



EU Frameworks on Climate, Peace and Security

CSDN Background Paper

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European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

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Executive Summary

This paper describes the evolution of EU Frameworks with a link to Climate, Peace and Security (CPS). It opens with a contextualising paragraph on why CPS matters for EU external action, continues by sketching out the evolution of EU action on CPS, looking at early foundations, the first integration in external action policies, impacts of the European Green Deal and geopolitical shifts, the focus on climate change and defence, recent policy developments, changes in funding frameworks and the corresponding risks of deprioritising climate action, and concrete frameworks such as Regional Climate Security Dialogues, EU-UN collaboration on climate-security, and the roles of different EU institutions for CPS. The paper provides a table on key EU actors on CPS and their roles here. It also briefly reflects on the implications of the observed shifts for peacebuilding and EU external engagement on CPS, and finally reports on latest trends and next steps. It also includes a comprehensive Annex I on 'Key CPS-related EU policy documents' which serves as a policy inventory.

Introduction: Why Climate, Peace and Security matters for EU external action

This section introduces the Climate, Peace and Security (CPS) agenda and explains why it matters for EU external action.

Climate change and environmental degradation interact with and affect conflict dynamics, governance fragility, displacement, food security, water and resource scarcity, and geopolitical competition in a multitude of ways. Climate and environmental risks can act as 'risk multipliers' but also offer avenues for cooperation in some instances¹. As the predicted impacts of climate and environmental risks become more visible, and their interaction with other drivers of fragility is more systematically researched, international organisations, including the EU, have placed greater emphasis on the interplay of climate change and environmental degradation with peace and security dynamics in their external action.

The EU's engagement on CPS-related issues is based on its commitment to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but also increasingly motivated by growing geopolitical competition around the energy transition, critical raw materials, and climate finance and concerns over instability in neighbouring and partner regions, i.e. the

¹ Simon J.A. Mason, Sebastian Kratzer, Edward Jackson (2026): Environmental Entry Points for Mediation, in: Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich 'CSS Analyses in Security Policy'
<https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSS-news/2026/02/environmental-entry-points-for-mediation.html>

growing recognition that the impacts of the climate crisis directly affect European security, economic interests and regional stability.

As a result, the EU has started to mainstream climate-security considerations into diplomacy, development cooperation, humanitarian action, and security policy and more explicitly approaches climate change as a systemic challenge to foreign and security policy that requires integrated responses across these fields.

While EU policy documents often refer to the ‘climate-security nexus’, this paper uses the broader term Climate, Peace and Security (CPS) to allow consideration of how the EU is including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, governance, and human security dimensions alongside climate action and security considerations.

Evolution of EU action on Climate, Peace and Security

This section provides a short chronology of how the agenda evolved within EU external action from early recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier in conflict-affected contexts into a geopolitical and security framework that is becoming more aligned with EU interests and its competitiveness agenda.

■ Early foundations

Early EU engagement linked climate change mainly to sustainable development and multilateral climate diplomacy. Following the 2007 debate on climate change and its implications for international security in the UN Security Council, the EU High Representative and European Commission (EC) published the 2008 paper “Climate Change and International Security”². This paper marked the first major institutional recognition of the intersection between climate-security risks. It referred to climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’, recognised the core challenge that climate change may be a particular burden to states and regions which are already fragile and conflict-prone³ and outlined a few example conflict that were ongoing at the time and driven by climate change⁴.

■ Integration in external action policies

Over time, climate-security concerns have become more integrated into conflict prevention, resilience frameworks, and humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus approaches. Prominently, the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (2021)⁵ sets out that EU “external action must target adaptation more effectively, through a

² https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/99387.pdf

³ Ibid. p.2

⁴ Ibid. p.3

⁵ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2021:82:FIN>

humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach"⁶. Contrary to only recognising that authorities in conflict-affected contexts will be overburdened by dealing with climate risks (see above), the EU now also drew attention to that “climate change multiplies the threats to international stability and security, which affect in particular people in already fragile and vulnerable situations”⁷ and recognised climate change as a factor that can contribute to conditions conducive to violent conflict⁸.

