



# Funding Instruments Meeting

Assessing trends in peace, security, stability and response to crises for global initiatives under the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework (2028-2034)

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Survey results  
July 2026

## European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) is the largest independent civil society platform of European NGOs, NGO networks and think tanks that are committed to peacebuilding and the prevention of violent conflict. EPLO's mission is to influence European policymakers to take a more active role in securing peace and resolving and preventing conflict through nonviolent means in all regions of the world, and to do so more effectively.

## Civil Society Dialogue Network

The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policymakers on issues related to peace and conflict. It is co-financed by the European Union (Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe). It is managed by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a civil society network, in cooperation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The fifth phase of the CSDN will last from 2023 to 2026. For more information, please visit the EPLO website.



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# Funding Instruments Meeting

## Background Paper- Survey results

### ▪ Objective

The objective of this background paper is to provide an overview of the perspectives given by the various organisations attending the CSDN Funding Instruments Meeting due to be held online on the 9th of July 2026.<sup>1</sup> This paper has been prepared on the basis of a participant survey completed by civil society organisations and think tanks working in the areas of intervention ‘Conflict prevention and peacebuilding’ and ‘Countering global, trans-regional and emerging threats.’<sup>2</sup>

### ▪ Added value of various EU funding types for peace & security

**Long-term funding**, which has been sustained by **thematic programming**, was reported by respondents as crucial for peacebuilding, addressing root causes of conflict and enabling sustained conflict prevention and ultimately resolution. Such **predictable support** has been valued as it has enabled organisations to build trust and reputation, engage communities and increase social cohesion over time, and ensure consistency of presence. It has also enabled organisations to develop **thematic capacities**.

The main added value of EU Rapid Response funding reported by respondents is the ability to **deploy more quickly and flexibly** in conflict-affected contexts, enabling organisations to **address acute needs and complex operational conditions**.

### ▪ Lessons learned from the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention

86.6% of survey respondents assessed the 2021-2027 MIP as **relevant or strongly relevant**. The current MIP is considered a robust framework that mostly aligns with the perspective of civil society organisations, particularly in areas like mediation, conflict prevention, crisis preparedness, inclusion and local capacity building.


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<sup>1</sup> This survey received the perspective of 15 organisations (3 July 2026). 40% reported having received funding from the Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention under NDICI-GE. 40% also reported having received EU Rapid Response funding.

<sup>2</sup> 93.3% of organisations participating in the survey reported working most closely with ‘Conflict prevention and peacebuilding’.

## How would you qualify the 2021-2027 Multi-annual Indicative Programme overall?

15 responses



Participants underlined strengths such as the **flexibility** of the MIP, which allowed the EU to work with organisations on current threats and risks in a comprehensive manner, its emphasis on **conflict analysis**, its **inclusivity lens on women and youth participation**, the inclusion of the **climate-security nexus** and the recognition of the central role of **civil society** in addressing conflict drivers and promoting inclusive peace and governance. Several respondents also praised the scope of the conflict prevention and peacebuilding, (CP-PB) objectives, including the promotion of a culture of non-violence.

The most recurrent area of improvement reported by respondents was the need for a **more even ratio of allocation** between ‘global/transnational threats’ and ‘conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and crisis preparedness’.<sup>3</sup> Other areas of possible improvement underlined by respondents are:

- for the CP-PB area of intervention, **more locally-led approaches**, accompanying and resourcing the priorities and agency of national and local actors.
- for the Global Threats area of intervention, a greater focus on strengthening **international norms, accountability mechanisms and due diligence standards** to regulate the proliferation of weapons and emerging lethal technologies.
- for the Global Threats area of intervention, a **greater role for NGOs** under the implementation of this area of intervention.
- more **flexible implementation modalities** for greater effectiveness.

Various respondents underlined the need to **update future priorities to include emerging realities**, including rising needs (humanitarian mine action, protection of civilians, etc.), while maintaining focus on cross-cutting issues like the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus.

<sup>3</sup> Some survey respondents underlined that this was particularly needed given the shortcomings in geographic funding for conflict prevention and peacebuilding

- **The current context for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programming and global threats programming**

Survey respondents highlighted that the **global context had changed significantly** since the last context assessment undertaken for thematic programming. They noted that the current context was marked by **rising geopolitical tensions**, more **protracted and interconnected conflicts**, wider drivers of **fragility** including **climate-related security impacts**, rising **humanitarian needs and displacement**, and **shrinking civic space**. They also noted the rise of **disruptive technologies** and the renewed **spread of explosive ordnance contamination**. They highlighted an increasing global trend of **unilateralism**, the narrow pursuit of self-interests and the **silencing of contestation** on the part of governments. With accountability decreasing, they noted a greater risk that the underlying drivers of conflict, violence, and global threats would remain unaddressed. They also noted that **mis/disinformation** strategies were being deliberately deployed by hostile actors thriving on exacerbated social divisions.

