



Civil Society Organisations' input to the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2025

Background paper
February 2025

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The objective of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture and a summary of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review process, including progress made in the 2025 review. The paper will also outline some recent UN policy developments and commitments relevant to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and will offer some suggestions for further reading.

The paper has been prepared in advance of the CSDN Policy Meeting 'Civil Society Organisations' input to the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review 2025'. The aim of the meeting is to gather input from representatives of civil society organisations to contribute to the European Union's recommendations for the UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review. It will provide an opportunity to review and reflect on the implementation of the UN resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace and to assess the functioning of the Peacebuilding Architecture. Civil society representatives will have the opportunity to address questions to relevant UN and EU officials.

Civil Society Dialogue Network

The CSDN is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policymakers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in cooperation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The fifth phase of the CSDN will last from 2023 to 2026. For more information, please visit the [EPLO website](#).

List of abbreviations

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT	(UN) Country Team
DP	(UN) Development Programme
DS	(UN) development system
DPO	(UN) Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	(UN) Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	(UN) Economic and Social Council
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU	European Union
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
GA	(UN) General Assembly
IEP	Independent Eminent Persons
IFI	International Financial Institution
IRF	(PBF) Immediate Response Facility
PBA	(UN) Peacebuilding Architecture
PBAR	(UN) Peacebuilding Architecture Review
PBC	(UN) Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	(UN) Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	(UN) Peacebuilding Support Office
PDA	(UN) Peace and Development Advisor
PRF	(PBF) Peace and Recovery Facility
RC	(UN) Resident Coordinator
RDB	Regional Development Bank
SC	(UN) Security Council
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
YPS	Youth, Peace and Security

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Key takeaways

If you only read one page:



1

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture encompasses many UN entities, agencies and tools. The Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Peacebuilding Fund perform a **'hinge function' to better connect the peace and security pillar with the whole UN system**, including the development system, humanitarian action, and the human rights pillar. The Peacebuilding Architecture Review is **an opportunity to oil the hinge**.



2

Recent UN policy outputs and commitments have called for **shifting the paradigm in prevention and peacebuilding to universality and action at the national level**. This means that UN Member States are primarily responsible for preventing and resolving violent conflict. **All states must work on prevention**, not just those who are affected by conflict.



3

This CSDN is a **chance to influence the EU and Member States' recommendations** for the Peacebuilding Architecture Review. Go to Annexe I to get an idea of what these recommendations normally look like.

Background: the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

History

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) was created following the 2005 World Summit in order to address peacebuilding and reconciliation in a more coherent, coordinated and integrative manner. Resolution 60/1 recommended the establishment of both the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and a “small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts” to assist the Commission, namely the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).¹ Resolution 60/80 included a request to the Secretary General to establish “a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding”, which came to be known as the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).²

The intended logic of the PBA was to build synergies for peacebuilding across the entire UN system, including both institutions and UN Member States; it was not intended as a new set of operational entities divorced from the rest of the UN system. It is largely accepted that the PBC, the PBF and the PBSO should bring greater coherence to the full spectrum of UN institutions, tools and member state efforts dedicated to peacebuilding.³

Relevant institutions, actors and tools

The following is a non-exhaustive list of relevant institutions, agencies and tools which form part of the broader UN Peacebuilding Architecture, beyond the PBC, the PBSO and the PBF.

The Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC is an intergovernmental advisory body that provides support to conflict-affected countries, with their consent, by providing political accompaniment and advocacy, and coordinating international efforts for post-conflict recovery, reconstruction, and sustainable development.

The PBC is composed of [31 Member States](#), elected from the General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council (UNSC), and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The top financial contributing countries and the top troop-contributing countries to the United Nations system are also members.⁴ The PBC has granted a standing invitation to the African Union to participate in all its meetings. The World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund have been invited to all PBC meetings since the Commission’s establishment.



¹ United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 2005 World Summit Outcome. UN Doc A/RES/60/1, p. 25.

