Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Policy Meeting

EU Support for Security Sector Reform:
Learning from the EU CSDP Missions and other EU support in Guinea-Bissau and DRC

Monday 16 May 2011

This meeting, organised in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN), brought together policy-makers, practitioners and experts from the EU institutions, EU delegations and CSDP missions, civil society organisations, and academic and research institutions. For more information about CSDN meetings, please contact Sanne Tielemans at EPLO (stielemans@eplo.org)

The objective of the meeting was to draw lessons from the EU's engagement in security sector reform (SSR) with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of EU support to SSR. Particular attention was given to the experience of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and other support projects in Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule. This report, by consultant Laura Davis, gathers views expressed and recommendations made by participants in the meeting, which are in no way attributable to the organisers, individual participants or participating institutions. The report is structured around the main themes discussed, drawing out the key points raised by the panellists and in discussion, and highlighting the recommendations participants made.

Introduction

Security sector reform is increasingly recognized as a crucial component in assistance for fragile states in post-conflict environments; including in the World Bank's World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development.[1] Developing institutions which provide security and justice for citizens is essential for stability and democracy-building.

The overall objectives of SSR are to support the transition of the security sector into security and justice services which are effective, legitimate and democratically accountable: into institutions which protect the citizen and support democracy, and which are democratically managed and accountable. It is a highly complex endeavour. In fragile and post-conflict settings, states often fail their security obligations or actively compromise the security of their own people, and security institutions are frequently highly corrupt and/or infiltrated by organized crime. This presents important challenges to reform. Engaging in SSR is not without risk. Incomplete reform processes can seriously increase the risk of a return to conflict.

The EU is facing its own challenges as it implements the reforms included in the Treaty of Lisbon. One significant change is the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Yet this also provides the opportunity to reflect on lessons learnt from the EU's past support to SSR and to make this support more effective and more comprehensive in the future.   The EU has a range of tools at its disposal to support SSR, most notably CSDP missions, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and geographical instruments, such as the European Development Fund (EDF). The new powers of the EU delegations in the field also provide opportunity for greater political engagement in SSR. The ways in which the

---

[1] Available at http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/fulltext

various EU organs - EEAS, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), DEVCO, the EU delegations and CSDP missions - as well as Member States work together in the future will have considerable impact on EU support to SSR.

EU Policies and Practice

Background to EU support to SSR

EU support to SSR is grounded in the Treaty on European Union, which establishes a three-fold basis for external action: i) The respect for human rights, rule of law and democracy; ii) conflict prevention, peacebuilding and international security; and iii) sustainable development.

The EU's policy framework for support to SSR comprises the Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006), the EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) (13 October 2005) and the Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform (24 May 2006). This policy framework predates the UN guidelines, and is closely based on the work of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC). Nonetheless, there is a sense that the EU is a relative newcomer to the field and that it continues to 'learn by doing'.

The EU's approach – like those of other organisations working in the field such as the OECD DAC and the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) puts SSR and other state-building approaches at the core of peacebuilding. It has two main objectives:

i)   to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security and justice challenges they face; and

ii)   to do so in a manner consistent with democratic norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of law.

On 11 May, High Representative Ashton addressed the European Parliament.[2] She argued that 'deep democracy' is vital for 'surface democracy' (where citizens participate in free and fair elections). Deep democracy includes justice and rule of law, security for the citizens, in line with the paradigm shift recognised by the World Development Report. Recognising that SSR should help to create a secure environment conducive to other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of armed violence and crime suggests that SSR is a vital component of promoting deep democracy.

Principles of EU support to SSR

SSR is by its nature **comprehensive and long term**. An important strength of CSDP is the combination of both military and civilian capability. Over the years, CSDP has developed the ability to deploy integrated missions addressing the police, justice system, border management and customs more comprehensively. But it is clear that SSR is not the preserve of CSDP alone; in the longer-term development aid needs to take on a primary role so the balance between the different EU instruments is right. With the current institutional arrangements, this means that the instruments are developed separately and should be brought together at different stages.

---

[2] Available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/326&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

EU interventions need to be **well-coordinated**, both in Brussels and in the field. This includes coordination between the EU actors and with international partners as well as the national authorities.