■ Recent policy developments

Over the past decade, the EU has built a stronger policy framework at the intersection of climate change, peace, and security. The [EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy](#) (2016), the [Climate Change and Defence Roadmap](#) (2020), the new [EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change](#) (2021) and the [Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security](#) (2021) collectively establish the importance of addressing climate-security dynamics as part of the EU's broader foreign policy commitments. In June 2023, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission (EC) published a [Joint Communication \(JC\) on the Climate-Security Nexus](#)⁹, which sets out an EU approach to addressing the growing impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in the fields of peace, security, and defence.

In particular, the 2023 JC on the Climate-Security Nexus provides a clear entry point for peacebuilding civil society organisations (CSOs) to support the implementation of this policy framework. It includes as a stated objective to continue “progress in addressing the linkages throughout the whole conflict cycle between the climate and environmental crises, peace and security”¹⁰ and strengthening the inclusion of a focus on climate, environment and natural resources in the methodologies for early warning and conflict analysis¹¹. Importantly, it draws attention to the two-fold challenge to both render climate and environment-related policies and practices to be increasingly conflict-sensitive, and to mainstream climate and environmental considerations into EU peacebuilding, stabilisation, crisis management and post-conflict recovery¹². It identifies strengthening climate, environment, peace and security nexus analysis across relevant EU Delegation (EUD) policies and actions as a key priority¹³. The JC also foresees the application of a human rights-based approach¹⁴, integration of a gender-responsive perspective and a child protection and youth dimension¹⁵ and sets out the importance to support context-sensitivity, local ownership and do-no-harm approaches¹⁶. Next to multilateral, regional

⁶ Ibid. p.18

⁷ Ibid. p.19

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-climate-security-nexus_en

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 10

¹¹ Ibid. p.5

¹² Ibid. p.10

¹³ Ibid. p.8

¹⁴ Ibid. p.9

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

and bilateral cooperation, the JC emphasises that the EU will enhance the cooperation with civil society in addressing the climate-security nexus¹⁷.

■ From ‘green’ to ‘clean industrial’ - European Green Deal and geopolitical shifts

The European Green Deal (2019) set central foundations to transform climate policy into a central strategic project for the EU. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the energy transition has become more relevant to strategic autonomy debates. As a result, the EU has linked energy security and strategic autonomy more closely to climate and environmental diplomacy. The EU’s framing has changed between first and second von der Leyen Commissions. Even though the energy transition is still framed as a climate necessity, the narrative has developed from a *green transition* framing towards one of a *clean industrial transition*, in line with EU geopolitical and economic competitiveness priorities. This is reflected for example in internal energy and resilience strategies such as the REPowerEU Plan to phase out Russian fossil fuel imports, and the corresponding ‘External energy engagement strategy’¹⁸, or the Integrated Framework for European Climate Resilience and Risk Management (forthcoming)¹⁹.

The central project to operationalise this agenda externally is the EU’s Global Gateway strategy²⁰, which focuses on infrastructure, connectivity and investment partnerships as main instruments of EU external engagement. Through Global Gateway, the EU has expanded its focus on renewable energy, hydrogen, transport corridors and critical raw materials in partner countries, including in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This carries important implications for the EU’s approach to development cooperation and peacebuilding. While the strategy is framed as rights- and values-based and aligned with sustainable development objectives, it also reflects growing EU priorities related to economic security, supply chain resilience and geopolitical influence. This, in turn, raises questions about how conflict sensitivity, local ownership and long-term social cohesion are integrated into large-scale infrastructure and energy investments. In practice, climate and energy partnerships increasingly intersect with strategic interests connected to energy sovereignty, industrial competitiveness and access to critical minerals. As a result, there is a risk that geopolitical priorities and migration concerns overshadow locally-led peacebuilding and climate justice approaches.