Participants assessed that this context reinforces the need for sustained investment in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, social cohesion and conflict sensitivity. However, they noted that, amid the growing emphasis on European territorial defence and governments' increasing focus on hard-power responses to perceived threats, **comparatively limited financial resources** continue to be allocated to positive peace compared with security and defence policies. They highlighted a **global funding crisis** in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly affecting work on gender, peace and security, climate change and arms control. Some respondents also underlined a downward trend in funding to address global threats in the last few years.


Survey respondents stressed that in the current context, global threats programming should not crowd out long-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Rather, responses to global threats should be conflict-sensitive and better connected to locally led prevention, resilience and peacebuilding outcomes.

- **Structuring of the MIP in two areas of intervention**

**Most respondents assessed that it would be partly relevant for future programming to remain structured in two areas of intervention.** 20% of respondents shared that it remained fully relevant, and 6.7% of respondents expressed that it would not be relevant.

Would the structuring of the Multi-annual Indicative Programme into two areas of intervention be still relevant for the next programming cycle from 2028 to 2034?

15 responses




Many survey respondents expressed that **challenges** in the areas of peacebuilding and global threats were becoming **even more interconnected**, as many of today's threats are both drivers and consequences of conflict and fragility. Participants notably stressed links between armed conflict, organised crime, climate and environmental pressures, displacement, violent extremism, weak governance, illicit economies, hybrid destabilisation and civilian harm. Some respondents noted that policy guidance, such as the upcoming **European Security Strategy** should recognise the importance and interconnection of challenges in both areas of intervention. Various respondents also noted that responses to global threats should be conflict-sensitive.

Various respondents noted that maintaining two distinct areas of intervention offered the advantage of preserving sufficient conflict prevention and peacebuilding funding and of keeping the intervention logic in CP-PB distinct from that of Global Threats, which contains a strong focus on law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and institutional capacity at the state level. They also underlined that this **distinction** was essential for trust-building with local actors. Several respondents suggested maintaining the two areas of intervention, but ensuring that priorities, objectives and expected results better support integrated approaches, while ensuring more equal funding. In general, respondents expressed that programmatically, integration should not come at the expense of dedicated peacebuilding funding, expertise, intervention modalities and partnerships.

## ■ Structuring of priorities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding

The structuring of the area of intervention “Conflict prevention and peacebuilding” into the three priorities described below is relevant

15 responses



Overall, respondents did not challenge the **relevance of individual priorities** under the CP-PB area of intervention. While some respondents agreed with the structuring into three priorities because they encompass the full conflict cycle, some also emphasised that the current priorities under the CP-PB area of intervention should be better connected, as the existing distinctions of a linear model of conflict can lead to fragmented, donor-driven cycles that can overlook the nature of conflict and concrete needs. Various respondents stressed the significant overlap between priorities two and three.

Respondents shared that while analytical tools and early warning systems are important, there is concern that the focus on these areas is excessive, particularly when the primary barrier to effectiveness is political rather than technical. Respondents suggest that future efforts should prioritise ensuring that existing, high-quality analysis—especially that generated by local actors—effectively informs decision-making and programming.

## ■ Specific objectives for conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Organisations prioritised current specific objectives for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in this order:

1. Conflict prevention and mitigation capacities in fragile countries (Local, national and regional)
2. Strengthening peace mediation actors, including civil society, women and young people
3. Mediation, mediation support and facilitation of dialogues
4. Violence reduction programmes, ceasefires and local security arrangements, access to basic services and measures to counter/prevent the spill-over of insecurity to other areas and communities

5. Addressing the specific needs of women and children in conflict affected contexts
6. Promoting peace values and a culture of non-violence, including through cultural and peace education initiatives, especially among children and youth
7. Addressing conflict dynamics related to climate change and environmental degradation
8. Consolidating security gains by civilian means and enabling the return/deployment of the State and basic services to populations in vulnerable, conflict-affected areas
9. Rebuilding trust between local populations and security forces, including by restoring or strengthening access to security and justice for all, reforming the security sector (SSR) and its governance, supporting disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), as well as, ensuring institutional and transitional justice
10. Developing EU conflict analysis methodologies
11. Better knowledge dissemination in EU services to respond to crises
12. Developing EU early warning systems
13. Participation and deployment in civilian CSDP and other international stabilisation missions, including strengthening police, rule of law and civil administration in fragile and conflict settings.

