The final agenda of the meeting is available to download from the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) section of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) website.

1. Session 1: Article 5 (Global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats)

The European External Action Service (EEAS) informed participants that the 2018-2020 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) was due to be finalised by mid-2018 and that it would take into account the recommendations from the recently-concluded Mid-term Review (MTR).

They also highlighted that the 2018-2020 MIP would include further simplification of IcSP programming and take into account the changed strategic context as set out in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy (EUGS). In this context, they stated that, under the Article 5 (global and trans-regional and emerging threats) component of the MIP, in addition to continuing to support ‘Counter-terrorism’ (CT), ‘Fight against Organised Crime’, ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection’ (with a focus on cyber and maritime security) and ‘Climate Change and security’, it was envisaged that the scope of the threats addressed by the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation centres of excellence (CoE) would be enlarged.

The European Commission (EC) presented the 2017 Annual Action Programme (AAP) for Article 5 and initial thoughts on the 2018 AAP.

Participants asked the following questions:

1. Where will the additional € 100 million which are foreseen in the legislative proposal to amend the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in order to enable the EU to support ‘Capacity building in support of security and development’ (CBSD) come from?
2. What types of actions does the EC envisage under the ‘Aviation security’ priority action in the 2018 AAP?
3. Why is much more funding allocated to the 'CBRN Risk Mitigation' heading than to the protection of "soft targets"?
4. Does the 'CBRN Risk Mitigation' heading have a focus on Africa, in particular the Horn of Africa?
5. Will additional resources be allocated to the 'Climate Change and Security' heading under the 2018-2020 MIP? What types of actions does the EC envisage under this heading?
6. Please provide some examples of the types of partners with whom the EC work in the implementation of Article 5 projects and programmes.
7. Are there any examples of "innovative" Article 5 programmes from which the EC could learn to inform the implementation of programmes supported by the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa)?
8. If CBSD is to be included in the IcSP as ‘Article 3a’, does this mean that it will be non-programmable?
9. What is foreseen in the 2018 AAP regarding small arms and light weapons (SALW)?
10. How is learning from ongoing and/or past programmes on high-risk priority areas (e.g. migration, countering violent extremism (CVE), 'law enforcement capacity building' etc.) integrated into risk mitigation measures for future programming?
11. Will IcSP funding be used to support youth organisations?
12. Please provide more information on the possible ‘CT and Criminal Justice Responses’ priority action.
13. Is gender analysis included as part of the EC’s learning from the Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) programmes?

In response, the EC and the EEAS said:

1. The source of the additional financial resources for CBSD will be determined by the regular budgetary process. However, following the negotiations which took place between the EC, the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the EU on CBSD, there was an agreement that the resources would not be taken from the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). This should be guaranteed through a declaration which will be attached to the amended IcSP Regulation.
2. The EC’s existing engagement on aviation security is focused on working with airport authorities to develop plans for securing airports and it is envisaged that it will also cooperate with third-country authorities in this area. Under the existing Civil Aviation Security (CASE) project, which is implemented by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), there is a facility from which the EC can mobilise resources at the request of a third party (e.g. if political dialogues with a third country result in a request to work on aviation security).
3. The indicative financial allocations percentage allocated to each of the five headings under Article 5 are set out as percentages in the Thematic Strategy Paper (SP) 2014-20201 and in amounts in the 2014-2017 MIP2. The indicative allocation for the 'CBRN Risk Mitigation' heading is 27-35% whereas the protection of "soft targets" is included under the 'Critical Infrastructure Protection' heading for which the indicative allocation is 8-12%. However, actions aimed at the protection of "soft targets" can also be supported under the 'CBRN Risk Mitigation' heading.
4. CBRN risk mitigation does not have a specific geographic focus. There are eight CBRN risk mitigation CoE around the world which collaborate through national focal points from each of the countries in which they are located. The national focal points jointly decide on the actions to be supported.
5. The financial resources for the 'Climate Change and Security' heading are rather limited (indicative allocation in the 2014-2020 SP: € 3-5%) and the indicative allocation for the

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1 See page 37.
2 See page 58.
2018-2020 MIP has not yet been determined. The IcSP is intended to serve as a “test bed” for ideas on this topic and financial resources should also be available under other EU external financing instruments (EFIs) such as the Partnership Instrument (PI).

6. The main partners for the implementation of Article 5 projects and programmes are EU Member State (MS) agencies and international organisations (e.g. United Nations (UN) agencies). The EC also works with the Council of Europe (CoE) in the ‘Cybercrime’ priority area and with grassroots organisations – through interlocutors – in the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCEF) in Bangladesh, Kosovo, Mali, and Nigeria.

7. Although it might not be possible to describe them as “innovative programmes”, there are a number of cases in which Article 5 financial resources were used to support preliminary actions before being replaced by resources from other EFIs. For example, the IcSP was used to support the West African Police Information System (WAPIS) before it received support from the European Development Fund (EDF). In addition, the STRIVE programme which was implemented in the Horn of Africa region has resulted in a STRIVE II programme in Kenya which is supported from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

8. CBSD will be included in the IcSP Regulation under Article 3a which will be treated as a separate standing article and the additional € 100 million will follow the same logic of attribution as the rest of the IcSP (i.e. 70% to be allocated under Article 3, 9% under Article 4 and 21% under Article 5).