■ Climate change and defence

A particular focus that the EU has taken in its approach to integrating climate action into its foreign and security policy, was a greater integration of climate considerations across the security and defence sectors, i.e. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

¹⁷ Ibid. p.22

¹⁸ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3A2022%3A23%3AFIN&qid=1653033264976>

¹⁹ https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-and-resilience-climate-change/european-climate-resilience-and-risk-management-integrated-framework_en

²⁰ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway_de

missions, intelligence and foresight, infrastructure resilience, and military energy systems. Inter alia, the 2023 Civilian CSDP Compact sets out that EU Member States are supposed to ensure that all missions have an environmental advisor, who is supposed to report on the missions environmental footprint and introduce environmental management systems²¹. Similarly, the 2023 JC on the Climate-Security Nexus includes a section on CSDP that sets out to "progressively mainstream and address climate and environmental aspects in the planning, implementation and review of" CSDP mandates²².

■ Changes in funding frameworks and risks of deprioritising climate action

NDICI-GE climate targets

The [Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe](#) (NDICI-GE) (2021-2027) is the current central instrument for financing EU external action. It includes several provisions relating to CPS-linkages, including with respect to addressing 'threats having a potentially destabilising impact on peace and security, deriving from climate change impacts'. It also includes a 30% spending target for climate action focusing on climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and a spending target for biodiversity of 7.5% in 2024 and of 10% in 2026 and 2027.

Post-2027 proposal

As NDICI-GE is coming to a close in 2027, the EC has published a proposal for the next budget as of 2028. The initial Commission proposal includes the Global Europe instrument for external action with a proposed budget of EUR 200 billion for 2028-2034. In this Commission proposal for the draft Global Europe instrument regulation, all thematic targets (for areas like climate, human development and gender equality) were dropped. A 35% climate target was kept in the Performance Regulation²³, which will monitor how EU funding is spent. Instead of keeping the targets in the Global Europe regulation itself, the Commission proposed a 'full mainstreaming' approach which relies mainly on the Performance Regulation. The application of the 'do no significant harm' (DNSH) principle is supposed to be continued, but the proposal also states the DNSH is applied "where feasible and appropriate"²⁴. Also, the climate target for external action is 5% points lower than in other instruments of the budget (30% for external action), and the proposal allows the Commission to adopt delegated acts to adjust the levels of the climate and environment spending targets²⁵. In this new proposed system, biodiversity and climate targets were also grouped together in a single category.

²¹ <https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/coe-factsheet-environmental-advisors-in-csdp-missions>

²² https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-climate-security-nexus_en (pp.11-12)

²³ [https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/0545\(COD\)](https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/0545(COD))

²⁴ Ibid. p.2

²⁵ Ibid. p.9

The 2025 Joint Communication on global climate and energy vision²⁶ sets out that this 30% target "will support partner countries in adopting credible climate action pathways and stimulate demand in clean industrial sectors." This type of EU is supposed to support the EU to diversify clean tech supply chains, reduce dependencies and strengthen economic security²⁷. Importantly, this is also supposed to be implemented in a conflict-sensitive manner²⁸.

Risks for deprioritising climate action

These shifts from earmarked thematic targets toward broader mainstreaming approaches may reduce the visibility and traceability of climate, biodiversity and peacebuilding-related spending within external action instruments. In addition, the dedicated programme for environmental and climate action, the LIFE programme, will not be continued under the next budget, and instead those activities will be integrated into broader instruments linked to competitiveness and national and regional partnerships, which further enhances the risk of reducing thematic visibility and distinct budgetary allocation²⁹. As a result, climate and environmental projects are expected to "compete within larger policy frameworks oriented towards other objectives"³⁰.

While the EU and its Member States remain central providers of international public climate finance³¹, it is important to note that dedicated CPS funding streams in its budget remain limited. Support so far is mainly embedded across broader resilience, adaptation, governance, and peacebuilding programmes.

■ Regional Climate Security Dialogues

As part of the implementation of the JC on the Climate-Security Nexus, the EU's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), together with their partner adelphi, are in the process of organising a series of Climate Security Dialogues in six different regions. These Regional Dialogues have the purpose to deepen and localise the conversations on climate security. They are taking place in different regions facing acute climate vulnerability and security threats across the globe.

