

**Online workshop series:
Climate change and human security:
integrating peacebuilding and climate adaptation efforts in practice**

May – December 2020

SERIES REPORT

In 2020 the [European Peacebuilding Liaison Office \(EPLO\)](#), together with [adelphi](#) and the [Climate Diplomacy](#) initiative, with support from the [German Federal Foreign Office](#), organised two series of online workshops. The series brought together civil society experts and policymakers to discuss challenges, lessons learned, best practices and recommendations relating to how to address the linkages between climate change, conflict and peace.

The discussions were focused in particular on how to integrate peacebuilding efforts and climate resilience programming, including through initiatives bringing communities together to address the effects of climate change and prevent conflict.

This report presents the key points from the discussions in the eight workshops in the series, which took place from May to December 2020.¹

Climate change, conflict and fragility: Increasing resilience against climate-fragility risks (19 May)

Speaker: Lukas Rüttinger (adelphi)

Respondent: Dr Ayan Mahamoud (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)

Mobilising decision-makers on water scarcity-induced conflict risks: the Water, Peace and Security Partnership (28 May)

Speakers: Camille Marquette (International Alert) and Rolien Sasse (Water, Peace and Security Partnership)

Respondent: Katariina Leinonen (European External Action Service)

Integrating peacebuilding and climate change mitigation efforts in natural resource management (9 June)

Speaker: Vincent Ogunyini (World Vision Kenya)

Respondent: Margot Loof (Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid (Cordaid))

The need for climate-sensitive conflict analysis in peacebuilding and climate adaptation efforts (17 September)

Speaker: Lukas Rüttinger (adelphi)

Respondent: Emma Whitaker (Mercy Corps)

Building community resilience to climate change and conflict: Lessons from the Pacific (24 September)

Speakers: Coral Pasisi (The Pacific Community) and Kate Higgins (Conciliation Resources)

Respondent: Kevin Petrini (UN Development Programme in the Pacific)

'MARSABIT': First documentary screening and interactive discussion with the audience (1 October)

Speaker: Vincent Ogunyini (World Vision Kenya)

Respondent: Simone Di Vicenz (Christian Aid)

Climate change, gender and violence in urban areas: Lessons from Pakistan (3 December)

Speaker: Dr Gulnaz Anjum (Institute of Business Administration)

Respondent: Dr Beatrice Mosello (adelphi) and Stefania Minervino (European Commission)

'MARSABIT': Documentary screening and high level panel discussion on peacebuilding and climate adaptation (10 December)

Speakers: Ambassador Thomas Ossowski (Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU), Elina Bardram (European Commission), Marc Fiedrich (European Commission), Obadiah Kisang (World Vision Kenya) and Sonya Reines-Djivanides (EPLO)

¹ The contents of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of EPLO, adelphi, the Climate Diplomacy initiative or the German Federal Foreign Office.

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1. Understanding the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflict

- The interactions between climate change, peace and conflict are complex; there is no simple, systematic and necessarily direct causal link between climate change and conflict, even though there is a growing confluence between fragility and vulnerability to climate change (70% of the most climate-vulnerable countries are also in the most fragile quartile). Climate change can exacerbate drivers of conflict and function as a threat multiplier, and its effects can constitute root causes of conflict. Correspondingly, conflict can undermine the resilience of communities to the effects of climate change. The need to address and adapt to the effects of climate change can also present opportunities for fostering co-operation and building peace between different actors (at different levels). In some cases, these integrated efforts can also contribute to climate change mitigation.
- Climate change is increasingly converging with a number of other political, social, economic and environmental pressures and shocks which can increase risks to peace. These include rising inequalities and uneven economic development, governance problems, population growth, environmental degradation driven by other causes, urbanisation, etc.
- There are diverse examples of compound climate-fragility risks which illustrate how climate change can contribute to conflict, and how their combined and respective effects may undermine community resilience. These risks can be interlinked, can mutually reinforce each other, and can contribute to diverse situations of fragility (e.g. local or large-scale conflicts, civil wars, transboundary disputes, poor governance, exacerbated structural inequalities, political unrest, etc.). They can also have an impact at different levels (local, national, regional and international) and spillover effects. They also tend to exacerbate the marginalisation and exclusion of typically vulnerable groups, including women, young people, ethnic and religious minorities, people with disabilities, etc.
 - **Local resource competition.** Climate change increasingly impacts the availability of natural resources such as water and land (increasing it or decreasing it), and the ability of populations to access them. This can result in more competition over the resources between the different groups that rely on them, which may in turn lead to violent conflict under certain circumstances.
 - **Livelihood insecurity.** Through its impact on natural resources, climate change can increase the livelihood insecurity of the populations which rely on them. This can lead groups to look for alternative livelihoods, and in some cases to engage in illicit activities (e.g. certain illicit crops such as poppy and coca are particularly resilient to the effects of climate change) and/or to join armed / criminal groups. Livelihood insecurity can also act as a push factor for migration / forced displacement (including from rural areas to urban areas), which can sometimes increase the pressure on resources, state services, etc., in the areas of destination.
 - **Extreme weather events and disasters.** If public authorities do not respond adequately to the needs of the population group(s) which are affected by disasters, this can result in a breakdown in trust between the group(s) and the authorities (particularly if certain groups feel that they have received less support than others); armed / criminal groups may also fill the gaps in the response and gain legitimacy. In addition, under certain circumstances, disasters can lead to outbreaks of violence more directly.
 - **Volatile food prices and provision.** Rapid changes in food prices (e.g. as a result of droughts or other weather events affecting the production of food) can be a particular threat to the food security and livelihoods of individuals and communities, including in countries which rely on imports and face high international food prices.
 - **Pressures on transboundary water management.** Existing transboundary water management structures around large water basins allow for peaceful co-operation over the use of the water.

However, the effects of climate change combined with some of the other above-mentioned factors may put them under increased pressure and make cooperation more difficult.

- **Rising sea levels and coastal degradation.** Sea level rise is an existential threat for many small island states, and as various coastal areas around the world are already facing diverse risks (e.g. saltwater intrusion into ground water, storms, etc.), it increases the livelihood insecurity of local populations.
 - **The unintended effects of responses to climate change.** As with any type of engagement, climate mitigation and adaptation efforts can exacerbate existing drivers of conflict or be a root cause of conflict, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This means that responses to climate change must be conflict-sensitive, including with respect to their long-term effects (see below).
- The climate-fragility risks and challenges can vary significantly between contexts, including contexts that are geographically adjacent. It is particularly important to understand (and address) their effects in marginalised areas, including transboundary areas with fragile ecosystems that lack access to public service delivery.
- In order to be effective and sustainable, responses to these risks have to address their complexity and their multidimensional nature. As a result, they need to be integrated (and coherent) across policy fields, particularly peacebuilding and climate change adaptation (as well as humanitarian aid and development cooperation, among others), instead of being designed and implemented in silos (see the final section).

Example 1: Climate change-induced conflicts between herders and farmers

Conflicts between herders and farmers, that are a particular challenge in parts of Africa, were raised in several discussions to illustrate the importance of understanding the links between climate change, peace and conflict. The effects of climate change on weather patterns can result in rains arriving early or late in the year in given geographic areas, which may result in livestock moving at unseasonal times. If this livestock arrives unexpectedly in villages and fields, it may imperil the livelihoods of local farmers (particularly if they have not yet harvested their crops), increasing the potential for conflict. Therefore, to prevent conflict between nomadic pastoralists and settled communities, it is essential to identify and analyse these links, and to build or strengthen mechanisms that will allow communities to respond and adapt to them in an integrated manner (e.g. by establishing proper channels of communication and dialogue between the communities, by studying and anticipating the effects of weather patterns to adapt accordingly, etc.).

Example 2: Climate-conflict dynamics in the Lake Chad region

The [analysis](#) carried out by adelphi in the Lake Chad region was presented to underline the importance of understanding the complexity of the links between climate change, peace and conflict. The examples of compound climate-fragility risks in the region relate to (a) livelihood insecurity (the combined effects of climate change and conflict have included forced displacements, the erosion of social cohesion, and restrictions on the movement of people), (b) increased competition over natural resources (for example, climate change has made extreme weather events more frequent, and the timing, duration and intensity of rainfalls hard to predict, phenomena which put at risk agreements between communities around the seasonal shared use of resources), (c) easier recruitment by and retention into armed groups (including as a result of inadequate state responses), and (d) counter-productive military responses. Overall, in the region, climate change and conflict have created negative feedback loops increasing vulnerability, exacerbating drivers of conflict, and undermining the resilience of communities with respect to both climate change and conflict.

