




**Climate, Peace and Security: Entry points for EU engagement
in complex partnership contexts - Perspectives on the MENA
region**

CSDN Meeting Report

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
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European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

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Contents

BACKGROUND	1
EU POLICY CONTEXT	1
CLIMATE, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MENA REGION: CROSS-CUTTING LESSONS FOR EU ENGAGEMENT	2
■ FROM CLIMATE RISK TO COOPERATION: START WITH CONCRETE, SHARED NEEDS	3
■ ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ARE GOVERNANCE ISSUES.....	3
■ LOCAL OWNERSHIP MEANS MORE THAN LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION	4
■ MOVE BEYOND SECURITY FRAMING AND OPERATIONALISE HDP	5
■ GENDER EQUALITY LENS AS AN ESSENTIAL TO CLIMATE SECURITY	5
■ FUNDING AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE CONSTRAIN INTEGRATED CPS APPROACHES	6
COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES	6
■ SYRIA: CLIMATE JUSTICE, LIVELIHOODS AND PARTICIPATION DURING THE POLITICAL TRANSITION	6
■ IRAQ: WATER, DISPLACEMENT AND SHRINKING CIVIC SPACE	7
■ LEBANON: FROM ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS TO SUSTAINABLE LOCAL SYSTEMS.....	8
■ PALESTINE: CLIMATE ADAPTATION UNDER POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL CONSTRAINTS	9
■ YEMEN: WATER, BASIC SERVICES AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AS ENTRY POINTS ACROSS CONFLICT LINES ...	10
OUTLOOK: FROM POLICY COHERENCE TO SUSTAINED POLITICAL AND LOCAL ENGAGEMENT.....	11
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EU ENGAGEMENT:.....	12
ANNEX I: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	14

Background

On 24 June, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), in cooperation with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission's (EC) Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), organised an online Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Geographic Meeting.

This CSDN meeting was convened in the context of the EU's efforts to strengthen the coherence between its climate adaptation, peace and security priorities as part of its external action and international partnerships. The overall aim was to unlock concrete recommendations that would lead the EU to more effectively use climate, peace, and security programming as a platform for engagement, as well as to inform the implementation of the Joint Communication on the Climate-Security Nexus.

The discussion drew on lessons learned from the MENA region, with a focus on Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen, to examine what has worked at the programming level, where gaps remain, and what the EU's political and institutional added value can be in supporting these approaches.

This CSDN event was the second of a series of online CSDN Geographic Meetings on addressing the climate-peace-security (CPS) nexus in different EU partnership contexts.

The CSDN meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule and gathered 22 CSO participants from peacebuilding civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as representatives of the EU institutions. No attempt was made to reach consensus on the issues discussed. The report reflects the range of views shared during the exchange. The following sections gather key observations and recommendations from the discussions.

EU policy context

Over the past decade, the EU has built a substantial policy framework at the intersection of climate change, peace, and security. The [EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy](#) (2016), the [Climate Change and Defence Roadmap](#) (2020), the new [EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change](#) (2021) and the [Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security](#) (2021) collectively establish the importance of addressing climate-security dynamics as part of the EU's broader foreign policy commitments. In June 2023, the EEAS and the EC published a [Joint Communication \(JC\) on the Climate-Security Nexus](#), which sets out an EU approach to addressing the growing impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in the fields of peace, security, and defence. Most recently, the [Council Conclusions on 'EU Energy and Climate Diplomacy](#) (2026) underline that climate finance 'tools need to remain climate, environment, and conflict sensitive' and set out that the EU will focus on climate vulnerable, fragile and conflict-affected areas. The new [Staff Working Document \(SWD\) on an Integrated Approach to Fragility](#) (2026) recognises environmental consequences of fragility and

climate-related challenges in root causes. In addition, water resilience has also gained greater prominence across EU external action: the [European Water Resilience Strategy](#) (2025) strengthens the water, peace and security nexus through attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding and greater cooperation.

For the MENA region specifically, the [Pact for the Mediterranean](#) (2025) and its first [Action Plan](#), published in April 2026, highlight the importance of collaborating with partners at the intersection of conflict, security, peace and climate stress and contain a number of initiatives with the aim to strengthen climate cooperation and resilience. The action plan is updated on a rolling basis. The [EU Strategy for Civil Society](#) and the [Civil Society Roadmaps](#), in turn, recognise civil society as an essential actor in EU external action.