² United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The Peacebuilding Commission. UN Doc A/RES/60/180, p. 5.

³ Hearn, S., Bujones, A.K. & Kugel, A. (2014). The United Nations “Peacebuilding Architecture” Past, Present and Future. Center on International Cooperation. New York University. New York. https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/1662/65/un_peace_architecture.pdf

⁴ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/commission>

The Commission provides **policy advice** to the UNGA, the UNSC, the ECOSOC, and other fora on integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery. The Commission also **works directly with conflict-affected countries** to develop context-specific peacebuilding strategies. The PBC brings together donors, financial institutions, governments, regional organisations and civil society to coordinate peacebuilding efforts, strengthen institutions, and to promote reconciliation and security sector reform. It also helps to bring **sustained international attention** to peacebuilding efforts and to **marshal resources** for post-conflict recovery efforts.⁵

In 2016, the PBC adopted a [Gender Strategy](#) which “defines a series of priority areas of strategic action for PBC’s gender-responsive engagement at the country, regional and global levels, as well as key messages that the PBC should systematically promote.”⁶ A subsequent [Gender Strategy Action Plan](#) was adopted in 2021, identifying four action areas for the work of the PBC. In 2021, the PBC approved a [Strategic Action Plan on Youth and Peacebuilding](#) to guide and monitor the Commission’s work related to the Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda.

The Peacebuilding Support Office

The PBSO sits within the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). It assists and supports the PBC with “strategic advice and policy guidance, manages the Peacebuilding Fund on behalf of the Secretary-General, and works to enhance system-wide coherence and partnerships with UN and non-UN actors in support of building and sustaining peace in partner countries.”⁷ The PBSO is further comprised of the **Peacebuilding Commission Support Branch**, which provides secretariat support to the PBC, the **Financing for Peacebuilding Branch** which administers the PBF, and the **Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Branch**. The latter supports UN-wide coherence and coordination across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace nexus. It leads in coordinating the YPS agenda on behalf of DPPA, supports partnerships with international financial institutions (IFIs), civil society and the private sector for collective impact for peacebuilding and promotes South-South and Triangular cooperation.⁸



The Peacebuilding Fund

The Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund “supports joint UN responses to address critical peacebuilding opportunities, connecting development, humanitarian, human rights and peacebuilding pillars.



⁵ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/about-the-commission>

⁶ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/gender-strategy>

⁷ https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbso_brochure_2023-09-12_0.pdf

⁸ Ibid.

The core principles of the Fund are being timely, catalytic, and risk-tolerant, and facilitating inclusiveness and national ownership, integrated approaches, and cohesive UN strategies.”⁹

Any UN programme country with urgent peacebuilding needs can access limited, short-term funding support through the PBF’s **Immediate Response Facility** (IRF), which can approve disbursements within 48 hours. For broader support in the medium term, the Fund’s **Peace and Recovery Facility** (PRF) is used. Eligibility for the PRF for a five-year period is granted by the Secretary-General upon request of the Head of State or Government following a thorough conflict analysis and strategic prioritisation process.¹⁰

The [Peacebuilding Fund 2020-2024 Strategy](#) identified three priority windows: ‘Facilitating Transitions’, allocated 35% of the Fund’s resources, ‘Women and Youth Empowerment’, allocated 25%, and ‘Cross-border and Regional Approaches’ allocated 20% of the Fund. The [Advisory Group of the Peacebuilding Fund](#) provides advice and oversight on the allocations, programming and policies of the PBF. “The Group provides important inputs and ideas on how financing can support and strengthen the efforts of the UN towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace.”¹¹

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs



The UN DPPA has a global mandate to advance the UN’s efforts in preventing and resolving violent conflict and building sustainable peace. The DPPA provides the Secretary-General with analysis of political developments worldwide, provides early warning of possible conflicts and offers expertise and assistance to UN Member States and regional organisations.¹² The Department provides support to the UNSC and to two standing committees established by the GA, the Special Committee on Decolonisation and the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The PBSO sits within the DPPA.