■ EU-UN collaboration on climate security

The EU collaborates with the United Nations (UN) on climate security, for example through mechanisms like the EU-UNEP Climate, Environment, Peace and Security Partnership and the EU–Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) Climate Change and Security Programme. As part of these commitments, the EU is carrying out climate security assessments in cooperation with the UN, focusing on different regions,

²⁶ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025JC0025&qid=1760959837610>

²⁷ Ibid. p.11

²⁸ Ibid. p.11

²⁹ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/ECTI_ATA\(2026\)780420](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/ECTI_ATA(2026)780420)

³⁰ Ibid. p.2

³¹ <https://ecdpm.org/work/european-support-adaptation-times-shifting-politics-and-tight-budgets>

to inform external action programming. They aim to identify and mitigate conflict risks linked to environmental stress.

▪ **EU institutions for CPS**

In recent years and to implement the JC on the climate-security nexus, the EU has set out to adopt a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to its climate-security agenda. As such, a large variety of Directorates-General (DGs) and services is supposed to contribute to the implementation of these policies. In the Commission, these encompass inter alia DG INTPA, DG CLIMA, DG ECHO, DG ENER, and FPI. At the EEAS, climate and environmental diplomacy, conflict prevention and mediation support, and security and defence policy integration are increasingly being integrated. The Council of the EU sets the political direction on CPS through Council Conclusions (CC). The European Parliament (EP) has also become more active on climate-security, transnational water governance and climate justice discussions. Please find specific EU actors and a description of their roles in Table 1.

Table 1: Key EU actors on CPS and their roles

Key EU actors	Role
Commissioner for Climate, Net Zero and Clean Growth	The Commissioner oversees the EU's climate policies. This role includes the responsibility for strengthening the EU's climate diplomacy and its role in international negotiations and the framework for a social and just transition. The position is currently held by Dutch Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra.
Commissioner for Preparedness and Crisis Management	The Commissioner oversees European crisis management and civil preparedness, both in the EU and globally. The position is currently held by Belgian Commissioner Hadja Lahbib.
Special Envoy for Climate and Environment Diplomacy (EEAS)	Represents the EU in international climate and environmental negotiations, ensuring that climate security concerns are reflected in diplomatic engagements.
CSDP Environmental Advisors in EU Civilian and Military CSDP Missions³²	'Deliverable 12' in the 2023 Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Compact ³³ sets out that in 2025, EU 'Member States will ensure that all missions have an environmental advisor, who will also report on the missions' environmental footprint and introduce environmental management systems'. These Advisors shall provide expertise on integrating climate-security risks into peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and crisis response efforts. As of early 2026, eight out of 20 CSDP civilian and military missions, had a deployed Environmental Advisor or focal point.
Green Transition division (EEAS)	The division GLOBAL.GI.3 on the Green Transition sits under the Directorate on Global Issues in the EEAS.

³² <https://www.coe-civ.eu/kh/coe-factsheet-environmental-advisors-in-csdp-missions>

³³ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/Civilian_CSDP_Compact_Report_22.05.2023.pdf

■ Latest trends - Where next?

In April 2026, the Council approved conclusions on ‘EU energy and climate diplomacy’, following the Commissions 2025 ‘Global climate and energy vision’ which offer an important reference point for the CPS agenda. In response, the EEAS stressed that “advancing the clean transition globally strengthens EU security, competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.”³⁴ While these priorities are predominant in the EU’s external discourse, it is important to draw attention to conflict-sensitivity requirements for climate finance that these frameworks ask for.

Other upcoming processes involve a Communication on humanitarian aid and a corresponding Staff Working Document (SWD) on fragility, expected in summer 2026, which is also expected to recognise climate change as a driver of fragility. The EU is also currently in the process of designing a new integrated framework for European climate resilience and risk management³⁵ which will build on the 2021 Adaptation Strategy.

The EU is also placing a greater emphasis on fragility and neighbourhood stability. It is likely to deepen CPS engagements in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, Middle East and North Africa, the Indo-Pacific, Black Sea region, Arctic, and the Western Balkans. Climate-security is becoming institutionalised rather than remaining a niche agenda. However, there are risks to the implementation and potential for inadvertent harm, if conflict prevention and conflict sensitivity requirements are not systematically integrated into these EU external engagements.