2. Analysing the linkages between the climate crisis, peace and conflict

- It is necessary for analyses and risk assessments to integrate climate change, peace/conflict and gender in order to provide adequate understandings of contexts and to help identify and design appropriate engagements – including peacebuilding actions, climate adaptation actions and engagements integrating both.
- International actors must base their engagements on climate- and gender-sensitive conflict analysis (at a minimum), or on gender-sensitive, sector-neutral integrated analysis (with conflict analysis and climate analysis integrated from the start of the process) (if possible).²
- Such analysis should:
 - Be a continuous process to inform engagements rather than a one-off exercise.
 - Be participatory in nature, integrating input from and involving local civil society and populations, including diverse women and men and marginalised groups.
 - Be carried out by experts from both fields working together, with experts from other fields when relevant (e.g. social psychology, urban planning, etc.).
 - Integrate climate science and analysis of the lived realities of local populations, blending quantitative and qualitative data,³ and ensuring that data is disaggregated to account for gender, age, socio-economic status, religious affiliation, ethnicity, etc., whenever possible.
 - Identify drivers of sustainable peace and climate adaptation, and capacities for / initiatives to strengthen resilience, in addition to identifying climate-conflict drivers and vulnerabilities.
 - Be adapted to the contexts being analysed and to the time frames available to actors.
 - Acknowledge uncertainties and make them explicit.
- International actors should:
 - Ensure that they have (access to) the relevant expertise, including within their personnel, to ensure adequate uptake of the analysis to inform policies and engagements.
 - Ensure that the funding they provide and the time frames of projects they support allow implementing partners to carry out such analysis.
 - Support making climate analysis and predictions more accessible and easily usable in conflict and integrated analysis, including by civil society actors living in contexts affected by climate change and conflict.
- Although there is an inherent degree of uncertainty in climate forecasting, the data available on existing climatic trends and the general predictions for the next 20-30 years are sufficiently reliable to justify integrating them into analysis and using them to inform engagements.⁴

² Examples of models for sector-neutral integrated analysis that were discussed included those developed or under development by [adelphi](#) and [Mercy Corps](#).

³ See, for example, the [Climate Security Expert Network](#) risk briefs and the [Shoring up Stability](#) report published by adelphi. Elements to examine may include weather patterns, local livelihoods, the availability of – and people's dependency on – natural resources, power distribution, governance structures, inequalities, the interactions between relevant stakeholders, local social and gender norms, environmental degradation, public service provision, the patterns of mobility of populations, social, political and economic inclusion and exclusion, informal and illicit economies, peace and conflict dynamics, historical dynamics of fragility, etc.

⁴ It was noted that communities of practice are usually more comfortable with the uncertainty that they are familiar with than with the uncertainty they are not familiar with. Conflict analysts who are unfamiliar with the uncertainties relating to climate predictions should seek to understand them better, and climate analysts who are unfamiliar with the uncertainties relating to changing political environments and conflict dynamics should do the same.

3. Case studies

3.1. Insights from efforts relating to water security

- There is currently an overall increase in water insecurity worldwide, and climate change is one of the factors contributing to the trend – both directly (through its impact on the availability of, and populations' access to, water) and by interlinking with other factors. There are numerous examples of conflicts arising due to climate change-induced water scarcity but violence can also break out when climate change causes water resources to become more abundant (e.g. because more livestock can be sustained with the water available, which may lead more actors to raid the cattle of other communities) or over-abundant (due to floods).
- As is the case for interventions which are intended to respond to the impact of climate change on other natural resources, efforts to address water insecurity should aim to transform negative interlinkages between water and conflict into opportunities to foster co-operation, to build peace and to promote joint adaptation.
- Efforts to enhance water management should involve the inclusive participation of all stakeholders that depend on, use and manage the relevant water resources, including diverse local communities, civil society actors and water management agencies, so that they may understand their respective (and common) challenges and devise equitable solutions together.
 - To facilitate the participation of diverse local actors in water management mechanisms and initiatives, they should be supported through capacity building and adequate funding, and relevant (scientific) analyses, information and data should be shared with them.
 - It is important to develop channels of communication and common understandings between conservation enforcement agencies and local communities about the latter's water needs, as there are examples in different contexts of the former committing human rights abuses against the latter in response to their use of protected bodies of water in periods of water scarcity.
- It is essential for stakeholders to act early to prevent threats to water security from materialising, and violent conflict from erupting as a result. In this respect, it is helpful to raise awareness about the urgency to respond to these threats, and to build and to strengthen early warning (and early action) mechanisms that integrate peacebuilding and climate change adaptation tools at different levels.
 - These can include tools to anticipate and to analyse weather patterns and the evolution of water resources, tools mobilising and processing different sources of data to predict possible outbreaks of violence, and tools to carry out participatory conflict analysis of the contexts considered to be at risk of water insecurity and violence. The [Water, Peace and Security \(WPS\) Partnership](#) uses machine learning algorithms as part of its early warning system to predict the emergence or exacerbation of water-related conflict.⁵
 - Using these tools in an integrated manner requires involving experts from different fields and developing effective ways to translate data and the results of analyses into policies and practices. Although this presents challenges, the successful integration of approaches,

