruments ENPI, IPA and EIDHR give to building security in our neighbourhood needs to be made explicit in the ESS and should be included in further strategic thinking about how to achieve the second strategic objective.

30. A clearer link between strategic objectives and decisions for engagement (especially for ESDP missions) be established, as to make decisions more transparent to European citizens.

**On effective multilateralism**

31. The acquisition of a permanent EU seat on the UN Security Council should be introduced as a sub-objective under the strategic goal of “an international order based on effective multilateralism”. Together with other European Member States, France and the UK could use the EU framework to revive negotiations about an UN Security Council reform.

32. EU – UN partnership and cooperation in the fields of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding should be further enhanced, particularly through cooperation mechanisms with the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office. Reference to such cooperation under the strategic objectives section should foster its implementation.
III. General Remarks

Which concept of security?
A revised ESS should improve in clarity with regard to the security concept applied. Traditionally, security has been defined as “national security”, with the referent object being the state. Following this centuries-old model, the state provides security for its citizens or a nation inside its borders. The focus with national security was on the protection from/the defence against external threats, mostly expected to come from other state actors. Traditionally the principle instrument for defence and for achieving security has been the military.

The 21st century’s security environment, threat potentials, but also the instruments needed to address these issues are changing. The introductory lines of the ESS recognise that the process of European integration has produced unprecedented peace and stability in Europe. War between Member States has become impossible. In combination with globalisation processes, European integration itself is also transforming basic concepts of political order such as territoriality, nationality, sovereignty and citizenship. The ESS rightly states that “internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (p.2). Living conditions and events in other world regions can have direct or indirect impacts on the security of people living in Europe as much as EU policies and actions can create positive or negative repercussions for European security.

Consequently, we argue that:

- Further clarification of the security concept applied in the strategy is needed. European Security should put the people and their needs at the centre. A revised version of the ESS should explicitly recognise that European citizens will not be secure until all members of world society are.
- Rethinking of the exclusive focus on external threats is needed. The EU and its Member States should take a self-reflective approach to challenges and threats identified in the ESS, i.e. consider how their own policies and actions affect the security environment in Europe and beyond.

Non-state actors and the role of civil society
The ESS recognises the fact that the scope for non-state actors in world politics has increased (p.2). The access to means of creating major insecurity nowadays is relatively easy and not restricted to state actors.

Threats to security through terrorist groups and organised crime are, however, only one side of the coin. Over the last decades, non-state actors, civil society and non-governmental organisations have come to play an increasingly important role in overcoming violent conflict, in building sustainable peace, in development efforts and in the defence of human rights and the facilitation of transitions to democracy. Both the success of the EU's external policies and strong, legitimate and democratic governance structures depend on the active involvement of local civil society in third countries.

On the other hand, organised civil society from Europe (e.g. NGOs) has developed expertise in the above mentioned areas and contributes to the implementation and promotion of the EU's policies and humanistic values. We welcome that in recent years principles of partnership and dialogue have been integrated in EU policies and instruments, as for instance through the PSC’s Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention (2006) and the European Commission’s Peace-building Partnership (launched in 2007).
Still, as the 2003 ESS version dates from before these positive developments, there currently is no mentioning of civil society in the document. Consequently, we argue that:

- A review of the ESS should acknowledge the important role of civil society as the basis of legitimate and democratic governance structures.
- Civil society organisations' expertise should be recognised and the need for dialogue, coordination and cooperation with them expressed, also to support the further development of operational capacities.¹

**The role of development and long-term preventive measures**

With a combined total of over 55 billion euros of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2008² the EU and Member States are the biggest provider of development aid worldwide. Development policies and external aid programmes have a large potential for tackling root causes of conflict. They can help to prevent crises, and thus influence the European and global security environment. The linkage between security and stability on the one hand, and development and poverty reduction on the other has been acknowledged in the ESS (p.2) and other official EU documents such as the European Consensus on development.³ After the 2003 ESS version, the EU has reformed its financial instruments for external aid and strengthened the role of EC delegations, thereby establishing a closer connection with beneficiaries in target countries. However, the strategic role and potential impact development policies and programmes can have on improving the security environment is still underdeveloped in the ESS.