The focus now needs to shift toward implementation, including meaningful co-design with and ownership by local peacebuilding CSOs. The EU will also need to actively work against the risk of securitising climate impacts, pay closer attention to the integration of gender equality and climate justice perspectives, and strive to avoid fragmentation across EU institutions.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the EU’s approach to CPS is entering a more geopolitical phase. As the EU deepens its engagement on climate security globally, implementation, institutional coherence and meaningful partnerships with local CSOs will be important for translating policy into sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. As the EU is positioning itself as a leading global actor on climate security, the effectiveness and legitimacy of its approach will depend on whether the EU can translate its expanding policy framework into conflict-sensitive, coherent and locally grounded partnerships and engagements.

³⁴ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-energy-and-climate-diplomacy-%E2%80%93-strengthening-sovereignty-and-advancing-global-clean-transition_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com

³⁵ https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-and-resilience-climate-change/european-climate-resilience-and-risk-management-integrated-framework_en

Annex I : Key CPS-related EU policy documents

Key EU frameworks	Relevance
<p><u>Council Conclusions on EU energy and climate (21 April 2026)</u></p>	<p>These Conclusions offer an important reference point for the CPS agenda. On the climate finance goal agreed at COP28, the Council 'underlines that all financial support tools need to remain climate, environment, and conflict sensitive' (p.11). Under the section on 'Global security and resilience', it sets out that the EU 'will place specific focus on climate-vulnerable, fragile and conflict-affected areas, Least Developed Countries, and the broad European neighbourhood' (p.13). It also stresses the 'need to further strengthen EU capacity to respond to climate- and environment related security risks by continuing to integrate climate and environmental aspects into foreign, security and defence policy, including peacebuilding, mediation, conflict-prevention, and CSDP missions' (p.14). Finally, the Conclusions also mention 'the importance of protecting, empowering and cooperating with civil society, environmental human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples, local communities and persons with disabilities' (p.13).</p>
<p><u>European Parliament resolution on humanitarian aid in a time of polycrisis (20 January 2026)</u></p>	<p>The resolution 'recalls that climate change acts as one of the main drivers of conflict', 'calls on the Commission to adopt the communication on humanitarian aid as envisaged in its 2026 Commission Work Programme [...]; highlights the importance of developing such a strategy with appropriately adapted, context-specific funding that addresses the interconnected challenges of peace, development, climate action, and humanitarian needs'; 'Insists on the need for an evidence-based approach to anticipatory action, particularly in fragile</p>

	<p>and climate-vulnerable settings, to increase the availability of quality data and risk analysis in order to improve early warning systems and integrate risk forecasting into humanitarian planning’.</p>
<p><u>RESourceEU Action Plan (3 Dec 2025)</u></p>	<p>The RESourceEU Action Plan builds on the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (2024) and lays out how the EU aims to accelerate and amplify its critical raw materials strategy. The Action Plan does not mention fragile or conflict-affected contexts, the green transition, or conflict-sensitivity. It notes that ‘CRMs are essential for the EU’s competitiveness, clean energy and digital transitions, as well as for its defence and aerospace needs and food security’ and that ‘the EU is excessively dependent on imports from non-EU countries.’ (p.1) It notes that ‘the EU should mobilise all its diplomatic and economic tools to facilitate the rapid conclusions of contracts between European and third countries’ companies along the raw materials value chain.’ (p.7) In the Action Plan, the Commission also announces here that it “will review and revise the Water Framework Directive” “in order to access critical raw material in the EU” (p.8).</p>
<p><u>Joint Communication (JC) 'EU global climate and energy vision: securing Europe's competitive role in world markets and accelerating the clean transition' (16 October 2025)</u></p>	<p>As announced in its 2025 Work Programme, the Commission set out its global climate and energy vision ahead of COP30. The JC sets out that 'it is essential to better integrate the climate, peace and security nexus in the EU’s external policy, including in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in international cooperation and partnerships.' (p.6); that 'Targeted EU support will be provided to the most climate-vulnerable countries, particularly [...] LDCs and [...] SIDS, [...] and under the Team Europe Initiative on Adaptation and Resilience in Africa.' (p.11); and that 'The EU will also continue to support climate resilience including in fragile and conflict-affected settings by drawing on its development, peacebuilding, and humanitarian instruments.' (p.11).</p>