⁵ In Mali, the WPS Partnership combines different tools as part of its early warning and analysis work, including participatory system dynamics modelling (which models the relationship between the hydrological system and the socio-economic context), human responses modelling (which examines which human responses result from various push and pull factors in the context) and impact analysis of water allocation decisions.

instruments and ways of working leads to co-benefits with respect to preventing conflict, enhancing water security and adapting to the effects of climate change.

- Lakes and rivers can extend across national borders, and it is therefore particularly important to strengthen the ability of transboundary water management structures to respond to pressures which result from the effects of climate change, other environmental shocks, or human activities.
- As national legal frameworks which govern the use of water can play a key role in protecting communities' access to water, it is helpful to promote the application of these legal frameworks locally, to sensitise law enforcement agencies to the needs of local communities, and to raise awareness in local communities about their rights and law enforcement mandates.

3.2. Insights from efforts relating to natural resource management and disaster risk reduction

- The impact of climate change on peace and conflict in Northern Kenya is another illustration of the compound risks relating to local resource competition and livelihood insecurity. The effects of climate change on weather patterns have led to shorter rain seasons and increased the frequency and duration of droughts. As these droughts have made grazing resources scarcer, they have shifted the mobility patterns of many pastoralist communities who have had to travel further from their homes to access pasture and water for their livestock. These changes have increased the competition between pastoralist communities over their access to, and control of, the depleting resources. This has resulted in violent conflict in certain cases, but it has also presented opportunities for peaceful co-operation.
- Different types of efforts have been helpful to help prevent conflict and build the resilience of communities to the effects of climate change.
 - Developing alternative livelihoods allows communities to reduce their dependence on livestock, which in turn reduces the competition for grazing resources.
 1. For example, the [IMARA programme](#) implemented by World Vision Kenya and its partners promotes alternative livelihood activities that include beekeeping, beadwork and the harvesting of gums and resins (and helps people to bring their products to markets).
 2. Efforts to promote alternative livelihoods should be particularly sensitive to the needs of, and the opportunities offered to, women, young people, people with disabilities, and marginalised members of communities.
 - Fostering collaboration between communities for the sustainable management and rehabilitation of land, forest and water sources can result in strengthened ecosystem services and more peaceful intercommunity relations.
 - Building or strengthening early warning (and early action) mechanisms that integrate input relating to (a) peace and conflict and (b) the effects of climate change on weather patterns allows communities to respond to climate-fragility risks in a timely manner. It is also helpful for these mechanisms to integrate information from both traditional community structures and scientific institutions.
 - Building or strengthening inclusive governance structures (including intercommunity governance structures, relevant public institutions, etc.) for natural resource management and sharing, as well as peace forums and dialogue mechanisms, is essential to ensuring the sustainability of peacebuilding and climate change adaptation efforts (and peaceful collaboration on these issues helps to build trust and has positive spill-over effects in other areas).