United Nations Development Programme

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the UN’s lead agency of international development, working in 170 countries to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality and contribute to the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The agency’s work centres on six core areas: poverty and inequality, governance, resilience, environment, energy and gender equality.¹³



⁹ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/fund>

¹⁰ https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbf_strategy_2020-2024_final.pdf

¹¹ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/eighth-ag>

¹² <https://dppa.un.org/en/about-us>

¹³ <https://www.undp.org/about-us>

Department of Peace Operations



The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) was created in 1992, then the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It “provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates”.¹⁴ The three main offices of the DPO are the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, the Office of Military

Affairs and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division.

Peace and Development Advisors

Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) are deployed under the auspices of the Joint UNDP – UNDP-PPA Programme on Building Capacities for Conflict Prevention, a “cross-pillar initiative that aims to enhance UN support to national stakeholders on conflict prevention and sustaining peace”. PDAs support the UN system to effectively respond to complex political situations, embedding expertise on **conflict analysis**, **conflict sensitive programming**, and **strategic leadership on conflict prevention** within UN Country Teams. 133 international and national PDAs based in over 73 countries respond to requests from national stakeholders to strengthen their national prevention capacities and mechanisms, and six Regional Specialists support cross-country and cross-border preventions efforts.¹⁵ PDAs offer conflict and political analysis to UN Resident Coordinators (RCs), Country Teams (UNCTs) and UN Headquarters, as well as providing “strategic guidance to the implementation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives to national counterparts”.¹⁶

UN Country Teams

United Nations Country Teams exist in 130 countries. The UNCT is composed of all the UN entities (16 on average) working on sustainable development, emergency, recovery and transition in a given programme country.¹⁷ The UNCT is led by the UN Resident Coordinator and ensures interagency coordination and decision-making at the country level.

Resident Coordinator

The Resident Coordinator is the highest-ranking representative of the United Nations development system (UNDS) at the country level. They lead the UNCT and ensure system-wide accountability on the ground for the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.¹⁸ The RC is designated representative of, and reports to, the UN Secretary-General.

¹⁴ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/departments-of-peace-operations>

¹⁵ [Project document: 2024-2028 Joint UNDP-DPPA Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention](#)

¹⁶ <https://www.peaceinfrastructures.org/thematic/peace-and-development-advisors>

¹⁷ <https://unsdg.un.org/about/how-we-work>

¹⁸ Ibid.

UN Resident Coordinator system

The Resident Coordinator system encompasses the UN RC and RC's Office and the UNCT and is served by the UN Development Coordination Office. The overarching objectives of the RC system centre on sustainable development, leaving no one behind and the eradication of poverty.¹⁹ It brings “together the different UN agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of operational activities at the country level. It **comprises a series of global, regional and country-level working mechanisms** that provide guidance and support the work of UN Resident Coordinators around the world”.²⁰

Recent UN policy developments and commitments

A New Agenda for Peace

In July 2023, Secretary-General António Guterres launched "[A New Agenda for Peace](#)", a policy brief on the future of collective peace and security systems. The policy brief was intended as a preparatory document, laying the groundwork for the Summit of the Future.

The policy brief underscores the importance of upholding international law and the UN Charter and advocates for proactive conflict prevention, addressing root causes such as political and economic instability. It emphasises the need **to revitalise diplomacy and strengthen multilateralism** to effectively prevent conflicts and sustain peace. However, it places “**national action at the centre**” of multilateralism, underlining that Member States have the primary responsibility and ability to prevent conflict.²¹ In practical terms, in order to “shift the prevention and sustaining peace paradigm within countries”,²² UN Member States must develop more robust **national prevention approaches**. States are encouraged to invest in resilience, governance, and social cohesion to address tensions before they escalate, **shifting from reaction to prevention within national frameworks**.