Climate, peace and security in the MENA region: Cross-cutting lessons for EU engagement

The developments in the **MENA region illustrate like few others the interlinkages between damaged ecosystems, environmental governance, armed conflict, resource management and livelihoods**. In this context, peacebuilding CSOs often play important roles in addressing these interconnected challenges, maintaining relationships and trust, providing expertise, and strengthening cooperation. Discussions during the meeting centred on how climate and environmental considerations can be meaningfully connected to EU programming in the MENA region, how the above EU policy toolbox can sensitively and effectively meet the context-specifics of the region, and which components of the agenda are of most relevance to the dynamics in the countries discussed. Overall, contributions highlighted that implementation can be improved in how funding is designed and channelled, partners are selected, results are measured, and programming connects to political engagement.

The discussion across the MENA region highlighted that **climate and environmental pressures rarely constitute standalone drivers of conflict**. Rather, they interact with existing political, economic and governance challenges, including displacement, livelihood insecurity, weak public services, resource competition and unequal access to decision-making. In many of the contexts discussed, years of conflict have simultaneously degraded the environment and weakened the institutions needed to manage environmental pressures. This creates a reinforcing cycle: environmental degradation increases vulnerability and tensions, while conflict further reduces communities' ability to adapt and manage shared resources.

At the same time, participants stressed that the **relationship between environmental pressures and conflict should not be understood only in terms of risk**. Water, agriculture, waste management, disaster risk reduction and other practical issues affecting people's

daily lives can provide entry points for cooperation, including between communities divided by conflict. The value of a CPS approach therefore lies not simply in adding a “climate” dimension to existing peacebuilding or security programming, but in identifying where environmental challenges can create opportunities to address underlying governance and conflict dynamics.

■ **From climate risk to cooperation: Start with concrete, shared needs**

Across the different country contexts, **practical environmental problems were identified as potentially useful entry points for dialogue**, with water management being particularly prominently mentioned. Where communities depend on the same water resources, or where water sources and majority populations are located on different sides of a conflict divide, interdependence can create incentives for cooperation. Participants pointed to experience in Yemen where disaster risk reduction and water-related programming across different governorates created opportunities to discuss practical forms of cooperation. In such circumstances, environmental issues can provide an entry point for confidence-building and, where conditions permit, broader mediation efforts.

However, **participants cautioned against assuming that every environmental issue should automatically be connected to a political or diplomatic process**. Linking a local environmental initiative to a high-level political process can be productive where there is political momentum and where broader engagement helps create a “win-win” outcome. Where political processes are stalled or highly polarised, such a linkage can instead prevent practical agreements from being reached. The appropriate relationship between local environmental cooperation and Track 1 diplomacy should therefore be assessed case by case, with space to keep local initiatives insulated from political processes when this allows them to continue.

This points **towards a more pragmatic understanding of CPS engagement**. Rather than presenting climate action as an additional diplomatic instrument, the EU can support locally identified issues that already matter to communities and build relationships and trust through these processes. Examples discussed included water and sanitation, agriculture, livelihoods, waste management, flood mitigation and disaster risk reduction. Supporting these can simultaneously address immediate needs, reduce sources of tension and strengthen relationships between communities and local authorities.

■ **Environmental issues are governance issues**

A central theme was that **environmental interventions cannot be separated from questions of governance, power and participation**. Infrastructure alone does not necessarily improve resilience. Several examples illustrated how investments can fail to generate sustainable outcomes when communities are not involved in determining

priorities, when local authorities lack the capacity to maintain infrastructure, or when interventions do not address the underlying incentives and behaviours surrounding resource use. In Lebanon, for example, participants described cases where environmental infrastructure remained non-operational after the end of donor support because local government structures were unable to maintain it.

The implication is **that environmental programming needs to engage with the institutions, policies and relationships through which resources are managed**. Waste management, for instance, requires infrastructure but also municipal policy, community participation and sustainable arrangements for operating the system. Likewise, water projects need to consider how water is governed and allocated, not only whether physical access to water infrastructure has improved.

Participants therefore called for a **stronger focus on the governance dimension of CPS**. The question is not only whether climate or environmental interventions reduce exposure to a hazard, but also who makes decisions about resources, who benefits, who bears the costs, and whether local institutions and communities have the capacity and legitimacy to sustain solutions. This requires environmental, conflict and gender-responsive analysis to be brought together from the outset rather than adding conflict-sensitivity or gender equality considerations after an intervention has already been designed.

