Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting

Conflict-sensitive engagement in Uganda: Gathering civil society perspectives

23 March 2018
Entebbe, Uganda

MEETING REPORT

The overall objective of the meeting was to gather civil society input on the situation in the North-West and South-West of Uganda and to consider possibilities for adjusting and deepening the European Union's engagement.

The specific objectives were:

- To identify the root causes of tensions and risks for violence, the role(s) of different actors as well as the conflict and gender dynamics at play in the North-West and South-West of the country, in particular in relation to land issues and to the refugee situation.
- To identify the existing local, regional and international capacities for preventing and resisting violence and building sustainable peace, in order to explore how to support them.
- To gather recommendations on how to improve the conflict sensitivity of the EU's current approach.
- To assess possible options for further EU engagement to address the interplay between humanitarian and development issues in these regions and contribute to conflict prevention and resolution.

The meeting gathered twenty national and international civil society experts working on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in Uganda. It was also attended by policymakers from the EEAS and the EU Delegation to Uganda. Discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule.

Civil society participants expressed a wide range of – sometimes divergent – views. There was no attempt to generate a consensus and the report contains the key points made.

This meeting report is divided into three main sections. The first section includes recommendations for the European Union, including for its conflict-sensitive engagement in the North-West and South-West of Uganda and for its dialogue with the Ugandan government. The second section provides an analysis of drivers of conflict and peace, in particular in relation to land issues and to the refugee situation. The third section presents an overview of key actors and stakeholders.
1. General recommendations for conflict-sensitive EU engagement

Participants commented positively on the EU’s current engagement in Uganda and on the EU’s desire to ensure the conflict sensitivity of its interventions. They also appreciated the organisation of this exchange with civil society experts on the conflict dynamics in their regions, and the presence of EU representatives at the meeting.

Regarding existing and future EU engagement, participants made several recommendations for the continuation and deepening of already-existing positive actions and commitments. In particular, they recommended that the EU continue to / deepen its efforts to:

