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Climate Change, Gender Equality and Peacebuilding: The Value of Gender-Sensitive and Climate-Sensitive Conflict Analysis

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Civil Society Dialogue Network

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, it has increasingly been recognised that both climate change and efforts to adapt to it have complex and diverse effects on peace and conflict dynamics. They can exacerbate patterns of exclusion and intersect with threats to the human security of populations, but they can also present opportunities for building sustainable peace – including through efforts to respond in an inclusive manner to the challenges that climate change poses.

The European Union and various international actors have made progress in understanding and responding to the linkages between climate change, gender equality, and peace and conflict. However, significant gaps and challenges remain in ensuring (1) that conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts adequately and systematically mainstream and integrate climate and gender equality considerations, particularly as they intersect with each other, and (2) that climate adaptation efforts do no harm and actively contribute to sustainable peace.

This discussion paper makes the case that conflict analysis that is sensitive to both gender and climate change is an essential contribution to efforts to achieve these two objectives, and that it should systematically be carried out by actors looking to intervene in fragile or conflict-affected countries.

In the first section, we examine how climate change and climate adaptation efforts may affect (gendered) conflict dynamics, violence and exclusion in different ways, underscoring the importance of avoiding assumptions and of carrying out nuanced and context-specific analysis to understand the dynamics at play in a given area. We also discuss addressing in an integrated manner these interlinkages in policy.

In the second section, we introduce and present the benefits of gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis, which is essential to ensure that interventions of any type are conflict-sensitive, i.e. that they do no harm and that they actively contribute to peace. Gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis helps making the impacts of peacebuilding and climate adaptation interventions more sustainable, it facilitates achieving integrated outcomes, it can strengthen relationships with local actors, and it benefits the organisations carrying out the analysis in different ways.

Finally, in the third section, we put forward and detail key recommendations for how organisations should approach gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis, and discuss how to address some of the risks and challenges that organisations may encounter.

The recommendations include that:

1. The integration of gender analysis and climate change into conflict analysis should become the minimum standard and should be prioritised systemically.
2. Conflict analysis should be geared towards building sustainable peace, including by integrating the identification of opportunities to pursue gender equality and to address climate change.
3. Conflict analysis processes should themselves always be conflict-sensitive (and thus sensitive to their own impacts on gender dynamics and climate change).
4. The personnel involved in conflict analysis processes should have adequate time and resources, and the relevant expertise on conflict prevention and conflict analysis, on gender, and on climate change and the environment, to carry out the analysis.

5. The personnel involved in conflict analysis processes should adopt a holistic understanding of human security.
6. Conflict analysis processes should be inclusive and participatory in nature.
7. Participatory conflict analysis processes must always guarantee the safety, security and wellbeing of the people who are consulted, and provide them with safe spaces allowing them to express themselves freely.
8. Participatory conflict analysis processes should also keep informed and benefit the people who participate in them.
9. Conflict analysis should examine dynamics over time and cover the interplay between elements at different levels.
10. Conflict analysis should be approached as a continuous process rather than as a one-off exercise.

As discussed at the end of the paper, a final recommendation is that gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis should not be an end in itself: it should serve to inform decision-making, programming and interventions. As it can be difficult for organisations to translate detailed analysis of complex situations into concrete actions that they can implement (or to adapt existing interventions), the connection between analysis and action should be built into both the conflict analysis process itself and the institutional processes that it feeds into.

1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that climate change has complex and diverse effects on peace and conflict, particularly in many fragile and conflict-affected countries. Marginalised groups, including women and girls, are often disproportionately affected. In addition, climate adaptation efforts themselves can have unintended harmful consequences, such as along gendered social cleavages by reinforcing systems of decision-making and power that may be dominated by men from particular ethnic groups and generations.

At the same time, climate change and the need to address and adapt to it can also present opportunities for building sustainable peace. This can include supporting the roles of diverse women, men, girls and boys in responses to climate change and in decision-making processes, addressing gendered inequalities and patterns of exclusion, and addressing the fundamental causes that are at the origin of violent conflict and that are exacerbated by, or that contribute to fuelling, climate change.

The European Union (EU) has made clear its ambition to address the linkages between climate change, gender equality, peace and conflict in an integrated manner.[1] However, even though the EU and various international actors have made progress in understanding and responding to these linkages, significant gaps and challenges remain in ensuring (1) that conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts adequately and systematically mainstream and integrate climate and gender equality considerations, particularly as they intersect with each other, and (2) that climate adaptation efforts do no harm and actively contribute to sustainable peace.

In this paper, we will start by presenting an overview of the linkages between climate change, gender, peace and conflict. We will then examine the value of ensuring that peacebuilding, climate adaptation and other types of interventions are based on gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis. Finally, we will present how to approach such analysis, including with respect to addressing potential challenges and to ensuring that the analysis is used to inform interventions.

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[1] See for example the Council conclusions on security and defence of June 2020, the EU roadmap on climate change and defence of November 2020, the regulation establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe instrument of June 2021 (in particular Annex III par. 3.2.(b) and Annex IV par. 3.(a)), the EU Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security of October 2021, the Council conclusions on EU climate diplomacy of February 2022, as well as the EU guidance note on the use of conflict analysis in support of EU external action of April 2021, which states that conflict analysis 'should be complemented and informed by a gender analysis and an understanding of the impacts of climate change'.

In this section, we will begin by examining how climate change may have an impact on conflict, peace and gender equality. We will then consider how human responses to climate change may also affect them. Finally, we will reflect on how climate change, conflict and gender inequality may be tackled in an integrated manner in policy responses.

a. How can climate change affect (gendered) conflict dynamics, violence and exclusion?

The research available on the interactions between climate change and conflict dynamics shows that they are complex and context-specific: there is no single, systematic causal link between climate change and conflict. Climate change is often described as a 'threat multiplier', as it can exacerbate conflict dynamics. Conversely, it can lead local, national and international actors to co-operate as part of efforts to adapt to its effects, which may contribute to building peace between them. In certain situations, it can also have little effect on existing peace and conflict dynamics.

As the effects of climate change 'operate in complex social, cultural, and political contexts', they can contribute to fuelling violence by intersecting with various drivers of conflict in different ways.[2] For example:

(1) Climate change can increase or decrease the availability of natural resources such as water and land (particularly pasture and arable land), and populations' ability and need to access and exploit them. This can lead to (escalated) competition, and sometimes to violent conflict, between members of communities whose livelihoods depend on these natural resources, between communities and central government, as well as between governments that share access to transboundary resources such as water basins. It can also lead certain actors to engage in illicit activities and/or to join armed groups as part of efforts to find alternative livelihoods when faced with reduced access to natural resources.[3]

(2) Climate change can have diverse impacts on the living situation and mobility of population groups, including by forcing certain groups to migrate in the face of livelihood insecurity and/or loss of inhabitable land (e.g. due to desertification or sea level rise), and by changing the movement patterns of pastoralist communities (e.g. due to erratic rainfall patterns forcing herders to move their livestock at unforeseen times of the year and through unusual routes).[4] In certain cases, tensions can erupt between and within groups, including with respect to power over access to, and the use of, resources (e.g.

