



## **Civil Society Dialogue Network Geographic Meeting**

# **Capacities for inclusive peace in the Bangsamoro: Gathering civil society perspectives**

**20 – 21 June 2018**

Dusit Thani Manila  
Ayala Center, 1223 Makati City, Manila

## **REPORT**

### **Background**

Recent events in Marawi have once again highlighted that Bangsamoro communities face continued threats to human security, adding to the uncertainty surrounding a future Bangsamoro entity. Whatever the progress and outcome of the current legislative process for the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and a later plebiscite, there will be opportunity as well as risk, as there will be moments when fixed positions, mindsets, practices and relationships can potentially be transformed. Therefore, the perspectives of civil society stakeholders living in and/or working on Mindanao are vital to understanding the priorities of those that will be most affected by any transition period towards a new Bangsamoro political entity.

This workshop aimed to take a snapshot of civil society perspectives, identify new opportunities for change and reflect on how local, national and international actors, including the European Union (EU), can better support the peace process in Mindanao. It focused on local governance and dialogue and brought together local, regional, and national civil society analysts and representatives. In the workshop, participants shared their vision for a future Bangsamoro entity, their views on the current challenges to the peace process and the role of civil society in a transition. Participants provided input on what shifts in local governance and approaches to dialogue they thought were necessary and how civil society could best support - and be supported - to promote peaceful outcomes.

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### **Civil Society Dialogue Network**

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The third phase of the CSDN will last from 2017 to 2020. For more information, please visit the [EPLO website](#).

## Acronyms

ADSDPP	Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AHJAG	Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BASULTA	Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi
BBL	Bangsamoro Basic Law
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIWAB	Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade
BM	Bangsamoro
BMCRRP	Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan
BTC	Bangsamoro Transition Commission
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CCCH	Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
CDA	Cooperative Development Agency
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CHD	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
CPC	Civilian Protection Component
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DA	Department of Agriculture
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DepEd	Department of Education
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Australia
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DWP	Dealing with the past
FAB	Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
GPH	Government of the Philippines
IDP	Internally displaced person
IMT	International Monitoring Team
IP	Indigenous Peoples
IT	Information Technology
IPRA	Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
IWG-DWP	Independent Working Group for Dealing with the Past
JCCCH	Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
JMAC	Joint Monitoring, Assistance, and Coordination Center of the GPH-MILF Peace Corridor
JPSC	Joint Peace and Security Committee
JPST	Joint Peace and Security Teams
JTFCT	Joint Task Forces on Camps Transformation
LCE	Local Chief Executive
LGBTQAI+	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer, asexual, intersex
LGSPA	Local Government Support Program in ARMM
LGU	Local Government Unit
LRA	Land Registration Authority
MAA	Most Affected Area
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MONGO	My Own NGO

NCIP	National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NDFP	National Democratic Front of the Philippines
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NTJRCB	National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
PNP	Philippine National Police
PO	Peoples' Organization
PRRD	President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
PWD	Persons with disability
RAN	Reform ARMM Now
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWC	Social Welfare Committee
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TESDA	Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
TJR	Transitional Justice and Reconciliation
TJRC	Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations

## Summary Report

The workshop, held on 20 and 21 June 2018 in Manila, welcomed 24 women and men of different generations, ethnic and religious background and segments of civil society in the Bangsamoro and Mindanao, invested in civil society networks, media, academia, farmers movements, interfaith and intercultural exchange, the private sector, women's rights, Indigenous Peoples rights, youth groups, conflict prevention, policy analysis, religious institutions, international peacebuilding non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

As there have been many analysis processes, this workshop aimed to add value by gathering civil society perspectives on the responses to the context dynamics, rather than on the dynamics themselves. Participants worked on visioning exercises, working through a strategic theory of change for external support more broadly, and shared ideas on good practices for the design of local governance and dialogue initiatives that would best meet the needs of a transition period toward a potential future Bangsamoro entity.

Throughout the workshop, participants raised challenges and discussed aspirations linked to cooperation, engagement, inclusion, traditional and religious culture, and connectivity. **'Community' in its widest sense seemed to be a consistent thread**, from stronger ties among geographic communities (local / Barangay, City / Municipal, Regions / Provinces, National) to communities of stakeholders, such as the community of civil society actors, private sector representatives, and strengthening community ties between those who shared a vision of the outcome of the peace process and a potential future Bangsamoro entity. The discussions also raised a number of overarching issues in the design of support that apply to local governance, dialogue initiatives and engagement with civil society working on Mindanao more broadly.

Participants identified challenges such as the **gap between theory and practice** in both local governance and dialogue mechanisms. Participants described that formal structures often did not fulfil their function effectively and in terms of support, the focus on institutions or mechanisms in theory rather than relationships and interactions in practice was undermining efforts to build peace. For example, the effectiveness of local decision-making bodies seems to vary significantly and yet their existence is automatically assumed to facilitate grassroots citizen engagement in governance despite the fact that they are often controlled by traditional politicians, clans and oligarchs who do not necessarily embrace more active citizenship. Another example of the gap between theory and practice revolves around activities that are misrepresented as 'consultation' and 'dialogue' when in many cases, it only means that people were present in a room together, or that they participated only to make a statement on their positions, without any meaningful interaction. The analysis in Sections 1 and 2 of this report has implications for the type of initiatives that are targeted, what impact (i.e. success), looks like and who defines what meaningful citizenship impact is in internationally-supported initiatives.

### Key Messages

*- Avoid conflating the existence of formal structures or the use of relevant terms with actual outcomes. Instead, design and evaluate activities based on how well they stimulate a positive change in mind-sets, practices, behaviours, and relationships of the different stakeholders in practice.*

- *Unpack references to words such as ‘dialogue’ / ‘consultation’ / civil society’ / ‘youth’ / ‘peace’ / ‘women’ in policies and programmes to ensure that they represent an informed, tailored and meaningful contribution to transforming a particular conflict or peace dynamic.*

The **one-sided nature of support** was another challenge that emerged. Participants described support that focused on building capacity for citizenship but which did not always seek to address the blockages that were thwarting engagement in parallel. For example, overlooking the reality that some local chief executives act as warlords with private armies (*see Section 1*) misses the crux of the issue, which is that even empowered citizens whose capacity has been ‘built’ have little space or incentives to be active in such a context. This gap in addressing resistance from those who hold the formal power was also discussed in the context of the peace process architecture, where civil society actors and other citizens who disagree with trajectories and messaging set by national government and the negotiating panels find themselves being excluded or in danger of being labelled as “spoilers” of peace (*see Section 2*). Practical implications of working on imbalances of power were discussed, such as supporting in-situ dialogues outside of major cities to address blockages facing under-represented indigenous groups (*see Output B on over- and under-representation*), but also by placing greater emphasis on building capacity, autonomy and visibility of local and under-represented rather than international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) for more sustainable outcomes.