- Systematically ensure the conflict sensitivity of its strategies and programming, for both short-term (humanitarian) and long-term (development) interventions, at all stages of the process. Participants emphasised the importance of:
  - Undertaking thorough conflict and gender analysis informed by consultations of local communities (including refugee communities) and local CSOs. In particular, participants stressed the value of consulting local community structures (including cultural institutions) on how to improve relations between host and refugee communities.
  - Ensuring all EU programming features robust monitoring & evaluation frameworks (with feedback and accountability mechanisms) that are based on the consultation of local actors, including for projects carried out by grantees.
  - Learning about local cultural norms, values and practices by organising inclusive meetings with representatives from civil society and communities, at every level.
  - Basing the design of the EU’s programmes on evidence, in particular robust research conducted by local academia and civil society.
- Engage in more cross-sectional and long-term programming for its humanitarian and development interventions, with funding allocated for multiple years. Participants highlighted the importance of not focusing too much on the short-term, and argued that it would be helpful for the EU’s programming to continue its positive progress in:
  - Becoming more integrated, acting both on the short term and long term, addressing multiple types of issues jointly (e.g. livelihoods, education and conflict resolution) and supporting both host and refugee communities together whenever possible.
  - Becoming more adaptive and integrating learning, in order to adapt to shifting local realities and needs. Participants emphasised the value of conducting ongoing conflict and gender analysis and consulting local communities and local CSOs, including women, men, girls and boys.
    - Supporting projects that are designed by local CSOs.
    - Ensuring that its interventions are more coordinated, including with actions by other international, national and local actors.
- Address the specific needs of different groups in the refugee population, notably by carrying out context analysis to understand the specific contexts of the different regions from which refugees are fleeing and the specific contexts of the different regions to which they have been displaced.
- Promote and support gender equality and women empowerment, in particular in relation to compensation mechanisms for land acquisition. Participants stressed the need to support measures that aim to address sex- and gender-based violence, in particular in refugee settlement camps.
- Support community-based structures (including clan-level structures, religious and traditional institutions and refugee organisations) and CSOs (in particular local CSOs), and build their capacity to engage in peacebuilding. In this regard, participants mentioned the value of actions to:
  - Support the training of community peace mediators who will be able to identify potential conflicts before they arise and lead to violence, and who can either directly act as mediators or refer the parties to community leaders or district structures.
  - Support the (ongoing) establishment of conflict mitigation / peacebuilding working groups involving refugees and members of host communities.
  - Support local media and their capacity to contribute to building peace between and within communities, for example by organising radio dialogues.
  - Support structures and projects which help with the social reintegration of former combatants, and which help current combatants transition to peaceful lives.
  - Share more information on the EU’s engagement in Uganda and make it more accessible, in particular with regards to the various types of funding it offers and the actors it supports.
  - Simplify access to EU funding and make it more flexible to allow local CSOs with less capacity than international CSOs to apply and qualify.
  - Promote greater civic space for civil society.
- Support and encourage public dialogue meetings with community leaders (both men and women) engaging on conflict issues in local areas. In order to determine the issues to address through such dialogue meetings, it can be helpful to work with community peace activists who organise surveys of the population. Community dialogue meetings involving members of both host and refugee communities, in particular, can make great contributions to the peaceful coexistence of the groups involved.
- Build and strengthen the capacities of alternative, informal dispute resolution structures. These structures can play a key role where formal structures are inadequate (for example because the latter are sometimes too disconnected from local dynamics).
- Support alternatives to agriculture as the main source of livelihood for both refugee and host communities, for example by supporting vocational training programs.
- Support youth-led organisations and young women and men in their efforts to promote peace and to be politically, socially and economically engaged. In this regard, participants emphasised the importance of:
  - Helping people and groups become more aware of their rights to participate in the governance of their country, at every level, and of the concrete roles they can play in the civic space.
  - Supporting capacity building programs targeting young men and women, girls and boys, in schools and out of schools, to improve their communication skills.
  - Supporting peace clubs (in schools and outside of schools) that allow young men and women, girls and boys from different tribes and communities (including host and refugee communities) to speak to each other, debate peacefully and learn to promote peace together. Peace clubs reduce tensions between groups of students, which in turns helps reduce tensions between the groups their families belong to. Peace clubs in schools in the Adjumani district were mentioned to illustrate their usefulness.
  - Supporting peace education programs and initiatives, in schools and outside of schools.
- Support legal aid service providers and other similar community initiatives and groups, in particular women empowerment groups, which help marginalised groups, women, men, girls and boys to defend their rights (including their land rights). Participants mentioned the value of helping build the capacity of organisations who educate people on land laws, and of supporting programs to train people in land mediation so that disputes can be settled without needing to go to the courts.
- Support early-warning mechanisms, and promote structures which allow civil society and the government to communicate closely, produce joint analysis and monitor conflict dynamics together. The efficient coordination of early-warning and early-response mechanisms
requires both state and non-state actors to work together to monitor conflict dynamics and share information and analysis. Helpful actions identified by participants included:

- Supporting the more frequent use of online platforms allowing individuals to provide input to early warning systems.
- Encouraging IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and the Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs' Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) to deepen their collaboration and further engage with local communities and civil society. The CEWARN collaborates fruitfully with networks of civil society organisations, but further engagement should still be encouraged.
- Supporting improvements to early response systems, which should notably mobilise community leaders to respond to potential triggers of conflict.

- Support projects that address and respond to environmental issues, whether man-made (e.g. due to intensive land use and the depletion of natural resources) or natural (e.g. floods in the Kabale area).
- Support programs to train the police to respect the rights (including the land rights) of people, and to conduct rigorous and transparent investigations (e.g. into land grabbing).
- Increase its support to research initiatives and ensure they are coordinated efficiently, including with research efforts funded by other international and national actors. Research results should also be disseminated more widely and effectively to reduce duplication and inform the public.
- Support and fund peacebuilding efforts in other parts of the country that have fragile peace and security dynamics.