■ **Local ownership means more than local implementation**

Participants consistently stressed the **importance of locally-led approaches**. Local CSOs possess not only technical knowledge but also political and social knowledge about how communities deal with conflict, environmental pressures and governance failures. This knowledge can be decisive in determining whether an intervention is feasible and sustainable.

Several examples demonstrated the **value of involving communities in identifying risks, designing solutions and monitoring their implementation**. In Iraq, inclusive dialogue processes were used to identify community priorities and vulnerabilities, followed by joint implementation and monitoring of water-resource agreements. Tangible improvements in livelihoods helped increase trust in the dialogue process. In areas affected by displacement in north-east Syria and northern Iraq, involving host and displaced communities early in decisions about natural-resource management helped generate incentives for community leaders and local authorities to contribute to solutions themselves.

This is distinct from simply subcontracting implementation to local organisations. Participants highlighted that **CSOs need meaningful participation in defining priorities and approaches, including where local authorities are involved**. Working with authorities is important for sustainability and to avoid blockages, but it should not mean allowing authorities to determine which CSOs can participate or receive support. This distinction

is particularly important in contexts where civic space is shrinking and political actors can influence the selection of local partners.

■ **Move beyond security framing and operationalise HDP**

Participants identified a persistent **risk that a climate humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus becomes another silo**, or that **climate and environmental issues are primarily framed through security concerns**. Such a framing could narrow the range of possible responses and encourage an emphasis on threats rather than on livelihoods, public services, governance and human security.

An operational HDP approach was instead understood as **embedding climate and conflict considerations within existing areas of work**. Agriculture, water, livelihoods, food security, waste management and disaster preparedness can all incorporate climate resilience and conflict transformation without necessarily creating separate “climate security” projects. An example from Syria illustrated how climate resilience was increasingly integrated into agricultural finance and livelihoods programming rather than treated as a standalone climate intervention.

Participants also noted that **the EU should make fuller use of its understanding of security**. Investments in conflict-sensitive water infrastructure, resource management, livelihoods and resilient local systems can contribute to human security by reducing pressures on communities and preventing further displacement. This does not imply disregarding hard security concerns, but rather broadening the understanding of what contributes to stability. A more holistic conception of security would also help align climate, development, peacebuilding and humanitarian instruments around shared outcomes.

■ **Gender equality lens as an essential to climate security**

The discussion also highlighted that **environmental pressures are experienced differently across gender and social groups**. Examples from Syria and Yemen were mentioned, where women and girls in some regions can carry a disproportionate burden of securing household water, including through longer journeys that expose them to harassment and violence. Environmental degradation can therefore reinforce existing inequalities and protection risks.

Participants stressed that **women should not be treated as an additional beneficiary category or as an “add-on” to CPS programming**. Women are often already central to maintaining community resilience, sustaining dialogue and responding to basic needs. In several contexts, environmental initiatives can also provide a politically more accessible entry point for supporting women’s participation in decision-making, including where

explicit discussion of gender equality or the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is politically sensitive.

Moving beyond an “add-on” approach requires **gender-responsive analysis to be integrated into climate and environmental assessments and programming from the outset**. It also requires attention to who is able to participate in decisions about natural resources, livelihoods and recovery, rather than focusing only on women’s vulnerability.

■ **Funding and institutional practice constrain integrated CPS approaches**

A strong cross-cutting message was that **existing EU funding practices can undermine the locally-led, integrated and long-term approaches that CPS policy seeks to promote**. Participants described funding as too frequently divided into thematic and institutional silos, with short project cycles and limited flexibility to adapt activities as circumstances change. Yet peacebuilding, trust-building and governance outcomes often take years to materialise and cannot be reliably captured through short-term quantitative indicators.

Participants therefore called for **more adaptive and sequenced funding, including mechanisms that bridge successive project periods and, where possible, different EU funding streams**. Holistic programming should be possible even where institutional silos remain: calls for proposals and budgets can explicitly allow individual funding instruments to support interdisciplinary approaches.

Monitoring and evaluation were another important concern. Participants highlighted the **mismatch between easily measurable outputs and longer-term qualitative outcomes**, such as improved access to water, increased trust, changes in governance or environmental improvements. Indicators should be developed jointly with implementing partners, adapt to realities on the ground and reflect what an intervention can realistically influence. In particular, CSOs should not be held accountable for or measure against political outcomes that depend primarily on broader geopolitical developments, for example by using indicators tied to political outcomes that are mainly outside their control.