Key Message

- *Work on both sides of the problem by targeting support towards addressing the political resistance and blockages as well as the capacity-related or technical obstacles to engaging in local governance and/or dialogue initiatives.*

In the discussions, the **question of context was significant**. For participants, this meant respect for and celebration of Islamic, Moro and indigenous ways of life, and recognising the role of autonomy, resilience, and improving social cohesion in a future Bangsamoro entity. As no conflict has followed exactly the same trajectory, there was a strong sense that peaceful transformation would only be sustainable if it aligned with the dynamics of peace, stakeholders and realities of the various communities and cultures in Mindanao. This also meant being willing to address blockages such as the difficulty for civil society to reach out to those who were vulnerable to recruitment by “black flag” actors<sup>1</sup> due to donor or government restrictions on travel to and security in Mindanao, and the misperception that dialogue equals support to terrorist activity.

The lesson was that **external support cannot be driven by external logic**. It was clear from various interventions that to ensure that initiatives fall on fertile ground and have an impact on peace, they will have to mirror and enhance the internal priorities set by a variety of Mindanao stakeholders, including (non-Moro) indigenous peoples, local government units, the sultanates and other traditional leaders, and the Christian population in the area. Throughout the workshop, participants raised the fact that whether a potential future Bangsamoro entity would thrive or not would depend on community-level buy-in and on addressing the reality that traditional and indigenous governance practices continue to be tokenized and seen as marginal or less legitimate than government or other elite actors.

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<sup>1</sup> Stakeholders still disagree on the translation of violent extremism and terrorism in the vernacular, and the extent to which Western concepts of preventing and countering violent extremism apply to local Bangsamoro realities. The common term used for the Maute Group and other related ISIS-inspired actors is “black flag”, or “blacks.”

Key Message

- Design engagement driven by the internal logic and priorities of those directly affected by risks of violence and prolonged uncertainty in Mindanao around a future Bangsamoro entity, and then measure peace impact (successes) based on their feedback.

Participants highlighted the **challenge posed by poor connectivity**, i.e. the lack of physical, mental, technological connections across the Bangsamoro and beyond, which sustains isolation and divides. Participants noted that many actors have a vested interest and profit from geographic and information disconnection; it makes services more difficult to access and facilitates corrupt practices in local governance. A lack of investment in physically connecting communities within Mindanao and across islands in particular, also meant that dialogue and building social cohesion with already under-represented groups looks even more challenging. The concept of connectivity was unpacked in a variety of ways, for example, referring to support for more communication and transparency to manage citizens' connection and expectations around the formal peace process and during any transition. It was also referred to as connections between civil society, such as academia, media and private sector, and the way that civil society is supported by external actors; for example, through funding design that can stimulate competition or constructive collaboration.

Key Message

- Promote connection and community in all its senses as a key objective in all forms of support, and measure success according to how well engagements strengthen connections and advance a sense of community.

## Section 1: Guidance for engagement on Bangsamoro local governance

*This section gathers the participants input on issues relating to local governance, their visions for and change pathways leading to a peaceful and inclusive Bangsamoro. It may be helpful to those working on developing or revising their strategic theory of change for external support in the area of local governance.*

### I. THE STATUS QUO

Although there are many actors and initiatives for peace and development in the Bangsamoro, systemic challenges have proven difficult to overcome. An intrinsic blockage is the unequal centre-periphery relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro people, which is at the core of the peace processes with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). As a result, traditional and indigenous governance practices are perceived as marginal and less legitimate. Without a deeper understanding of Bangsamoro claims to autonomy and self-determination by the rest of Philippine society, it will be difficult to change the usual top-down and securitized approach.

At the same time, horizontal conflicts are prevalent. Local decision-making processes are often controlled by dynasties, clans and oligarchs, supporting a culture of impunity. Geographic, socio-economic, cultural, and technological divisions and asymmetries also make inclusive growth difficult, further marginalizing citizens from social engagement. These fissures exist even within the peace process architecture. Civil society actors and other citizens who disagree with trajectories and messaging set by national government and the negotiating panels are in danger of being labelled as “spoilers” of peace. In the last year, this has become an issue in the context of Marawi rehabilitation and reconstruction, where requests to Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) for greater citizen involvement and clearer information flows have not always been met. A clear lesson is that communicating policy and decisions to citizens is key to manage expectations.

Investment in citizenship, inclusive governance, Bangsamoro-driven solutions, and connectivity are key, with particular priority to respect for and celebration of Islamic, Moro and indigenous ways of life, autonomy, resilience and improving social cohesion.

The analysis, discussion and recommendations presented in this section are intended to offer practical guidance for external support in terms of what an engagement should be trying to achieve (objectives) and what success looks like concretely (outcomes) according to the collective perspective of the various civil society stakeholders and voices participating in the workshop. Different groups of participants described what an inclusive and peaceful Bangsamoro entity would look like in the medium to long-term (see Annex 1). From this, participants sketched out the type of activities and focus areas that could be supported by the international community, which is reflected in the theory of change table on page 10. These needs are grouped into the four major themes, discussed below, that represent what kinds of impact were prioritised by participants for local governance.