Also, the impact of development policies and programmes on conflict dynamics – both positive and negative impact – has not yet been translated into practical measures such as a systematic integration of conflict analysis into different stages of planning and programming. The Commission’s checklist for root-causes of conflict, developed in 2002, is a good starting point in this area, but more needs to be done to integrate a conflict sensitive approach into all levels of project design, implementation and assessment. The consistent implementation of a gender perspective is also lacking to a great extent.

Although the EU is the world’s largest donor it should also be borne in mind that overall expenditures on defence within the EU are more than four times higher than the total spending on development. Almost all EU states lag behind the OECD target of 0.7% of GDP for ODA and in 2008 progress towards reaching this target has actually deteriorated. Reaching the MDGs and the 0.7% target, as the Council has re-committed itself to do by 2015 in its conclusions of May 2008⁴, would undoubtedly pay dividends in the form of increased global security.

Moreover, since 2003 the OECD recognises as ODA-eligible expenditures the civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, an increase of investment by the EU and its Member States in this direction would clearly enhance the sustainability of the European Security Strategy through the availability of a wider range of policies aiming at stability.

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⁴ Council Conclusions: Speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, 26 and 27 May 2008.
Development goals are goals in their own right. Promoting the security of European citizens can not take precedence over the primary goal of poverty eradication under the EU’s development policy. The majority of EC aid should therefore be directed to LDCs and low-income countries. Improving policy coherence for development will enhance the active role that development cooperation can play to prevent violent conflicts.

Consequently, we argue that:

- A revised ESS should make a strong statement about giving priority to preventive measures, and explicitly recognise the potential of development policies and external aid programmes for contributing to an improved security environment.
- Systematic use of conflict analysis methodology should become a common practice for all external action programming, including an explicit commitment to mainstreaming conflict sensitivity in development to be included in the ESS.
- The EU and Member States could increase its efforts to meet the OECD target of 0.7% of GDP for official development assistance. Exceeding this target and especially increasing the investment in civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution would set a clear marker as to where the EU priority is. The ESS should strengthen these commitments and safeguard the integrity of development cooperation.

ESS evaluation process

While the ESS outlines a security environment, derives strategic objectives from it and translates these into policy implications, the strategy still lacks a clear and comprehensive procedure and methodology for evaluation, particularly with regard to its implementation. For this purpose, a stock-taking of existing policies and instruments would be useful, taking into account both pillar one and pillar two elements. On a similar line, the European Parliament recently invited the High Representative to assess in a White Paper the progress made. We support this proposal as such an exercise could mean a step towards better identifying how different EU policies and instruments relate to the strategic objectives and which influence specific EU policies and instruments can have on the security environment.

Where shortcomings in specific policy sub-areas have been identified we welcome the introduction of action plans, where possible with measurable benchmarks. For instance, the instrument of headline goals for capability development in the field of ESDP is an existing example that points in this direction. In the area of development co-operation the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide the basis for measuring development progress, backed up by periodic reviews and high level events, such as the upcoming one in New York in September 2008. The existence of such underlying strategies with measurable benchmarks and timelines for their achievement, facilitates the evaluation of progress made, and demonstrates the willingness to follow through on political commitments. As a platform of peace-building NGOs, we particularly invite the EU to enter into dialogue with relevant actors on establishing an action plan and evaluation mechanism to measure progress in the field of the prevention of violent conflict.

Both European Parliament and national parliaments should be involved in a regular (e.g. every two years) general review and evaluation process of the ESS, and the EU should foster broader debate among European citizens as well as consulting non-European stakeholders including civil society on a strategy of which they are the ultimate referent object.
Consequently, we argue that:

- A procedure and methodology for a regular review and evaluation of the ESS needs to be introduced. European Parliament and national parliaments are to be involved in the evaluation procedure, and a programme should be set up to foster public debate about the ESS among European citizens.
- The High Representative should respond to Parliament’s invitation to produce a White Paper on the ESS, including a stock-taking of all existing second and first pillar policies and instruments with the aim to identify their relation to strategic objectives and security environment.
- A dialogue with relevant actors about the introduction of an action plan for the further implementation of the Göteborg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict should be introduced.

IV. The Security Environment: Global Challenges and Key Threats

The ESS’ first section outlines a number of global challenges, among them competition for natural resources, poverty, diseases, migration and the interrelation between violent conflict and development prospects. At the centre of the strategy, however, are the five identified key threats: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

New threats and their link to root causes of conflict

We largely agree with the description of global challenges and identified threats. Still, we see the “new threats” as a function of the changing security environment. The ESS’ focus on countering threats does not sufficiently address the causes which are at the route of instability, conflict and crisis, i.e. poverty, inequality, injustice, lawlessness, alienation in a globalised world and environmental degradation.