9. The EC works with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on actions relating to SALW by collecting data to feed into an INTERPOL database on tracking weapons. It also works with the African Union (AU) in order to engage additional countries on the topic.

10. Article 10 of the IcSP Regulation provides that all actions, in particular those which are undertaken in the priority areas of ‘Counter-terrorism’ and ‘Cyber Security’, have to follow a human rights-based approach. The EC has also developed a guidance document on this issue and it is used in the design and review of all projects.

11. The EC puts a lot of emphasis on supporting youth initiatives and there has been a significant increase in financial support to youth initiatives around the world. IcSP Article 5 has been used to support a number of youth initiatives under the STRIVE programme (e.g. the Extremely Together initiative in co-operation with the Kofi Annan Foundation) as well as other initiatives in Morocco and Yemen and support to the One Young World forum.

12. Criminal justice is a cross-cutting issue in all Article 5 programmes.

13. Gender is one of the key issues currently being discussed in the context of the counter-terrorism (CT) programmes. Following the recent meeting of the community of practitioners on violent extremism (VE), the EC is considering how to develop a work strand on this issue.

2. Session 2: Article 4 (Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness)

The EC presented an update on the 2017 AAP for Article 4 (Conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness) and the process for the 2018-2020 MIP, and initial thoughts on the 2018 AAP.

Participants asked the following questions:

1. Is there a possibility for civil society engagement on decisions about the geographical priorities of the ‘Support to in-country civil society actors in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building’ action document in the 2018 AAP?

2. Regarding the selection of projects under the ‘Support to in-country civil society actors in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building’ action document, are
issues such as policy lessons learned or immediate impacts in-country taken into account?

3. Is there scope for civil society consultation on the non-programmable Article 3 (Response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts) component of the IcSP, particularly regarding the principles applied in the allocation of funding?

4. Are there any further plans for formal consultations with civil society before the end of the year?

5. Does the “regionalisation” of the EU officials working on the IcSP imply that they will work on regional rather than country-specific topics?

6. Which countries will be eligible under the regional calls for proposals which are foreseen under the ‘Support to in-country civil society actors in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding’ action document in the 2017 AAP?

7. Has the EC developed strategic thinking on preventing violent extremism (PVE) actions to be taken into consideration under Article 4 programming?

8. Is it possible for civil society actors to submit project proposals outwith normal calls for proposals?

9. Please provide some information on any planned actions for the prevention of electoral violence in Zimbabwe.

In response the EC said:

1. The geographical priorities for 2018 are still under discussion but the EC is always open to engage with civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the EU’s partner countries.

2. While EU delegations (EUDs) might prefer projects with impacts in-country, a combination of both aspects could be interesting as long as the aim is to strengthen in-country civil society capacities for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding.

3. The EC does not organise formal consultations on Article 3 as it is the non-programmable part of the IcSP. However, informal consultations do take place with civil society actors and international organisations, and the EC is open to receiving comments and recommendations on it.

4. This is the main civil society consultation. However, the EC is open to further engagement and it will be possible for civil society actors to submit additional comments and recommendations for the 2018 AAP and the 2018-2020 MIP after the meeting.

5. The EU officials in each of the six regional teams (i.e. Dakar, Nairobi, Beirut, Bangkok, Brasilia and Vienna) will be separate from their colleagues in the various EU delegations (EUDs).

6. As the geographical priorities are still under discussion, all countries are currently eligible.

7. The EC has not developed particular guidance on PVE programming. However, specific policies related to PVE, lessons learned and best practices are taken into account when developing action documents and in other exchanges on programming with EUDs.

8. The majority of grants under Article 4 have been awarded through calls for proposals. However, in crisis situations and through informal consultations with civil society actors, there are possibilities for submitting project proposals outside the normal processes.

9. Preparatory talks are still ongoing regarding possible actions for preventing electoral violence in Zimbabwe.

The EC invited implementing partners to contact them when they are in Brussels so that they can update officials on their Article 4 projects.

3. Session 3: Small group discussions on objectives for Article 4 component of 2018-2020 MIP

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis’.
A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Confidence building, dialogue, mediation and reconciliation’.

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Post-conflict and post-disaster recovery (including stabilisation)’.

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Curbing the use of natural resources to finance conflicts’.

4. Session 4: Small group discussions on priority areas for Article 4 in 2018 and beyond

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Land-related conflicts’.

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Sexual and gender-based violence in conflict’.

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Culture (including cultural heritage) in conflict prevention and resolution’.

A civil society participant gave a summary of the issues which had been raised in the working group on ‘Working with religious actors’.

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**Civil Society Dialogue Network**

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The third phase of the CSDN will last from 2017 to 2020. For more information, please visit the [EPLO website](http://example.com).