Reform processes should be **locally owned**, which can be difficult to achieve in practice. For example, although CSDP missions are only launched with a UN mandate or with the agreement of the host country, developing shared objectives and milestone with the national partner can be difficult. It is important to note that local ownership does not imply state ownership – the consultation, involvement and oversight of society within the country is crucial.

Each country or region has different needs, and interventions should be **tailored** to the context. This should take into account the different security needs of different people, including women.

The EU should have a built-in programmatic approach based on benchmarks so that **progress** towards objectives **can be monitored**, including when support is on-going so that programmes can be adapted as necessary.

The main activities

EU support to SSR focuses on reforming the defence and police sectors, and also strengthening the rule of law and justice. In early post-conflict stages, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is a priority. Interventions may adopt a 'strengthening' or 'substitution' approach. Strengthening means monitoring, mentoring and advising police, magistrates, judges and other officials. One CSDP mission, EULEX Kosovo, has a limited executive mandate and substitutes for national personnel. However, this is rare, and only happens where the national infrastructure is extremely weak. Substitution usually includes a strong element of strengthening, as part of the mission's exit strategy.

Challenges

EU efforts to support SSR have faced serious challenges. In fragile situations, the infrastructure is poor and human resources limited. As many of the public institutions are directly connected to the security system and in desperate need of reform, it can be difficult to know where to begin. Where the public institutions are weak and the national partner's capacity to absorb aid is very low, this can contribute to a tendency to 'build' rather than reform the security sector, with the risk that important reforms, for example to make the security services democratically accountable, are deprioritised. However, the absence of qualified personnel and adequate infrastructure and equipment remains a serious challenge to SSR in post-conflict and fragile situations.

In addition, 'emergencies' – whether upcoming elections or resurgence in violence – make long-term, structural reform more difficult. As one participant put it, 'it is like trying to change a ship while you are sailing it.' The result is that reform efforts tend to be more reactive than anticipatory. This dynamic, which can be compounded by government actions, have a direct impact on the security sector, undertaken without consulting or engaging SSR actors. For example: in DRC the government has 'integrated' former armed groups in the national army which has made EUSEC's attempts at a census of the army more difficult.

Lessons emerging from EU Support to SSR, with a particular focus on CSDP missions in the DRC and Guinea-Bissau

Context

The Democratic Republic of Congo is as big as Western Europe. It has been conflict-ridden for 15 years and prior to that was a failed state. The challenge in DRC is to make the link between 'surface democracy' and 'deep democracy'. The international community – including the EU and its Member States – is trying to ensure that the elections planned for November 2011 will take place, and will be free and fair. (EU support for the elections will be more than €100 million.) Some of the investments that the EU and its member states have made in SSR in DRC should contribute to this process. The *Police d'Intevention Rapide,* which were trained by the French in advance of the 2006 elections, have received further investment from the Instrument for Stability. The police force in general is stronger than it was five years ago.

There are currently two CSDP missions in the DRC; EUPOL which focuses on police reform and EUSEC which works to reform the army. EUSEC has considerably more financial resources than EUPOL. The Commission has also supported extensive police- and justice-sector reform through the EDF.

In contrast to the DRC, Guinea-Bissau is a small country with a strong identity where there has been comparatively little violence. The core functions of state have been undermined by international organised crime; indeed, organised crime is far stronger than either the state or the international community. EU support to SSR has included Commission-funded interventions (particularly through the EDF and IfS) and a CSDP mission. However, the deep-rooted natures of the problems need to be framed in a regional approach to tackling the drug trafficking routes between Western Africa, Latin America, and Europe. As a result, the EU decided to halt the CSDP mission and to engage the government in dialogue and consultation (under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement) to work out a way forward.

Lessons from EU SSR support in DRC and Guinea-Bissau.

1. The Strategic Objectives of SSR

Security sector *reform* seeks to change the nature of the security services to increase the security of the population and to enable democracy-building, and to increase the democratic accountability of the security services. However, resistance from local authorities to genuine reform, the closing down of 'democratic space' (as in DRC since 2006) coupled with poor infrastructure and human resources may mean that SSR projects 'lose their soul' and risk replicating old models of (military) technical assistance by supporting the security services without adequately reforming them. To avoid this, SSR should be closely related to democratic agenda and broader democracy-building projects (e.g. reform of the civil service), be people-centred and take the particular needs of women into account. Further, SSR funding should be dependent on measurable progress towards democratisation.