1. Citizenship
2. Inclusive governance
3. Bangsamoro-Driven solutions
4. Connectivity

<u>Themes</u>	<u>Desired Changes</u>	<u>Blockages to address</u>	<u>Inputs required</u>	<u>Stakeholders to engage</u>
<b>Theme 1: Citizenship</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meaningful, progressive and constructive participation of independent CSOs</li> <li>• Functional local special bodies</li> <li>• Active community participation in local development</li> <li>• A mainstreamed gender perspective</li> <li>• CSOs able to monitor government planning, budgeting, and implementation processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSOs are often controlled by LGUs -- MONGOS – “my own NGO”</li> <li>• A culture of service delivery is not present in local communities</li> <li>• Formal and non-formal systems for civic responsibility are often not in place</li> </ul>	<p>Skills required</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analytical/theorizing skills - Empathetic listening and mutual tolerance</li> <li>• Lobbying and advocacy - Expanding influence</li> <li>• Diplomatic skills and political communications</li> <li>• Proposal/writing research</li> <li>• Financial management</li> <li>• Facilitating, mediating/dialogue skills</li> <li>• Problem solving</li> <li>• Gender analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Media/thought leaders</li> <li>• Academia</li> <li>• Traditional and religious leaders</li> <li>• Non-state leaders</li> <li>• Security sector</li> <li>• Private sector</li> <li>• LGUs/Regional Government</li> <li>• International donor community</li> <li>• Integrated bar of the Philippines</li> </ul>
<b>Theme 2: Inclusive Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A shift towards more shared leadership</li> <li>• Meaningful people’s participation across different sectors</li> <li>• A shared development dividend across the region and across communities</li> <li>• Accountability and transparency in all aspects of local governance</li> <li>• Values-driven governance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clan/oligarch monopoly of decision-making process</li> <li>• Challenges with institutional culture</li> <li>• CSO reluctance to engage in difficult political dialogues</li> <li>• Tokenism</li> <li>• Culture of impunity and lack of transparency</li> <li>• Proliferation of loose firearms</li> <li>• LCEs as warlords with private armies</li> <li>• Gap between theory/policy and practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Representation, engagement</li> <li>• Effective communication</li> <li>• Learning/sustaining gains from previous initiatives and investments</li> <li>• Culture of peace</li> <li>• Convening inter and intra-faith dialogue</li> <li>• Education module development</li> <li>• Peace education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DepEd</li> <li>• Local, regional, and national governments</li> <li>• Citizens</li> <li>• AFP</li> <li>• Religious leaders and teachers</li> <li>• School heads, parent-teacher associations</li> <li>• Traditional leaders</li> </ul>
<b>Theme 3: Bangsamoro-Driven Solutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educated and literate young people with equity for women and girls</li> <li>• Madrasahs are part of the education system</li> <li>• Peace agreements are implemented</li> <li>• Inclusive local governance systems</li> <li>• Equitable gender representation</li> <li>• Effective service provision and resource management</li> <li>• Vibrant and inclusive local economic markets</li> <li>• Traditional and indigenous cultural practices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Islamic and traditional education are seen as marginal, not for mainstream use</li> <li>• Existing policies are not enforced</li> <li>• Government responses to crisis are often securitized</li> <li>• CSOs are not often equipped to engage constructively with government and security actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training for historians, educators, madrasah administrators, religious/traditional scholars</li> <li>• Funding for Mindanao history materials</li> <li>• Lobbying and advocacy (messaging)</li> <li>• Gender mainstreaming</li> <li>• Leadership</li> <li>• Policy formulation</li> <li>• Fiscal administration</li> <li>• Training in entrepreneurship and management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DepEd + related line agencies</li> <li>• President of Philippines</li> <li>• General public in Luzon and Visayas</li> <li>• Media</li> <li>• Congress</li> <li>• Landowners and Business Leaders</li> <li>• Artists + Art Industry Leaders</li> <li>• Sultanate, Elders and Traditional Leaders, Ulama and Religious Leaders</li> <li>• Academia and CSOs</li> <li>• Schools of Living Traditions, IPs (non-Moro)</li> </ul>
<b>Theme 4: Connectivity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved access to information and decision-making (IT solutions)</li> <li>• Promotion of economic justice</li> <li>• Strong horizontal and vertical linkages across levels of governance</li> <li>• Formal governance integrates indigenous governance and resource management</li> <li>• Bangsamoro history is fully integrated into the Philippine national narrative</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resistance to change</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IT infrastructure and skills to engage with telecommunications and media companies</li> <li>• Business management</li> <li>• Entrepreneurship and innovation</li> <li>• Fiscal policy (including shariah-compliant financing)</li> <li>• Spatial development planning - ancestral domain sustainable development protection plan (ADSDPP) formulation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government (DTI, LGU, COA, D8M, DILG, NCIP, DepEd, Congress)</li> <li>• Prospective Bangsamoro leadership</li> <li>• International community</li> <li>• Business Clubs, BIMP-EAGA, Economic elite / others with vested interests / spoilers</li> <li>• Banks (Islamic)</li> <li>• CSOs, watchdogs</li> <li>• Government Contractors</li> <li>• Destructive development actors</li> <li>• Those with prejudiced mindset against minorities</li> </ul>

Figure 1. Themes and Theories of Change towards Inclusive Bangsamoro Governance

## II. THEORIES OF CHANGE FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE BANGSAMORO GOVERNANCE

### Theme 1 - Citizenship

#### *Analysis*

Many people feel that there is no benefit in civic engagement. Any time spent on local governance activities translates to lost time and income because advocating for efficient service delivery may be blocked by corrupt government officials and other vested interests. At the same time, local development council seats for civil society and people's organizations are often occupied by Local Chief Executive-controlled or -aligned CSOs, the so-called MONGOs – “my own NGOs” and many local special bodies are only activated to meet compliance standards. Ultimately, a culture of service delivery is often not present in local communities. Not all CSOs have the technical understanding of the government planning and budgeting cycle and so are unable to substantially and constructively engage. Many CSOs and government leaders still subscribe to an adversarial mindset. There are misconceptions about what gender inclusion means and the value of women's participation.

#### *Necessary changes*

- Functional local special bodies that facilitate meaningful local participation
- Active community participation in local development plans and initiatives
- Meaningful, progressive and constructive participation of independent CSOs in local development
- A gender perspective throughout governance structures and functions
- CSOs equipped and able to monitor government planning, budgeting, and implementation processes

A culture of empathetic listening and mutual tolerance on all sides should be espoused, with CSOs and civic organizations learning how to expand their circles of cooperation and influence, for example, through more engagement with various media and thought leaders and other non-traditional allies in the academe, traditional and religious leaders, other non-state leaders, security sector, private sector, LGUs, and the ARMM regional government.

### Theme 2 – Inclusive Governance

#### *Analysis*

Governance and security challenges that prevent inclusive governance in the Bangsamoro are tied to the monopoly of clans and oligarchs of local decision-making processes. Some LCEs act as warlords with private armies, with loose firearms supporting a culture of impunity. As a result, the magnitude of these challenges discourages citizens participation in governance. There are few perceived social or economic benefits to engagement; at worst, engagement can endanger people's' lives and property. There are no incentives for transparency or accountability. Tokenism is a rampant practice, where LCEs install “friendly” civil society actors in designated seats in local development councils and mechanisms. This has also led some CSOs to be reluctant to engage in difficult political dialogues, for fear of being politicized or co-opted or perceived as such. Academic institutions have also had difficulty in bridging theory and practice, lacking interactions with practitioners, CSOs and those directly affected by conflict and bad development.