Participants also mentioned the importance of:

- Supporting programmes aimed at creating or improving working relations between state and non-state actors (as well as formal and informal, and legally-recognized and non-legally recognized actors). In the South-West in particular, government structures do not adequately consult and work with community structures.

Finally, participants argued that the EU could focus less on:

- District boundaries and more on organic group boundaries.
- Ethnic groups and put more emphasis on taking into account clan dynamics.

2. Recommendations relating to the EU’s dialogue with the government of Uganda

Participants identified several issues on which the government of Uganda should make progress to address conflict dynamics and build peace. The following recommendations were made during discussions on what the EU could promote in its dialogue with the Ugandan government.

Participants argued that the Ugandan government should:

- Revise the Land Act to align with the government’s implementation of the land policy (i.e. the legal framework on land issues needs to be adapted and reflect the government’s actual policy). In its current form, the Land Act is not adapted to the reality of the refugee situation and its implications for land ownership, and it does not properly address issues relating to customary land tenure, land use and land acquisition.
- Produce a clear, transparent and fair legal framework for land acquisition and compensation. The central government should consult communities (at every level), civil society and individuals on the matter, as its plan to amend article 26 of the Constitution would damage relations between the government and the population and between host and refugee
communities. In defining a legal framework on land acquisition, the central government should seek to find a just balance between having the tools to foster economic development and defending land rights. Solutions can include providing people and communities with access to efficient dispute resolution mechanisms and fast tracking land disputes through courts. The legal framework should also guarantee the fair valuation of and compensation for land (including through other means than money), the right to a fair hearing of all parties, the equal involvement of women, etc.

- Have a clearly-defined strategy to address competing claims from absentee landlords and land occupants, landless groups and refugees. This strategy should be accompanied by efficient implementation mechanisms.
- Follow a rights-based approach to land issues and avoid the politicisation and ethnicisation of decisions relating to these issues (at the local, regional and national levels).
- Further improve its transitional justice policy in order to better address issues pertaining to the interplay between displacements, the return of ex-combatants and land ownership and restitutions.
- Clearly define the mandates of its organs and agencies in relation to land issues, and ensure that they operate only within the limits of their mandates. Government structures dealing with land issues should also be coordinated better and have their capacities adapted to their mandates.
- Rework and improve the online land registration system.
- Inform its citizens and refugees better about their rights in relation to land ownership. The process to register land should be standardised and made simpler and more affordable.
- Be more engaged in protecting the environment.
- Expand the civic space for civil society.

With regards to the refugee situation in particular, participants argued that the Ugandan government should:

- Engage fully in the peace process in South Sudan and address the causes of forced displacements.
- Improve its coordination of the aid efforts of national and international actors.
- Take a more comprehensive approach to the refugee situation, connecting efforts to address the refugee situation with local development policies.
- Prepare feasible, long-term plans for the allocation of land to refugees within the framework of the open door policy.
- Manage and address different refugee needs more systematically, coherently and transparently.
- Establish more accurate refugee numbers and be transparent in how it calculates these numbers and defines the status of refugee.
- Clarify the relationship between the location of the refugees and the location of the land they receive.
- Manage urbanisation and its consequences better, in order to notably prevent the exacerbation of tensions linked to unemployment.
- End the competition between local and central governments, in particular in relation to responsibilities over land and to the economic issues and opportunities linked to the arrival of refugees.
Civil society participants identified various groups that tend to be underrepresented and overrepresented as beneficiaries of international aid and/or in local institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs). There were some differences among participants in evaluating the degree of support to certain groups, which were described by some participants as underrepresented and by others as overrepresented. All views are presented here, and some groups in the ‘underrepresented’ and ‘overrepresented’ categories therefore overlap. Participants did not argue that groups in the ‘overrepresented’ category should receive less support, but rather that it would be helpful for groups in the ‘underrepresented’ category to be supported and consulted to a larger extent than is currently the case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underrepresented</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young women (from 13-year-olds to 25-year-olds)</td>
<td>Middle-aged men (from 30-year-olds to 55-year-olds)</td>
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<td>Both female and male elders responsible for / taking care of their grandchildren</td>
<td>Children (0 – 15-year-olds)</td>
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<td>Adolescent boys (from 15-year-olds to 20-year-olds) who are out of school</td>
<td>Young men (from 18-year-olds to 35-year-olds)</td>
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<td>Unaccompanied young girls and boys in refugee camps</td>
<td>Settlement-based refugees</td>
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<td>The informal economic sector, especially in urban centres – street vendors, sex workers, fishing communities, etc.</td>
<td>CSOs based in urban centres, in particular in Kampala</td>
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<td>Female and male persons with disabilities (PWDs)</td>
<td>International CSOs</td>
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<td>Refugees that are not well-connected (i.e. refugees with no connections to camp / community leaders)</td>
<td>Young people and women</td>
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<td>Some minority groups (e.g. the Bakingwe, Murle and Shilluk)</td>
<td>Village savings and loan associations</td>
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<td>Refugees that have moved to urban centres</td>
<td>The male-dominated leadership of refugee associations</td>
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<td>Refugee women in leadership roles</td>
<td>Farmers, including refugee farmers</td>
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<td>Former and current combatants</td>
<td>Married women, in comparison to unmarried women</td>
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<td>Survivors of torture</td>
<td>Poor people striving to engage in productive initiatives</td>
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<td>Small, grassroots community-based organisations</td>
<td>Development actors in the Acholi area</td>
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<td>Poor actors in rural communities</td>
<td>The Bidi Bidi Refugee Settlement</td>
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<td>Less formally-educated women and men (in favour of ‘elites’ who are more frequently contacted)</td>
<td>Expatriates</td>
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<td>National-level actors, in comparison to international-level actors (expatriates)</td>
<td>Christian organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>In some cases, non-traditionally vulnerable groups (e.g. men and boys)</td>
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<td>Unmarried, single women</td>
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1. Drivers of Conflict in the North-West and South-West of Uganda

A. General / cross-cutting risks and drivers of conflict:

The following drivers of conflict were described as common to both regions:

- There are unaddressed, lingering grievances and tensions from past wrongs and conflicts, including when past conflicts led to the displacement of populations who have since then not been able to reacquire the land they were forced off and/or settled in areas where their presence increased the pressure for land. 
  
  *Examples: Displacements in the 1990s and early 2000s linked to attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Rwenzururu region, and to attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda, including in the Guru district.*

- There is a lack of political opportunities for young men and women.

- CSOs are overstretched and lack resources, and they face a shrinking civic space.

- There is a limited access to (and there is competition between – and sometimes within – communities for) natural resources, including firewood (particularly in the North-West), charcoal, construction materials, water, wood and fuel.

- The high growth rate of the population means that the limited access to land is a growing source of tensions. The high arrival rate of refugees only increases this pressure.
  
  *Example: In the Yumbe district, there are over 280,000 refugees, 71% of which are children and young people.*

- There is a lack of significant alternatives to agriculture as a key source of livelihood for both refugee and host communities. Refugees are assumed to be farmers, even if they are not. Humanitarian and development aid workers tend to put too much focus on agriculture-related issues and needs and not on alternatives. This adds to the pressure on access to land and on the land itself, as the intensive use of small parcels of land in some areas is resulting in decreases in soil fertility.

- There is a lack of access to education, and illiteracy remains an issue despite the progress made over the last decades.

- Political actors politicise ethnicity for their own interests (i.e. they support and side with specific ethnic groups against others for political reasons).

- Poverty, limited economic opportunities for young men and women and the inadequate/unequal distribution of resources contribute to fuelling tensions. In particular, there are significant inequalities in access to land. Rich investors and private companies have disproportionate advantages in acquiring and registering land (the process is easier for them, the land is valued to their benefit, the fees discourage less wealthy actors, and wealthy/powerful individuals can often outright seize land with impunity due to corruption). This further exacerbates inequalities and fuels tensions with local, poorer groups and individuals.