From a long-term strategic perspective addressing these underlying root causes will effectively contribute to improved security for European citizens and people worldwide. We thus applaud the EU for recently having identified climate change as an international security issue. Similar importance needs to be given to poverty, violent conflict and human rights violations. In particular the EU needs to acknowledge the impact of gender based violence in society in general and during, before and after armed conflicts. One option of doing so might be to list these issues next to the identified threats as “global challenges impacting on European Security”, and to also translate these challenges into objectives with corresponding policy implications.

Consequently, we argue that:

- A clear logical and practical link between underlying root causes of conflict and identified threats needs to be established.
- In line with a long-term, preventive approach to security, the issues of poverty, violent conflict, human rights violations, climate change and gender based violence should be upgraded in a reviewed ESS, e.g. by introducing a second category of “global challenges impacting on European security”.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

We agree that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their proliferation have a serious threat potential for the security not only of European citizens but for people worldwide. In 2003 the EU has adopted a Strategy against the proliferation of WMD with the aim to reinforce the EU’s and Member States’ active contribution to multilateral efforts in this field. In addition, the new first pillar Instrument for Nuclear Safety practically contributes to the prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

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While we welcome the multilateral approach, a focus on prevention and efforts to resolve existing conflicts through diplomacy, dialogue, financial assistance and other civilian means, we point to the current focus on external threat perception on the one hand, and the potential of disarmament initiatives on the other. Several Member States and EU allies themselves possess WMD. The EU’s strategy against proliferation of WMD quotes the thinking we invite to further develop upon: “disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race.”6 The EU WMD non-proliferation policy framework could be used for an initiative where the EU leads the world by example with a commitment of Member States to dismantle their own WMD arsenals with clear disarmament targets. Another element of such an initiative could be an agreement that no WMD be stored on the territory of EU Member States, including US military bases.

Consequently, we argue that:

- The EU should use its international role and weight to lead and promote a new WMD disarmament initiative while strengthening existing international treaty regimes and export control arrangements.

**Regional Conflicts and State Failure**

The ESS recognizes the linkage between state failure and regional conflicts, and the fact that “a practical way of tackling new threats will sometimes be to deal with older problems of regional conflicts” (p. 4). Regional conflicts indeed often are contexts where weak state-level governance with no access to justice, endemic corruption, and lack of democratic participation becomes intertwined with long-term cross-border disputes over power, resources and historical issues. In such a setting conflicts easily spill over borders, creating vicious cycles of regional instability which lead to even more complex and intertwined conflict patterns.

State failure, or fragility, is both a consequence and a cause of the perpetuation of regional conflict factors. In many cases these factors need to be addressed with an integrative strategy and together with regional and international partners. The involvement of local civil society and stakeholders for peace in different phases of re-establishing good governance is an essential element for long-term success in any effort to address both issues.

Consequently, we argue that:

- The EU’s approach to fragility and regional conflict needs to include thorough conflict analysis and should focus on the re-establishment of governance structures.
- The participation of local civil society, and especially peace stakeholders and potential spoilers, in different phases of re-establishing good governance is essential for long-term success.
- Regional peace-building strategies should be programmed in better coordination with regional organisations (AU, ASEAN, etc.) and UN agencies, including exchange of best practices.

**SALW and other conventional weapons**

On a global scale small arms and light weapons (SALW) – sometimes also called the WMD of the poor - continue to be the weapons of choice in the vast majority of conflicts and terrorist attacks. Even prior to the drafting of the ESS the EU had started to take action in the area of conventional arms control with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998) which was followed up by the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW (2005). The EU was also active in the drafting

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and implementation of the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines (1998), and the signing of the recent international Treaty on Cluster Munitions (2008) shows that multilateral disarmament initiatives can be effective if there is political will and leadership.

However, serious shortcomings in the EU strategies risk undermining these efforts and fuelling, rather than lessening, armed conflicts in the world. Despite the fact that the Code of Conduct will celebrate its tenth anniversary in 2008 it is still not legally binding, and the EU Strategy on SALW is neither a programming document, nor is it linked to specific budget lines. In addition, a lack of standardised export criteria across the EU and an irresponsibly flexible use of the International Import Certificate means that SALW may be transferred through those Member States with less strict export controls, to third countries in conflict situations, including those in which the EU is considering launching ESDP missions.