Finally, the **complexity of EU funding mechanisms can exclude smaller local CSOs**. Participants suggested strengthening the capacity of smaller CSOs to access EU funding directly, while also creating greater opportunities for larger INGOs to channel funding to smaller local partners.

Country perspectives

■ **Syria: Climate justice, livelihoods and participation during the political transition**

The discussion on Syria illustrated particularly clearly how **climate, environmental degradation, livelihoods and political transition are intertwined**. Years of conflict have damaged water networks, contaminated wells and reduced access to irrigation, while environmental degradation has affected agriculture and livestock. In north-east Syria, drought and water scarcity were described alongside oil extraction and inadequate access to fresh water as pressures directly affecting communities that depend on agriculture.

Participants stressed that **climate impacts cannot be separated from the economic consequences of these pressures**. Recent droughts have increased production costs for farmers, while reduced agricultural support has further weakened livelihoods. The discussion therefore framed climate justice partly in terms of who bears the costs of environmental degradation and climate impacts, particularly farmers and livestock owners who have contributed little to the underlying environmental pressures.

The political transition creates both opportunities and risks. Participants emphasised that reconstruction and institutional rehabilitation should prioritise affected communities and local stakeholders, rather than being driven predominantly by central authorities, donors or private investment. Rural areas require particular attention, as communities outside major urban centres have experienced significant conflict-related damage and remain highly exposed to environmental and livelihood pressures.

Shrinking civic space was identified as a major obstacle to sustainable reconstruction. Restrictions on NGO registration and participation can exclude CSOs with long-standing relationships with communities; women-led and feminist organisations face additional constraints due to restrictions on their participation and the politically sensitive nature of gender equality and women's rights work, which in turn limits the diversity of perspectives informing reconstruction and climate resilience efforts. Participants noted that environmental issues such as water, waste management, power cuts, household resources and local resource governance can sometimes provide a less politically sensitive entry point for participation, including for women. Environmental programming can consequently create space to address participation and WPS concerns without necessarily making these the initial entry point.

For the EU, the key lesson is that **support for CPS in Syria cannot remain confined to programming**. During the political transition, local CSOs need channels to inform discussions on governance, recovery, climate resilience and transitional justice. Participants specifically highlighted the importance of considering climate justice within broader transitional justice discussions and of maintaining support for independent civil society, local media and journalists, and women-led initiatives.

■ **Iraq: Water, displacement and shrinking civic space**

On Iraq, participants described a close relationship between water scarcity, agricultural livelihoods, displacement and local tensions. In north-western areas, declining water

availability has made agriculture increasingly difficult, encouraging movement towards larger cities and generating new pressures on urban areas. Competition over water and other resources can then compound tensions between communities, including in areas hosting displaced populations.

Experience from community-level programming showed that **inclusive dialogue is most effective when linked to practical action**. Bringing communities together to identify vulnerabilities, implement resource-management agreements and jointly monitor results can demonstrate tangible benefits and build trust. Environmental issues can therefore serve as a “soft entry point” for bringing together actors who would otherwise be unlikely to engage with one another.

At the same time, the discussion identified **shrinking civic space as a major constraint** on this approach. Participants raised concerns that increased involvement of governmental actors in the selection of CSOs for externally funded projects can favour organisations linked to specific political groups, while excluding independent organisations, often those working on human rights, WPS, Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and CPS. This was contrasted with earlier practice in which EU donors could maintain more direct relationships with local CSOs. Participants called for a return to more direct engagement while emphasising that this should not mean excluding governmental authorities. Rather, the EU should work with authorities and civil society in parallel and ensure that government involvement does not become a gatekeeping mechanism for civil society participation.

■ **Lebanon: From environmental projects to sustainable local systems**

On Lebanon, the discussion centred strongly on the **relationship between environmental pressures, economic insecurity, weak governance and social trust**. Pollution, waste management and resource scarcity were described as issues that directly generate tensions at community level. Rural areas can be particularly underserved when external funding is channelled primarily through ministries and central institutions.

Participants also highlighted the **gap between awareness and agency**. Communities may understand that climate change is affecting their lives but lack the resources or institutional support to develop and implement their own adaptation strategies. Simple, locally accessible approaches to climate knowledge, combined with peer-to-peer learning and coaching, were seen as more effective than abstract awareness-raising and climate terminology.