A stronger strategic approach would also allow SSR support to be more flexible and better able to manage risk.

Recommendations:
➢ The EU should strengthen its strategic approach and identify its niche in supporting SSR in relation to other interventions by the international community. It should engage only in value-based *reform* not

just assistance, or it risks 'losing its soul.' The presence of other actors engaged in assisting the security sector– particularly China in Africa – should not lead to a 'race to the bottom'.
➢ EU support to SSR should proactively seek to take into account and respond to people's security and justice needs and concerns, with a particular emphasis on how women and men experience justice and security differently. Without this key dimension of SSR, reform processes will miss the opportunity to tackle issues of security sector governance, accountability, legitimacy and transparency.
➢ Civil society and the European Parliament should ensure EU support to SSR meets these objectives.

2. Frame the technical aspects of SSR in the political context

For SSR to bring about reform, the EU and other SSR actors need to engage politically as well as technically, and technical aspects of SSR need to be firmly grounded in the political context.

In Guinea-Bissau, the relevant laws needed for reform have been passed, but in a country in which organised drug crime has infiltrated every layer of government and the security sector, implementation of these laws is a challenge.

In DRC, EUPOL has access to national policy-makers through the *Comité de Suivi de la Réforme de la Police* (CSRP), the working group coordinating police reform since 2008. It also has direct access to the Ministry of Home Affairs. EUPOL has, for example, engaged with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Home Affairs to prepare the organic laws (or: fundamental laws) necessary for police reform. But differences between the two ministries hinder the passage of the organic law.

In contrast, there is no equivalent national coordination for defence reform; indeed the Congolese authorities resist coordination, preferring to enter into bilateral arrangements with donors. Although there is a lot of interest from international donors in defence reform, none is willing to take a coordinating role. A key component of EUSEC's work is a census of the army and distribution of identity cards. However, the mission needs governmental support to distribute the cards and in some regions – particularly the Kivus – a lack of government support has hampered efforts. All these examples suggest that EU SSR reform efforts need greater political support from the EU institutions to engage at the highest level in-country.

A positive outcome of the intervention in Guinea-Bissau was that it prompted a broader, public debate for the first time on the role of the security services in society. This political debate opened up new space for discussion on, for example, the role of ex-combatants. (Political- and military-related killings regularly hampered a lot of reforms necessary for democracy.) So when the coup took place in 2010, people came out in opposition to the military, which was quite remarkable.

There is a tendency in SSR projects to try and adopt laws quickly, without consultation or even the meaningful participation of the national assembly. But even where parliaments are weak, working with them on SSR will strengthen their capacities.

Recommendations:
➢ The EU should strengthen the political aspect of SSR support so that SSR support contributes directly to 'deep democracy' as defined by High Representative Ashton and is closely linked to a democratisation agenda.
➢ EU support to SSR should work with parliaments, thus enhancing their capacity to hold the security sector to account, for example, by supporting parliamentary committees to play a scrutiny function.

They should avoid the temptation to push through laws necessary for SSR without the participation of the parliament for although this may be quicker, it undermines the democratic accountability component of SSR.

➢ Where possible, SSR projects should seek to catalyse broader public debates around the role of the security sector.

3. High-level political dialogue as an intrinsic element to SSR

In DRC, the reform agenda in SSR projects was much stronger during the Transitional Government and before the elections of 2006. At this time, then Commissioner Louis Michel had strong political engagement with President Kabila and the government; as the EU's engagement has weakened, so has the reform aspect of SSR. There is no high-level political dialogue connected to SSR in DRC.

In Guinea-Bissau, the EU is engaged in an Article 96 consultation, but prior to this, there no was high-level dialogue related to SSR in Guinea-Bissau either. (Article 96 of the Cotonou agreement states that in case of a breach of commitments to good governance and human rights, the EU and partner enter into consultations).

Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement provides a legal basis for high-level political dialogue; ongoing political dialogue at this level would provide the forum for the EU and national partner to agree on plans to ensure they are relevant and have realistic expectations, and agree on benchmarks to measure progress. The EU and national partner could then jointly monitor progress.