[2] See for example: Nora Rathje (2021), 'Time for climate-sensitive conflict transformation: Complex crises need complex responses', Berghof Foundation; Kate Higgins and Ciaran O'Toole (2021), 'Climate change and conflict risks in the Pacific', Conciliation Resources.

[3] European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) and adelphi (2021), 'Climate change and human security: integrating peacebuilding and climate adaptation efforts in practice – Series report', pp. 6-8; Lukas Rüttinger (2015), 'A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks', adelphi, pp. 16-25 & 51-57; Hanne Fjelde and Ninavon Uexkull (2012), 'Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies, vulnerability and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Political Geography*, vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 444-453.

[4] EPLO and adelphi (2021), *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; Lukas Rüttinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-63; Mike Jobbins and Andrew McDonnell (2021), 'Pastoralism and Conflict: Tools for Prevention and Response in the Sudano-Sahel', Search for Common Ground.

between displaced and local population groups, between pastoralist and farming communities, etc.).

(3) Climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and natural disasters. If public authorities do not adequately prevent, mitigate and address these events' impact, this can undermine the trust of populations in authorities and fuel grievances (especially those relating to non-inclusive governance), particularly if assistance is unevenly provided between and within population groups.[5] In some cases, armed groups may try to gain legitimacy by filling the gaps in the authorities' response.

The resilience of population groups and individuals to the conflict dynamics and threats to their security that climate change exacerbates can vary by gender, ethnicity, age, religion (or lack thereof), class, (dis)ability, sexual orientation, education, etc., and how these identities intersect.[6]

This is particularly apparent with respect to gender, which determines key aspects of how people experience and are able to respond to the effects of climate change on their human security and conflict dynamics.[7] Gender roles and the gendered distribution of power in societies may interplay with the aforementioned dynamics in multiple ways.[8] For example:

(1) Access to, and the use of, natural resources are often profoundly gendered. As women frequently have to manage various household responsibilities such as collecting water and firewood, resource scarcity induced by climate change can expose them to violence in the course of undertaking these chores and for being unable to fulfil these responsibilities. Livelihood insecurity resulting from resource scarcity can also pressure men into joining armed groups in order to provide for their families; this exposes them to violence and can lead them to become perpetrators of violence themselves.[9]

(2) The effects of climate change may force herders to shift to different grazing lands. As a result, they are sometimes forced to move through more insecure areas, and they can be more likely to engage in violent conflict with farming communities whose lands they may be passing through or using for their cattle. Young men are particularly represented among the herders making that shift. Women and girls can be more likely to remain behind in villages, where they can face increased burdens to fulfil their traditional responsibilities and experience violence if they cannot do so.[10]

(3) Governance structures (particularly those relating to natural resource management) that exclude and marginalise women and minority groups can make them more vulnerable to the effects of extreme weather events such as floods and droughts.[11] In addition, extreme weather events can suddenly and significantly disrupt men and women's ability to carry

[5] Lukas Rüttinger (2015), *op. cit.*, pp. 34-41.

[6] Jessica Hartog (2021), 'Turning up the heat: Climate change, fragility and conflict', International Alert.

[7] 'Gender' is understood here as 'the social (rather than biological) attributes, norms, roles and attitudes considered appropriate for groups of men and women by a given society at a given point in time and learned through socialisation': United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) et al. (2020), 'Gender, climate and security: Sustaining inclusive peace on the frontlines of climate change', p. 14.

[8] For an overview of some of the aspects of this interplay, see for example Elizabeth E. Smith (2022), 'Gender dimensions of climate insecurity', *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, No. 2022/4.

[9] Ibid., pp. 18-19; Chitra Nagarajan, 'The gender dimensions of conflict and resilience in northern Nigeria', in Ibid., p. 28; Virginie Le Masson et al., 'Everyday violence and its impact on insecurity and resilience in Chad', in Ibid., p. 29; August Emmett Boyer et al. (2020), 'Advancing gender in the environment: exploring the triple nexus of gender inequality, state fragility, and climate change', USAID and IUCN, pp. 18-20.

[10] UNEP et al., 'Climate change, conflict, and shifting gender dynamics in pastoralist communities: Perspectives from North Kordofan, Sudan', in UNEP et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[11] August Emmett Boyer et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23; UNEP, 'Understanding the gender dimensions of climate change and security in western Nepal', in UNEP et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, p. 37.

out their traditionally prescribed gender roles, such as fulfilling household responsibilities for women and working to earn an income for men. Whilst men and women may both experience stress and anxieties as a result, it is usually men who are more likely to engage in domestic violence in these situations.[12]

At the same time, despite its negative effects, it is also possible for climate change to contribute (directly or indirectly) to peace and gender equality in different ways. For example:

(1) In situations where women and girls remain in villages while herder men are more absent due to having to shift to grazing lands that are further away, the increasingly feminised social composition of the village population can lead to strengthened roles for women in decision-making structures and shift social perceptions of their ability to lead.[13]

(2) Similarly, pastoralist women who are forced to adopt a more settled lifestyle may in some cases make it easier for them to access health care, acquire skills and education, and to develop positive relationships with women from farming communities, thus strengthening inter-group social cohesion.[14] This can also be true of intra-group social cohesion, as women who are negatively impacted by climate change (e.g. by having to cede control over land to male family members due to diminishing land availability) may increasingly count on each other for protection and assistance.[15]

(3) Faced with the effects of climate change, women (particularly young and indigenous women) have been leading numerous protests and movements for sustainable change. In doing so, they may carve out a political space for themselves and take leadership positions that contribute to changing social norms about their participation in political affairs, despite the high personal risks sometimes associated with this.[16]

The interplay between gender and other identities with respect to how people experience and are able to respond to the linkages between climate change and conflict means that it is essential not to view men, women, boys and girls as homogeneous groups, rather to identify patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the distribution of power between and within groups, and diverse patterns of resilience and vulnerability.[17]

In addition, even though these initial sets of examples illustrate some of the possible linkages between climate change, gender, conflict and peace, it is not always possible to identify a causal relationship between climate change and existing conflict dynamics in a given area, and there can be a lack of consensus between scholars on the overall impact of the former on the latter – including because climate change can affect diverse types of dynamics with opposing influences on different drivers of conflict.[18]

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[12] Amiera Sawas et al., 'Reflections on gender, climate, and security linkages in urban Pakistan', in Ibid., p. 36 ; EPLO and adelphi (2021), *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

[13] UNEP et al., 'The "feminization" of communities in Sudan: New opportunities for peacebuilding', in UNEP et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, p. 31

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Marisa O. Ensor, 'Gender, climate change and security risks in Egypt: Opportunities for synergistic action' in Ibid., p. 32.

[16] Molly Kellog, 'The role of women in addressing urban climate-fragility risks through local governance in Freetown, Sierra Leone' in Ibid., p. 33. See also the activists and organisers presented in Elizabeth Djinis (2021), 'Three climate activists from the Global South on their daily realities of living through crisis' and in Lindsey Jean Roetzel (2021), 'Why women are key to solving the climate crisis'.

[17] This also includes non-binary people.

