







FLASH RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Policy Meeting

EU Support for Security Sector Reform: Learning from the EU CSDP Missions and other EU support in Guinea-Bissau and DRC

Brussels, 16 May 2011

This document presents the key recommendations made by participants at the CSDN meeting and collated by the meeting rapporteur, Laura Davis. These recommendations do not necessarily represent the views of the organisers, nor can they be attributed to any individual participant or participating institution.

A Strategic EU Approach to SSR

- ➤ The EU should identify its niche in supporting SSR in relation to other interventions by the international community. It should engage only in value-based *reform* not just assistance, or it risks 'losing its soul.' The presence of other actors particularly China in Africa should not lead to a 'race to the bottom'.
- ➤ EU SSR support is currently treated as more technical than political. The political side should be strengthened so that SSR support contributes directly to 'deep democracy' as defined by <u>High Representative Ashton</u> and is closely linked to a democratisation agenda.
- ➤ It is unclear how DEVCO will engage in SSR after 1 June; civil society and the European Parliament should press for continued close engagement of development aid in SSR.

Political dialogue

- Political dialogue should be integrated into SSR process on the basis of Article 8 of the <u>Cotonou</u> Agreement
- Political dialogue could enable the EU to place more priority on outcomes (e.g. reducing criminality and human rights violations by security agents) rather than focusing on tangible outputs (e.g. building courtrooms, training) and to link the political with the technical aspects of SSR.
- > Through political dialogue, the EU and partner country can develop joint benchmarks for progress and follow-up (e.g. implementation of laws passed in relation to SSR).
- > Some participants felt the EU should apply conditionality where state actors block reform.

Contextual Political Analysis

- > The political analysis informing SSR projects must be significantly improved and include assessment of where power lies, formally and informally.
- ➤ In some contexts, CSDP missions need to be part of a larger regional approach (eg, tackling organised crime in Guinea-Bissau)

Coordination

- ➤ Good in-country coordination between donors and between the donors and partner country is recognised as essential for SSR. The EAS should take a lead role in ensuring EU-side coordination, and integrated missions should replace multiple interventions.
- Coordination mechanisms should be formalised and include the partner country.

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Improved coordination (as in DRC) should lead to a shared political agenda by the EU institutions and Member States, in-country and in Brussels.

Local ownership

➤ Local ownership of SSR projects in fragile situations presents significant challenges. In part these may be informed by better political analysis, engaging civil society in SSR and recognising the importance of addressing corruption and organised crime.

Short-term mandates; long-term engagement

- The EAS can now take responsibility for developing a longer term vision for EU intervention in a given context, identifying the right mix of tools and instruments.
- ➤ Member states who commit to deploy resources only in the short term and thus determine the short-term nature of CSDP mission mandates should take a longer term approach. Civil society has a key role to play in this and the European Parliament should also be engaged.

Multiple instruments

In DRC, EUPOL, EUSEC and the Commission all work on SSR. Replacing multiple instruments with a single integrated mission would not only increase the ability of the EU to address the security sector more strategically and holistically, but would also level out imbalances in financing.

Personnel

- ➤ Good governance, human rights, civilian protection and conflict sensitivity should be included in job descriptions for all SSR staff.
- ➤ Civilian staff are often unable to work with military counterparts. In Mauritania, a *guardia civil* officer was seconded to the delegation to support civilian project managers, to good effect. This model should be replicated elsewhere.
- ➤ When the SSR expert pool comes online, EAS and CSDP should find a mechanism to include regional experts to strengthen the pool.

SSR Concept

➤ The EU should revise its concept of SSR to take into account the realities of non-Western (and potentially fragile) situations. This should include how to address non-state actors (e.g. militia groups) and how to connect with traditional governance structures providing justice/security.

Monitoring and evaluation

- M&E for SSR is difficult and can be sensitive. EU SSR support urgently needs to integrate monitoring and evaluation into its programming, particularly the impact of SSR projects on people's lives on the ground.
- M&E for SSR focussing on external impact should be built into programme design and management structures and should be flexible. It should measure expected and unexpected results.
- > Training SSR staff in M&E would entrench M&E as a core skill; staff can be supported by experts when needed.