#### *Necessary changes*

- A shift towards more shared leadership
- Meaningful people's participation across different sectors
- A shared development dividend across the region and across communities
- Accountability and transparency in all aspects of local governance
- Values-driven governance

There is a real need to develop skills to enhance representation, communication, and engagement on two levels: (i) with local, regional, and national governments; and (ii) with citizens. This will entail getting the buy-in of sitting LCEs (including those considered as “warlords”), the security sector, and traditional leaders. There is specific gap in distilling good practices and sustaining gains from previous governance-related initiatives and investments. This includes the former CIDA-funded Local Government Support Program in ARMM (LGSPA), as well as Reform ARMM Now (RAN), the CSO accompaniment platform for the ARMM Reform Process under the Hataman caretaker administration.

## **Theme 2 – Bangsamoro-Driven Solutions**

### *Analysis*

The default approach to crisis situations in governance in the region is top-down and securitized. A fundamental barrier to the passage of a Bangsamoro Basic Law that is consistent with the spirit and letter of the GPH-MILF Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (and other signed agreements) and a peaceful transition is the lack of widespread understanding of Bangsamoro claims to autonomy and self-determination. Traditional and indigenous governance practices are perceived as marginal and less legitimate. A shift in mindset is required; from an unequal centre-periphery relationship controlled by central government, to a partnership between the Bangsamoro people and wider Philippine society. Moreover, management of resources and decision-making around development and planning is inequitable. Basic service provision is not prioritized. Economic policy is usually decided at higher levels and it does not often factor in local livelihoods or localized practices of social enterprise. Education, whether Western, secular or Islamic, is still not universally accessible for geographic or socioeconomic reasons and Madrasah education is still relegated to the margins, when it should be viewed as more than a purely religious activity, and accepted and strengthened as a valid means of preparing students for the labour market. A final issue for all levels of governance is that, despite the fact that some women hold substantial leadership roles in the ARMM, gender equality is not even and interpreted the same way across all communities.

### *Necessary changes*

- Educated and literate young people with attention to equity for women and girls
- The national education system integrates Madrasahs
- Implemented peace agreements (the passage of a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB)-compliant, “real” Bangsamoro Basic Law)
- Inclusive local governance systems with all parts of society participating actively
- Equitable gender representation at all levels of governance
- Effective basic service provision and resource management
- Vibrant and inclusive local markets
- Revival and acceptance of traditional and indigenous cultural practices for participation and governance

These actions require efforts at the national level, outside the ARMM, as well as at the grassroots level within the Bangsamoro region. The passage of an acceptable BBL hinges on the word of the President and a substantial level of buy-in from the general public in Luzon and Visayas, which would require the support of the media. These inputs could shape a favourable outcome once the BBL draft is debated by the Congressional bicameral committee. At the same time, community-level engagement that brings in the perspectives of non-Moro stakeholders, indigenous peoples, local government units, the sultanates, and the Christian population in the area is required, focusing on meaningful inputs from a variety of stakeholders, such as community elders, traditional leaders, artists, journalists and cultural workers.

#### **Theme 4 – Connectivity**

##### *Analysis*

Connectivity refers to a meaningful and reciprocal relationship between traditionally unequal actors: the powerful and the powerless; the voted and voter; business actors and their clients; administrators and those they serve; the Bangsamoro and the non-Bangsamoro. Many actors have a vested interest and profit from geographic and information asymmetries, which make services more difficult to access and facilitate corrupt practices. A lack of infrastructure is a major limitation to technological connectivity, along with power shortages and other geographic and logistical limitations. Efforts towards economic justice are blocked by economic elites and competitors who may not benefit from empowering local businesses. Government systems remain top-down by default and are not well-suited to horizontal and vertical connection. And there are vested interests within local government units that might block the harmonization of indigenous knowledge practices with the regular governance systems of the Philippine state. A lack of appreciation of Bangsamoro indigenous knowledge practices is also a major barrier. The experiences of the previous attempts to implement the GPH-MILF Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission's recommendation range from a lack of understanding from government, prevalent prejudice against minorities, as well as active blocking by some actors who have a history of sustaining an environment of marginalization, dispossession and human rights violations in previous conflicts.

##### *Necessary changes*

- Improved access to information and decision-making, particularly through IT solutions
- The promotion of economic justice, not only growth
- Strong horizontal and vertical linkages across levels of governance
- Formal governance integrates indigenous governance and resource management
- Bangsamoro history is fully integrated into the Philippine national narrative

Connectivity may be formal or informal, but it is always substantive, participatory, and culturally-sensitive. It means a reimagining of the negative power dynamics, leading to more equitable horizontal and vertical connectivity in decision-making, for example through economic justice that entails healthy relationships between displaced business persons and the relevant government agencies, funding institutions, and larger national and regional business clubs who can support local economic markets to flourish.

### III. CSO RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU ON ITS ENGAGEMENT ON BANGSAMORO LOCAL GOVERNANCE

As well as the more specific ideas that might emerge from the analysis and presentation of changes and blockages, there are more general recommendations for support to local governance that cut across all four of the themes that should be taken into account in political, development, economic or other engagements.

#### *For the design and implementation of support*

- Provide the resources for civil society and local governance actors to jointly track and distil best practices and gains from previous governance-related initiatives and investments
- Support resources for workshops, specific platforms to facilitate the exchange of best practices and lessons learning on local governance from across the Philippines (between Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) as well as exposure to global innovation, trends, models, and perspectives
- Allocate dedicated human and technical resources for ‘coordination’ in project funding to strengthen horizontal and vertical linkages at national, regional, provincial, and community level
- Invest in building the capacity of local CSOs in the areas of political research and analysis so they can be proactive as well as reactive to the context; for example, by adding a research and analysis capacity building dimension in all calls for proposals for civil society  
Engage with partners periodically to review the course of action within local governance projects and promote the most relevant and effective responses to contemporary events and dynamics  
Increase the number of meetings and networking opportunities with local community-level initiatives and platforms, as opposed to only through international NGOs.