[18] See for example: Tor Benjaminsen et al. (2012), 'Does climate change drive land-use conflicts in the Sahel?', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 49, no. 1; Luca Raineri (2020), 'Sahel climate conflicts? When (fighting) climate change fuels terrorism', European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief 20, pp. 2-3; Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim (2020), 'Role of climate change in Central Sahel's conflicts: not so clear', The Africa Report.

As a result, the complexity of these linkages means that in order to reach a robust understanding of the dynamics at play in a given area, it is necessary to avoid assumptions and to carry out a nuanced and context-specific analysis of how climate change has gendered effects on diverse drivers of peace and conflict in the area.

b. How can efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change affect (gendered) conflict dynamics, violence and exclusion?

Research on the linkages between climate change, peace and conflict has often focused on the effects of climate change itself. However, policies and programmes designed to mitigate and adapt to climate change can also fuel conflict or provide opportunities to build peace, like any other intervention in fragile or conflict-affected contexts. Like development interventions,[19] climate change adaption initiatives cannot be seen as merely technical but also as political in nature, as they engage with, and modify, existing power structures.[20]

There are multiple ways in which climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts can exacerbate gendered conflict and fuel exclusion, particularly in situations where authorities focus on defending the interests of specific groups within the population, to the detriment of others.[21] For example:

(1) When they fail to address systemic inequalities and power relations, climate change adaptation projects implemented at the community level can further entrench existing social hierarchies, abet elite capture, weaken social cohesion and fuel conflict.[22] They can also contribute to increasing gender inequalities, particularly with respect to livelihood activities.[23]

(2) Decisions over which adaptation strategies to pursue can be taken based on the vested interests of political actors and benefit certain population groups over others (e.g. farmers over herders). This can disrupt social dynamics and power relations in a way that is conducive to conflict between affected groups.[24]

(3) Programmes aiming at protecting forests and other types of lands and natural resources can fuel local tensions, foster mistrust toward authorities and reinforce exclusion when international actors and/or national authorities do not involve communities whose livelihoods depend on these resources in decision-making processes and in the implementation of programmes, particularly if marginalised communities are compensated to a lesser extent than others.[25] In addition, forest services and other

[19] Kenneth Bush (1998), 'A Measure of Peace: Peace And Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Of Development Projects In Conflict Zones' (Working Paper 1), Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, p. 8; Mary B. Anderson (1999), 'Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War', Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers; Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew J. Williams (2009), 'Conflict and Development', London, Routledge.
[20] International Crisis Group (2020), 'The Central Sahel: Scene of New Climate Wars?', Africa Briefing no. 154, p. 7.
[21] See for example Lukas Rüttinger (2015), *op. cit.*, pp. 64-68; Kate Higgins and Ciaran O'Toole (2021), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
[22] Lisa Buggy and Karen Elizabeth McNamara (2016), 'The need to reinterpret "community" for climate change adaptation: a case study of Pele Island, Vanuatu', *Climate and Development*, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 270-280. See also: Lisa Schipper et al. (2021), 'Why avoiding climate change 'maladaptation' is vital', Carbon Brief.
[23] Marcia L. Nation (2010), 'Understanding women's participation in irrigated agriculture a case study from Senegal', *Agriculture and Human Values*, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 163-176.
[24] Niagalé Bagayoko et al. (2017), 'Gestion des ressources naturelles et configuration des relations de pouvoir dans le centre du mali : entre ruptures et continuité', African Security Sector Network, pp. 16-17; Luca Raineri (2020), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.
[25] Toral Patel et al. (2013), 'Predicting Future Conflict under REDD+ Implementation', *Forests*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 343-363; Luca Raineri (2020), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

government agencies empowered to protect certain areas and resources from degradation can engage in abusive, gendered practices against local communities and fuel grievances that can facilitate recruitment by armed groups.[26]

(4) Control over the implementation of activities and the funding provided by international actors can lead to power struggles between political authorities at different levels, particularly in post-conflict situations where issues relating to the degree of autonomy of subnational entities remain contentious.[27]

Conversely, when they are sensitive to power relations, gender dynamics and the diverse human security needs and preferences of the people living in a given context, climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts can actively contribute to peace and help prevent conflict. This is particularly the case when they have a positive (direct or indirect) transformational impact on societies, reinforcing dynamics of equality, inclusion and cohesion at the structural level. For example:

(1) Projects that bring together different local actors and communities, and that empower them to implement collective activities (for example around sustainable energy production or natural resource management and protection), can strengthen the social cohesion among the people involved and foster dynamics of inclusion. This can in turn have a positive effect on local governance structures and help make them more inclusive, particularly with respect to the participation of diverse women in decision-making processes.[28]

(2) Climate change adaptation efforts that relate to livelihood diversification can provide opportunities for marginalised people and groups to engage in economic activities that they previously did not have access to, including because of traditional social norms. This can result in the empowerment of certain women and other marginalised groups, and to greater gender equality.[29]

(3) Climate adaptation efforts have increasingly benefited from analysis processes involving the use of meteorological and climatic data to make predictions on the evolution of weather and climate patterns on the short, medium and long terms. These processes can be integrated in early warning mechanisms and combined with peace and conflict analysis processes in order to anticipate possible tensions and conflicts over available resources, and prevent them.[30]

The complex interactions between climate adaptation efforts and peace and conflict dynamics in any given context underline again the importance of understanding the impact(s) that interventions may have on these dynamics. It cannot be assumed that climate adaptation efforts will necessarily be conducive to peace and foster inclusion. Instead,

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[26] Luca Raineri (2018), 'If Victims Become Perpetrators: Factors Contributing to Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Central Sahel', International Alert.

[27] Simon Levine (2014), 'Conflict, climate change and politics: Why a techno-centric approach fails the resilience challenge', HPG Working Paper, ODI, pp. 5-9.

[28] Florian Krampe (2021), 'Sustaining peace through better resource governance: Three potential mechanisms for environmental peacebuilding', *World Development*, vol. 44, 2021; Florian Krampe (2016), 'Empowering peace: Service provision and state legitimacy in Nepal's peace-building process', *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 53–73; Katie Harris (2010), 'Water and conflict: Making water delivery conflict-sensitive in Uganda', Saferworld; Jennifer Leavy (2018), 'Resilience Results: BRACED Final Evaluation', p. 85.

[29] See the dynamics in the described in the Rimaiibe tribe analysed in Jonas Østergaard Nielsen and Anette Reenberg (2010), 'Cultural barriers to climate change adaptation: A case study from Northern Burkina Faso', *Global Environmental Change*, vol. 20, pp. 142-152.

[30] See, for example, the work carried out as part of the Water, Peace and Security Partnership.

interventions should be designed, implemented and monitored to ensure that they do no harm and that they actively contribute to peace and therefore to gender equality.

c. Tackling climate change, conflict and gender equality in an integrated manner in policy

If climate change, conflict and gender equality issues remain in silos, there is a risk that actions may contradict each other and be counter-productive. To ensure that interventions for climate adaptation are both conflict-sensitive and contribute to gender equality, and to avoid the many pitfalls discussed in the previous sections, it is essential to tackle these issues intentionally in an integrated manner.

There are many ways to do so, for example through training or programming which integrate climate change, gender equality and conflict issues and considerations throughout the project cycle, from the planning stage, to the content and the evaluation phase.