In an increasingly fragmented international order, the policy brief envisions the UN in the role of supporter of Member States in their conflict prevention and resolution efforts, rather than taking the lead. However, the Agenda highlights the principle of **universality**, insisting that conflict prevention and peacebuilding should not be limited merely to a set of conflict-affected countries, but that **all states must play a role in mitigating threats to peace and security** worldwide.

Pact for the Future

The United Nations "[Pact for the Future](#)", adopted during the Summit of the Future in September 2024, is a comprehensive agreement designed to revitalise multilateral cooperation and address pressing global challenges. It encompasses commitments across various domains, including peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, climate

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ <https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/QCPR-Info-Brief-2-UN-RC-System-UN-DOCO-Nov-2016.pdf>

²¹ UNSG. (2023). New Agenda for Peace. In Our Common Agenda - Policy Brief 9. New York: Secretary-General of the United Nations, p. 12.

²² Ibid. p.20.

action, and science, technology and innovation. Key actions contained in the Pact include reforming the UN Security Council to enhance representation, reaffirming dedication to nuclear disarmament, and adopting a Declaration on Future Generations to ensure long-term sustainability.

The ‘International Peace and Security’ chapter of the Pact recognises peacebuilding as an **inherently political process** that requires **sustained commitment, inclusive governance, and strong national ownership**. It stresses that lasting peace cannot be achieved solely through technical or security-driven approaches, but must be rooted in inclusive political settlements, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The Pact highlights the need for enhanced diplomatic engagement, trust-building measures, and dialogue to address the root causes of conflict. In line with ‘A New Agenda for Peace’, the Pact underscores the importance of **strengthening and implementing existing national prevention strategies** to sustain peace, urging member states to **develop such strategies where they are absent**, in alignment with national priorities.

The Peacebuilding Architecture Review

Background

The UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) is a periodic assessment of the UN’s peacebuilding system, conducted every five years to evaluate its effectiveness and propose improvements. The review examines the work of the PBC, PBF and the PBSO, focusing on their ability to support conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery, and sustainable peace. The process involves consultations with UN member states, regional organisations, civil society, and financial institutions to identify challenges and opportunities in peacebuilding efforts. The review process shapes a resolution which is then presented for adoption by the UNSC and the UNGA.

The European Union and the PBAR

The EU and UN cooperate across a broad range of areas, including peace and security, human rights, sustainable development, climate change and environmental protection, disarmament and non-proliferation, fighting corruption and organised crime, and global health. Collectively, the **EU and its Member States are the largest financial contributor to the UN system**, providing about a quarter of all the voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes. The Member States of the EU together account **for more than half of all contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund**.²³

The European Union actively engages in the UN PBAR, taking part in meetings with the PBC and organising thematic or regional consultations as part of the informal phase. Insights gathered during these processes feed into EU recommendations for the PBAR. For example, in 2020, the EU and the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) organised a virtual thematic consultation on ‘Conflict Prevention, Human Rights and Agenda 2030’. The

²³ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-and-united-nations_en

subsequent EU recommendations for the 2020 PBAR are annexed to this background paper (Annexe I).

2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture

The fourth review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture was mandated by General Assembly Resolution [75/201](#) and Security Council Resolution [2558](#). According to the Terms of Reference, the review should be “**forward-looking**, aiming at further improving the work of the UN on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, with **appropriate emphasis on implementation and impact at the field level**, encompassing activities aimed at supporting national and regional efforts to prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, and supporting the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture.”²⁴

The PBAR consists of an informal phase which took place in 2024, and a formal phase, taking place in 2025.

Informal phase

The informal phase consists of:


- **PBC meetings** with Member States to discuss progress on the implementation of the resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture.
- **Reflections provided by the Independent Eminent Persons** on the implementation of the resolutions. The panel of [Independent Eminent Persons](#), appointed by the Secretary-General based on current or past membership of relevant senior advisory boards and groups, hold consultations with various peacebuilding stakeholders. Based on these consultations, the panel provides an independent submission that feeds into the formal stage of the PBAR. This submission can influence how Member States approach the Review.²⁵
- **Regional and thematic consultations with think tanks and academic institutions, regional organisations and civil society** organised by both UN entities and institutions and UN Member States. The consultations aim to assess progress and propose concrete suggestions for improving the implementation of peacebuilding and sustaining peace.²⁶ This CSDN meeting is one such consultation.