<p><u>Joint Communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean (16 Oct 2025)</u></p>	<p>The Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) published a Joint communication on the Pact for the Mediterranean. Sections relevant to CPPB set out that ‘addressing climate, environmental and security challenges together can help build and further strengthen the region’s resilience’ (p.2); that ‘Climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss heavily affect the Mediterranean region and its resilience. The clean transition also represents an opportunity to boost sustainable competitiveness in the region.’ (p.14); that ‘The Pact will aim to achieve a common understanding of regional and international security landscapes, fostering cooperation, including on areas such as preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, circumvention of EU sanctions, maritime security, resilience of critical infrastructure, hybrid and cyber threats, FIMI, defence capacity building, peace mediation, and conflict resolution.’ (p.18).</p>
<p><u>European Ocean Pact (5 June 2025)</u></p>	<p>The Pact focuses heavily on security, strategic interest and competitiveness, in line with EU priorities. It commits to ‘ensuring that the Arctic remains a region of peace’ (p.18), reinforces ocean diplomacy to ‘safeguard and promote EU interests and values’ and partnerships (p.19). ‘Enhancing maritime security and defence as a prerequisite’ and ‘strengthening EU ocean diplomacy and international rules-based governance’ are two of six central priorities next to ocean research, ocean health, blue economy and supporting coastal communities. Maritime and food security are two priorities among a broad range of elements covered by the announced funding and ocean-relevant policies. It also sets out that by 2027, the Commission will propose an “Ocean Act” (p.2). The pact also sets out to ‘bolster [EU] naval operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy’ (p.18).</p>
<p><u>European Water Resilience Strategy (3 June 2025)</u></p>	<p>The European Commission’s Directorate General for Environment (DG ENV) published its European Water Resilience Strategy. Sections relevant to Water,</p>

	<p>Peace and Security set out that ‘Climate-driven threats and biodiversity losses, malicious attacks linked to the disruption of critical water infrastructure and supply, alongside accidental pollution of inland and marine waters have been identified as key water risks by Member States.’ (p.18); that ‘The water, peace and security nexus will be strengthened through bringing together humanitarian, development and peace actors, advocating for compliance with International Humanitarian Law to support the safety and security of water resources, water personnel and infrastructure in conflict zones.’ (p.20); that ‘By setting minimum environmental requirements for EU funded humanitarian aid operations, the EU promotes sustainability of water resources in contexts which are particularly affected by water shortages.’ (p.20); that ‘The EU will support the extension of the UN Water Convention as a means to promote sustainable management of shared water resources, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, security, and economic development.’ (p.20); that ‘Citizens need local solutions that protect them and allow them to be prepared for what cannot be prevented’ (p.20).</p>
<p><u>Preparedness Union Strategy (26 March 2025)</u></p>	<p>This strategy has the declared objective “to prevent and react to emerging threats and crises”. While the strategy heavily focuses on EU-internal crisis response, population preparedness, and public-private, as well as civil-military cooperation, there are a few links to climate and external action, mainly from a trade/partnerships perspective: ‘If not addressed [...], the human, economic and social costs of climate change will only increase in the years to come including growing pressure from the negative impact of climate change in other parts of the world, for example disruptions in trade routes and global supply chains. Climate, environment and security are strongly interlinked.’ (p.1) On partnerships and EU neighborhood, the strategy sets out that ‘In an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, and to tackle global challenges such as climate change and</p>