Another important way to stage this integration is through policies and the processes which lead to their adoption. Indeed, policies are key entry-points not only to mandate certain actions be taken, but may also provide the opportunity to build consensus on objectives and clarify key conceptual elements. It is therefore essential to enshrine an integrated understanding of climate change, gender equality and conflict concerns in the main policies which tackle these issues.[31]

There are several policy frameworks dealing with climate change, gender equality and conflict, but they rarely 'speak to each other'.[32] The European Green Deal, for example, features a section addressing the importance of climate action in the EU's external action, and particularly highlights climate and environmental challenges as "threat multipliers" which could become "sources of conflict".[33] However, it does not discuss gender equality and barely addresses differentiated ways in which people may be affected by climate change based on their socio-economic status.[34]

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is another useful policy framework to investigate the integration of the three components (climate change, gender equality and conflicts) and it could be seen as an entry-point to further discussions on the nexus between climate change, gender equality and conflict. However, only 17 out of 80 NAPs studied by SIPRI mention climate change, and only three WPS National Action Plans – all from donor countries – included specific goals and actions 'addressing climate-related security risks'.[35] Climate change is briefly addressed in the EU's Strategic Approach to WPS as a component of the prevention pillar,[36] but women are only described as "disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change". This section could for example have articulated ways in

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[31] It is also important that priorities identified in policies are then backed up with appropriate allocation of funding to ensure that policy objectives can actually be carried out. This has been a chronic issue in the past for reaching both climate and gender equality goals.

[32] International Alert (2021), 'Integrating gender and security in climate adaptation: Principles for success', pp. 7.

[33] European Commission, 'The European Green Deal', Joint Communication, 11 December 2019.

[34] The European Green Deal only mentions that "[EU] citizens, depending on their social and geographic circumstances, will be affected in different ways" in the context of the Just Transition Fund, but this by definition does not include most of the people who are affected by the EU's external actions (who are citizens of third states).

[35] Elizabeth Seymour Smith (2020), 'Climate change in WPS National Action Plans', *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, no. 2020/7, pp. 9-10.

[36] Council of the European Union, 'EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security', Council Conclusions, 10 December 2018, pp. 32.

which climate change and conflicts might also be opportunities for shifts towards gender equality, and how different gender identities are impacted by climate change and conflict.

The EU's third Gender Action Plan (GAP III) is the EU's main framework for promoting gender equality in its external actions, and includes climate change (the 'green transition' in GAP III) as a key thematic area, while conflict and climate change are jointly listed as critical factors exacerbating inequalities.[37] The nature of the overlap and interplay between these factors, however, is not articulated elsewhere in the text. The section on WPS briefly acknowledges that crises such as conflicts are 'increasingly linked to global challenges'[38] such as climate change, but no further explanation of this link is offered. The section of GAP III exploring climate change and gender equality simply does not address conflict situations. GAP III therefore serves as an example of a policy which incorporates climate change, gender equality and conflict issues under the same umbrella, but does not necessarily shed light on the ways in which these issues intersect.

One important entry point to ensure this overlap and interplay is articulated in policy, and that policies in turn mandate climate, gender equality and conflict-sensitive actions, is analysis. Indeed, policies should be informed by, and make explicit calls for, gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analyses. The following section will explore what is meant by 'gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis' and their added value.

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[37] European Commission and European External Action Service, 'EU Gender Action Plan III: An Ambitious Agenda for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in EU External Action', Joint Communication, 25 November 2020, pp. 2.

[38] European Commission and European External Action Service, *op. cit.,* 2020, pp. 18.

3. Conflict analysis, gender and climate change: The essentials

In this section, we will start by presenting conflict analysis that integrates considerations relating to gender and climate change, what it involves and why. We will then develop what are the benefits of carrying out such conflict analysis for actors looking to engage (or already engaging) in a given context. Finally, we will provide an overview of existing frameworks.

a. What is gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis?

Conflict analysis refers to the process through which one is able to identify and understand a given context, particularly in relation to the peace and conflict dynamics within it. This will include:

- the formal and informal institutions in place within it;
- the key actors and population groups, their relations and the distribution of power between them;
- the 'political, economic and social factors that may cause, sustain and drive a conflict';
- the possible drivers and opportunities for peace.[39]

These elements may be covered and studied across various levels (e.g. at the household, community, regional, national and international levels), with particular attention being paid to how the dynamics identified at different levels interlink.[40] Conflict analysis is also used to examine the possible (or existing) impact of an intervention under consideration (or that is already ongoing) on the peace and conflict dynamics in the context – and vice versa.

The dynamics and societal structures that are studied in a conflict analysis may be profoundly complex in nature, and it is impossible for any conflict analysis to be exhaustive or perfectly up-to-date. However, depending on its purpose, the scope may be narrowed to specific geographic areas, issues and/or levels of focus, and adapted to different phases of conflict.[41]

Any conflict analysis involves examine how power is acquired, held, maintained, distributed, wielded, and lost in the context under study, it must necessarily integrate the gendered dimensions of that power to be fit for purpose, as 'gender' permeates the power relations between different groups in society, including and not limited to relations between 'men' and 'women'. Gender affects and characterises, inter alia:

- people's identities, roles and relations and the different socially-constructed gendered expectations that are placed upon them with respect to how they should behave, interact with others and live their lives (e.g. young men may be expected to protect their communities, women to be married and to care for the household, etc.);

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[39] Conciliation Resources (2015), 'Gender & conflict analysis toolkit for peacebuilders', pp. 13-15; Saferworld et al. (2004), 'Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding', pp. 23-25.

[40] Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 9 and p. 21.

[41] Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012), 'How to guide to conflict sensitivity', p. 5; Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) (2017), 'Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines and Procedures', p. 10 and pp. 30-31; Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), 'From conflict analysis to peacebuilding impact: Lessons from the People's Peacemaking Perspectives project', pp. 27-28.

- meanings and symbols that shape how people see the world around them (e.g. representations of masculinity may be associated with the capacity and the inclination to be violent, femininity to submission and/or to engaging in dialogue, etc.);

- people's access to and control over resources (e.g. women may have to go through more complicated processes than men to obtain legal ownership over land, and only certain women may be able to afford pursuing that process);

- formal and informal institutions, including organisational structures, patterns of decision-making, cultural practices and social norms that are constructed based on ideas about gender but also produce gendered differentiations themselves (e.g. it may be challenging for women and young men to play leadership roles in local governance structures that involve traditional, religious leaders).

While the way gender is constructed varies between and within contexts, 'gender is consistently a factor that determines who has access to power, authority and resources', and it interacts and intersects with other factors, identities and systems of power.[42] For example, within a given area, young women from pastoralist communities may be less represented in formal institutions managing access to natural resources than older pastoralist women, who may themselves be less represented than women from farmer communities – with old, wealthy men from the dominant ethnic group in the farmer communities having the highest degree of representation.