Dialogue would also help the parties to hold each other to account, and enable the EU to apply conditionality if the national partner blocks reform and/or tolerates human rights abuse, particularly by state agents. At the moment, there are no consequences for national authorities if they fail to implement necessary reforms.

There may be situations where the government is committed to SSR, but is unable to address fundamental problems of corruption and organised crime (such as in Guinea-Bissau). In these cases, high-level dialogue could help the national authorities and the EU tackle the issue regionally, engaging the UN or relevant regional organisations.

Recommendations:
➢ High-level political dialogue should be integrated into SSR processes as a matter of course on the basis of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement
➢ Political dialogue could enable the EU to place more priority on outcomes (e.g. reducing criminality and human rights violations by security agents) rather than focussing on tangible outputs (e.g. building courtrooms, training) and to link the political and the technical aspects of SSR.
➢ Through political dialogue, the EU and partner country can develop joint benchmarks for progress and follow-up (e.g. implementation of laws passed in relation to SSR).
➢ There should be consequences where national authorities block meaningful reform and tolerate human rights abuse. The EU should apply conditionality where this happens; the Cotonou Agreement provides a transparent process for this.

4. Local ownership

Local ownership can be a serious challenge where the authorities are unwilling or unable to commit to reform. To broaden the understanding of local ownership beyond the authorities, missions try to engage with civil society at all levels of the programme. In DRC, for example, civil society organisations are involved in the CSRP and particularly with projects aimed at introducing community-based policing.

As noted above, coordination of SSR projects by the national government is key to success. In Guinea-Bissau, the government was supportive of SSR, but it was not adequately engaged in formulating the national strategy, or in the planning stage of the CSDP mission. In DRC there is a coordination body for police reform, but participants felt that police reform efforts would be far more successful if there were one project led by the Congolese government with the participation of different donors rather than the current approach of many different projects engaging in police reform under the umbrella of the CSRP. Further, there is no equivalent coordination body for defence reform, nor a ministerial- or presidential-level steering group to coordinate SSR across police, justice and defence sectors, which is a serious lack.

Local ownership (by the government) is also seriously undermined by corruption and organised crime within the security sector.

Recommendation:
➢ Local ownership of SSR projects in fragile situations presents significant challenges. In part these may be informed by better political analysis, engaging civil society (including human rights organisations) and the media in SSR and recognising the importance of addressing corruption and organised crime. Good practice at the community level of protection by the security services and collaboration with the community should also be taken into account.

5. Limitations of the EU Concept

A limitation to the way in which the EU supports SSR is that the approach, which is institutional and top-down, is informed by how security institutions work in Europe. EU SSR support could be strengthened by thorough analysis of how the security institutions really work in each case, not only according to what the laws and Constitution say, but how they operate on the ground. In a country like DRC, security provision has, over decades, become informal. For example: in reality, there are several Congolese armies, not just one.

In addition, non-state actors provide security, and traditional forms of governance contribute to justice and security, yet these actors are not included in SSR projects as they do not fit with how the security sector is understood. In addition, in fragile situations such as DRC, the power lies in the person holding a position rather than in the institution itself. Similarly, in Guinea-Bissau, the emphasis of SSR projects has been on legislative reform, but the main challenge remains in implementation given the infiltration of organised drug-related crime within the institutions.

A thorough political analysis of the power networks at play and how security is really delivered could greatly improve the relevance and impact of SSR projects.

Recommendations:
➢ The EU should revise its concept of SSR to take into account the realities of non-Western (and potentially fragile) situations. This should include how to address non-state actors (e.g. militia

groups) and how to connect with traditional governance structures providing justice/security without compromising human rights principles.
➢ The EU should also address corruption and organised crime operating within the security sector as a key obstacle to meaningful reform.

6. The challenge of short-term CSDP mandates within a long-term vision for SSR

CSDP missions have short mandates, usually of one year. These short-term mandates present challenges to the missions on the ground: it is difficult for missions to develop long-term engagement with local authorities and civil society, and to integrate key issues into the mission strategy and develop milestones.