The Lebanese experience also illustrated the **importance of designing for sustainability**. Infrastructure created through donor projects can become non-functional once funding ends if the local institutions responsible for operating it lack the necessary capacity or resources. Participants suggested that EU-funded initiatives should therefore include

follow-up after project completion and deliberately create networks and coordination mechanisms that can survive beyond an individual project.

The broader lesson is that **humanitarian, development and peacebuilding support cannot be sequenced only according to moments of crisis**. Participants pointed to a gap between humanitarian support following conflict and longer-term development and peacebuilding investment. A stronger HDP approach would build on existing local peacebuilding structures and community mechanisms before crises occur, rather than seeking to establish them once emergency funding becomes available.

■ **Palestine: Climate adaptation under political and territorial constraints**

On Palestine, the discussion underscored the extent to which **climate vulnerability is shaped by political and territorial realities, and how an affected environment, soil degradation, severe conflict, including resulting damages to ecosystems, and public health crises interlink**. Changes in rainfall and seasons affect agricultural activities, while the lack of land sovereignty, violence against Palestinian farmers and imposed restrictions on access to the populations' own water resources severely constrain Palestinians' ability to adapt. The fiscal and institutional constraints facing the Palestinian Authority further limit the development of adaptation and mitigation infrastructure. Overall, climate change was described as something of a luxury issue to consider. Although a climate adaptation plan has been adopted by the Palestinian Authority, adaptive capacity is severely limited by the lack of sovereignty and jurisdiction on the ground.

In Gaza, extensive destruction of water, sanitation and energy infrastructure and restrictions on the import of materials severely constrain humanitarian and environmental work. This is also affecting water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) work and access to energy, to the point that even minimum relief is extremely hard to be delivered.

Participants noted that dialogue, youth training, research and international advocacy are useful to sustain a people-to-people approach, but that reports and workshops are not enough given the realities on the ground: **environmental peacebuilding requires a parallel effort empowering communities and providing concrete community resilience support alongside broader political support**. Local initiatives involving farmers, communities and peace activists can help maintain access to resources and relationships across divides, but their ability to generate broader change remains constrained by the broader political and security environment.

The discussion therefore highlighted an essential limit to the CPS approach: **locally led environmental cooperation cannot substitute for political action where (geo-)political and security conditions directly prevent communities from accessing resources or**

implementing solutions. Participants called for the EU to ensure that its foreign policy and its CPS programming are mutually reinforcing, including through a stronger focus on international law and accountability and through concrete action to address humanitarian access in Gaza.

Indicator rigidity was also raised, describing objectives, language and indicators that CSOs have no ability to design or control, including indicators tied to shifts in public sentiment on a two-state solution over an 18-month project. Participants stressed that **without political intervention and high-level commitment to international law, civil society work will remain limited.**

■ **Yemen: Water, basic services and disaster risk reduction as entry points across conflict lines**

Yemen provided some of the clearest examples of environmental pressures functioning simultaneously as conflict multipliers and opportunities for cooperation. **Water and sanitation disputes are among the most common sources of community-level tensions** identified through conflict analysis. Damage to water infrastructure, political fragmentation and the presence of landmines further complicate access to water. Poor waste management adds environmental and public health risks while contributing to local disputes.

Yet these same issues can create practical incentives for cooperation. **Water sources and population needs do not necessarily correspond to conflict frontlines**, creating forms of interdependence that can encourage actors to cooperate even where political relations remain deeply divided. Disaster risk reduction initiatives between governorates have demonstrated how practical environmental cooperation can open communication channels and create a basis for broader confidence-building.

Participants also highlighted **the importance of working through existing local administrative structures**, even where those structures are weak or have limited capacity. Bringing authorities, communities, CSOs, international organisations and, where appropriate, private-sector actors into practical problem-solving can strengthen ownership and reduce duplication. The response to flooding in Taiz was cited as an example where an integrated response and communication between actors enabled humanitarian, development and peacebuilding responses to complement each other rather than operate separately.

The **EU can therefore add value to CPS efforts in Yemen by supporting local systems capable of managing environmental pressures, rather than establishing parallel structures around individual projects.** In Yemen, CPS programming can contribute to both immediate service delivery and longer-term governance and peacebuilding where it strengthens relationships and capacities that already exist.

Outlook: From policy coherence to sustained political and local engagement

The dialogue suggested that **the EU does not primarily need another framework for recognising the links between climate, peace and security**. Rather, the challenge is to translate existing policy commitments into more locally grounded ways of working. Across the MENA contexts discussed, the most promising approaches combined three elements: locally identified priorities, practical solutions that generate tangible benefits and opportunities for dialogue, and relationships between communities, authorities and external actors that can survive beyond individual projects.