- The degradation of the environment, which results in particular from intensive land use and the unsustainable use of natural resources, increases tensions between the groups who own and use nearby land.
• International humanitarian and development aid programming is sometimes not conflict-sensitive, and it can fuel local tensions by benefiting certain groups (communities, ethnicities, clans, refugees, etc.) more than others. It can sometimes also create false expectations in local populations (e.g. if people expect aid workers to provide them with employment opportunities).
• There are cultural tensions between some clans, ethnicities and communities.

Example: In the North-West, the Dinka community traditionally rejects inter-community marriages.

B. Drivers of conflict related to land issues:

The following drivers of conflict were described as common to both regions:

• The Land Act needs revision and the National Land Policy is not implemented as fairly as it should be. The legal framework on land-related matters is not satisfactory.
• Local communities and the people who own and/or use land are often not properly consulted and compensated when their land is acquired by other parties (and there are many cases of "land grabbing", where compensation is entirely absent). The government, the army and (wealthy) individuals / investors are usually responsible for acquiring the land. The police are not usually directly engaged, but they can facilitate the process.

Example: Land occupants in the Tooro Kingdom not being properly informed of the status of their land.

• There are unsettled historical injustices and historical land claims by different communities, which may be mobilised by cultural institutions competing against each other for land, including across district boundaries and international borders (in particular with South Sudan and the DRC). Other institutions, such as churches, can also have competing claims over land.

Examples: Competing land claims linked to the Queen Elizabeth National Park and to the Semuliki National Park, and the competing claims opposing the Bunyoro and Buganda kingdoms.

• The land administration governance structures are inadequate and not properly run, and they lack the capacity to handle land acquisition and allocation processes rigorously, transparently and in an open and inclusive manner. There is also often a lack of clarity in the legal delimitation of land areas. In cases of land grabbing, investigations often do not produce results due to issues of corruption. The grievance mechanisms are non-existent or inadequate. Likewise, the land dispute resolution mechanisms are not effective and not integrated in the governance structures.

Examples: The lack of clear legal delimitation of land led to competing claims by the Kabarole District Local Government and the Ntoroko District Local Government regarding the land under their respective authority.

• The customary ownership of land poses various types of challenges with regards to the settlement of competing land claims (e.g. in cases of unclear inheritance or land delimitation) and to the acquisition of land by the government.
• Land matters are often politicised, with government decisions (at all levels) on land-related matters taken to further the (immediate or long-term) interests of decision-makers by favouring certain groups (e.g. specific communities and ethnicities), certain wealthy/powerful individuals, the decision-makers’ relatives, etc.
• The evaluation of the land that is taken sometimes happens a significant amount of time after it was taken, which means that the compensation the previous owners of the land receive is less than it would have been if the land had been evaluated more promptly.
• Gender inequality in access to land and in the defence of land rights is perpetuated by compensation schemes. For example, land compensation in the oil sector disproportionately penalises women, as the money is usually given to the men even if it was the women who were using the land.
• Citizens and communities are insufficiently informed on existing (and future) legislation on land acquisition and ownership. They are not sufficiently knowledgeable of their rights and of the legal mechanisms at their disposal.
There is insufficient legal oversight of practices that endanger land and land resources (bricklaying, deforestation, etc.).

There are longstanding tensions between pastoralist and cultivator groups regarding the use of certain areas of land.

**Example:** See the tensions between the Basongora pastoralists and Bakonzo cultivators in the Kasese district.

The mass acquisitions of land by the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the National Forestry Authority (NFA) have led to tensions with local communities on which these decisions were imposed. The way the UWA and the NFA sometimes issue licenses for land exploitation (for grazing, harvesting, producing wood, etc.) also produces tension due to the lack of transparency, consultations and oversight throughout the process.