#### *In these focal sectors / priority areas*

Support civil society platforms and activities that will accompany and monitor any future Bangsamoro Government, including enabling CSOs to support, advise and connect units and authorities. *See model - Reform ARMM Now (RAN) and ARMM Watch, an evolving civil society platform that entered into a “social contract” for good governance with the ARMM Reform Government under Mujiv Hataman in 2013*

Fund projects designed to support informed, expert civil society engagement with government on a development agenda, particularly for transparency, third-party monitoring and accountability, building specific capacity for:

- Funding and/or convening dialogue and diplomacy between civil society and local government
- Providing training resources and joint learning opportunities for civil society to better understanding the national, regional, and local planning and budgeting processes
- Providing training resources and opportunities for peer-to-peer exchanges for civil society to better access, process, and analyse local government data

Increase outreach and engagement with local private sector actors, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, proactively connecting them to civil society and local governance initiatives.

Provide organisational support to local special bodies (school boards, local development councils, health boards) to institutionalize both technical and cultural changes necessary for good governance, particularly once a new Local Government Code and other key laws come into being in a potential Bangsamoro entity.

Increase support to indigenous peoples' traditional governance structures, focusing on increasing capacities to manage governance, to integrate international human rights standards into those governance structures, and to play a more direct role in conflict transformation.

## Section 2: Guidance for promoting and supporting meaningful intra-Bangsamoro dialogues

*This section summarises participants' analysis and recommendations on the challenges, needs and good practices for dialogues as part of peace efforts. The section is structured to support the practical translation of this analysis into the design or prioritisation and includes a mapping of dialogue-inducing initiatives, actors and spaces (see Annex 2 - Contemporary Peacebuilding Dialogues in Mindanao).*

### I. WHOLE-OF-CIVIL-SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN PEACE

According to participants, communities participate in dialogues for four important reasons: to get information, to (re)connect with other stakeholders, to meet and engage with government officials, and to push for reforms. Dialogues, if held in a participatory and generative manner, subvert the standard top-down power dynamics prevalent in the Bangsamoro, and open up the possibilities that would otherwise not exist. The workshop allowed for a rapid 'audit' of dialogue initiatives which created space for a frank reflection on the opportunities, limitations, and points for improvement in the design and facilitation of dialogue in the Bangsamoro. Participants sketched out recommendations for course correction towards more meaningful dialogues, which, given the increasing complexity of the peace process, including the rise of black flag activity after the Marawi siege, will be an important instrument of peace going forward.

#### *Challenges of Participation*

Inclusion and funding in support of peace often favors actors and initiatives that are directly aligned with the GPH-MILF peace process architecture. Perceived allies are prioritized while projects contrasting or deviating from the messaging set by national authorities are in danger of being dismissed as "spoilers". Participants noted that the politics of exclusion can still apply to them as experienced actors in peace initiatives, , forcing them to proactively insert themselves into key dialogue activities, even when not invited. Formal quotas and mandates to ensure meaningful civil society participation in government dialogue mechanisms could address this. The fact that some stakeholders cannot choose to participate or not in dialogue due to various barriers, both perceived and real, was also raised. For example, this could be due to a lack of capacity to convey input, or because there is little incentive to engage given existing structural bottlenecks (e.g. "majority wins" rules for plebiscites). Others decline invitations in order to maintain the ability to veto a process later by saying they weren't consulted, for example some political leaders who are against the BBL. As such, participants urged that the difference between "not being consulted" vs. "invited but did not come" be clarified.

#### *Meaningful Dialogue*

The term 'dialogue' has been used indiscriminately in the past, including to define panels of presentations or information extraction/collection. This has serious implications for effectiveness real and perceived, of such a tool. There is also conflation of participation and representation. In many national and regional dialogues, representatives may take part in exclusive meetings, but their presence does not always guarantee that information will be disseminated to other parts of an organization or to the communities they work with, or that their inputs truly represent community

needs and aspirations. Some NGOs have positioned themselves as the representative voice of a community without organizing and supporting the needs and interests of those communities to contribute meaningfully. This supports the earlier emphasis on engaging directly with different segments of society at community level.

### *Independence and Agency of Civil Society*

Ensuring the independence in the design and implementation of dialogue processes is a major issue. Civil society actors can struggle to be constructive partners for peace if beholden to the negotiating parties or external donors. For example, donor policy can often influence grassroots civil society actors to realign programming based on frameworks formulated in donor capitals thousands of kilometres away. Moreover, the dialogues may end up being designed based on metrics set by donors, such as attendance and numbers of participants, in order to comply with contract requirements, instead of defining metrics that seek to measure the level of accountability and responsiveness to the communities being served.

## **II. OVER- AND UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN INTRA-BANGSAMORO DIALOGUES AND CONSULTATIONS**

The following profiles are over- and under-represented in previous dialogues based on the combinations of identity-markers, such as gender identity, religious belief, age, language, territory group, political perspective, and type of stakeholder.

OVER-REPRESENTED IN DIALOGUES	UNDER-REPRESENTED IN DIALOGUES
Those with high levels of formal education	Those with low levels of education
People from major cities such as Manila, Cotabato or Davao	Those from island provinces and grassroots leaders from rural areas
Men, in particular older men	Women ( <i>notably Women of the MILF - Bangsamoro Islamic Women’s Auxiliary Brigade and Social Welfare Committee</i> ) and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+)
Maguindanaon, or from mainland ARMM, rather than the island provinces	Indigenous peoples, Shiite minorities, Buddhists and non-Moro groups
Those comfortable communicating in English and Tagalog	Those not comfortable communicating in English or Tagalog
“Token” leaders of groups deemed acceptable by either the GPH, the MILF, or both	Non-Bangsamoro from Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao and Settlers / Christians
Influential traditional leaders (sultans and datus) and perceived power-brokers	People that are not organized into civil society groups, e.g. fisherfolk, vendors, drivers, labourers, sari-sari stores

<p>Local government units (LGUs) (overrepresented in community-level processes, but not in national-level dialogue and decision-making), local chief executives (LCEs), governors or mayors</p>	<p>Business support groups, chambers of commerce, business councils and clubs</p>
<p>Police and army chiefs and commanders</p>	<p>Groups that are critical and therefore are perceived as “spoilers” and those perceived or labelled as “extremist groups”</p>
<p>Influential academics (<i>e.g. the Mindanao State University on Marawi rehabilitation</i>)</p>	<p>Media as a whole, in particular Mindanao and Moro media</p>
<p>Civil society leaders (both national and international) that are affiliated with or are deemed acceptable by the MNLF or MILF, or have a well-established position on the peace process program or agenda.</p>	<p>Civil society that are not explicitly organized around peace or the peace process, such as: trade unions and labour groups; <i>Imams, aleema, toril</i> administrators and teachers; NGOs working in development, livelihood, other sectoral concerns; artists; cultural workers; athletes; informal services sector; student associations and councils; peasant / farmer organizations; teachers associations</p>
	<p>Young people (notably indigenous, Moro and out-of-school youth) and Senior citizens</p>
	<p>Internally Displaced Persons and diaspora communities</p>
	<p>Persons with Disabilities</p>