For conflict analysis to capture power relations within a given context adequately, it needs to assess gender relations and gender (in)equality (in other words, to adopt a 'gender lens') (1) in every aspect of the substance of the analysis and (2) throughout the analysis process itself:

(1) Conflict analyses should substantively examine, inter alia:

i. The diverse roles that different men and women play in conflict dynamics, and the different ways in which they may experience conflict and violence. This analysis must take care to understand that neither men nor women are homogenous groups (e.g. poor rural women may have different experiences, needs and expectations from urban educated women, etc.).

ii. How gender norms and structural, gendered marginalisation interact with other dynamics to drive or to prevent conflict. For example, it may be expected of young men that they provide for their families. As a result, if their livelihoods collapse due to an extreme weather event, some of them may be driven to join armed groups that offer high sources of income.

iii. How conflict itself contributes to shaping gender norms. For example, if most men leave a village to take part in a conflict, the women who remain in the village may start managing its natural resources and other issues, and gain long-lasting legitimacy in endorsing such responsibilities.

Identifying opportunities for peace can also involve examining which gender roles and norms, and which dynamics of exclusion, may be challenged or transformed to foster inclusion and to promote peace. In Nepal, the traditional barriers to land ownership for women led many women to join or support the Maoist rebel movement, which had

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[42] Conciliation Resources (2015), *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; USAID (2021), 'ADS Chapter 205 Integrating Gender Equality and Female Empowerment in USAID's Program Cycle', pp. 11-12.

promised to reallocate land more equitably. Addressing these barriers to women's land ownership proactively could have in part helped to prevent the conflict.[43]

(2) The following questions may shed light on the gender-sensitivity of an analysis process: Who is carrying out the analysis and what biases may they have? What assumptions may underpin the research plan and questions? What type of data is collected and how is it processed (e.g. are algorithms producing biased results?)? Who is engaging with which members of the local population and using which methods (e.g. it may sometimes be helpful or necessary to hold separate discussions with men and women so that interlocutors may speak openly)? How are the data and the conflict analyses used?[44]

In the first section, we examined how both climate change and climate adaptation interventions can have varied and multiple impacts on the peace and conflict dynamics in a given context. Consequently, conflict analysis must adequately integrate considerations relating to the effects in the context of climate change and of responses to it, and to whether a possible intervention may influence how diverse people experience these effects. This sensitivity to climate change and responses should apply to all of the elements considered in the analysis – not only to those for which these connections are the most evident.

Adopting a gender lens in doing so is again essential, as gender (in)equality affects resilience to climate change and conflict at multiple societal levels, and gender can be a determinant 'of both vulnerability and an increased capacity to support resilience within larger systems.'[45] For example, research in rural Kenya identified both similarities and notable differences in the behaviours and strategies pursued by men and women in the face of climate change.[46] Climate change and gender considerations should thus not be 'separate additions' to a conflict analysis; both should instead be fully integrated (and connected) throughout the analysis process.[47]

In practice, this means examining the gendered effects of climate change and of possible interventions on, inter alia:

(1) key actors and diverse population groups (climate change may affect their livelihoods, their access to and control over natural resources, the distribution of power between them, their resilience to other security threats, their interests in maintaining or changing the status quo, their possible incentives to engage in violence, the socially-prescribed roles of women, girls, men and boys of different social, economic and ethnic (etc.) backgrounds);

(2) possible root causes of conflict (the effects of climate change may exacerbate grievances toward the state among a given ethnic or gender group due to unequal access to

[43] Saferworld (2016), 'Gender analysis of conflict toolkit', chapter 4; Conciliation Resources (2015), op. cit., p. 16; UNEP et al. (2013), 'Women and Natural Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential', pp. 18-19.

[44] Saferworld (2016), op. cit., chapter 2.

[45] Audrey Anderson (2018), 'Resilience in Action: Technical Brief – Gender Equity and Social Inclusion', Mercy Corps, pp. 2-3. See also Houria Djoudi et al. (2016), 'Beyond dichotomies: Gender and intersecting inequalities in climate change studies', Ambio, no. 45, pp. 248-262, who explains that the 'capacity to adapt and respond to change' is 'shaped by [gendered] power relations determining access to resources, information and the availability of options and choices' (p. 9), and Sarah Hackfort and Hans-Jürgen Burchardt (2016), 'Analyzing socio-ecological transformations – a relational approach to gender and climate adaptation', Critical Policy Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 9.

[46] Marther W. Ngigi et al. (2017), 'Gender Differences in Climate Change Adaptation Strategies and Participation in Group-based Approaches: An Intra-household Analysis From Rural Kenya', Ecological Economics, vol. 138, pp. 99-108.

[47] For reflections on integrating conflict analysis and other types of assessments, see for example Saferworld et al. (2004), op. cit., p. 27.

resources, public services, and government support compared to other groups; they may amplify inter- and/or intra-community tensions around access to land, particular for women and other marginalised groups; etc.);

(3) peace and conflict dynamics (the effects of climate change may force herder communities to adopt transhumance routes that may exacerbate tensions with farmer communities, and make women herders and farmers being more vulnerable to attacks by groups from the other communities; they may lead conflict actors to engage in dialogue and in the development of conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions around the use of natural resources, but at the same time entrench the exclusion of women and other marginalised groups from these structures, particularly if they are not able to take part in the processes setting them up; etc.);

(4) institutions and organisational structures (e.g. the effects of climate change may reinforce formal governance institutions over informal ones, which may have a positive or negative impact on the decision-making role of certain marginalised groups; they may stretch thin the capacities of local institutions and reinforce the power of the national government; they may lead to heightened levels of corruption or, conversely, contribute to strengthening good governance and inclusion, including due to pressure from international donors; etc.).[48]

As part of gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis processes, different types of qualitative and quantitative data should be combined and integrated in the analysis (including climate-related data), using data disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, religion and other markers whenever possible to be able to capture and analyse in an intersectional manner how climate change affects diverse groups differently.[49]

b. What are the benefits of gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis?

The primary reason to carry out conflict analysis is to ensure that interventions of any type are conflict-sensitive, i.e. that they do no harm and that they actively contribute to peace, as conflict analysis provides not only an understanding of the context but an estimation of how the intervention may interact with the context.[50] In particular, conflict analysis allows actors to understand the 'needs, vulnerabilities and priorities of men, women, boys and girls across contexts', how they would be affected by a given intervention, and how to maximise an intervention's positive impact on their human security.[51]

As a result, carrying out gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis helps make the outcomes of peacebuilding and climate adaptation interventions more sustainable: peacebuilding activities will be adapted to the long-term effects of climate change and the corresponding needs and interests of diverse population groups, and climate adaptation

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[48] See for example some of the points and questions in Dennis Tänzler and Nikolas Scherer (2018), 'Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change', adelphi, pp. 10-15 and in Kirby Reiling and Cynthia Brady (2015), 'Climate change and conflict: An annex to the USAID climate-resilient development framework', USAID, pp. 18-26. The analysis can also involve reflecting on how the possible engagement itself could contribute to climate change, including by examining its carbon footprint.

[49] See for example UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) et al. (2020), 'Climate Security Mechanism – Toolbox: Data Sources'; Janani Vivekananda (2019), 'Shoring up stability: Addressing climate and fragility risks in the Lake Chad region', adelphi.

[50] Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 22.