1. It is important to support (a) the participation of diverse women (including young women), young men, people with disabilities and other marginalised groups in these governance structures (which are often dominated by elder men), and (b) the ability of these groups to defend their rights (including with respect to land ownership).
 2. It can be helpful to combine formal and informal governance structures and conflict resolution mechanisms, so that they may complement and reinforce each other. In Kenya, the IMARA programme supports communities' engagement with county governments to ensure that their input is integrated into action plans relating to natural resource allocation and management, and that the most vulnerable are protected and supported adequately.
- Since climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters (including droughts, storms, floods, etc.) and the vulnerability of populations to them (due to its effects on livelihoods, access to natural resources, conflict, urbanisation, etc.), disaster risk reduction efforts must also integrate climate change adaptation and peacebuilding in order to be more effective and sustainable (particularly with respect to building communities' resilience to disasters).
- As part of its [resilience programme](#), Cordaid has sought to integrate these dimensions throughout the stages of its engagements. This includes:
 1. Conducting joint, community-led disaster and conflict risk analysis (integrating, if possible, climate projections);
 2. Setting a common agenda to carry out multi-stakeholder risk reduction planning;
 3. Establishing disaster risk reduction structures at different levels;
 4. Implementing resilience measures through a participatory approach;
 5. Documenting, monitoring, evaluating and learning from the engagements to inform other actions and support their advocacy work (as well as that of local civil society actors).

Cordaid's experiences have shown that peacebuilding actions such as peace dialogues and social cohesion activities have proven particularly helpful in complementing the other pillars of their engagements in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

3.3. Insights from efforts to strengthen community resilience in the Pacific region

- In the Pacific region, climate change has also exacerbated the vulnerability of communities and countries, and increased risks of conflict as a result. Its effects relate to:
- Livelihood insecurity (in particular due to climate change-induced water and food insecurity);
 - The forced displacement of communities;
 - The undermining of the blue economy (including due to its impact on tourism and fisheries);
 - Uncertainty around maritime zones and boundaries (which poses challenges to law enforcement);
 - The degradation of coping capacities (in particular to natural disasters).
- Atoll nations are particularly vulnerable to these effects.
- Climate change has contributed to livelihood insecurity in the region in different ways. The destruction and degradation of coral reefs that it causes has had a significant impact on ocean life, which affects the activities of coastal fisheries on which Pacific populations are heavily reliant. It is challenging to replace food sources and to develop alternative livelihoods, especially as seasonal fishing is intertwined with culture and tradition and contributes to social cohesion. Climate change has also contributed to water scarcity and decreased the reliability of water sources.

- Climate change has resulted in forced displacements within and between Pacific countries, in particular because of rising sea levels, coastal erosion, floods and vulnerability to extreme weather events. This has led to conflict between displaced and host communities, including over access to land and resources (in both rural and urban settings) and due to tensions arising from different cultural practices (e.g. differences in fishing practices between displaced Tuvalu communities in Niue and local communities led to tensions which were defused by reconciliation initiatives).⁶
- Responses to the effects of climate change can themselves create, unearth or exacerbate conflict and/or threaten the security of communities. For example:
 - Armed forces are increasingly being deployed as part of responses to natural disasters, but they can themselves be a source of insecurity for many communities (e.g. in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea).
 - State interventions relating to the management of local land and natural resources following natural disasters or to the arrival of people displaced by climate change can also be a driver of conflict, particularly when they contradict local arrangements.
 - If they are not conflict-sensitive, humanitarian and development actions may create new forms of exclusion, and exacerbate local conflict dynamics.
- International actors which seek to support Pacific communities should base engagements on those communities' needs and aspirations, knowledge and capacities, cultural practices and understandings of peace and security.⁷ They should:
 - Engage in dialogue and build relationships with both national actors and local communities (recognising the diversity between and within them), consult them and involve them directly in decision-making processes.
 - Recognise and promote as credible and legitimate the traditional knowledge and cultural practices developed by communities, formally integrate them into decision-making processes, and ensure they are used together with climate science to devise solutions and engagements.
 - Support local capacities for peace, resilience and adaptation, inclusive indigenous governance mechanisms, and traditional approaches to managing tensions between communities that are respectful of human rights, including (informal) agreements for climate change-induced relocation.
 - Ensure that funding and investments are sustainable, coordinated, coherent, and adapted to local capacities for absorption. In particular, they should provide local organisations and communities with more long-term, core funding, and coordinate through regional frameworks when relevant in order to avoid overwhelming the capacities of national governments.
 - Support efforts to document and capture the cultural practices which will disappear due to the loss of land resulting from rising sea levels.
 - Promote the provision of legal protection for people who are displaced by climate change.
 - Provide additional financial incentives for ocean and ecosystems conservation, including by involving the business sector.
 - Increase efforts to pursue climate change mitigation.