The use of land on/next to the border can lead to tensions and disputes with groups from the other side of the border.

**Example:** This is the case with fishing activities on Lake Albert.

Additional drivers of conflict were particularly mentioned in discussions relating to conflict dynamics in the South-West of Uganda:

- The fact that land is a key component of people’s cultural identity can magnify tensions over land.
- Oil has particularly been found on land owned by people and communities rather than on land owned by the government (as is more often the case in the North-West). Land owners and occupants are often not compensated adequately for the land that is taken away from them for oil exploitation.

**Example:** See developments in the Ntoroko district.

C. Drivers of conflict related to refugee issues:

The following drivers of conflict were described as common to both regions:

- The central government often does not adequately consult local communities on the allocation of land to refugees. The mechanisms of land acquisition for allocation to refugees are not sufficiently transparent and agreed upon with host communities, and local community structures are often ignored in the process. It is often not clear to land owners and host communities if, when and how they will be compensated for the land that was taken away from them, which can lead to false expectations and generate frustrations. The lack of dialogue means that host communities and land owners can sometimes feel that they are not shown enough appreciation for the land that is allocated to refugees. The lack of dialogue also fuels tensions with regards to land use (e.g. when refugees are forced to use the land of host communities for their cattle).

**Example:** In the Kyaka II Refugee Settlement in the Kyegegwa district in the South-West, the consultation process with the host community was poor/non-existent.

- The central government and international actors do not sufficiently adopt a long-term approach to refugee issues. This is notably reflected in the poor analysis of local capacities to host refugees (in terms of land distribution, access to resources, etc.), of risks in the cohabitation of different groups, of necessary services to address issues (e.g. disease outbreaks, conflict dynamics, etc.), etc.
- The delivery of aid by international actors between refugee and host communities, and sometimes within the refugee communities themselves, is sometimes imbalanced.

**Example:** UNHCR and the government of Uganda have agreed that the humanitarian services provided must benefit refugees and host communities following a 70:30 ratio. Some believe that the ratio should be closer to 50:50, and that there should be more transparency in implementing and monitoring the policy.
In the North-West, in particular, the fact that the standards of living of nationals are sometimes (perceived to be) inferior to those of refugees can fuel tensions (e.g. there have been cases of famines during which refugees received aid but not host communities).

- There are often disagreements between the central government and local government authorities on their respective mandates regarding refugee matters. Host communities can find it difficult to know who the relevant government interlocutors are, decision-making processes are not transparent, responsibilities are blurred, and the compensations host communities and landlords receive for the land allocated to refugees can vary widely from one area to another.
- Refugee communities and host communities (or groups within them) sometimes make inadequate efforts to coexist peacefully together.
- Refugee camp commandants sometimes improperly distribute and sell the land that is supposed to be allocated to refugees.
  
  *Example: The case of a camp commandant selling refugee land to (non-refugee) wealthy people was mentioned for the Nakivale Refugee Settlement in the Isingiro district in South-West Uganda.*

- There is insufficient clarity in the legal determination of who qualifies as a refugee. It can therefore be difficult to determine one’s rights and obligations, and host communities can sometimes include people who qualify as refugees.
  
  *Example: See the Bakonzo tribe in the South-West.*

This poses problems regarding the attribution of land to refugees, as individuals and groups who should not qualify can be recognized as refugees and be given land that is unjustly taken away from communities and landlords. The issue of the insufficient legal definition (and application) of the status of refugee is tied to political interests. Refugee numbers are sometimes inflated by government actors for political/economic purposes, and some refugees are given national IDs to allow them to vote in elections and support specific parties and politicians.

- The central government focuses mostly on the refugees themselves and not enough on trying to address the root causes and drivers that lead them to become refugees in the first place.