[51] UNEP et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, p. 43.

efforts will not inadvertently cause harm that would undermine their positive impact and will instead strengthen mechanisms contributing to long-term resilience.[52]

It also helps interventions achieve integrated outcomes: it will serve as the foundation to allow peacebuilding activities to reduce the vulnerability of populations to climate change and to support their resilience and adaptive capacities, particularly that of diverse women and marginalised groups, and to allow climate adaptation efforts to actively contribute to peace by ensuring that processes are inclusive and lead diverse actors to co-operate.[53]

As gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis should be regularly/continuously updated (see section 4.a. below), in addition to informing initial decision-making about whether and how to engage as well as the design and implementation of interventions, it serves to inform how to adapt interventions based on the evolution of the context, and to monitor and evaluate more accurately their multifaceted, gendered impacts (in combination with other tools).[54]

As conflict analysis processes should involve the participation of diverse local members of the local population (see section 4.a. below), they can also help build trust and relationships with local civil society actors. Developing these positive relationships can be useful not only to facilitate consultations and to ensure that interventions are sensitive to the needs of diverse local population groups, but also to help address imbalanced power dynamics between international and local actors, establish more equal relations, and enable partnerships to adequately support local actors and their ownership over initiatives to address the linkages between climate change and conflict.[55]

Finally, such analysis processes yield multiple internal benefits for the organisations carrying them out. Integrating gender and climate change in conflict analysis requires sharing information across policy fields and bringing together people with expertise on different thematic areas and issues. The insights gained from this co-operation (and from the analysis itself) will help challenge possible incorrect assumptions that some of the people involved may have and it will help build the knowledge and capacities of the people involved (for this reason, it is particularly useful for organisations to involve internal staff in the conduct of conflict analysis, even when working with partners and external actors).[56]

The people who conduct joint conflict analysis processes will also develop shared, nuanced understandings of the context under study, which will facilitate the development of synergies between different types of instruments and actions across their respective fields of work, and the identification of entry points for integrated interventions to address cross-cutting dynamics relating to climate gender, gender and peace/conflict.[57] A better understanding of

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[52] On the importance of being sensitive to climate change in mediation efforts and peace processes to achieve sustainable outcomes, see for example European Institute of Peace (2020), 'Making peace with the climate: Conflict resolution in a climate-changing world'.

[53] Kirby Reiling and Cynthia Brady (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 17; see for example also Jon Kurtz and Greg Scarborough (2012), 'From conflict to coping –Evidence from Southern Ethiopia on the contributions of peacebuilding to drought resilience among pastoralist groups', Mercy Corps.

[54] Saferworld et al (2004)., *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27 and 81-87.

[55] Conciliation Resources (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 16; EPLO (2018), 'Meeting Report of the CSDN Policy Meeting "Reviewing the EU's conflict analysis practices – Gathering civil society input"', pp. 6-7.

[56] Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[57] Fabio Olivia and Lorraine Charbonnier (2016), 'Conflict analysis handbook: A field and headquarter guide to conflict assessments', UN System Staff College, pp. 26-30. The argument in favour of joint conflict analysis processes has particularly been put forward in relation to how to help operationalise the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. See for example: Pauline Veron and Volker Hauck (2021), 'Connecting the pieces of the puzzle: the EU's implementation of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus', ECDPM, pp. 10-14.

the conflict dynamics and the violence in the context also helps increase the safety and security of the personnel and civilians working in the context to implement an intervention.[58]

c. What are examples of existing frameworks?

Several organisations working in peacebuilding, climate adaptation and gender equality have begun to publish their reflections on conducting integrated conflict analyses which focus on gender and climate. These publications illustrate in particular different ways of conceptualising the overlap of climate, gender and conflict in analyses. Two main types of frameworks emerge: those which focus on (1) *conflict*-sensitivity of analyses for climate adaptation, including elements on gender, and those on (2) *gender*-sensitivity of conflict analyses, which sometimes mention considerations in relation to climate change.

Publications which are primarily on *conflict*-sensitive analysis for climate adaptation include mentions of how climate change and conflict compound risk factors and disproportionately affect people in gendered ways. For example, a guidance note by International Alert (2021) suggests analysing the overlap of climate and security risks, and exploring how these are 'shaped by people's gender and social identities'. In Mali, women are particularly affected by climate shocks and conflict in part because their livelihoods are primarily based on substance farming and small trade activities. The authors suggest taking a broader look at 'the impacts of climate stress on social, political and economic dynamics'.[59] The US Agency for International Development's (USAID) framework for climate-resilient development includes a question in its Climate Vulnerability Assessment on gender as a factor among others (i.e. age, marital status) in people's adaptive capacity.[60] The USAID framework also includes a dedicated annex outlining the importance and a methodology for conflict-sensitivity, and while a few questions in this methodology suggest gender-sensitivity (for example, 'Has the crisis changed the distribution of power in the community? How is it different for men and women?'), this is not a systematic feature. The 2019 adelphi 'Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change' address gendered aspects in several places, and primarily examine how climate adaptation is affecting gender relations.[61] The USAID and adelphi frameworks for conflict-sensitive climate adaptation include considerations on gender in some manner, these remain mostly sparse and unsystematic. A more gender-sensitive framework would for example mandate analysis of gendered dynamics in every step of analysis, both in terms of risks and also to identify opportunities for furthering gender equality through conflict-sensitive climate adaptation.

The publications which call for *gender*-sensitive conflict analysis in turn tend to be quite limited in the extent to which they address climate change, with references only to natural resource scarcity, broad references to the environment and land-based conflicts, issues which are related to climate change.[62] A policy brief by UN Women (2012) refers to 'environmental change' as an element to collect information about from both women and men, and 'environmental stress' as a structural cause of conflict.[63] More climate-sensitive

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[58] Fabio Olivia and Lorraine Charbonnier (2016), *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[59] Ibid., p. 4.

[60] Kirby Reiling and Cynthia Brady (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[61] Dennis Tänzler and Nikolas Scherer (2018), *op. cit.*

[62] Sanam Anderlini (2006), 'Mainstreaming Gender in Conflict Analysis: Issues and Recommendations', World Bank; Saferworld et al. (2017), 'Building inclusive peace: Gender at the heart of conflict analysis'.

[63] Anne Marie Goetz and Anne-Kristin Treiber (2012), 'Gender and Conflict Analysis', UN Women, p. 2.

frameworks for gender-sensitive conflict analysis could further explore links with climate change, and particularly how climate change impacts conflict dynamics in gendered ways.

Some frameworks make an effort to transcend the issue as to whether a given analysis leans more towards gender-sensitivity or climate-sensitivity, or even under which category the analysis should fall (conflict analysis, climate vulnerability assessment, etc.). For example, Mercy Corps has developed a 'sector-neutral analysis', which aims to unpack security dynamics in an integrated manner with the broad goal of improving human security. This type of analysis can then lead into multi-sectoral assessments with more specific areas of focus, including climate, conflict and gender.[64]

While the aforementioned existing frameworks highlight ways in which to tackle gender, climate change and conflict, none do so in a truly integrated and systematic manner. The following section will discuss how such a gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis should be approached.