The brevity of CSDP mandates is largely due to Member States, which are perhaps less likely to commit to providing capabilities for a longer period. Although it is usually difficult to determine at the outset for how long a mission is likely to be engaged, CSDP missions see the need for longer mandates, yet Member States seem to lack the necessary longer-term perspective.

In Guinea-Bissau, although there was good cooperation between the Council and Commission at the early stages of planning, there was no link made between the planned CSDP activities and longer-term programming of Commission instruments from the outset. In retrospect, ensuring an early connection between the EDF, IfS and the CSDP mission planning processes could have strengthened the plan for EU support to SSR in Guinea-Bissau. This should have included linking EDF directly with the exit strategy for the mission, and integrating benchmarks into the mission plan to help manage the phase out process, and transfer of the bulk of programming to EDF.

The creation of the EEAS provides an opportunity for the EU to plan its presence more carefully, and take a longer vision of what kind of action it wants to take, i.e. which instruments to use at which time, and how they may be combined.

Recommendations:
➢ The EEAS should now take responsibility for developing a longer-term vision for EU intervention in a given context, identifying the right mix of tools and instruments. This should include developing benchmarks for phasing out the CSDP mission and transferring lead responsibility to development aid.
➢ Member States – who commit to deploy resources only in the short-term and determine the short-term nature of CSDP mission mandates – should take a longer-term approach. Civil society has a key role to play in this and the European Parliament should also be engaged.

7. The value of integrated rather than multiple EU interventions

An important lesson from DRC is that EU support to SSR in the country, with two CSDP missions and EC support to police and justice sector reform is seen by the Congolese authorities and other parts of the international community as a fragmented approach. This compartmentalisation mimics the separation between the different pillars of the security sector in DRC, and means that a holistic approach, addressing the system as a whole, is impossible.

There are significant practical obstacles to good EU coordination including the short-term mandates of CSDP missions versus the long-term approach of Commission support. There is no alignment between

the cycles of the different types of support. There is little cross-over or mutual reinforcement. Although there is an EU 'road map' for SSR engagement in DRC, this has not contributed to a more comprehensive or strategic approach: the question of whether EUPOL or the Commission leads on police reform, for example, remains contested. The absence of a coordination mechanism means that to date coordination has relied on the personal qualities of the staff members concerned, which is structurally unreliable.

This fragmentation is exacerbated by the difference in funding levels between the three interventions. The existence of separate EU SSR support projects and a lack of coordination between them means that Commission, EUPOL and EUSEC staff sometimes disagree publicly, which reduces the impact of the interventions further.

An integrated approach could enable a more strategic engagement, reduce the impact of resourcing differences between the missions, and present the national authorities with a single interlocutor.

> **Recommendation:**
> ➤ Replacing multiple instruments with a single integrated approach would not only increase the ability of the EU to address the security sector more strategically and holistically, but would also level out imbalances in financing and present the national partner with a single interlocutor.

8. Post-Lisbon reforms as an opportunity for greater coordination

At headquarters level, it is unclear what role (if any) DEVCO will have in SSR after 1 June 2011. Given the importance of SSR within development aid, and the attention given to this in the World Development Report, it would be unfortunate if DEVCO lost responsibility for, and competence in, SSR.

In general, the missions and delegation in Kinshasa have not yet fully adapted to the new institutional arrangements. Yet the relationships between the EU actors are at a turning point and participants hoped that implementing the post-Lisbon reforms would greatly increase coordination between the different EU actors, and particularly between CSDP missions and longer-term development aid.

Previously, the CSDP missions in DRC received political guidance from the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes. With the post-Lisbon reforms, this role has been transferred to the EU ambassador, who is resident in Kinshasa (unlike the EUSR who was based in Brussels and travelled throughout the Great Lakes region). This proximity will make it easier for the CSDP missions to develop a stronger relationship with the person providing political guidance. In principle, if there were a key issue to be raised at the political level, the head of the CSDP mission and the EU ambassador could make a joint intervention with the relevant minister, although this has not yet happened.

Participants also noted that ambassadors in the field and at the Political and Security Committee (PSC) from the same Member State may have differing views; Member States need improve their internal communication and have a consistent position.