²⁴

https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/letter_from_pga_and_psc_launching_2025_review- final_letter-combined_with_tors.pdf

²⁵ [https://gppac.net/peacebuilding-architecture-review#:~:text=The%20UN%20Peacebuilding%20Architecture%20aims,RES%2F2282%2C%20PP8\).](https://gppac.net/peacebuilding-architecture-review#:~:text=The%20UN%20Peacebuilding%20Architecture%20aims,RES%2F2282%2C%20PP8).)

²⁶ *Ibid.*



Source: 2025 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture²⁷

Outcome of the informal phase

The two most significant documents to have emerged from the informal phase of the PBAR in 2024 are the letter of the Independent Eminent Persons (IEP) to the Secretary-General and the report of the Secretary General on ‘Peacebuilding and sustaining peace’.

The [IEP letter](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbar_2025_ieps_letter.pdf) addressed to the Secretary-General highlighted that “A new culture and mindset are required to **shift the Peacebuilding Commission from a post-conflict afterthought to a primary preventive and sustaining-peace pillar** across the United Nations system”.²⁸ The panel recommended enhancing the mandate and resources of the PBC to better mobilise support and coordinate conflict prevention and resolution efforts. The letter also addressed the **urgent need for sustainable financing**, urging Member States to increase contributions and explore innovative funding mechanisms to meet the growing demand for peacebuilding initiatives. The letter recommends **strengthening bottom -up participation**, particularly of women and youth, and greater engagement with both civil society and the private sector in order to foster truly national and inclusive partnership.

²⁷ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2025-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>

²⁸ https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbar_2025_ieps_letter.pdf

The Secretary General was requested by the UNGA and the UNSC to produce a detailed report in 2024 on continued implementation of the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace in advance of the 2025 UN PBAR. The subsequent '[Peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Report of the Secretary General](#)' reiterates many of the key points of 'A New Agenda for Peace', with the Secretary-General again arguing that conflict prevention is primarily the responsibility of Member States, and not just those affected by conflict, requiring a paradigm shift "to universality and action at the national level".²⁹

In terms of strengthening the PBC, the Secretary-General's report acknowledges the PBC's role in promoting South-South and triangular cooperation but argues that adjustments will need to be made to the functioning of the Commission to increase its effectiveness in supporting Member States' national prevention strategies. The 2025 PBAR review is described as an opportunity for UN Member States to institutionalise the convening role of the PBC and to define the modalities necessary to increase communication between the Commission and UNCTs, special political missions and peacekeeping operations.

Some of the key issues that have emerged from the informal phase have been identified by The International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding (CCCPA).³⁰ They include:

- Defining inclusive national ownership
- Promoting inclusivity and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and YPS agenda
- Clarifying the role of the PBA
- Advancing financing for peacebuilding with a specific focus on the role of IFIs, Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and the private sector.

The summaries of the thematic and regional consultations which have taken place and the written submissions which have been submitted thus far are available on the [UN's website](#).

Formal phase

For the formal phase of the PBAR, two co-facilitators, Egypt for the GA and Slovenia for the SC, have been appointed to conduct intergovernmental consultations which will result in agreed recommendations for consideration and decision by the General Assembly and the Security Council by the end of December 2025.

Security Council Report have identified five potentially contentious issues for the negotiations:³¹

²⁹ <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/367/51/pdf/n2436751.pdf>, p. 4.