⁶ Given that the nature of this type of displacement means that it is often irreversible, as the homes of displaced people disappear due to rising sea levels, some participants drew parallels with displacements and the destruction of homes resulting from desertification.

⁷ [Conciliation Resources](#) have centred their engagements in the region on the views of local communities, putting them at the core of all stages of their methodology (which is not necessarily linear): (1) building relationships with local communities, (2) carrying out research and inquiries with them (including through focus groups, listening and storytelling, relational mapping and participant observation), (3) making sense of the results of the research with them, (4) supporting community-led climate-sensitive peacebuilding actions, (5) reflecting on the actions with the communities, learning from them and devising new actions together, and (6) engaging in advocacy, learning and dialogues at scale.

3.4. Insights from efforts to address gender-based violence in urban areas in Pakistan

- There are a number of factors that contribute to increasing Pakistan's vulnerability to climate-fragility risks, including that:
 - Its climate is characterised by extreme variations in temperatures, and is subject to frequent (and worsening) heatwaves, droughts and floods;
 - The political and economic challenges it has faced over the course of its existence have contributed to structural governance problems and insufficient capacities to address risks;
 - The country is still affected by its past as a colony, including with respect to a legacy of bureaucratic violence;
 - Many people are being displaced due to climate change-induced water scarcity in rural areas and moving to urban centres;
 - The policies adopted to address climate change and adapt to its effects are not sufficiently / adequately implemented.
- Urban centres, particularly coastal urban centres such as Karachi, are especially vulnerable to climate-fragility risks because:
 - They are very densely populated (with a significant percentage of their populations living in informal settlements);
 - They are often quite politically and economically segregated, with the poorest areas and informal settlements being particularly exposed to floods, having limited access to public services, and receiving insufficient support to face these risks;
 - The air quality is often low;
 - They are expanding at a fast rate, with developments projects often favouring those with a high socio-economic status and harming the most vulnerable (e.g. coastal land reclamation projects preventing people engaging in fishing from working, people living in poor areas getting evicted to make space for new constructions, etc.).
- In urban centres, across all socio-economic status levels, women tend to be more negatively impacted than men by the effects of climate change and the different types of violence (and stress) it creates and exacerbates. These gendered effects are especially prevalent among poorer populations.
 - When homes are demolished by floods, women are more often injured, exposed to health hazards or killed than men. In addition, as women are more exposed to violence than men when leaving their homes, being displaced due to floods makes it harder for them to work and/or sustain their families.
 - Women are more often the victims of domestic violence resulting from climate change-induced livelihood insecurity (e.g. due to floods or food and water scarcity). For example, men may consider that women are not fulfilling their prescribed roles to support the family, and men who are unable to leave their homes and work due to floods may also engage in more domestic violence as a result of the anxiety and the stress that they experience.
 - In rural areas, women tend to spend time with other women for activities outside their homes (e.g. to fetch water together), whereas in urban centres women tend to have to remain inside their homes. As a result, they are cut off from informal social protection networks which can help to reduce stress and make domestic violence less prevalent. Climate change-induced displacement from rural to urban areas therefore exposes displaced women to increased stress and domestic violence.

- Due to gender norms, women tend to be the ones who have to stay at home to take care of sick family members; this limits their ability to receive social support outside their homes, to achieve any sort of autonomy and sometimes to fulfil the rest of their prescribed tasks, thus exposing them further to domestic violence.
- International actors should:
- Support strengthening climate-fragility resilience through gender-sensitive actions which involve (urban) women and girls, are community-led (particularly by women), enhance livelihood security, protect the most vulnerable, address the realities of the informal sector, and create and promote safe spaces (especially for women).
 - Invest in public information campaigns about the diverse effects of climate change, including with respect to their gendered nature and the ways in which they exacerbate vulnerabilities at different levels, affect people differently based on disparities in socio-economic status, and lead to psychological violence.
 - Encourage the Pakistani government to fulfil its duties under the 2017 Climate Change Act, develop neighbourhood profiles and ensure its policies are adapted to local realities, and engage constructively with civil society and international organisations.