### Using Track 1 to support informal community-level participation

Several initiatives were cited that made the best of inherent top-down dynamics, as they leveraged the influence exercised by the national GPH-MILF peace architecture to support more participatory processes and dialogues on the ground. These include:

- Legitimizing/mainstreaming of women’s participation agenda through the CAB and the BBL. The use of gendered language in the CAB was sustained and brought to the grassroots, providing a basis for informal representation of women in communities.
- The presence of a Civilian Protection Component in the International Monitoring Team ensured that local NGOs and peoples’ networks had a stake in ensuring the ceasefire, alongside national and international representatives.
- The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission was supported through a localized listening process that gathered community experiences, fears, and aspirations related to human rights violations, marginalization through land dispossession, and other legitimate grievances.

### III. TECHNICAL DESIGN OF INTRA-BANGSAMORO DIALOGUES

Location / Venue. Many dialogues are conducted in Manila and other capital cities, which tends to lead to higher participation from the privileged profiles described in the previous section as over-represented as they are more likely to be informed and able to participate. Alternative venues in rural areas for in-situ dialogues would make them accessible to community members who are not informed of the dialogue, or without financial means to attend. Tapping into existing dialogue processes by “non-traditional” stakeholder groups, such as informal networks and dialogues among religious women, could enhance impact by providing a greater variety of perspectives on basic needs.

Dialogue Design and Configuration. Designing dialogue entails defining a clear objective and mapping out who needs to be in the room. Although standard dialogues are often multi-stakeholder and multi-issue, it is neither necessary to bring everyone in the same room, nor is it desirable to prioritise consensus. Bilateral dialogues and focused “safe spaces” for internal dialogues among groups could engage more people where they are. Internal dialogues within stakeholder groups are also necessary to ensure buy-in before proceeding to higher-level multi-stakeholder dialogue. One implication is the shift from civil society being broad advocates for peace to civil society organizations specialising in convening dialogues, with the necessary technical skills to facilitate and engage.

- Civil society’s ability to engage formal actors builds confidence at all levels, ensuring coordination with the relevant formal peace mechanisms (peace panels, JCCCH, IMT), the security sector, and inviting participation of non-state armed groups and politicians in ceremonial activities. This can help in linking very localized and informal agreements to the formal processes of government (e.g. agreements reached by traditional leaders for land conflict resolution are codified by the DENR and LRA) to ensure sustainability and non-

recurrence. The remaining challenge, however, is maintaining community and civil society independence and impartiality, ensuring that communities are on an equal footing despite the presence of politicians or men in uniform during the process.

Public or Private: Lack of transparency and consistent two-way communication is a constant challenge at all levels of dialogue. Participants noted that there is a lack of a unified and comprehensive communications plan for each peace process. The tendency for information to be kept within privileged circles of trust can be broken by ensuring that information is cascaded by participants to other members who were not in the room, and encouraging intergenerational, interfaith, intra-faith and inter-regional exchange by bringing in young people as a dialogue partner. Continuous investment in communication could encourage deeper and broader participation so that communities can feel that they have a stake in the peace and development process. Participants also noted that they are prevented from fully reaching out to populations who are vulnerable to recruitment by “black flag” actors. Outreach is limited by donor security and government policy restrictions (i.e. no access to BASULTA island provinces for internationals; engaging with vulnerable populations may be perceived as support to terrorist activity.)

Frequency / Duration: In many cases, limiting dialogue to a process and/or duration of a process has led to communities feeling used—as the dialogue is transactional, not in their best interests—and therefore, prone to consultation fatigue. The challenge is maintaining practical, strategic, independent, and consistent dialogues that are able to sustain such processes. Ongoing and consistent two-way flow of information would give priority to the nurturing of meaningful relationships and channels of communication versus limiting it to (goal-oriented) mediation and negotiation or ‘consultation’.

#### **Balancing independence and collaboration in intra-Bangsamoro dialogue platforms**

Some participants described donor support as a double-edged sword. While many initiatives cannot survive without external resources, the challenge lies in ensuring that dialogues are designed in ways that are meaningful to communities, not donor-driven. At the same time, responsible donor platforms can nurture better CSO collaboration.

- One participant described their facilitation of the return of IDPs to a village through a dialogue with MILF combatants. This (and other interventions) was need-based (not donor-driven), implemented with no external support, and was driven by the willingness of people to go and their understanding of mutual benefit as stakeholders of the affected community.
- DFAT-Australia’s Coalitions for Change platform was described as good funding model, where CSOs were encouraged to form joint platforms in working on various dialogue processes together, bridging gaps and looking at how to design to minimise competition between organizations over funding or position.

## IV. CSO RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EU ON WAYS TO PROMOTE AND SUPPORT INTRA-BANGSAMORO DIALOGUES

### *Key Skills and Resources*

From the analysis of contemporary dialogues, a number of key skills and resources were identified that would significantly enhance civil society actors' capacity and ability to convene dialogues locally and on a sustainable basis. These were noted as:

- **Strengthening the number and capacity of local facilitators:** key dialogue tools such as conflict analysis, negotiation, public speaking, and facilitation as well as basic logistical and financial support for useful platforms and spaces
- **Providing technical support for local and traditional conflict mitigation and resolution mechanisms** (e.g. on rido, with communities), including skills for convening dialogues and long term financial support which allows local peacebuilders to develop methodologies and build confidence with conflict parties.
- **Allocating resources to mechanisms advancing coordination and dialogue amongst CSOs** for greater complementarity and connecting academia with on-the-ground civil society networks to ensure strong praxis on key peace and development issues (e.g. discrimination, security, gender, etc.)
- **Supporting rigorous reflection processes, exchanges on best practices and lessons learned exercises as part of impact evaluation** of previous and current investments in the Philippines (between Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) and in other parts of the world, ensuring exposure to global innovation, trends, models, and perspectives on dialogue and peace processes. This can be done through peer-to-peer exchanges, accompaniment, field trips, introductions or trainings.