³⁰ See GPPAC briefing

³¹ <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-02/in-hindsight-the-2025-peacebuilding-review.php>

1. **The concept of national ownership.** There is divergence on whether national ownership focuses on sovereignty or on bottom-up inclusive approaches to peacebuilding.
2. **Financing for peacebuilding.** Demand for the PBF outstrips the resources available but there is continued opposition to channelling assessed contributions to the Fund.
3. **The role of the PBC in conflict prevention remains contentious,** as some Member States are wary of overreach from the PBC on sensitive issues such as human rights and climate, peace and security.
4. **Tracking progress.** Given the array of recommendations that emerge in the reviews, dedicated capacity is needed to track progress.

Further Reading

UN documents

- [A New Agenda for Peace \(July 2023\)](#)
- [Mid-term Review UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund Strategy 2020-2024](#)
- [Peacebuilding and sustaining peace- Report of the Secretary-General \(November 2024\)](#)
- [Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund 2020-2024 Strategy](#)
- [Summit of the Future Outcome Documents - Pact for the Future, Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations \(September 2024\)](#)
- [United Nations Peacebuilding Commission](#)

2025 Review

- [Thematic and Regional Consultations](#)

The EU and the UN

- [The EU and the United Nations](#)
- [EU priorities at the United Nations](#)

Analysis of the PBC

- [Elevating the UN Peacebuilding Commission: Proposals for the Summit of the Future](#)

Further reading for the breakout sessions

1. Strengthening national ownership in the context of national prevention approaches

- [Building on What Exists: Demystifying National Prevention Strategies](#)
- [The UN's capacity for supporting member states' national prevention strategies: Assessing practical capabilities](#)
- [What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do to Support National Prevention Strategies?](#)

2. System-wide coherence for peacebuilding

- [Humanitarian, Development and Peace nexus](#)
- [Concrete steps to support the implementation of Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace at the country level](#)
- [Revisiting the Peacebuilding Commission's "bridging" and advisory role](#)

3. Delivering on horizontal priorities

- [Mid-term Review UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund Strategy 2020-2024](#)
 - o Pages 18-23: Findings on 'Fostering Inclusion through Women and Youth Empowerment'
 - o Pages 23-25: Findings on 'Support to CSOs'
- [UN Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace](#)
- [UN Peacebuilding Commission Gender Strategy](#)
- [UN Peacebuilding Commission Gender Strategy Action Plan](#)
- [UN Peacebuilding Commission Strategic Action Plan on youth and peacebuilding](#)

Non-Paper

Main conclusions and recommendations for the UN Peacebuilding Support Office from Informal EU Consultation for the 2020 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Conflict Prevention, Human Rights and Agenda 2030 – ‘leaving-no-one behind’ 27 April 2020, Brussels (virtual)

Informal consultations on how, within the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, to more effectively operationalise conflict prevention, reinforce human rights protection and strengthen linkages between peacebuilding and Agenda 2030 (Goal 16) and “leaving no-one behind”, with more than 100 persons from EU institutions and its main conflict prevention and peacebuilding partners and stakeholders, and EU Member States, resulted in the following main conclusions and recommendations:

- The UN PBA needs to **adapt to the new type of challenges** that the world is facing today compared to in 2015 – climate change, demographic changes and migration flows, forced displacement and humanitarian crisis. This includes challenges created or amplified by the **COVID-19 pandemic**. The pandemic is a **game changer** and a stress-test for the peacebuilding architecture (and the global system). To prevent the pandemic from being a driver of conflict:
 - Attention has to be paid to **supporting building and sustaining** both peace in countries that are in imminent risk of or in conflict, *and* reforms in fragile countries.
 - The UN PBA needs to prioritise ensuring the availability of high-quality granulated and up to date **conflict prevention data to guide actions**.
- Continued progress is necessary to ensure that **peace is built and sustained through a truly integrated approach**, in particular at the operational level, effectively linking conflict prevention, human rights and Agenda 2030.
 - **Cross-pillar cooperation** has to be further enhanced and a peacebuilding and sustaining peace mind-set and posture has to be fostered across the UN system.
 - The space for the **PBC, PBF, UN Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers and the UNDP-DPPA joint conflict programme** – influence, visibility, responsibilities and resources – needs to be maintained and expanded.
 - **Peace and Development Advisers** should be further drawn upon to help shockproof actions, with particular attention to multi-stakeholder long-term horizon scanning.
 - The role and resources of **Resident Coordinators** should be further strengthened – their offices reinforced, and their specific capabilities revisited.
 - **Shared/joint analysis** should be systematically applied and result in more joint-up and coordinated efforts, from the ground and up.
 - **Partnerships** must continue to be strengthened, and new partnerships should be established within and across the UN System, and with civil society.
- A **further operationalisation of the prevention agenda** within the UN PBA should be a priority. The crucial link between humanitarian, development and conflict prevention actors must be more explicitly acknowledged.
 - Recognising **the primacy of politics**, the UN PBA should increase support for inclusive dialogue, strengthening local governance structures and capacities, while also ensuring transitional justice and the addressing of grievances and reconciliation.
 - The focus on **inclusive dialogue and early mediation** has to be enhanced, going beyond the directly engaged conflicting parties.