Consequently, we argue that:

- SALW should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “key threat” in the updated ESS.
- The ESS should contain an explicit commitment to making the Code of Conduct on Arms Export binding and to drawing up further guidelines to limit the transfer of all categories of arms and their storage within the EU (including of arms stored on EU territory by non-EU states) in order to be a credible actor in peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict.
- The EU should continue to engage in multilateral fora, such as the recent Dublin conference on Cluster Munitions, to agree and enforce international standards on limiting the spread of weapons with the potential to have disproportionate effects on civilian populations, and should push for the adoption of a global treaty on SALW.

**Climate Change**

The links between climate change and international security are now almost universally acknowledged and it is likely the effects of conflicts fuelled by climate change will soon begin to be directly felt within the EU. The European Council recognised these linkages in June 2007, and in March 2008 a Joint Paper of the High Representative and the Commission outlined the wide-ranging and potentially massive implications of climate change for the EU and its security strategy. This paper made a number of positive suggestions to the Council on ways in which the EU could successful mitigate the effects of climate change on conflict. These include intensifying EU capacities for research, analysis, monitoring and early warning and watch lists; further building up EU and Member State planning and capabilities including civil protection; focusing attention on the security risks related to climate change in multilateral arenas and increasing international cooperation at all levels; and integrating climate change into EU regional and country strategies.

We welcome the EU’s creation of the Global Climate Change Alliance in 2007 to assist the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in tackling climate change and the ESS should make a high level political commitment to follow through on the commitments contained within this strategy. In addition to these important steps the ESS must also explicitly recognise the effect that the EU and Member States policies and behaviour have on climate change, and the EU should continue to show global leadership on this global threat by further reducing emissions and investing in energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy technologies.

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7 Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, 14 March 2008
Consequently, we argue that:

- Climate change should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “global challenge impacting on European security” in the updated ESS.
- The ESS should make reference to the proposals in the Commission-Council Joint Paper and make a political commitment to implement these proposals.
- The ESS should recognise the effect the EU and Member States have on climate change and commit the EU to working towards a global agreement on climate change by 2009.

**Gender based violence**

The links between gender equality and international security were officially acknowledged by the international community in 2000 when the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The resolution highlights the urgent need to increase women’s participation in building peace and the need for special protection for women and girls. To further underline the devastating effect of gender based violence in conflict the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1820 in June 2008 and demanded a complete halt to acts of sexual violence and stressed that such violence could significantly exacerbate conflicts and impede peace processes.

Human rights, gender equality and the linkages to democracy and sustainable development are at the core of various international instruments acknowledged by the EU Member States: from the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Millennium Development Goals, and UNSCR 1325 and 1820, as well as a number of European Parliament resolutions, Council conclusions and Commission communications.

Consequently, we argue that:

- Gender based violence, whether it is directed towards men, women or children, should be included as a distinct category and be listed as a “global challenge to European Security” in the updated ESS.
- The ESS should make reference to the proposals in the UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820 and make a political commitment to implement these proposals.

**V. Strategic Objectives**

Based on the challenges and threat analysis, the ESS’ second section sets out three objectives to defend the EU’s security and to promote its values: addressing the threats, building security in our neighbourhood, and an international order based on effective multilateralism.

**Addressing the Threats OR Preventing Threats and Crisis?**

The ESS names several useful guiding principles from which strategic thinking could be further developed, such as “think globally and act locally”, “restoring good governance, fostering democracy” through local capacity building and early “conflict prevention and threat prevention” which “cannot start early enough”.

We share this orientation towards prevention, early warning and early action, and therefore suggest changing the title of this first strategic objective into “Preventing

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Threats and Crisis”. This would add clarity in terms of strategic orientation and send a clear message as to where the EU’s priorities lie.

We believe that the concept of ‘key threats’ as outlined in the ESS is too narrow. Given the list of key threats included in the strategy, they are, in our view, at least in part symptoms of broader global challenges.

We would therefore welcome if the review took account of the fact that whilst there are immediate short term threats – and whilst we may not agree that the five highlighted in the ESS reflect an exhaustive list of these, we would not, in broad terms, disagree with the inclusion of these – but also a number of global challenges which impact the security situation.