### *Recommendations for these focal sectors / priority areas*

1. Support dialogue on the economic aspects of transition, linking Bangsamoro SMEs with the major local business councils and with the international business community
2. Promote localized prevention of violent extremism using dialogue and involving local communities on the front lines, instead of government / military-oriented "countering" approaches
3. Facilitate outreach to religious youth groups and those outside-of-education to play a constructive role in communities and towards peaceful relations
4. Increase resources and attention to interfaith and intra-faith dialogue between and among religious leaders and in communities, in particular dialogue among Muslim communities in the Bangsamoro
5. Support a civil society delegation to the Office of the President around the passage of a CAB-compliant BBL before the end of the congressional bicameral committee process
6. Promote media activities to amplify voices and create awareness of the Southern Philippines issues, perspectives on the BBL, culture, and history among a wider national audience; this can be done through media courses for Bangsamoro communities, conflict-sensitivity trainings for reporters and supporting or organising field trips of mainstream media journalists to meet members of different local communities in the Bangsamoro
7. Support the implementation of the GPH-MILF Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report recommendations, specifically

- a. the TJR popularization work being done by the Independent Working Group for Dealing with the Past (IWG-DWP) and civil society actors involved in the TJRC listening process;
  - b. advocacy on the draft bill creating a Transitional Justice and Reconciliation on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB)
8. Support constructive dialogues between CSOs and the security and defence community on security sector reform (SSR), including through roundtables, invitations to informal /high-level meetings and by identifying and using opportunities for dialogue in initiatives outside of development and peacebuilding programmes

## Annex 1. Visions of an inclusive and peaceful Bangsamoro entity across levels of governance

The components emerging from the visioning exercises describe aspirations for governance at multiple levels. These components may offer useful guidance for what success looks like concretely / what an engagement should be trying to do according to the collective perspective of civil society stakeholders participating in the workshop.

	National – Regional	Regional-Provincial	City-Municipal	Barangay
Political Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relationship between the Bangsamoro and rest of the Philippines is harmonious.</li> <li>Women participate equally in all branches of decision-making (executive, legislative, judiciary).</li> <li>Fiscal powers of the Bangsamoro entity are strong.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Bangsamoro peoples across the various ethnolinguistic groups are united in their support to the new regional government.</li> <li>There is horizontal and vertical integration and coordination amongst the various local government units, where the region directly works with barangay.</li> <li>Open data (particularly in relation to the budget)</li> <li>Citizens, organised groups, regional parties engage the Bangsamoro Parliament and set the legislative agenda.</li> <li>Bangsamoro Parliament and government include all ethnicities and religions, and 50% women.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Majority of local government units have the seal of good local governance;</li> <li>Regular municipal assemblies where mayor updates constituents are held.</li> <li>Local special bodies are operational and composed in a transparent manner.</li> <li>Indigenous peoples’ rights to Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) are acknowledged and protected.</li> <li>Citizens are consulted at local and community level, not at regional level and not in a token manner.</li> <li>Cities compete on cleanliness, being green and being well-governed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basic services are effectively delivered.</li> <li>Citizens of all generations are informed and engaged in barangay planning.</li> <li>Regular sectoral meetings which include young women, traditional leaders and differently-abled persons are held.</li> <li>Plans are responsive and aligned with local needs.</li> <li>Planning, implementation, and evaluation is inclusive of all the segments of the affected population.</li> <li>Barangay justice system is effective and operational.</li> <li>The role of traditional and religious leaders is recognized and harnessed in policymaking.</li> </ul>

	National – Regional	Regional-Provincial	City-Municipal	Barangay
Economic Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is political and economic reciprocity between the national government and the Bangsamoro government.</li> <li>• Provinces, cities, and islands within the Bangsamoro are connected to each other and with other areas in the Philippines.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development is shared amongst the provinces. The Bangsamoro are no longer the poorest in the country.</li> <li>• Growth with equity is encouraged.</li> <li>• The employment rate is higher.</li> <li>• Policies are designed towards economic justice and fiscal autonomy.</li> <li>• Resources are used and sustainably developed, in a non-extractive manner.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Business people, including those who are displaced, are involved in decision-making.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proactive and bottom-up village development is encouraged.</li> <li>• Self-reliance is a driving economic principle for communities.</li> <li>• Local roads are laid with concrete.</li> </ul>
Social / Cultural Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• and narrative is included as part of the national curriculum.</li> <li>• Madrasah education is recognized.</li> <li>• There is interoperability between Islamic and mainstream/secular education.</li> <li>• Certifications of teachers and students in Islamic schools are accepted as valid</li> <li>• The Bangsamoro narrative is part of national history.</li> <li>• People of the Bangsamoro, Indigenous peoples are treated no differently from citizens from Manila and are not perceived as marginal, violent, criminals or terrorists.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women and girls are literate and educated.</li> <li>• Intercultural and intracultural, interfaith and intra-faith dialogues occur at all levels.</li> <li>• Indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro and Moro people have harmonious relationship, including in governance mechanisms.</li> <li>• Families are resilient. The welfare of children from distinct cultures and traditions is prioritized. The relationship and communication between children and their mothers and fathers is renewed.</li> <li>• The spirit of Bayanihan is renewed.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Children have access to quality secular and Islamic education.</li> <li>• Central media has status locally and citizens have access to local newspapers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Religious leaders are engaged in participatory decision-making.</li> <li>• Common feast days/ activities across cultures and faiths are celebrated.</li> <li>• Pre-colonial Bangsamoro coffeeshop culture is revived and thriving.</li> <li>• Values formation institutions and education are mainstreamed.</li> </ul>

	National – Regional	Regional-Provincial	City-Municipal	Barangay
Human Security Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Transitional Justice processes are supported.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is less insurgency in the region.</li> <li>• Traditional leadership and mediation mechanisms are recognized and operational.</li> <li>• The proliferation of guns and firearms diminishes by 50%.</li> <li>• Grievances of Moro and Indigenous Peoples in conflict affected areas are addressed.</li> <li>• The Bangsamoro is free from <i>rido</i>.</li> <li>• People are free to move, to speak and to do business.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Marawi reconstruction is substantially completed.</li> <li>• IDPs can return to their original homes if so desired.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public places where people can meet and socialize safely are available.</li> <li>• People, especially the young, are taught the lessons of the Marawi siege.</li> <li>• Traditional leaders regularly share information on security situation among each other.</li> <li>• Military uniforms are not visible anymore.</li> </ul>