> **Recommendations:**
> ➤ Civil society and the European Parliament should press for continued close engagement of development aid (i.e. DEVCO) in SSR, in accordance with the OECD DAC guidance on ODA eligibility.
> ➤ Member states should ensure that their ambassadors in the field and in the PSC have a consistent position.

9. Monitoring and measuring progress

A joint review of progress in SSR should be conducted by the EU and national authorities, with the national authorities taking the lead.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for SSR projects is difficult and can be sensitive. M&E of SSR projects does not require a fundamentally different approach than for other development programmes: 'rather than re-inventing the wheel, we may need off-road tyres' as one participant put it. In addition, few SSR actors – international and national- are comfortable with the language of M&E or results-based management. But it is an important part of SSR assistance and including an assessment of the politics surrounding SSR is vital for capacity building and training projects.

M&E should not be focussed solely on the internal functioning of SSR projects: it is more important that it looks at the effects on the population. Measuring for impact on civilian protection and human rights would further improve the effectiveness of SSR and link it more firmly to democratisation processes. SSR projects should monitor for expected and unexpected impact – the latter is particularly important and often overlooked.

Recommendations:
- M&E for SSR is difficult and can be sensitive. EU SSR support urgently needs to integrate monitoring and evaluation into its programming, particularly the impact of SSR projects on people's lives on the ground.
- Monitoring for impact on civilian protection and human rights would connect SSR projects more closely to a deep democracy agenda.
- M&E for SSR focussing on external impact should be built into programme design and management structures and should be flexible. It should measure expected and unexpected results.
- Training SSR staff in M&E would entrench M&E as a core skill; staff can be supported by experts when needed.

---

10. Personnel

CSDP missions have difficulty in recruiting the right personnel with the right expertise experience. While this is a general problem for CSDP missions, it is exacerbated in the DRC by the additional requirement that staff be French-speaking.

In Guinea-Bissau, the Commission was able to recruit good experts through the IfS, but they could not form a team as they were not available at the same time. This experience is shared by other missions: generally, decisions to deploy experts quickly to the field mean that the Civilian Response Teams have tended to engage individuals that can be in place in 3-4 days, rather than teams that take longer to establish. An important lesson from this experience was that the EU should contract experts from an agency which can provide a team and also provide back-up in sensitive contexts. The experts in this case needed support from inside and outside the EU institutions.

As the SSR Pool of Experts is developed, the EU should find creative ways of engaging experts from the region as well as from the EU. Experience from Guinea-Bissau suggests that regional (in this case African) experts were able to build better networks and relationships with the military and national authorities than their European colleagues.

The job descriptions of CSDP and EU delegation staff do not include protection of civilians, good governance or sensitive political issues, with the result that these questions may be side-lined. Protection of civilians, human rights and good governance should be addressed more strategically in CSDP mandates and mission staff job descriptions.

A further staffing challenge which civilian Commission project managers have faced in the past is that they cannot engage fully with military counterparts.

Recommendations:
➢ Good governance, human rights, civilian protection and conflict sensitivity should be included in job descriptions for all SSR staff.
➢ Civilian staff members are often unable to work with military counterparts. In Mauritania, a *guardia civil* officer was seconded to the delegation to support civilian project managers, to good effect. This model should be replicated elsewhere.
➢ As the SSR Pool of Experts is developed, EEAS and CSDP should find a mechanism to include regional experts to strengthen the pool. The pool should also consider contracting teams, rather than individuals, from agencies who are able to provide additional back-up to the team in the field.

---

11. Coordination with other donors

A 'Friends of Guinea-Bissau' group was created for all international stakeholders, including: the EC delegation, the Council and Commission at headquarters level, CSDP Head of Mission, experts engaged under the IfS, the UN agencies, and the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (Brazil). The group discussed the state of play and possible actions to take. Participation in this group gave the EU leverage due to the CSDP mission's engagement in DDR, and the upcoming EDF. However, the impact of the group was limited as it was *ad hoc;* there were no Terms of Reference, no national counterparts, and it was not linked to other structures (particularly national structures) engaged in SSR.

Recommendation:
➢ International donor coordination bodies should be inclusive – of both the international actors and national counterparts. These bodies should be formal, with clear Terms of Reference.