We therefore believe that it is important that the review incorporates this understanding by identifying these global challenges (we would argue these to be most of the items listed under root causes whilst specifically adding gender based violence, gender based human rights abuses, climate change and global resource competition to these), alongside the list of immediate threats.

In terms of the latter, we also believe that the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (including their manufacture, sale, export, and use) should be added to the immediate key threats. Far more people in the world are killed or maimed by the use of SALW than by WMD.

Consequently, we argue that:

- The title of the first strategic objective should be changed from “Addressing the Threats” to “Preventing Threats and Crises”
- The understanding of “strategic objectives” should be clarified, and we suggest doing so by focusing on guiding principles, rather than a description of EU activities, initiatives and instruments
- The definition or enumeration of the threats and challenges to be addressed by this strategy should be clearer and wider, including global challenges which impact on European security and the more immediate key threats
- The list of global challenges should include the root causes referred to in the ESS and gender based violence, gender based human rights abuses, climate change and global resource competition
- The list of key threats should be widened to include the proliferation of SALW.

**Building Security in our Neighbourhood**

The ESS, in this section and elsewhere, recognises and acknowledges the fact that in a globalised world security is a global concern. However, this section then goes on to set out why the geographical area referred to as ‘neighbourhood’ is more important to European security than other parts of the world.

We believe that security is indivisible; insecurity and injustice anywhere in the world will lead to insecurity and injustice everywhere. We therefore fundamentally believe that the ESS review should reflect the importance of security, stability, and justice everywhere.

To that end, the impact of EU policies beyond the ‘neighbourhood’ are as important and should be as conscious of their impact on conflict, their conflict prevention potential and their contribution to a safer and better world. This, we believe, needs to be reflected in the review.
Despite this, we would make the following comments on the specific content of this section.

The 2003 ESS’ second strategic objective outlined geographic priorities for EU engagement, focusing on the European neighbourhood and particularly on nearby areas affected by violent conflict and instability (i.e. the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus, and the Middle East).

Since then the EU has successfully introduced its European Neighbourhood Policy and contributed to stability in the Western Balkans and Turkey by providing the perspective of EU accession. The first pillar financial instruments for pre-accession (IPA) and assistance to the European Neighbourhood (ENPI) as well as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) massively contribute to stabilizing and developing regions geographically close to the EU, but the strategic role of these external financial instruments to an improved security environment is currently not sufficiently recognized.

Also for second pillar ESDP the outlined geographic priority has been largely followed with crisis management missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Ukraine/Moldova, Georgia and Palestine. However, the connection between second pillar mission engagement and this strategic objective is not spelled out, thus making it difficult for European citizens to understand which criteria Member States and Council follow for decisions about where and when to engage.

Consequently, we argue that:

- The contribution pillar one financial instruments ENPI, IPA and EIDHR give to building security in our neighbourhood needs to be made explicit in the ESS and should be included in further strategic thinking about how to achieve the second strategic objective.
- A clearer link between strategic objectives and decisions for engagement (especially for ESDP missions) be established, as to make decisions more transparent to European citizens.

**Effective Multilateralism**

We welcome the ESS statements on commitment to multilateralism, International Law and to the further development of international society. We also share the view that the United Nations Charter should be the fundamental framework of international relations, and thus focus specifically on EU – UN partnership and cooperation.

Generally, the EU should focus on making international society more effective and contribute actively to developing regional integration in other world regions. In this regard a revised ESS could introduce as a sub-objective a permanent seat of the EU in the UN Security Council (UNSC). Substituting the UK or France with a permanent EU seat, such a move could then be used to signal to African states that after internal agreement they could acquire a permanent seat through the African Union (AU), and the second of European World War II victors would cede its seat to the AU. This way a permanent EU seat would not only help to overcome an anachronistic world governance structure, but it would also be a major step to demonstrate that the EU is actively engaged in helping to establish a more equal world order.

In the field of peace-building and crisis prevention partnership and cooperation between the EU and the UN could be further enhanced. For instance, the EU could include in its strategy how to practically contribute to civilian components of UN peacekeeping missions based on its growing capabilities and expertise in civilian crisis management. Furthermore, the revised strategy should make explicit the collaboration...
between EU activity and the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the other UN agencies having peacebuilding and crisis prevention programmes, such as UNDP and others. Again, by establishing stronger partnership and cooperation with the UN in the fields of peacebuilding and civilian crisis management, the EU could show a leading role as an innovative world power.