	<p>global health, the EU and Member States should continue to develop and deepen tailored and mutually beneficial bilateral and plurilateral partnerships including in particular by strengthening cooperation and supporting EU candidate and neighbouring countries.' (p.15)</p>
<p><u>A Competitiveness Compass for the EU (29 January 2025)</u></p>	<p>The Competitiveness Compass is the first major initiative of the second mandate of the Von der Leyen Commission. It focuses on three core areas: innovation, decarbonization and security. The Compass stresses that the Commission "will create a platform for the joint purchase of critical raw materials".</p>
<p><u>Council Conclusions on Green Diplomacy (18 March 2024)</u></p>	<p>The Council Conclusions on Green Diplomacy highlight the link between climate change, environmental degradation, and global instability, stressing their disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups. They underline the need to mainstream the climate, peace, and security nexus in its external action, enhance climate preparedness in security policies, increase conflict-sensitivity, and scale up adaptation finance for conflict-affected states. They also call for global water security efforts.</p>
<p><u>Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus (28 June 2023)</u></p>	<p>The EEAS and the Commission published the Joint Communication (JC) which outlines how the EU seeks to address the growing impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in the fields of peace, security and defence. In the JC, the EU recognises that "while a lot is being done to advance green transition and manage its challenges, there is an increased risk of instability, insecurity and even conflict" and calls for "climate and environment-related policies and practices" to be "increasingly conflict-sensitive", and states that its efforts against "climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss" may "also contribute to conflict prevention and peace".</p>
<p><u>EU Peace Mediation Guidelines (2023)</u></p>	<p>Chapter 13 (p.41) in the EU's updated Peace Mediation Guidelines deals with 'Environment and</p>

	climate change'. It explores how factoring in these dimensions in peace mediation can render peace processes more sustainable.
<u>Critical Raw Materials Act (16 March 2023)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Respective Parliament Resolution</u> • <u>Council final approval</u>
<u>Council Conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy (9 March 2023)</u>	The Conclusions on 'Climate and Energy Diplomacy – Delivering on the external dimension of the European Green Deal' present climate and energy diplomacy as 'a core component of EU's foreign policy' and stress the EU's determination to engage and work with partners worldwide to implement the Paris Agreement.
<u>The European Union Disaster Resilience Goals (8 February 2023)</u>	The European Commission adopted a Recommendation and a Communication on European Union Disaster Resilience Goals to establish five common goals: 1) anticipate, 2) prepare, 3) alert, 4) respond, and 5) secure. The fifth common goal in particular refers to unprecedented disasters, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and climate change.
<u>Council Conclusions on Disaster Risk Reduction (28 November 2022)</u>	The Council approved conclusions on DDR in EU external action in which it recognises 'the links between fragility, conflict and disasters', also stating that '[i]n fragile and conflict-affected contexts, disasters can intensify the underlying causes of fragility and conflict drivers and destabilise prospects for sustainable recovery and peace' and that '[p]articipatory and inclusive DRR processes and anticipatory action in line with the [...] HDP nexus can serve as a tool for peacebuilding where disasters and conflicts interact, while conflict prevention measures are essential for an environment that is conducive to DRR'.
<u>Council Conclusions on Water in the EU's external action (19 November 2021)</u>	In the conclusions, the Council reaffirms 'the EU's diplomatic engagement on water, especially transboundary water cooperation, as a tool for

	<p>peace, security and stability’, and stresses ‘the need to address water issues as an integral element of conflict prevention, resolution and stabilisation, including through capacity building, notably as regards mediation’. It also emphasises ‘the need to develop and use all necessary water risk mapping tools, early warning systems, the required expertise and disaster risk reduction and management built on conflict sensitive, gender-responsive and human rights-based approaches’, and states that as ‘cooperation on water issues, especially in a transboundary context, provides an opportunity for measures conducive to peace’, ‘it is important to factor in water-related risks and indicators into conflict analysis and programming in fragile states and conflict-affected areas, as well as into the design and deployment of CSDP missions to conflict theatres’.</p>
<p><u>2020 EU Guidance on Conflict Analysis</u> (26 August 2021)</p>	<p>This joint guidance note describes the key principles of an integrated, joint conflict analysis and its value for EU external action. It identifies climate change as a threat multiplier with need for particular attention and promotes considering climate and environmental dynamics and trends as part of an integrated approach to conflict analysis.</p>
<p><u>Council Conclusions on Maritime Security</u> (22 June 2021)</p>	<p>The Council of the EU adopted conclusions on the EU’s intention to increase its role as a global maritime security provider in which it reaffirmed that ‘climate change and environmental degradation are an existential threat to humanity and biodiversity, as well as to healthy oceans and seas, have increasing implications for global peace and security and international stability, including maritime security, and require an urgent collective response’.</p>
<p><u>EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change</u> (24 February 2021)</p>	<p>The EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change advocates for climate-resilient societies and infrastructures, stressing the need for conflict-sensitivity in climate adaptation and recognising the security risks of climate-related displacement and resource competition. It also states that the EU will</p>