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[64] See for example Eric Vaughan and Sarah Henly-Shepard (2018), '*Resilience Measurement Practical Guidance Note Series 1: Risk and Resilience Assessments*', Mercy Corps.

4. How should gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis be approached?

In this section, we will propose ten recommendations that should guide conflict analysis processes integrating climate and gender considerations. We will then address some of the risks and challenges to consider when carrying out conflict analysis, particularly with respect to implementing some of these recommendations. Finally, we will discuss how essential it is for actors to use the conflict analysis to inform their interventions.

a. Guiding principles and recommendations

Based on our research on existing guides, frameworks and reports on lessons learned and good practices, we propose the following principles and recommendations to carry out gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis.

1) The integration of gender analysis and climate change into conflict analysis should become the **minimum standard** and should be **prioritised systemically**.

The European Union and EU Member States should develop, prioritise, integrate and mainstream gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis at a systemic level within their organisations, and they should require all partners (including international organisations, national governments, civil society actors, etc.) to do the same – including within budgets, planning guidelines, established procedures, funding applications, organisational development plans, relevant contracts with service providers, etc., across policy fields.[65]

2) Conflict analysis should be geared towards **building sustainable peace**, including by integrating the identification of opportunities to **pursue gender equality** and to **address climate change**.

This involves identifying what can contribute to transformative changes in favour of gender equality and environmental sustainability, including in terms of enabling greater inclusion as part and as a result of peace and climate-related efforts (paying particular attention to the contributions and participation of diverse women, young people and marginalised groups).[66]

3) Conflict analysis processes should themselves always be **conflict-sensitive** (and thus sensitive to their own impacts on gender dynamics and climate change).

Conflict analysis processes are not neutral activities but interventions involving actors engaging in and from a given context.[67] Participatory elements of the analysis process, in particular, can contribute to building peace by bringing people together, but they can also do harm and reinforce dynamics of exclusion if they are not planned and carried out carefully and sensitively. International actors should be conscious of the asymmetrical power dynamics characterising their relations with local actors, and they should be careful not to

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[65] Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.
[66] Conciliation Resources (2015), *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16; International Alert (2021), 'Integrating gender and security in climate adaptation: Principles for success', pp. 5-6 and 9-11.
[67] GPPAC (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 11.

'dominate' them and impose external framings on issues they want to gather input on, as this can prevent local actors from expressing their sincere opinions.[68] These considerations are particularly true in the context of analysing (and engaging with local actors around) issues relating to climate change, given the asymmetrical levels of responsibility between countries in terms of their respective contributions to it.

4) The personnel involved in conflict analysis processes should have **adequate time and resources**, and the **relevant expertise** on conflict prevention and conflict analysis, on gender, and on climate change and the environment, to carry out the analysis.

In particular, it can take time to plan participatory conflict analysis processes – especially if an organisation does not have local partners who can provide help. However, the multiple benefits of carrying out conflict analysis are worth the investment (including because ensuring that interventions are conflict-sensitive saves time and resources in itself), and conducting 'good enough' analysis (for a specific purpose) that is then expanded, deepened and kept up-to-date can help address time constraints.[69]

The personnel involved should also be able to integrate their methods and adopt an interdisciplinary approach. This includes combining qualitative and quantitative data relating to peace and conflict dynamics, the human security of populations, structural drivers and institutions, and climate science, gathered through different tools and with a gender lens.[70]

5) The personnel involved in conflict analysis processes should adopt a **holistic understanding of human security**.

This is essential in order to be able to capture the complex and varied impacts that climate change and climate actions may have – directly or indirectly – on conflict and on the lives of diverse population groups. This is particularly true of gendered patterns of exclusion and forms of violence that are often overlooked as part of analyses, including domestic violence (often against women) within households.[71]

6) Conflict analysis processes should be **inclusive and participatory** in nature.

Conflict analysis processes should meaningfully involve diverse stakeholders and members of the local population and civil society (including diverse women, young people and other marginalised groups, taking into account gender, class, religion, ethnicity, (dis)ability, rural/urban divides, etc.,) to develop in-depth and nuanced understandings of social norms, of power dynamics, and of people's varied lived experiences, needs, priorities, and existing initiatives with respect to the impacts of climate change and conflict on their human security. Engaging with diverse civil society actors can also help actors looking to intervene to gain access to people and areas that would otherwise be difficult to reach, to be informed early of changes in the context that would otherwise be noticed later, and to capture forms of

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[68] GPPAC (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[69] Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[70] Katie Peters et al. (2020), 'Climate change, conflict and fragility : An evidence review and recommendations for research and action', ODI, pp. 28-29 and 31-32; Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28. For a climate-security risk assessment produced through interdisciplinary research, see for example: Janani Vivekananda (2019), *op. cit.*. On building staff capacity for conflict sensitivity, see for example: UNDP (2017), 'Conflict Sensitivity: Experiences from Local and Community Development Practice in Myanmar', pp. 37-39.
[71] See for example EPLO and adelphi (2021), *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

violence that macro-level sources of input may tend to miss (e.g. as mentioned above, climate-induced gendered domestic violence).[72]

7) Participatory conflict analysis processes must always guarantee the **safety, security and wellbeing** of the people who are consulted, and provide them with **safe spaces** allowing them to express themselves freely.

This should involve assessing before the consultation the diverse needs of possible participants, whether it would be safe for them to speak about conflict, gender and climate change, which location (within/outside of the country or online) will be as safe and accessible as possible for them, etc. It also involves ensuring that the design and the facilitation of the consultation process (e.g. through workshops) allow all participants to feel safe among the people present, and to contribute input freely (for example, it may be difficult for women to express certain views in front of men, certain power dynamics between the participants may lead some to remain silent, etc.).[73]

International actors should also be sensitive to local and national dynamics with respect to whom they select to participate (paying attention to how possible participants are perceived by others in the context), how they present the process and its purpose (e.g. the term 'conflict analysis' may be perceived negatively and may have to be avoided, and it is important to manage expectations about what can happen as a result of the analysis), how they approach the circulation of the outcomes of the analysis process (as sharing certain information may be harmful), etc.[74]

8) Participatory conflict analysis processes should also **keep informed and benefit the people who participate in them**.

Conflict analysis processes should not be solely extractive. Although it can be sensitive to share the results of a conflict analysis, organisations should do their best to keep the civil society actors who contributed input informed about how the analysis is used, and to share as much information as possible from the analysis with them. Such information sharing and restitution helps build trust, it allows participants to appreciate the impact of their contributions, and it can enable them to use the analysis to inform and develop their own activities.[75]

9) Conflict analysis should examine dynamics over **time** and cover the interplay between elements at **different levels**.

Climate change may have various reinforcing, conflicting or unconnected effects on gendered peace and conflict dynamics at different levels (e.g. at the household, community, regional, national and international levels) and in the short, medium and long terms. It is important for conflict analysis to provide an understanding of these complex relations in order

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[72] Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), 'From conflict analysis to peacebuilding impact: Lessons from the People's Peacemaking Perspectives project', pp. 7-19; Conciliation Resources (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 21; GPPAC (2017), *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26; EPLO (2018), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
[73] Sophia Close et al. (2020), 'Facilitation guide: Gender-sensitive conflict analysis', Conciliation Resources and Saferworld, pp. 9-10.
[74] Conciliation Resources (2015), *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8; GPPAC (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 20; Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.
[75] EPLO (2018), *op. cit.*, p. 3.

to ensure that dynamics that develop over the long term or that take place at other levels than that of a given intervention do not undermine the sustainability of its outcomes.