- Peace Processes need to focus on the **implementation of peace agreements** (rather than the signing), countering recurring cycles of violence and rebuilding sustainable peace. Mediation and dialogue are key, as is establishing partnerships for peace.
 - **Human rights** have to be more systematically used as an indicator for conflict prevention, and linkages between the PBC and Human Rights Council strengthened.
 - Further attention is required to **the social media realm**, to reduce hate speech and counter disinformation.
 - **Gender equality and the Women, Peace and Security agenda** need to be more systematically integrated throughout the UN PBA, and not seen as a separate issue.
 - **Climate fragility** has to be more consistently included as a human security context-specific risk in conflict analysis and strategic planning.
- The **field perspective has to be strengthened**, translating policy to actions on the ground and **fostering a whole-of-society approach** that reaches a wider range of peacebuilding actors with particular focus on women and youth. A shared **understanding of peacebuilding in each unique context** and a sense of local ownership of the peace process is required. The COVID-19 pandemic underlines the importance of ensuring community resilience.
 - The **UN DPPA regional offices** should be drawn upon more to ensure strong partnerships on the ground as well as faster and more sensitised engagements, appointing civil society liaison persons and using the PBF Gender and Youth Promotion initiative to reach local and non-formal stakeholders.
 - **More robust standards and procedures** should be developed to ensure a systematic and effective engagement of local actors from the outset, including more regular and extensive exchanges between the UN PBC and civil society, including **actors beyond well-known NGOs**, and with focus on grass-root and civic actors – women and youth.
 - The UN PBA should **draw more on regional frameworks** as the entry point to local actors and invest more in cross-border and regional peacebuilding work.
 - The UN PBA should try to **bring funding streams closer together** for more coherent and **joint-up approaches fostering good peacebuilding donorship**, for more predictable, long-term, inclusive, flexible, rapid and less risk adverse funding. The PBC's unique role should be further leveraged to bring attention to peacebuilding needs while prioritising inclusivity, thereby triggering financial (and political) support to all stakeholders. The UN PBF has to become better at addressing root causes and respond to needs as identified by those on the ground.
 - PBF actions need to be **guided by active listening** to those on the ground.
 - The PBF should encourage **joint engagements** (rather than separate projects) and require reporting on stakeholder coherence to ensure coordination.
 - The PBF should help create **incentives for donors** by enhancing transparency and accountability for all sized contributions as a way to strengthen donor trust, and apply context-specific risk management and mitigation strategies to reinforce the do-no-harm principle and ensure more targeted, inclusive and participatory support.
 - The PBF should consider **human rights programming** accessible only to civil society organisations, civic groups and social movements, and apply one common integrated mark and tracker for human rights and gender across all grants.
 - The PBF must ensure **sustainable funding** to avoid sending a message that the consequences of making progress, is a significant decrease in international support.
 - The PBF needs to further **prioritise conflict prevention**, paying attention to youth and the empowerment of women.