	<p>“aim to increase international climate finance for adaptation through the EU instruments for external action and by leveraging private sector investments”.</p>
<p><u>Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security</u> (5 October 2021)</p>	<p>The EU Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security that was drafted by the EEAS and approved by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) aims to ‘increase the impact of the EU’s external action on peace and security by ensuring that the climate and security nexus, including consideration for environmental degradation, is addressed in all relevant EU activities’.</p>
<p><u>Global Gateway</u> (Start date: 2021)</p>	<p>Global Gateway is the EU's strategy to foster digital, energy and transport sectors in partner countries. It will mobilise up to €300 billion. Projects often focus on renewable energy or critical raw materials, and several projects are carried out in conflict-affected regions. Climate and energy are key areas for the partnerships.</p>
<p><u>Climate Change and Defence Roadmap</u> (9 November 2020)</p>	<p>This document was elaborated by the EEAS in collaboration with Commission services and the European Defence Agency (EDA). It establishes EU priorities for integrating climate security considerations into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations.</p>
<p><u>Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy</u> (20 January 2020)</p>	<p>In these Conclusions, foreign ministers of EU member states renewed the EU’s commitment to place climate action at the centre of external policy. Inter alia, they set out that "climate change multiplies threats to international stability and security in particular affecting those in most fragile and vulnerable situations, reinforcing environmental pressures and disaster risk, contributing to the loss of livelihoods and forcing the displacement of people" (p.6).</p>
<p><u>European Green Deal</u> (EGD) (11 December 2019)</p>	<p>The European Green Deal identifies climate change as ‘a significant threat multiplier and a source of</p>

	instability' and promotes a just and sustainable transition that mitigates conflict risks.
<u>European Parliament resolution on the climate and environment emergency (28 November 2019)</u>	Ahead of the UN COP25, the European Parliament declared climate and environment emergency in Europe and globally in this resolution.
<u>Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy (18 February 2019)</u>	The Foreign Affairs Council in 2019 reiterated the EU Global Strategy (2016) and the serious implications of climate change for peace and security across the globe. It includes inter alia the invitation that conflict prevention tools like EU conflict Early Warning System should take into account the security challenges linked to adverse effects of climate change and environmental risk factors (p.5). They also recognise that "those in most fragile and vulnerable situations are the most exposed and the least able to respond or adapt to climate change" (p.4) and that disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention are basic pillars of climate change risk management and should be integrated as such (p.4).
<u>EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (2016)</u>	The Strategy recognises climate change as a risk multiplier and calls for enhanced resilience-building to prevent conflicts exacerbated by environmental stress. The Strategy also stresses that the EU's 'peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle'.
<u>Climate Change and International Security (14 March 2008)</u>	Following the 2007 debate on climate change and its implications for international security in the UN Security Council, the EU High Representative and European Commission published this paper, which marked the first major institutional recognition of the intersection between climate-security risks. It referred to climate change as a 'threat multiplier', recognised the core challenge that climate change may be a particular burden to states and regions which are already fragile and conflict-prone and



outlined a few example conflict that were ongoing at the time and driven by climate change.

Annex II: List of abbreviations

CC	Council Conclusions
CPS	Climate, Peace and Security
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSDN	Civil Society Dialogue Network
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
DG	Directorate-General
DG CLIMA	Directorate-General for Climate Action
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG ENER	Directorate-General for Energy
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
DNSH	Do No Significant Harm
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUD	EU Delegation
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
JC	Joint Communication
LIFE	Programme for the Environment and Climate Action
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
NDICI-GE	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SWD	Staff Working Document
UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	UN Framework Convention on Climate Change