10) Conflict analysis should be approached 'as a **continuous process** rather than as a one-off exercise.'[76]

At a minimum, conflict analysis should be iterative and updated on a regular basis in order to keep track of the evolution of the context (including during the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of interventions). This is necessary in order to be able to adapt, to launch or to put an end to interventions in a timely manner based on changing dynamics. For example, as the effects of climate change can include increases in sudden extreme weather events, unpredictable rainfall patterns and long-term trends with tipping points that can be accompanied by abrupt violence, it is essential to be able to maintain an up-to-date understanding of such events and of their gendered impact on peace and conflict dynamics in order to be able to respond appropriately.

b. Possible challenges and risks

There are a number of possible challenges and risks to consider when carrying out gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis. A first challenge relates to the difficulty of **bringing together people from different policy fields** and with different expertise, methods and understandings of concepts, to work on and integrate different types of (qualitative and quantitative) data as part of an analysis process.[77] To address this, relevant actors should engage with one another regularly through formal and informal channels; participate in (joint) trainings on conflict prevention and conflict sensitivity, on gender analysis and on climate assessments; and develop adequate information-sharing processes. Their organisation should create structural incentives and processes for co-operation, for knowledge management and transmission, and for building staff capacity to integrate insights from other fields.[78]

Certain actors **assume that a single conflict analysis can necessarily meet all needs**. There are many different reasons for which various institutional actors may need a climate-sensitive and gender-sensitive conflict analysis to inform their work, and it may not be possible for a single analysis process to address all of them. Conflict analysis processes that are too ambitious (particularly when they already involve looking at complex dynamics such as the gendered interactions between climate change, conflict and peace) can require time and resources to such an extent that actors may subsequently consider that they are 'done' carrying out analysis for a while – which is problematic given the importance of ensuring that analyses are updated regularly. Instead, it can be helpful to complement 'strategic' conflict analysis by carrying out smaller-scale, targeted conflict analysis (that are still sensitive to

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[76] EPLO (2018), *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[77] Katie Peters et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, pp. 31-33. For a look at some of the different framings of issues around climate security within the EU institutions, see Elise Remling and Anniek Barnhoorn (2021), 'A reassessment of the European Union's response to climate-related security risks', *SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security*, no. 2021/2.
[78] For example, it can be helpful to integrate these issues in job descriptions, handover procedures, performance assessments, lessons learned processes, etc.

gender and climate change) to provide (additional) insights tailored to the particular needs of actors and interventions.[79]

Another challenge relates to the possible **lack of available information and data** about some of the issues being studied as part of a gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis. It is often necessary to rely on external sources of data, and gaps can include the lack of disaggregated data (particularly by gender) or the absence of data altogether (e.g. on gender-based violence, on local perceptions of insecurity or on climate vulnerability in specific areas within a country).[80] Engaging with partners across policy fields can be helpful in gathering relevant data, but it is not always possible to fill these gaps. In addition, it can also be the case that the **information gathered is contradictory** – for example in participatory processes during which civil society actors share conflicting perspectives. It is important in itself to identify these differences in outlooks, and to gain a nuanced understanding of how the issues at stake are perceived by different context actors (conversely, homogenisation can be dangerous as it may feed or result from confirmation biases).

Finally, as for any research process, it is important to be aware of, and address, potential **analytical biases**. Confirmation biases, in particular, can lead analysts to focus disproportionately on elements that they expected to observe and to see play a particular role, to the detriment of others, and to adopt certain framings and presume causal relationships that were valid for other contexts but are not necessarily true for the one under study.[81] In the case of gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis, this could involve giving too much weight to climate change with respect to how it exacerbates conflict dynamics, and minimising the role of other drivers, or missing how the effects of climate change contribute to peace in certain parts of the context. It could also involve focusing on women solely as victims and/or agents of positive change, without paying attention to how certain women may perpetrate violence. Recognising biases and addressing them is necessary at every step of the conflict analysis, and inclusive analysis processes are helpful in that regard.

c. Using the conflict analysis to inform interventions

A final, essential consideration that should be at the centre of any conflict analysis process is that conflict analysis 'is not an end in itself': it should serve to inform decision-making, programming and interventions.[82] It can be difficult for organisations to translate detailed analysis of complex situations into concrete actions that they can implement (or to adapt existing interventions), and for that reason the connection between analysis and action should be built into both the conflict analysis process itself and the institutional processes that it feeds into.[83]

In this regard, in addition to providing an understanding of the context and of the (possible) intervention's interactions with it, conflict analysis should include actionable recommendations for conflict-sensitive (and therefore gender-sensitive) and climate-sensitive

[79] Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[80] August Emmett Boyer et al. (2020), *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.
[81] Fabio Olivia and Lorraine Charbonnier (2016), *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[82] GPPAC (2017), *op. cit.*, p. 11. Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[83] Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 23 and 26.

actions. As this requires time and resources, this aspect of the analysis should be recognised, planned and supported from the design phase of the process.[84]

Conflict analysis processes should be designed with the entry point within the institution in mind; similarly decision-making processes and the programming cycles within the organisation should be able to implement the findings and recommendations of conflict analysis at the appropriate policy and programming levels – including by ensuring there are continuous analysis processes in place so that sudden developments in a context that may require intervening or adapting existing actions can be taken into account.

It should also involve ensuring that gender-sensitive and climate-sensitive conflict analysis is integrated structurally throughout the stages of programming and intervention processes, including within (or in connection with) other analysis frameworks (e.g. security risk assessments, adaptation planning exercises, vulnerability assessment frameworks, etc.).[85] The interventions that conflict analysis feeds into should themselves have built-in time and resources to allow for the monitoring of the evolution of the context and of the intervention's interactions with it, including through indicators defined through the conflict analysis and by updating the analysis itself.[86]

Finally, in order for the relevant services and teams to use and implement the conflict analysis in their work, they should not only have the adequate capacities (including with respect to a familiarity with conflict prevention, gender sensitivity and climate adaptation) and structural incentives (including in terms of reporting on the implementation of the analysis) to do so, but also be engaged early on in the conflict analysis process. In particular, including the relevant stakeholders within an organisation in the design phase of a conflict analysis process (particularly with regard to the purpose of the analysis, how it will be conducted and how it is expected to be translated into actions), is especially beneficial to help ensure that there is cross-institutional ownership over the analysis and that it is used to inform interventions.[87]

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[84] Ibid., p. 26.
[85] Kirby Reiling and Cynthia Brady (2015), *op. cit.*, p. 20; Dennis Tänzler and Nikolas Scherer (2018), *op. cit.*, 99. 9-18; Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 27 and pp. 63-69; Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[86] International Alert (2021), *op. cit.*, p. 4; Saferworld et al. (2004), *op. cit.*, pp. 73-78.
[87] Saferworld and Conciliation Resources (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29; EPLO (2018), *op. cit.*, p. 3.