4. The way forward: integrating peacebuilding and climate change adaptation efforts

International actors which seek to contribute to human security by addressing conflict and/or the effects of climate change should:

- Systematically base their engagements on **robust climate- and gender-sensitive conflict analysis** (at a minimum) or **gender-sensitive sector-neutral integrated analysis** (if possible), in order to avoid doing harm and to have a sustainable positive impact. They should also ensure that the funding they provide to implementing partners allows them to carry out such analysis. The analysis process should:
 - Be participatory in nature and integrate input from local civil society and populations, including diverse women and men and marginalised groups.
 - Integrate diverse types of expertise and knowledge (including from local communities), blending quantitative and qualitative data, and using disaggregated data.
 - Identify drivers of sustainable peace and climate adaptation, and capacities for / initiatives to strengthen resilience, in addition to identifying climate-conflict drivers and vulnerabilities.
- Promote and support **holistic engagements which integrate both peacebuilding and climate change adaptation**, including through integrated programming. Integrated engagements can create synergies and mutual co-benefits across both dimensions. Integrated engagements should:
 - Be based on **a robust overall theory of change** which includes a vision for the long term (and anticipates possible future climate change-induced and conflict-induced changes in the context), and that they are monitored and evaluated with respect to their impact across both dimensions.
 - Be decided, designed, implemented, monitored and evaluated in **a participatory and inclusive manner**, with the meaningful involvement of affected stakeholders at all stages, particularly local communities and civil society, and diverse women and men, including young women and men, and marginalised groups.
 - Systematically integrate **gender**, support and respond to **the specific needs of the most vulnerable**, and address **marginalisation**.
 - Involve **strengthening trust, co-operation and relationships between stakeholders** (e.g. by contributing to social cohesion within and between communities, by building trust between communities and authorities, by fostering collaboration between partner governments, etc.).
- Support **the initiatives of local actors** to address climate change and build peace, and help strengthen **their capacities for resilience** (and for public advocacy), including through **the provision of adequate, flexible, integrated and long-term funding and capacity building, and by sharing relevant information** (including analysis and forecasts) relating to conflict and the effects of climate change.
- Help to build, strengthen and support **early warning mechanisms which integrate conflict prevention and climate change adaptation**, at different levels (particularly at the local level). These mechanisms should be supported in their capacity to gather, to process and to disseminate information relating to both peace/conflict and the effects of climate change.

- Help to build, strengthen and support **inclusive governance structures which integrate peacebuilding and climate change adaptation**, at different levels. They should pay special attention to ensuring that diverse women (including young women) and marginalised groups are able to participate meaningfully in these structures. This includes:
 - Supporting community-based governance structures for the management of natural resources, including land, forests and water.
 - Ensuring that governance structures are accountable to populations, and address the needs of all people and communities.
 - Engaging with relevant public authorities to ensure that informal and community-based governance structures are adequately linked to, and supported by, formal and public institutions.
- Pursue a number of other entry points for integrated engagements, including in relation to contributing to **resilient, diverse and sustainable livelihoods**, addressing the **structural causes of inequalities and marginalisation**, engaging in **peace-positive disaster risk reduction**, providing access to peace and climate-sensitive **education**, promoting **effective and equitable service delivery** by public authorities, and supporting **public information campaigns**. As part of these efforts, peacebuilding and climate change adaptation may also be integrated with various other fields of activity.
- Support integrated engagements in **different types of contexts** affected by climate-fragility risks, including urban contexts.
- **Co-operate at the regional and international levels** in order to devise and promote transboundary responses to climate-fragility risks where relevant.
- Promote **good and inclusive governance** in partner governments, and the design and effective implementation of **national integrated action plans**.
- **Refrain from militarising their responses to climate-fragility risks**, as militarised responses can have unintended and counter-productive impacts, including on the resilience of local communities to both climate change and violent conflict.
- Encourage actors which are engaging in integrated engagements to **monitor, evaluate, document and communicate their impact, experiences, lessons learned and best practices**, in order to allow others to learn from them, to foster further collaboration across the peacebuilding and climate change adaptation fields, and to increase the visibility of integrated engagements.
- Be ready to **take risks** in their programming, to help **foster innovation and ingenuity** in integrated engagements.