Respondents valued objectives linked to **inclusivity** and **localisation**. Several respondents shared that EU analytical tools and early warning systems were well developed and that **field-based interventions should be prioritised** over expanding internal EU capacities. They suggested streamlining early warning and knowledge management under a single strategic objective. Respondents expressed that CSDP missions should demonstrate greater impact and be more clearly linked to trust-building and local legitimacy.


For **future objectives**, respondents proposed to strengthen locally-led peacebuilding, and a deeper integration of the **Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)** and **Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS)** agendas. They also suggested adopting a dedicated focus on the **Humanitarian–Development–Peace (HDP) nexus** to bridge funding and operational gaps. Suggestions for new or adapted objectives include incorporating **transitional justice** and accountability mechanisms, **climate-related security and environmental peacebuilding**, and **humanitarian mine action** as a foundational enabler for stability and recovery. Respondents recommend reviewing technical or security-driven interventions—such as those regarding the state, security sector reform, and stabilisation—to emphasise legitimacy, trust, and social cohesion, while also addressing contemporary challenges like digital threats and information integrity.



## ■ Structuring of priorities for global, trans-regional and emerging threats

The structuring of the area of intervention global, trans-regional and emerging threats in the five priorities described below is relevant

13 responses



While respondents considered the existing priorities relevant, they highlighted the need to address the **decline of the rules-based international order**, the erosion of **multilateral frameworks**, and the rise of **interstate conflicts**. They also highlighted the need to explicitly incorporate **challenges posed by new technologies**, specifically artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, **digital disinformation**, **conventional weapons proliferation** and the **spread of explosive ordinance contamination**. Some respondents expressed that there was an over-emphasis on counter-terrorism.

Respondents supported integrating conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and human security frameworks to Global Threats priorities to ensure that responses address **root causes** and are **conflict sensitive**. To better address social cohesion, trust in institutions, and local grievances, they suggest prioritising **locally-led responses** and the inclusion of **civil society**.

## ■ Specific objectives for global, trans-regional and emerging threats

Organisations prioritised current specific objectives for global, trans-regional and emerging threats in this order:

1. Increased effectiveness of efforts to combat illicit trafficking, smuggling and organised crime
2. Increase the effectiveness of efforts to address climate/environment security risks
3. Increased engagement of national authorities in addressing global challenges related to maritime security
4. Increased partner countries' capacity to combat cybercrime

5. Improved detection of and mitigation against risks related to CBRN materials or agents and risks related to installations or sites through the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative and associated actions.
6. Support multilateral action in the fight against terrorism and the effectiveness of relevant regional and multilateral counterterrorism bodies and fora
7. Support targeted countries and regions in putting in place comprehensive national and regional counterterrorism strategies towards addressing global threats
8. Strengthen law enforcement and judicial entities across the counterterrorism cycle (covering anticipation, prevention, protection and response)
9. Enhanced capacities on strategic trade controls of dual-use goods
10. Increased engagement of national authorities, in cooperation with the private sector and civil society, in addressing trans-regional and global threats to cybersecurity
11. Increased engagement of national authorities, in cooperation with the private sector and civil society, in addressing global challenges related to civil aviation
12. Promote a culture of safety and responsible science and engineering

Respondents also stressed the need to prevent violent extremism not only through counter-radicalisation, but also accountability mechanisms to prevent grievances on which recruitment to terrorist groups thrives.

Respondents stressed that **illicit trafficking**, smuggling and organised crime should include the diversion of weapons, ammunition and explosive materials, as these contribute to armed violence, conflict recurrence, civilian harm and regional instability.

Respondents also prioritised the objective on **climate and environmental risks**, noting these increasingly interact with conflict dynamics and impacts, including explosive ordnance contamination.

Objectives related to trade controls, **maritime security**, **CBRN** risk mitigation and **cybersecurity** were also prioritised by respondents, particularly where they support upstream risk reduction, prevention, institutional capacity and regional stability.

For **future objectives**, respondents notably proposed to strengthen **support to multilateralism and international norms and** to include a focus on **risks related to climate change, environmental harm and resource exploitation**. They also suggested adopting an explicit focus on the entire lifecycle of **weapons and ammunition**, including prevention of diversion and trafficking. They also proposed objectives addressing **digital and AI-related threats**, including autonomous weapons, algorithmic targeting, surveillance, and information manipulation, notably through responsible governance but also through building proactive societal resilience and the protection of media freedoms.

Respondents stressed that security-focused objectives, particularly those concerning counterterrorism and law enforcement, should be grounded in **human rights**,

**International Humanitarian Law (IHL), and conflict sensitivity.** Respondents emphasised the necessity of mainstreaming the **protection of civic space**, democratic institutions, and accountability mechanisms across all objectives.