*Additional drivers of conflict were particularly mentioned in discussions relating to conflict dynamics in the North-West of Uganda:*

- Tensions, conflict dynamics, grievances and alliances imported from South Sudan persist and are sometimes magnified in the region.
- Security issues linked to the conflict in South Sudan (and, to a lesser extent, to the situation in the DRC) can spill over across the border. The examples discussed included the spread of small arms and of communicable diseases.
2. Drivers of Peace in the North-West and South-West of Uganda

A. General / cross-cutting drivers of peace:

The following drivers of peace were described as common to both regions:

- Despite growing tensions, Uganda remains politically stable and peaceful compared to some of its neighbours.
- International, national and local civil society organisations contribute to preventing conflict and building peace both within and across communities.
- Women empowerment initiatives and organisations make a positive difference in addressing social, economic and political gender inequality.
- Community structures, including traditional land management structures and cultural/religious leaders, can play a positive role in preventing conflict and building peace. They are more trusted by the population than government structures. In particular, they can play a mediation role on land-related issues, including with regards to land and resource allocation.
  
Examples: Clan heads in general, the Acholi principles, the Rwoth, the Lugbara Kari, the Madi cultural leaders, the Adjumani District Elders Forum, etc.

B. Drivers of peace related to land issues:

The following drivers of peace were described as common to both regions:

- Land is often rich and biologically productive, which means that the efficient and proper agricultural management of land yields very positive results.
- There are various land-related initiatives and policies from the Ugandan government that have, or present the potential to have, positive impacts for local populations. This includes the National land policy and the JLOS’ 4th Strategic Development Plan (SDP IV).
- The Local Council I (LCI) court system, which is closer to people, allows for fairer legal procedures in relation to land matters than courts at higher levels.
- Despite some shortfalls, the central government has shown some willingness to address land matters in a productive way.

Examples: Positive progress was made in the work of the Uganda Land Commission and through some of the reforms that have been adopted with regards to land registration processes.

- Local formal land registration and management structures deliver better results than centralised structures.

Examples: District land boards, district tribunals, Arua land committees, etc.

Additional drivers of peace were particularly mentioned in discussions relating to dynamics in the North-West of Uganda:

- When the process is conducted properly, communities who give away land can be rewarded with infrastructure development and employment opportunities from which they benefit significantly.
The central government’s Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) can have positive outputs through its focus on land-related matters.

C. Drivers of peace related to refugee issues:

The following drivers of peace were described as common to both regions:

- Consulting host communities about the distribution of land to refugees, and organising dialogues between host communities and refugee communities early in the process, strongly contributes to building peaceful relations between host and refugee communities. This can lead to a more efficient exploitation of lands and an increase in the production of food, as communities and individuals work together better.
  
  Example: See how the host community was consulted in the Kamwenge district in the South-West.

- When the government prepares host communities to receive refugees and to co-exist with them, this helps ensure a smooth process and fosters peaceful collaboration. In particular, when they are supported by the government, cultural institutions and local community structures can help build peace between refugees and host communities. Conflict mitigation and peacebuilding working groups comprised of members from both refugee and host communities can also help appease tensions and design common projects. In addition, when there is an integrated understanding, across host and refugee communities, of how land can become a source of conflict, this can increase the tendency of actors to resolve disputes peacefully.

- Uganda’s policies towards refugees are quite generous, which means that refugees are generally grateful and appreciative towards Ugandans.
  
  Examples: The 2006 Refugee Act, the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) framework, the “open door” refugee policy in general, etc.

- There are often cultural affinities and strong common social networks and identities between host communities and refugees. There is often a desire on both sides to build positive relations.
- Economic relations and exchanges contribute to peaceful collaboration (e.g. when host communities provide services and sell local products to refugees).
- When the planning and implementation of refugee interventions is conflict-sensitive, in particular when services and aid are provided equally/proportionately to refugees and host communities, this contributes to their peaceful coexistence.

Additional drivers of peace were particularly mentioned in discussions relating to dynamics in the North-West of Uganda:

- Many Ugandans who live in the North-West directly benefited from, and/or have relatives and members of their communities who benefited from, the hospitality of communities in South Sudan when they were themselves displaced due to conflicts in Northern Uganda. Many of them are therefore keen to help refugees from South Sudan.