This has implications for both programming and diplomacy. The **EU can act as a convener**, bringing together actors who do not routinely communicate, facilitating exchanges across contexts and ensuring that lessons from local initiatives inform broader policy and diplomatic engagement. At the same time, the EU needs to recognise that its own credibility is part of the operating environment. Participants noted perceptions of inconsistency between EU commitments to human rights, international law and peacebuilding and other aspects of EU external action. Such perceptions can undermine the trust on which dialogue initiatives depend.

The **Pact for the Mediterranean and its Action Plan** were identified as a potentially useful vehicle for bringing together different strands of EU engagement rather than creating additional thematic silos. Participants called for structured mechanisms to involve affected communities and civil society in the implementation and assessment of relevant initiatives, including consideration of their governance and human rights impacts. The EU's existing policy and programming toolbox provides important entry points, but its value will depend on whether these instruments are connected to local realities and whether communities have meaningful opportunities to shape their implementation.

Ultimately, **participants called for a shift from short-term project delivery towards sustained investment in people, relationships and local systems**. This includes longer-term and flexible funding, support for local organisational capacity, more adaptive monitoring and evaluation, and stronger mechanisms for connecting community-level experience to national and EU-level policy. It also means recognising human security as an essential component of European security. In contexts where conventional diplomatic engagement is constrained, locally grounded CPS initiatives can provide valuable entry points, but they can only realise this potential if the EU provides the political space, resources and consistency needed for them to endure.

Recommendations for EU engagement:

1. Fund locally led, integrated CPS approaches for the long term

- Make funding more flexible, adaptive and able to bridge project cycles and EU instruments.
- Enable climate, peacebuilding, livelihoods, governance and humanitarian objectives to be addressed within the same intervention.
- Design streams to bridge gaps between project periods and between different EU instruments.
- Support smaller local CSOs directly or enable larger partners to channel funding and capacity support to them.

2. Treat environmental action as a governance and peacebuilding issue

- Require and fund integrated climate, conflict and gender-responsive analysis from the project design stage.
- Prioritise participatory resource management, local resilience and inclusive dialogue alongside infrastructure.
- Use environmental issues as entry points for cooperation where they create practical incentives, while keeping them separate from stalled political processes.

3. Protect and support meaningful local participation

- Re-establish direct EU engagement with independent local CSOs and avoid government nomination becoming a gatekeeping mechanism.
- Systematically support women-led, feminist and human rights-based environmental initiatives as entry points, including where WPS framing is politically constrained; resource gender-responsive disaster preparedness.
- Establish structured dialogue mechanisms with local CSOs, including in transitional contexts, for local knowledge to inform EU programming, diplomacy and Pact for the Mediterranean initiatives.
- Support actions that address shared challenges, directly link to people's daily lives (e.g. WASH initiatives and waste management projects), that can serve as effective entry points for bottom-up communication channels, dialogue, participatory disaster risk reduction, engagement and trust-building.

4. Make EU support more coherent, credible and accountable

- Align political engagement with human rights, international law and conflict-sensitive programming.
- Embed climate-sensitive components in existing agriculture, water, livelihoods and mine action programming rather than creating parallel, siloed workstreams.

- Apply conflict-sensitivity and do-no-significant-harm principles across operations, and maintain visible, traceable funding for climate, biodiversity and peacebuilding.
- Use flexible, context-specific KPIs and recognise long-term qualitative outcomes such as trust, governance and improved resource access.
- Co-develop indicators with implementing CSOs; recognise qualitative, long-term impact in reporting; dedicated budget lines for staff training and for follow-up at six, twelve and twenty-four months after project end.

5. Broaden the EU's understanding of security

- Recognise resilient water systems, service infrastructure, livelihoods, local governance and social cohesion as contributions to human security and stability.
- Use the EU's convening power to connect communities, authorities, CSOs and international actors around practical challenges.
- Invest in sustained relationships and local capacities, not only individual projects.

Annex I: List of abbreviations

CPS	Climate, Peace and Security
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSDN	Civil Society Dialogue Network
DNSH	Do No Significant Harm
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU	European Union
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JC	Joint Communication
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PA	Palestinian Authority
SWD	Staff Working Document
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
YPS	Youth, Peace and Security