**Cross-Cutting (Across All Levels)**

Political Indicators	Economic Indicators	Social / Cultural Indicators	Human Security Indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“ Active citizen participation and “empowered ‘followership’” is present at all levels of government.</li> <li>“ Local government mechanisms and powers are fully devolved and functional towards genuine autonomy.</li> <li>“ Transparency / open governance is practiced in vetting infrastructure projects.</li> <li>“ Civil society’s role in governance is institutionalized.</li> <li>“ 50% participation of women at all levels is ensured.</li> <li>“ Traditional leadership is recognized and relied upon</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“ Women are able to gather together and to participate in business and social enterprise.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“ Gender fairness, sensitivity, and balance is mainstreamed.</li> <li>“ Young people of all communities and levels of education are engaged by local, national and international actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>“ Communities come together to celebrate life without fear.</li> <li>“ Communities are resilient and human security is ensured at all levels. Families are free from food insecurity.</li> <li>“ Religious and cultural tolerance prevails.</li> <li>“ Transitional justice processes are operating.</li> </ul>

## Annex 2. Contemporary Peacebuilding Dialogues in Mindanao

Promoting and supporting meaningful intra-Bangsamoro dialogues requires an understanding of existing mechanisms, tools, and capacities being used in recent and ongoing initiatives within the region.

The Annex lists examples of contemporary **intra-Bangsamoro dialogue processes that were perceived by the civil society participants to have created a useful peace impact**. In order to demonstrate the various mechanisms and contexts in which dialogue takes place, participants plotted out initiatives according to four relative indicators on an axis: formal, informal, implicit, and explicit.

Formal – linked to the peace process

Informal – not linked to the peace process

Explicit – with a planned or intentional peace impact

Implicit – with peace as a side / secondary effect of the main activity

### Notes on the tables

Dialogue initiatives are dominated by formal-explicit joint mechanisms under the GPH-MILF peace process architecture, as well as the informal-explicit civil society initiatives directly accompanying or supporting the formal architecture in varying degrees. This ranges from the pre-Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) joint ceasefire and criminal interdiction mechanisms, to the expanded platforms created under the CAB, of which the Bangsamoro Transition Commission and its consultation activities for the drafting and passage of an enabling law are just one stream of engagement.

New expanded peace tables established by OPAPP, as well as the mechanisms for the shift to federalism and Marawi reconstruction, are major additions under the Duterte Administration. The latter two are not directly part of the GPH-MILF peace process, but significantly impact upon peace outcomes in Mindanao. These are supported by informal advocacy and dialogue platforms at regional level, including: interfaith and intra-faith dialogues; tri-peoples peace platforms; peace initiatives explicitly targeting youth and women; and capacity-building efforts such as peace camps and the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute.

Community-led conflict transformation networks and alternate dispute mechanisms are in place across the provinces. These are often informal, tied to traditional knowledge-practices, and may or may not receive external support from donors. This includes: Dawah and khutbah sermons facilitated by the imams; dialogue activities facilitated by the *bae-a-labi*, or the women of the Bangsamoro royal houses, and their non-Moro indigenous peoples counterparts. There are also some local governance-related dialogue platforms, such as integrated development alliances amongst adjacent government units (such as those in Basilan, or the Iranun cluster in northern Maguindanao); or dialogues tied to psychosocial support processes in evacuation centres.

### Formal – Explicit Initiatives

Linked to the peace process with a planned or intentional peace impact

#### ***Joint mechanisms under the GPH-MILF peace process architecture***

JCCCH, AHJAG, JCMAC, International Monitoring Team and its Local Monitoring Teams, peacekeeping mechanisms

Organized quick response teams

#### ***Expanded peace tables established by OPAPP***

including the IP Peace Panel

Initiatives under the MNLF-GPH Peace Process

#### ***CAB and BTC-related consultations***

Congress-BTC public hearings on the BBL

TJRC Listening Process

#### ***National conferences on BBL and federalism***

### Formal – Implicit Initiatives

Dialogue linked to the peace process with peace as a side / secondary effect

National Youth Parliament

#### ***Task Force Bangon Marawi and its CSO Platform***

Democratic Leadership and Active Society Empowerment (DELACSE) training project

Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Study Groups

Bangsamoro Transition Commission's Task Force Lanao

### Informal – Explicit Initiatives

Not linked to the peace process but with a planned or intentional peace impact

#### ***Various CSO-led initiatives and CSO-CSO Dialogues on the BBL***

Insider Mediators Group

EnPold- Enhancing Political Dialogue for Inclusive Peace

Kusog (Strong) Mindanaw

CSO BTC lobby teams = dialogues with stakeholders

Mindanao Peoples' Peace Agenda, All-Out-Peace, Sign BBL

#### ***Community-led conflict resolution networks***

ARMM-Rido Settlement Network (ACMRS)

Ranao Reconciliation Committee

ARMM RUC MTRU

TFCRM

Tumikang Sama-Sama with Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Rido with The Asia Foundation

#### ***Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms***

Local conflict resolution through the traditional justice system

#### ***Peace journalism networks***

Mediation

Mindanao Media Summit

***Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute (MPI) - Grassroots Peacebuilding Learning Centre***

#### ***Youth coalition movement for peace***

Mindanao Tri-people Youth Conference supported by the Bishop-Ulama Conference (MTYC)

Muslim Students Association

Provincial Tribal Youth

Youth Capacity Building for Conflict Analysis among the Youth

#### ***Intra-Bangsamoro dialogues***

Speakers Bureau (sponsored by UN Women) – training / capacity-building of Bangsamoro women facilitators

Bangsamoro Platform for Unity, Solidarity and Harmony (BM-PUSH)

Informal discussions between MNLF-MILF, MNLF-MNLF, MNLF or MILF with others

***Interfaith and intra-faith dialogues***

IP-Muslim, Muslim-Muslim dialogues  
Bishop-Ulama Conference  
Sultan Federation

***Coalition-building among LGUs***

Iranun Development Council (IDC), Basilan Alliance

**Informal – Implicit Dialogue**

Not linked to the peace process with peace as a side / secondary effect

Duyog Marawi

**Youth interfaith/intercultural exchange**

ex – MARADECA, Kids for Peace, youth and peace camps

MyPeace by Balay Rehab

Peace governance in Mindanao (Catholic Relief Services)

Activities of royal women – *Bae-a-labi* – women with royal titles enthroned and recognized

Religious (*ulama*) *majlis as-surah*

*Dawah* and *khutbah* sermons in the masjid

Clan and family conversations

Moro-IP kinship rituals

Inter-IP Dialogue

Social media platforms. Facebook pages and groups such as Bangsamoro News, ARMM Watch

Dialogues taking place in evacuation centres among different ethnolinguistic groups

Evacuation centre psychosocial activities

Weddings and Social functions