- Some in the host communities and among refugees from South Sudan have the same origins and belong to the same groups, ethnicities and/or communities.
  
  Example: See the Kuku people, the Madi people and the Kakwa people.

- Other examples of common social affiliations include speaking the same language, being linked through intermarriages and belonging to the same religious groups.

  Example: In the Arua and Adjumani districts in particular, most refugees are Christian and host communities are also largely Christian. This is less so the case in the Yumbe district, where the host communities are predominantly Muslim.

- Landlords in the West Nile sub-region are particularly willing to offer/sell land in areas where the government does not own land and therefore cannot allocate land as easily to refugees.
Civil society participants identified a wide range of key actors to consider in the analysis of conflict dynamics in the North-West and South-West of Uganda, in particular in relation to land issues and to the refugee situation. These included:

### Governmental Actors

- The President
- The Office of the Prime minister (OPM)
- Government institutions managing public land resources (e.g. the Ministry of Lands, Housing & Urban Development, the National Forest Authority, the Uganda Wildlife Authority, the Uganda National Roads Authority, etc.) and other land governance structures (e.g. district land boards, land tribunals, the Uganda Land Commission, etc.)
- Other government ministries (the Ministry of Education and Sports, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Judiciary (and the Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) more broadly, including prisons), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, the Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development)
- Security agencies, including the police and the military
- Members of Parliament and politicians at different levels
- The Uganda Human Rights Commission
- Local district governments and sub-county governments
- Local Councils (LCs), from the village level (LCI) to the district level (LCV)
- Resident district commissioners (RDCs)

### Societal Actors

- Cultural institutions, both those which are legally-recognized (e.g. kingdoms such as the Bunyoro Kingdom and various chiefdoms) and those which are not
- Religious institutions and their leaders (e.g. the Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the Muslim Supreme Council, the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda, etc.)
- Other formal and informal governance structures (i.e. Elders forums and local governance associations)
- Other community-based organisations and structures (e.g. water use committees, gender/protection committees, children clubs, victims associations, school management committees, teachers, parent-teacher associations, village saving and loans associations, etc.)
- Civil society organisations (international, national and local), in particular development and peacebuilding organisations
- Entertainment groups (e.g. musicians) who engage in awareness-raising actions
- Schools, hospitals and other institutions which own land
- The media (local, national and international)
- Academia (e.g. research departments at the Makerere University, including its School of Women and Gender Studies)

### Private sector

- National and international investors
- The Ugandan business community
- Oil companies and other private actors
### Population Groups

- Landlords, including absentee landlords (the latter were mentioned in relation to the Rwenzururu and Bunyoro sub-regions in particular)
- Private individuals and various types of communities and groups exploiting land and/or land resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, etc.)
- Families
- Women, men, boys and girls

### International Actors

- The EU (including the EU delegation)
- EU Member States (EU MS)
- The UN (including UNDP, UNICEF and other UN programs and agencies)
- Other international actors

Additional key actors were mentioned in relation to the refugee situation specifically:

- The African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC)
- The governments of South Sudan, of the Democratic Republic of Congo and of Burundi
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uganda
- UNHCR and other UN agencies
- The EU (DG ECHO in particular) and EU MS
- Other international humanitarian actors (e.g. the Red Cross and the World Food Programme)
- National and international donors

- Host communities
- Border and trans-border communities
- Refugee communities (and the men, women, boys and girls within them): refugee clan heads, informal refugee structures, protection groups at the settlement level, settlement commandants, disease-carrying refugees (e.g. nodding disease victims), awareness groups among refugee and host communities (e.g. those engaging in peer education on various topics)
- Refugee welfare committees (RWCs)
- Civil society organisations from South Sudan
- Traders / business actors

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**The Civil Society Dialogue Network**

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The third phase of the CSDN will last from 2017 to 2020. For more information, please visit the [EPLO website](#).