Consequently, we argue that:

- The acquisition of a permanent EU seat on the UN Security Council should be introduced as a sub-objective under the strategic goal of “an international order based on effective multilateralism”. Together with other European Member States, France and the UK could use the EU framework to revive negotiations about a UN Security Council reform.
- EU – UN partnership and cooperation in the fields of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding should be further enhanced, particularly through cooperation mechanisms in civilian peacekeeping and with the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the other UN agencies having peacebuilding programmes. Reference to such cooperation under the strategic objectives section should foster its implementation.

VI. Policy implications for Europe

The final chapter of the 2003 ESS focuses on policy implications for Europe which is divided into the four sections “more active”, “more coherent”, “more capable” and “working with partners”.

Before commenting on this final section we want to remind of the following statement from the ESS’ “Strategic Objectives” section (p.7):

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations requiring multi-faceted responses and instruments.

We welcome and applaud this statement. It recognises clearly that there is an important role for civilian contributions to security. We invite the EU to further develop such differentiated thinking which takes into account the whole variety of instruments also for “policy implications”.

We suggest that this section be revised in light of our revisions in previous chapters and we have made our comments on these above.

More Active

The ESS identifies the need to improve the EU’s full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention “including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.” (p. 11)
We reiterate that a preventive approach should lie at the core of the ESS. Achieving greater security for European citizens through an improved global security environment implies that a revised ESS needs to emphasise long-term preventive measures, including pillar one instruments. Crisis management instruments and intervention are often necessary, but should be seen only as one element in the mixture of policies and instruments needed to counter today’s threats and security challenges. Crises should be prevented; only if that fails do they need to be managed.

We welcome that the ESS promotes support to the United Nations, but we deplore that it specifies this support only for short-term crisis management. More coherent efforts and UN cooperation are needed for the broader field of peacebuilding, i.e. the work needed not only to halt crisis, but to support conflict resolution and to develop functioning governance structures with conflict resilient societies.

**More Capable**

We support the further build-up of the EU’s institutional infrastructure and capabilities to prevent violent conflict as well as the pooling of Member States’ resources where this would lead to a more efficient approach. However, we deplore once more that in the current version of the ESS the emphasis in capability development seems to lie on intervention capabilities with a particular focus on military ones.

In fact, this seems to ignore the ESS’s own recognition that “in almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos” (p.12), not to mention the fact that a majority of ESDP missions are actually civilian in nature.

The EU should build on its civilian capabilities through structural changes aimed at ensuring greater coherence of policy, more financial and human resources, and increased investment in areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) where it has already had some success. Sufficient infrastructure should be put in place to enable rapidly deployable civilian support where and when needed and welcomed by the local population. This infrastructure should cover all the phases and the needs of a large-scale intervention, including the training, recruitment, planning, logistics and institutional learning.

The support and funding of initiatives for Civil Peace Services (where peacebuilding experts from civil society organisations provide support to civil society actors in conflict areas), the development of civilian peacekeeping capacities, and the support for civil society engagement (especially in conflict areas but also in the strategic and policy debate) are elements which could further strengthen the EU’s capabilities for peacebuilding.

**Policy Coherence**

The question of coherence between EU policies and in particular in relation to development policies is an important aspect of further developing a people-centred approach to European security. The ESS should include a requirement that all EU policies (both external and internal) are assessed in terms of the impact they are likely to have on developing countries (both generally and specifically). Whilst the Policy Coherence for Development programme addresses this concern to a certain extent, this is only the first step and could be improved in terms of methodology.
The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office — EPLO

EPLO is the platform of European NGOs, networks of NGOs and think tanks active in the field of peacebuilding, who share an interest in promoting sustainable peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the European Union.

EPLO aims to influence the EU so it promotes and implements measures that lead to sustainable peace between states and within states and peoples, and that transform and resolve conflicts non-violently. EPLO wants the EU to recognise the crucial connection between peacebuilding, the eradication of poverty, and sustainable development worldwide and the crucial role NGOs have to play in sustainable EU efforts for peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

EPLO advances the interests of its members through common policy positions and consequently advocating for those common positions. EPLO disseminates information and promotes understanding of EU policies of concern to its Members. The Office builds also solidarity and cooperation amongst its members and with other relevant NGO networks. Finally, EPLO raises awareness about the contribution the EU should make to peacebuilding and the need to hold the EU accountable to its own political commitments of helping secure peace within and outside its borders.

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